











# The Statesman.

No. VII.—DECEMBER 1, 1880.

## EDITORIAL NOTES.

A CONTEMPORARY (*Allen's Indian Mail*) writes as follows in the last number of that journal:—

The fifth article in the November number of THE STATESMAN, states what are called simple facts on the subject of "Public Works Waste in India," which the author, an anonymous P.W.D. man, admits embrace a sweeping charge against the officers of the Public Works Department. The real motive is found in the words—"the military element predominates in the department." A paper on the important question of the prohibition or permission of "Export of Grain in Famine" is, as is the wont of this periodical, marred by intense personal hostility. Surely the question of feeding the people need not be peppered with political acrimony.

If the writer had said the question of *starving* the people, he would have understood the feeling with which the article was written. The people in the North-west Provinces were deliberately starved to death in the late famine, after fifty years' experience of these calamities. And the Government then strove with its whole might, to persuade the people of this country that it had made every effort to save them alive. What wonder that we speak with acrimony about the authors of such a policy. An experience of fifty years with these calamities, long since showed that there is but one way of meeting them successfully. In the first place—

I. They must be met in the same resolute spirit with which the Government encounters the calamity of war. Everything must be condoned at such periods, except failure. It is Lord Northbrook's lasting praise, that he met the famine of 1873-74 in this spirit, and the result was that for the first time in modern history, was the calamity encountered successfully.

II. The collection of the land revenue (State rental) must instantly be suspended in such calamities, after the example of the Native States. There is no Poor Law in India. The people themselves maintain their own poor in all calamities, and in the most noble manner. Now, by wringing the rent from them when there is no harvest, we deprive the cultivating peasant farmers of the small fund they possess for their own maintenance and that of their dependents, until the next season.

From the time of Colonel Baird Smith's report upon the famine of 1860-61 in the North-west, it has been known by the Government just as well as by our-

selves, that the suspension of the land revenue (or State rental) collections at these periods, is the one measure that relieves the people more than all others put together. The most urgent remonstrances upon the subject of these "collections" were made in 1877-78. The remonstrances were treated as waste paper, and when a frightful mortality ensued, the Government declared that no such remonstrances had reached it. The ink of this assurance was hardly dry, before the most absolute proof was produced that the statement was utterly false. Not only had the district officers exhausted remonstrance, but Sir George Couper himself had officially warned the Supreme Government that the collection of the rental, if persevered with, would destroy the people. On the 11th of October, he wrote to the Government of India:—

*If the village communities, who form the great mass of our revenue payers, be pressed now, they will simply be ruined.*

And the very man who wrote thus to the Supreme Government, against persevering with the collections, went steadily on with them, regardless of the ruin which he knew they were working. We showed ourselves as remorseless to the peasant cultivators of the North-west Provinces, as the worst Irish landlord in the late distress in Ireland, and were then afraid to let the world know what we had done.

III. Whenever the famine districts are remote, the State should do as Lord Northbrook did in 1873-74: form State granaries therein. The granaries are wanted more for the purpose of controlling prices and keeping them below the starvation rates to which the grain dealer otherwise advances them, than for the actual food of the people, of which in general there is enough.

IV. Relief-works of an adequate order should be opened at once; and the able-bodied labourer thereon be paid ordinary rates of wages. It is infamous to take advantage of the necessities of the labourer at such periods, to avail ourselves of his work at one-half its remuneration in ordinary times. With railways urgently wanted all over the country, there ought to be no difficulty whatever in opening relief-works upon an adequate scale, wherever famine threatened the people.

V. All export of grain should be arrested, from the infinite difficulty there is in getting a supply of food redistributed, where the districts have been drained of the stores required for their own consumption.

VI. Charitable relief-works, and all forms of charitable aid, should be kept distinct from ordinary works of improvement, prosecuted at such periods.

VII. Railway communications should be pressed on to completion everywhere, to equalize the supply and the price of food all over the country, as far as possible.

Now, these simple propositions constitute an almost complete famine code of themselves. The whole of them are little better than truisms, and yet the Government of India never acts upon them. It refuses to meet the clamour of famine, in the spirit in which it is ever ready to prosecute war, however wicked and causeless. It refuses to suspend the collection of the State rental, although it knows that the exaction will indefinitely enhance the sufferings of the people. It refuses to acknowledge the success of Lord Northbrook's granary system, and rebuked the Madras Government severely, for attempting to form granaries in 1877. It refuses to open adequate relief-works, and when forced to establish them, sets up a cruel system of task-work thereon, while reducing the wages to allowances of an order that simply mean protracted starvation. It refuses to stop the export of grain, in the name of the false science upon which it fastens the name of political economy. It refuses to give adequate charitable relief to the aged and infirm, the sick and the delicately nurtured, who cannot go on the works; and administers its scanty and insufficient aid with perpetual warnings to every one to be sure not

to do too much. Finally, it does not know what a Public Works policy means. It has never had a Public Works policy, and has none to this hour. The consequence is that when famine comes, no one knows how or where to set the people to work, or upon what. In Mysore, where it has just allowed one-fourth of the people to die of hunger, the Native rulers before us so covered the kingdom with tanks and reservoirs, that one square mile of area out of every fifteen is water. And these men did not know how to rule! And the Famine Commission appointed to inquire and report upon it, prefers to conceal it all from the nation.

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
SIR BARTLE FRERE is a man of "artistic culture," "literary ability," "varied attainments," "remarkable apprehension," "capacity for great and varied affairs," "breadth of view," and "comprehensiveness of vision." He is characterised by "elevation of sentiment," "loftiness of thought," "nobility of soul," "power of attaching men to himself," "a hopeful, kindly, charitable view of men and things," "a sympathetic desire to do good," "a bull-dog tenacity of purpose," "great energy in emergencies and contingencies," "a moral courage which never holds to any kind of pressure," "enthusiasm," "patriotism," "readiness to assume, to sustain, and to vindicate responsibility," "faithfulness, fidelity to every sort of human duty, to the sacred cause of religion, and to the service of Almighty God."

At all events, this is what Sir Richard Temple declares him to be. Now, it is the statement of simple fact that Sir Bartle Frere left India in 1867 under so heavy a cloud for his rashness, folly, moral cowardice, and insubordination, that every one at the time believed his public life to be over. It was *he* who really destroyed the Bombay community, and brought down the Bank of Bombay, in the speculative madness of 1864, to which he ministered with his whole might, in the teeth of urgent remonstrances by Her Majesty's judges of the High Court on the one hand, and the warnings of the Viceroy (Sir John Lawrence) on the other. He is a popularity hunter of the worst order; for he is ever on the side of the oppressor, whether the indigo planter or the colonial aggressor. If the right thing should happen to be popular, none so enthusiastic as Sir Bartle Frere in its advocacy; but let the right thing be *unpopular*, and you then see the moral coward he really is. He will give you fifty plausible excuses for doing what is wrong, whether it is to enter Afghanistan by the back door, to keep the gambler under the protection of the law courts, or to betray the country into a Zulu war, by dishonestly attempting to set aside an award he has himself courted. Sir Richard Temple is a man of very much the same type, and it is certainly most amusing to see the one man passionately vouching for the character of the other. Happily, they are both definitely shelved, in so far as the public service is concerned.

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FAMINE in India arises from three great combining causes—namely (1) a failure of the rains; (2) the poverty of the people and the soil; and (3) the want of communications in the country. The failure of the rains ought not necessarily to produce famine. It is the poverty of the people, the fact that the masses live from hand to mouth, that makes a failure of the rains always mean famine. But neither a deficient rainfall, nor the poverty of the people would produce famine such as we see in India, if the means of communication between its provinces were more developed. Failure of harvests, the general poverty of the people, and the want of cheap and effective means of bringing food from distant provinces

where it is plentiful—together produce these calamities. No proper answer can be given to the problem that does not cover the three factors that produce it. Though we cannot control the rainfall and compel the earth to yield her harvest, we may prevent the failure producing famine, by getting the people redeemed from their present poverty, and by so perfecting “communications” in the country, that the surplus harvests of its most distant provinces can be transported cheaply and expeditiously to the extremities of the Empire. The range of inquiries, therefore, that we have to make, may be shown in skeleton form as follows :—



There is not a heading in this synopsis that should not be distinctly dealt with. It is the second great division of the subject, however, that will tax and test our powers. It is the abject poverty of the people, that makes a failure of the harvests produce such suffering amongst them; and it is necessary to lay bare the causes of that poverty, and to show by what means they may be removed, or counteracted. The task is complicated by the fact that while this poverty is nearly universal, its causes are far from being uniform. Thus the general poverty in Oudh, may not be attributable to the same causes as the poverty of the ryots of the Deccan—indeed we know it is not; and if our inquiry is to be an earnest and not perfunctory effort to describe the true condition of things in every province of India—it will be accomplished only by devotion to the work, and patient, resolute earnestness to produce a true picture of the state of things.

PRESUMING upon popular ignorance of the fact that his name is associated in India with measures concerning its agricultural classes of the most fatal and cruel order, Sir Richard Temple ventured, at the general election, to offer himself to the farmers of East Worcestershire as a proper person to represent them in the new Parliament. Let us now tell English farmers, then, what he contrived to do for the peasant proprietary classes in the Central Provinces of India a few years ago. When he was sent to those provinces in 1861 as Chief Commissioner, he found there an agricultural population of eight millions in the possession either of those ancient tenant rights which have ever prevailed under Native rule, or of the ownership of the fields which they cultivated, as their fathers had done before them, from time immemorial. Private landlordism was unknown, and so vexed was the righteous soul of this "official" at the sad disadvantage of the people that he induced the Supreme Government of India, with Sir Bartle Frere as his ally, to sanction his confiscation of the cultivators' rights, that he might confer them upon a class of private landlords whom it was necessary to create for the purpose, and whom he did create, under the title of Malgoozars. About half a million of the actual cultivators of the soil were reduced by him to the status of mere tenants-at-will, while the peasant proprietors, more than 150,000 in number, saw the ownership of their holdings torn from them by a stroke of his pen, that he might confer it upon the mushroom "landlords" he had created, for no other purpose than that he is an apostle of landlords' rights. The author of the Zulu War, Sir Bartle Frere, was the leading spirit in the Supreme Government of India at the time, and these two men between them were permitted to carry this disastrous revolution without a word of remonstrance. The Government of India long since awoke to the nature of the wrong it had sanctioned; thousands of the old peasant proprietary being driven from their ancient homesteads, either into emigration, or into a forced surrender of the rights which Sir Richard Temple was permitted to wring from them, and to vest in the "private landlords" whom he had himself created. So gratuitous was the wrong, that it is difficult to this hour to make these mushroom landlords even understand the rights that have been transferred to them, private landlordism being an institution unknown to the people of India before our time. There is probably no man living to-day to whom it has been given to commit such gigantic wrong as this man, Sir Richard Temple; and he dared ask the tenant-farmers of Worcestershire to send him to Parliament as their representative! The reader will perhaps ask how it is that the wrong has not been undone. Any one who has lived long in India can tell him. We govern India despotically by a Civil Service that constitutes a great bureaucracy, which, after the fashion of all such bodies, never admits that it has erred. The Supreme Government of to-day really laments the revolution which it sanctioned fifteen to twenty years ago, but Sir Richard Temple is nearly at the top of the official tree, and it is a point of honour with the heads of this great Service to stand unflinchingly by their order. The India Office knows well the wrong that has been committed, and contemplates with distress the ruin which has been brought upon these provinces. Every effort that has been made by the editor of this journal to get the wrong undone, and the ancient rights of the cultivators restored to them, has been in vain, and the scandalous injustice will go unredressed unless Parliament can be induced to take up the matter. And the man who is the author of this wrong dared, we say, present himself to-day to the farmers of Worcestershire as an eligible person to represent them in Parliament, to which we have to appeal on behalf of his victims in India! If the India Office acted rightly it would send him back to Nagpore

to undo the wrong he has committed, and suspend his pension until the work was completed. One more fact the people of England ought to know about him. In the depth, then, of the terrible famine that destroyed 6,000,000 of the cultivators three years ago in India, Sir Richard Temple induced the Supreme Government to cut down the famine ration of food, for men already starved, to 1lb. of grain per day! To justify this cruelty, he boldly introduced the same ration into the gaols of Bombay, when the mortality became so frightful that he had instantly to abandon it. He made this abominable experiment wholly without sanction; but his class do what they please in India. And with these memories attaching to him, he dares come to this country seeking to represent English farmers in Parliament, and hoping to pass himself off as a statesman amongst us.

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THE *Echo* summarizes the history of the late famine in India, and the causes of the mortality that attended it, with perfect accuracy, as follows:—

Lord Northbrook was ruled by the principle that the saving of life should be the first object of a British Government, armed with absolute power, and therefore responsible for the lives of its helpless subjects. Lord Lytton laid it down that "the task of saving life, irrespective of the cost, is one which it is beyond our power to undertake." The Governments of Bombay and Madras urged measures of relief, which the Viceroy persistently refused to sanction until the desperate condition of the people compelled him reluctantly to acquiesce. The works which were ultimately commenced afforded no real support to the starving population, who gradually drifted into a state of emaciation, in which they were only fit for gratuitous relief. Then they died in shoals. Lord Lytton had directed that the daily wage should be fixed at a rate just sufficient to support the labourer, and so endeavoured to arrange it as to secure to all a quantity of food "just sufficient for a bare subsistence." The Government of Madras had fixed its scale of wage in accordance with, but somewhat below, that sanctioned by Lord Northbrook in 1874; but Sir Richard Temple, as Famine Inspector, acting under orders from the Viceroy, reduced it, in spite of the protest of the Sanitary Commissioner and many other local officials, to a figure which meant starvation. The amended scale was persisted in for three months, and then the higher rate was returned to. But the mischief had been done. It has been estimated, and the Commissioners say on substantial grounds, that 5,250,000 of human beings died in that terrible time.

This is the official estimate; and in view of the century of experience we have had in the treatment of these calamities, and the cynical defiance of its teachings shown by Lord Lytton's administration, the heaviest mark of the national displeasure ought to be attached to the men who ignored his predecessor's measures altogether, and professed to regard the statesmanship they embodied as Utopian. We have never thought it right to hold Lord Lytton answerable for the catastrophe of 1877-78, as he naturally leaned for guidance upon Sir Richard Temple and Sir John Strachey. It was they who misled him throughout; Sir Richard Temple's conduct, in particular, deserving any handling it may receive; for he had been at Lord Northbrook's right hand all through the Behar famine; he professed to approve it heartily, and reduced it to positive travesty by the wild extravagance of his expenditure. And yet the moment Lord Northbrook's back was turned, he became Sir John Strachey's accomplice and tool in reversing that nobleman's policy with a zeal that scandalized all observers, and that resulted in the dreadful mortality that occurred. They at once reverted to the cruel and fatal policy that Lord Northbrook was supposed to have stamped out, and warning every one that the great danger to be avoided in these calamities was the "doing too much" for the people. They at last ended by issuing orders in 1877 to the Lieut.-Governor of the North-

west Provinces to ignore the famine that was then prevailing there, and proceed with the exaction of the land revenue as in ordinary years. The first Parliamentary Committee that sits upon Indian affairs must inquire closely into the whole history.

We trust very earnestly that the Famine Commission will be the last of the efforts made by the Home Government to ascertain anything about our rule of India, by inquiries conducted in that country. The cost of these Commissions, and they are *very* costly, is absolutely thrown away. "Inquiry in India" means a mere device for whitewashing compromised reputations and making things pleasant. There has been no inquiry into the late famine as yet, for the Commission was a costly and shameless farce. When we heard that it was to assemble at Simlah, we noticed the matter in the *Calcutta Statesman* (14th March, 1878), as follows:—

Since it is said to be going to hold its sittings at Simlah, it becomes a comparatively unimportant matter how it is constituted. The public has long since lost all faith in committees which sit at Simlah. When Simlah comes to be provided with a coat-of-arms like Bombay, its appropriate motto will be *Dulce est desipere in loco*. A great object of desire among members of the Services in these days, is a seat on one of these Simlah Committees of Inquiry; and one of the ways in which a great man can oblige a friend is by procuring him an appointment. Here and there a conscientious, hard-working official enters a protest against removing a committee to Simlah, on the ground that its members would do their work better in the plains; but such protests are, of course, disregarded. As regards the Famine Commission, it seems exceptionally undesirable that it should sit on the hills, or indeed that it should sit permanently anywhere. If it is not to visit the different provinces, and take evidence on the spot, it is not easy to see that a Commission in this country was necessary at all. A committee in London could hold an inquiry equally as well as a commission at Simlah. No doubt, however, it will be a very pleasant arrangement, not only to its members, but, if witnesses are to be called, to them also.

The home public should know how these so-called "inquiries" are conducted. We may illustrate the procedure very fairly by the sessions held by the Commission at Agra. Now Agra was one of the great centres of the North-west Famine. The sufferings of the people in the collectorate had been terrible, and the official world had deeply resented our comments upon the guilty indifference of the local Government thereto. The Commission came to Agra in the course of their tour, being carefully nursed by officials at every step of their journey. We were in Agra when they reached the city, and, instead of earnest inquiry into the famine, the Commission spent the two or three days they were there in visiting the Taj, Futtehpoore Sikri, and Secundra, doing all the "lions" of the place. Instead of vigorous, determined inquiry into the neglect which had left the people to perish, the Commission were pleasantly lodged for a couple of days in the Collector's bungalow, and then dismissed by railway to "do the lions" of Cawnpore and Lucknow in the same way. Mr. Caird could do nothing. He was simply borne along with the "official" Commissioners in a body, every man of them ready to reply to every inquiry he might make, in the plausible and stereotyped official style. The Commissioners were two or three days in Agra, and they might just as well have been in the moon, for all purposes connected with their mission. Is it not time that administration of this order came to an end?

It is because THE STATESMAN is edited in no spirit of *dilettantism*, but with an earnest determination that the people of this country shall know what our Indian



rule really is, that we recur so constantly to the question of the Berars, the abolition of the Salt Line, our rule of Mysore, the state and condition of our own subjects, and the crime of the Afghan War. The condition of the Indian finances occasions us no uneasiness, for it is attributable solely to our own incapacity and want of financial skill, that there is an Indian finance problem at all. It is not, we say, Indian finance that occasions us the slightest uneasiness; it is the condition to which our rule has reduced the masses of the people, and the utter baseness of our conduct towards the Native Princes. It is, we repeat, because this journal is edited in no spirit of *dilettantism*, that we insist so earnestly upon the temper of all classes towards us in India. We are hated by the classes that were once influential and powerful, and by the *alumni* of our own schools and colleges, for our selfish and utter exclusion of them from all positions of honour and emolument in the country; hated by the masses of the people for the abject misery to which our rule has reduced them; and hated by the Princes for the tyranny and oppression of the Simlah Foreign Office. We know of no problem to-day in India, the hope of solving which, does not depend upon the elevation of our own morality as rulers. We have only to stay where we are, for our rule to end in a gigantic cataclysm. Another "lying" Afghan war or two, a few years more of such rule as that which has reduced Mysore to its present condition, and a renewed lease to the Simlah Foreign Office to play the official "malefactor" towards the Native Princes, and the end will not be very far off.

THERE has been a steady deterioration in the *morale* of our rule since Sir Charles Metcalfe's pure and noble spirit was reflected in the course of the Indian Government, and St. George Tucker's influence was paramount at the Council Board in Leadenhall Street. Our rule culminated in Metcalfe's sacrifice of himself to the public welfare, by setting the Indian Press free in 1835. His experience at Hyderabad had shown him with lightning clearness the demoralization upon the threshold of which we were treading. In looking round him, he seems to have hoped that the complete freedom of the Press would prove the surest counteractive to the evils, of which secrecy and irresponsibility are the inevitable parents. The Anglo-Indian Press has not realized the hopes which his pure and great spirit conceived therefrom. He forgot that it would necessarily reflect the views and opinions of a "society" saturated with militarism and officialism. He had hardly left India than the first Afghan war was secretly hatched at Simlah, and that war contained within itself the seeds of every crime that followed. At its heels came the financial embarrassments of the Treasury, which that chapter of shame, "the Conquest of Sindh," it was hoped, would set right. The gulf yawned wider than ever, when Lord Dalhousie conceived the idea of filling it by throwing treasury after treasury of the Native Princes into the chasm. Sattara, Nagpore, Tanjore, Jhansi, and the overflowing treasury of Oudh went, one after another, into the gulf and disappeared. The private freeholds of the Mahratta country went next, and then came the Mutiny and Rebellion. The true character of these acts of rapacity and violence was veiled from the English nation. The Court of Directors, at first sensibly shocked by their immorality, ended by accepting and propagating the hypocritical pretences put forth from Simlah in their justification, until they were suddenly hushed by the horrors of 1857, which sent wailing into every English home. The Nemesis of another Afghan war is now to dog our footsteps in the years that are to come; and if

ever calamity and conscious guilt demanded the self-introspection of a people, our rule of India demands it to-day. The late Political Secretary at the India Office, Sir John Kaye, told us that more political insanity had been hatched at Simlah than in any other place in the world. We must cease to rule India from Simlah altogether, and rule it from the gates of Parliament itself. It is the secrecy and irresponsibility of Simlah counsels that is destroying the Empire, while the atmosphere in which these counsels are conducted, is that of utter frivolity from one season's end to another.

A CORRESPONDENT of the *Standard* sends that journal the following graphic and painful story of the burial of the dead at Candahar:—

Maiwand, September 17.

The force here has now completed its melancholy duty of burying the dead, and of identifying, as far as possible, their remains—as painful a task as ever fell to the lot of soldiers to perform.

The following are the details of the distribution of the dead, and these throw some light upon the obstinacy of the fighting, and of the comparative loss in the battle itself and upon the dreadful retreat to Candahar.

Upon the march up we buried fifty-two Europeans and ninety-four Natives, showing that the sufferings of the retreat told with about equal severity upon Englishmen and Indians.

In the enclosed gardens where the last stand was made, and the colours of the 66th lost, were found the bodies of eighty-five Europeans and thirty-seven Natives. This is significant of the fact that the British regiments held together to the last.

The villagers had already buried those who fell on the field of battle, and although the graves were opened for purposes of identification, and the bodies reburied according to their nationality, some of the graves may have been overlooked. The numbers, however, approximate to four hundred; total, six hundred and sixty-six.

Besides these, the late Sirdar of Khelat-i-Ghilzai reports that he buried one hundred on the line of retreat.

The following officers were identified and buried in the gardens: Major Blackwood, Royal Artillery; Colonel Galbraith, Major Oliver, Captain Macmath, and Lieutenants Rayner and Chute, of the 66th Regiment; Captain Smith, of Jacobs' Rifles, and an officer who could not be identified. Seven officers are known to have been killed on the battle-field before the retreat began, and three are not accounted for.

Representatives of all the regiments present were engaged in the work of identification, under Lieutenant Beresford-Peirse, of the 66th.

The Burial Service of the Church of England, and the Catholic Mass for the dead were read over the various graves, and the last military honours were paid to them.

Of the number of bodies still missing and unaccounted for many were, no doubt, buried by the villagers, and others straggled away from the line of retreat and were murdered. Thus while the loss on the field of battle seems to have been little above four hundred, nearly twice that number must have fallen after the retreat began, although but three hundred and sixty bodies have been found.

The bodies both of the Afghans and our own men who fell on the battle-field were buried, and the huge graves which mark the burial-place of the former show how heavy their loss must have been.

The bodies must have been buried as a mark of respect, and not for sanitary reasons, as the dead horses still lie unburied, and their bodies mark the positions of the artillery and cavalry during the battle.

The Bombay Grenadiers must have behaved steadily and well until the final break-up, for while the 66th and Jacobs' Rifles were partially protected by a depression of the ground, and their corpses show that their loss was comparatively small, the Grenadiers were on an exposed rise, swept in all directions by the enemy's fire, from which they suffered heavily, but they maintained their ground until the flanking artillery fire and the charge of the Ghazis broke Jacobs' Rifles.

Down in the enclosures the fight was very hot. Here the ground is everywhere strewn

with shot and shell, and the *débris* of waggons, and of accoutrements and remnants of clothing. This was especially the case near the last position taken up by the artillery.

We have counted four hundred graves of the enemy's regular troops. Those of the Ghazis are scattered everywhere, and many were carried away to die in the villages round. The Native reports state that their loss was almost fabulous.

Here, then, is the end of Lord Lytton's crime. The seeming insignificance of their adversary blinded both the Tory Ministry and its instruments to the guilt of what they were doing, and to the true character of the enterprise upon which they were rushing. War is ever popular in an atmosphere so charged with militarism as that of Anglo-Indian society. There were many in India, nevertheless, who saw clearly both the gravity and the guilt of the Governmental course, and predicted its inevitable issues. The nation is still, we observe, amused with estimates of its cost that will mock the final audit of the accounts. Before the last traces of this war disappear from the Indian balance-sheet, and the Indian army is brought back to its former strength and condition, its depleted arsenals re-equipped, and its Commissariat and Ordnance departments reorganized, the expenditure will certainly not fall short of £40,000,000, and will more probably reach £50,000,000. The monetary cost of the crime is, unhappily, the smallest part of the retribution it brings upon us. Inglorious and insignificant as have been its operations, it has been a bloody war even to ourselves, and a mere wholesale butchery of the people whom we have called "the enemy." The light-hearted gentlemen at Simlah, when deciding to make their buccaneering raid upon Cabul, were signing the death-warrant of thousands of our own soldiers, and amongst them many of our best officers. A complete return of the "casualties" in this war, will make the nation stand aghast. Our camp followers perished by thousands in the advance, and it is a small estimate of our own loss in "killed" that puts it down at 10,000 to 12,000 men. Hardly a day has passed for the last two years, which has not brought us the record of calamity or loss somewhere or other. The losses of our so-called "enemy," have been enormous, and, unhappily, have not been confined to fighting men. Unoffending villagers had their homesteads laid waste and burnt with fire in the depth of an Afghan winter, and men, women, and children were driven homeless and destitute before the invading soldiery. It is not easy, my Lord Lytton, to estimate the guilt and the dishonour into which you, your great instigator, and your instruments have betrayed us as a nation, and the human suffering of which your crime has been the parent. A holocaust of 40,000 dead is the first-fruits of our offering to the Imperial image set up with tinsel trumpery at Delhi, and should suffice, we think, to keep its inauguration in remembrance. We shall forget the guilt of the war more easily, however, than the cost of it. But two short years back, the crime was still unperpetrated, and to-day there is not an actor in it who does not know well that history has already put its brand upon him for all time.

It is satisfactory to find indications on all hands, that the true state of matters in India is beginning to be widely understood in this country. Mr. J. T. Mackenzie (Glen Muick, Aberdeenshire,) sends a valuable letter to one of our morning contemporaries (*Daily News*) upon the fatal policy pursued by the late Ministry in India. The conclusion of his letter runs thus:—

Our danger in India is not from opposition from internal military organization. By refraining from unnecessary interference with the fighting mountain races, half our present army could march through India. Our real danger lies in the fact that our Government is

tyrannical, oppressive, and ungenial. A continuation in that system will compel a social rising of the people; and what adds to this danger is that the enormous home requirement we extort from India is now regarded by the people as a tax paid by them to the Queen of England, and as the cause of their distress. Indian officials may deride the possibility of such a combination; not those who have witnessed Mohammedan and Hindu tenantry uniting and by force resisting some of the more than usually oppressive exactions of their much-dreaded landlords. If this occurs, it will be a repetition of the rising of the serfs in the middle ages. Why do we tolerate these abuses, and run the risk of losing an empire, the envy of Europe, so beneficial to England, her trade and commerce? Because Indian topics are as distasteful to us, as a people, as Mr. Gladstone states they are to the Cabinet. The generous sympathies of England are given to other oppressed nationalities. Self-vanity makes her shrink from an inquiry which would prove there is as much misrule in her government of India, as in that of other Eastern potentates. There is one chance for India and for the averting from England one of the greatest disasters she may ever sustain, by the spread of intelligent Liberalism. If remorse could be aroused for the criminal abrogation of our duties, the effete administration, sinecures, and highly-paid, inefficient officials who are ruining and impoverishing India, would be abolished, and the substitution effected of some real and efficient government there.

Mr. Mackenzie tells us unpleasant truths in this passage, but if wise, we shall ponder them.

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ONE of the most common charges against the Indian Executive is that it has no sympathy with private European enterprise, but shows great jealousy of it, and offers a steady obstruction to its agents. Every one who has been connected with such enterprise in India knows the charge to be perfectly true. It is not that there is any active dislike to private enterprise. On the contrary, the Government is sincere enough in declaring that it is friendly thereto, and desires to promote and assist it. But the Government is a Bureaucracy that has absorbed all powers into its own hands, and permits nothing to be done without its paternal sanction and approval. The consequence is that, wherever the agents of such enterprise may go in India, they find themselves in presence of some "official," embodying in himself all the executive powers of the Supreme Government, and but too often disposed to use these powers in the obstructive and offensive way in which such powers ever are used, in similar circumstances. The arrival of a European stranger in any part of the Mofussil is an event, and he divides the attention of the people with the "officials" of the locality. There are now two English gentlemen where yesterday there was but one. There is a great deal of human nature about us all, and the "official" does not quite like the independent bearing and attitude of the interloper. They will get on together by-and-by, perhaps, but it will be readily understood that, where the "civilian" is exacting, and the interloper accustomed to move and act with the freedom that he enjoys in this country or in the colonies, the priggishness of the one man, and the self-assertiveness of the other, produce an amount of friction that at last ends in an explosion. The "official" has no active desire to obstruct the enterprise of the other, but practically he too often does so at all points, and in ways that are intolerable, because they seem to be, and indeed commonly are, the assertion of mere arbitrary power. If the "interloper" is found to be a good fellow, and becomes popular with the "officials," he is sooner or later allowed practically to share their powers, when he can do pretty much as he likes, at the expense of the unhappy people. The obstruction to private enterprise does not arise, I say, from any conscious, or active, dislike thereto, but from the fact that the work has to be carried on in the presence of small bureaucratic officials full of a sense of their own importance, without the slightest sympathy with or interest in the enter-

prise, or disposition to help it; and, on the other hand, ready to seize any opportunity of reminding the "agents" that they are not in England, but in India. Trivial disputes and offences become incessant under such circumstances, and as the official "hierarchy" hang together, the whole body of non-official Englishmen engaged in independent private enterprise in the country, complain, with more or less truth, that the Government is unfriendly to them.

BUT the evil goes further than this. Power is far too centralized in India. We have a very fair illustration of this evil in the fact that at this very moment Sir James Fergusson, the Governor of Bombay, though very desirous to put up a telephone between his residence and the Government offices, is unable to do so, and has positively to get the sanction of the Viceroy in Council before the wire can be set up. Observe how it works, as an obstructive to enterprise. Some months ago, a few gentlemen at Edinburgh formed themselves into the Anglo-Indian Telephone Company, for the purpose of introducing telephone exchanges into India. In September last, they sent out a small staff of experts to set up a Telephone Exchange in Bombay, and another in Calcutta. They were warmly received in Bombay, every one from the Governor downwards, wishing the Exchange to be established at once. In any other country in the world the thing might have been done, for there is nothing but advantage to be reaped from such an Exchange being set up in Bombay, and yet the Local Government was obliged to prohibit the work, and tell the Company's agent he must travel 4,000 miles to Simlah and back *for the sanction of Lord Ripon in Council* before a single telephone could be put up in the island! The telephone staff sit twiddling their fingers and thumbs, and wondering at the ways of India. Accuse the Government of India with obstructing the telephone, and it will repudiate all "desire" to do so; but there is the obstruction for all that. And no one can tell when it will be surmounted. A score of references will probably be made to different departments and probably to England, before so simple a thing as the Telephone is allowed in the island, lest Beelzebub, we suppose, should get hold of the instruments and fill the island with discordant hubbub. It is, of course, very trying, very irritating to the men who are committed to the enterprise. Infinite cobwebs stand between them and their work, and there is no cutting through the unobstructive-obstructiveness, the sincere-insincerity of the "welcome" they receive in India.

## LETTER TO SIR LOUIS MALLET.

11, HAROLDSTONE ROAD, KENSINGTON,

*November 1, 1880.*

MY DEAR SIR LOUIS MALLET,—I now submit, for the consideration of the Secretary of State, a further memorandum on the condition of India, with the reforms which, it seems to me, are necessitated thereby. I have no anxiety whatever as to what we call the finances of India: it is the condition of the people, and the total want of statesmanship in our attitude towards it, that create uneasiness and indeed alarm in my own mind.

In the memorandum which I now submit, I point out in its first section that the great, the adequate, remedy for relieving our rule from the reproach which now rests upon it, lies in the proper solution of the land question in Bengal. If, as rulers, we have but the insight and the courage to seize the truly wonderful opportunity that "question" places in our hands, we may solve thereby the whole "financial" position with ease. I cannot but think it providential, that the very error which Lord Cornwallis made ninety years ago, should have produced to-day the precise conditions we could wish for, for redeeming not merely Bengal from the confusion and strife of which the settlement has been the parent, but all India from the effects of our improvidence and misrule. By buying up the middleman rights that the settlement has given birth to, at fifteen or sixteen years' purchase, the State will become the possessor of an almost exhaustless fund for redeeming the finances of the country from all embarrassment whatever, while putting an end to the impossible attempt to raise a revenue by direct taxation from the people, and yet furnishing us simultaneously with the millions that need to be spent upon public works in every province of the Empire. By showing ordinary prudence and courage in the treatment of the land under perpetual settlement, the State will be able to borrow whatever money may be required for the vast works of improvement that are necessary, upon the security of the land itself and the immense surplus income therefrom, that will pour steadily, and in ever-increasing amount, into the Treasury.

Let me assume that the present margin of rental between the State demand under the settlement and the actual rental paid by the cultivator is £8,000,000 sterling a year. We know, from the Road Cess statistics, that it is considerably

more, probably £10,000,000. Now, we may extinguish the "middleman" claim to this margin by fifteen or sixteen years' purchase of the amount, say £120,000,000 to £150,000,000 sterling. The operation would, of course, be gradual only. We should concentrate the whole strength of our Survey and Settlement departments upon the work, and should soon be in a position to redeem these zemindar and middleman rights, at the rate of £5,000,000 to £10,000,000 a year. The whole operation ought not to extend over more than twenty years, and it would be open to us to pay for these rights by the creation of Government stock in India, or what would be far wiser, considering the overwhelming need in the country of capital, by borrowing £5,000,000 to £10,000,000 a year in London in gold, and paying the middleman in silver. The operation would rapidly send the price of silver up to its normal or proper value, when it would be a matter of almost no consequence in which metal the borrowings were made. The loans would be secured by the actual rental received by the Government, while an Imperial guarantee should be added, as a matter of common sense and common propriety, to reduce the interest to the lowest possible rate. At the end of the operation, the case would stand thus: the Government would have incurred a liability to English capitalists during the twenty years the work was progressing, of £120,000,000 to £150,000,000 sterling, at, say, three-and-a-half per cent. interest. The stock would be the very finest security in the world, the amount being secured by the real estate of Bengal, yielding a *minimum* rental of £8,000,000 to £10,000,000 a year, with the unearned increment to be added thereto for all time; and secondly, by the credit of the English nation. The account would therefore stand thus:—

## GOVERNMENT OF INDIA.

Dr.		Cr.
Annual dividends on, say, £140,000,000 stock, secured by the land, and an Imperial guarantee, at 3½ per cent. ...	£4,900,000	Annual rental of the land paid to the Government instead of the Middleman every year ... ..
		£9,000,000

The charge upon the debit side would be the fixed maximum liability, the credit upon the per contra side, the minimum receipts of the State. Instead of £9,000,000 a year, we might reasonably count upon £12,000,000, from the steady rise in the value of land in the Lower Provinces, and the impossibility of the soil ever being exhausted. We should, meanwhile, have largely changed the face of the country, by converting the £140,000,000 of "fixed" capital into "floating," thus supplying the most urgent want of the people, and indefinitely lowering the present ruinous rates of interest. We should open to the English nation an annual investment of its surplus capital to the extent of £5,000,000 or £10,000,000 a year, in the *direction in which we are under positive moral obligation to make it flow*. Instead of our capitalists profligately devoting their surplus wealth to the immoral uses of the Turk for ironclads and debauchery, or sinking it in Mexican Bonds, we should, *pro tanto*, give them the opportunity of diverting it to the best possible use, and to the highest interests of both nations. It is a scandal that reaches Heaven against us, that we positively shut off the 250,000,000 of our poor subjects in India from the resources of English capitalists, while allowing

Powers that are an infamy on the earth to borrow whatever they can get, and for any purpose however vile. Let our statesmen but show ordinary prudence, insight, and courage in dealing with this land question in Bengal, and we have in it the solution of every difficulty we experience with the Indian finances; an adequate provision for the Public Works Budget; the end of the Exchange difficulty; and of the dangerous agrarian quarrel among the 60,000,000 of people in Bengal; while we shall be able to prosecute adequate State enterprise in improving the agriculture of the land. I shall not conceal that I regard the section of any memoranda that deals with this question, as the most important of all. It is eighteen years, at least, since I first stated my conviction that the State should do what I now once more, and with almost passionate earnestness, urge upon its decision.

Of immense importance also is the demand I have made for a complete and final separation of the Public Works Accounts from those of Ordinary Revenue and Expenditure. I have been urging the reform for the last twenty years, and the folly that fails to discern its paramount need would strike me dumb, but that I have resolved to persevere to the end.

Of the same importance again, is the demand that there should be a real decentralization of the accounts, instead of the sham decentralization inaugurated ten years ago. There can be no wise, no equitable, no enlightened taxation in India, until the liabilities of each province are definitely ascertained, and its taxation proportioned thereto. As matters now stand, the Imperial accounts are a chaos. We have had twenty years of improved book-keeping, until I am sick of the very word "accounts." What we want is statesmanship, and there has been none in my time, but a reign of mere charlatans, like Sir Richard Temple. His astounding settlement of the Central Provinces was the result of there being no balance-sheet for him to make up for those Provinces; and so he was permitted to tie them round the neck of the other Provinces of India by a land settlement of ninepence the acre, and simultaneously to *create by law* a new body of mushroom landlords at the cost of confiscating the old occupancy rights of the present proprietary. This man ought to be turned inside out before a Parliamentary Committee of Inquiry. If I write bitterly, what wonder! I have been writing passionately on the subject to ears that *would* not hear, and eyes that *would* not see: and I would fain strangle the folly in a final death grasp, if I could.

Of vital importance again, is our mode of financing Indian loans, and our grotesque and wild devices in varying the forms of the Loans, until no one on earth can understand them. There should be but two great consolidated Stocks—the Public Debt proper, and the Public Works debt; and England *must* give the Imperial guarantee to both. It is madness, it is suicide, not to do so. If we think our hold upon India worth but twenty years' purchase, that very fact tells us, with trumpet tongue, to give the "guarantee." Mr. Gladstone has only to use his great, and persuasive, and illuminative gifts in Parliament, to procure the guarantee at once; and it is insanity to withhold it.

As to Public Works, the people are reduced to so dangerous a condition, from the exhaustion of their food stores and the growing exhaustion of the soil,



that we must cover India, at all costs, with cheap railways. Cheap railways! My heart misgives me as I write the words. The nation may as well give up the hope, for good, of ever seeing a cheap railway built in India, while the bureaucracy have anything to do with it. They cannot even *conceive* what a cheap railway means. We must do it from *London*, from the gates of Parliament, if it is to be done at all.

A great State Department of Agriculture again, is a vital necessity of the present condition of affairs. But it will have to be administered from London, from the doors of Parliament. It is Anglo-Saxon thought and wisdom that must come to the help of India. The half-Oriental Indian civilian will never do anything but mar the work, and convert it into a "preserve" of well-paid appointments. We must have a great State Department of Agriculture, administered by men like Mr. Caird, in direct and enduring association with the Secretary of State, "Indian experience" being called into council only when local facts require to be ascertained. I cannot express too earnestly my conviction, that if our rule is to be redeemed from its present reproach, we must put the "Indian departments" aside altogether, except for the carrying out of "orders" issued from this country in the wisdom and strength of counsels that are here at our command.

Finally, I affirm my full conviction that our *direct* rule can never, in the nature of things, hope to be successful. Strangers and aliens as we are, we can never rule the people of India successfully, as we are now attempting to do, by excluding the people themselves from the administration of their own affairs. Every student of Indian history, every observant traveller in India knows well what splendid government there has been in the country, in all its provinces, at one time and another. The interested notion is propagated amongst us, that native rule has been distinguished for nothing but its weakness and its wickedness. The fact is, the provinces of India have been governed in days gone by, with such wisdom and success, that the Empire is crowded with monuments of the fact. *We, strangers, have largely done our work in India; and as masters and tutors, we do not like to recognize a fact that is dawning on all hands.* The sooner we give up the hopeless task of attempting to rule directly, as we are now doing, the better. Our rule is a costly and sickly exotic; ever growing more and more costly, more and more sickly. We should set our house in order, that we may retire with something like respect on the part of the people for what we have done for them. The memory of the anarchy and suffering from which our advent rescued them is fast fading from their minds; and they see to-day nothing but our failure, and our selfish injustice towards them. They see our true *morale* in the crime of this Afghan War, the sacrifice of their revenues to party necessities at Manchester, and the selfishness, meanness, and injustice of our every arrangement.

Happily, there is still time to redeem ourselves in their eyes, and the opportunity. England must *herself* assume the responsibilities she has been mischievously persuaded to devolve upon the small body of public servants she has sent to India in her name, WHOM SHE NEVER CALLS TO ACCOUNT FOR WHAT THEY

no. The nation hears complaints from India, and forthwith the Secretary of State formally enquires of the men complained against, whether there is any ground for the discontent that is expressed. To a man, they answer "No!" and will, of course, so answer to the end of the chapter. And the stereotyped despatch comes home from India with the customary assurance, "I have the honour to inform your Excellency, that everything is well!" And so things have come at last to this pass, that a man would really seem to have only to leave India with the broad stamp of administrative failure upon him (as in the case of Sir Bartle Frere) to be regarded in this country as a man of mark and a statesman, until in the course of his promotion, he is pitchforked into circumstances in which he plunges the nation into a Zulu, Afghan, and Basuto War. If England had the remotest understanding of current Indian history, she would have known that Sir Bartle Frere left Calcutta in 1861-62, and Bombay in 1867, under so heavy an indictment for administrative folly, rashness, and moral cowardice, that he ought to have been relegated for the rest of his life into private obscurity. A similar man has come home to-day in Sir Richard Temple, an embodiment of Indian civilianism in its worst peculiarities. It is idle to speak of these frightful personalities. These two men but yesterday, were both in the "running" to be made Viceroy of India, and it is the positive duty of a publicist, as I conceive that duty, to tell the nation plainly the true state of matters.

I have suggested changes of a somewhat radical nature in the form of the Indian Government, from the Secretary of State downwards. Upon this head I may say, and do say frankly, that I do not feel the ground under my feet so sure as in the matters I have above spoken of. I take the initiative, because the great mass of men are afraid of committing themselves to distinct projects of reform, from a care for their own reputation. My reputation must take care of itself. Some of the reforms I have suggested must, I think, commend themselves to most minds. England at this moment presents the world with the strange spectacle of an ancient but numerically small people, attempting to rule 250,000,000 of the human family—who have come under their government they hardly know how, and without the cost of a sixpence to them—without changing by a hair's breadth or developing by an inch, the governmental institutions which have been evolved out of their own insular and peculiar history. Because England herself is ruled tolerably well upon the whole by a Parliament and a Cabinet which are perpetually changing, her statesmen are so hide-bound by precedents that they think the heavens would fall, if they appointed a permanent Secretary of State for India! And so, all through. It is against this crystallized folly that I earnestly protest. Because we did not see very well how to govern India from England, we have devolved our tremendous responsibilities upon a small regiment of men whom we call the Indian Civil Service. We permit no despotism at home, but are jealous almost to the point of disease of all Executive action, while we calmly hand over 250,000,000 of people to the covenanted mercies of this handful of men—and never call them to account for what they do. Well: they have ruined the noblest dependency a nation ever possessed, and filled 250,000,000 of people, prince and

peasant alike, with deadly hatred of us and our rule :—the princes for the high-handed insolence and injustice with which the Bureaucracy treat them ; the people for the abject misery to which we have reduced them. And the nation lives meanwhile in a fool's paradise called "The Blessings of British Rule." At all events, I have now "delivered my own soul." Let the nation see to it ere it is "too late."

Believe me, my dear Sir Louis Mallet, yours very sincerely,

R. KNIGHT.

*Postscript.*—Since this letter was in type, I have read Mr. Caird's note upon the administrative reforms required in India, and the reply of the Government of India thereto. It is gratifying to me to find that Mr. Caird discerns the necessity of many of the reforms I have been insisting upon for years. The so-called reply of the Government of India is of the usual stereotyped order, a mass of sincere insincerity from beginning to end. Let me instance the way in which it deals with Mr. Caird's demand that the people should no longer be excluded from the higher grades of administrative appointments. "We entirely agree," they say, "with Mr. Caird. The British Parliament and Home Government have repeatedly ordered us to make this reform. We are ardently bent upon it ourselves ; and we propose to admit Natives '*gradually to one-sixth* of the higher appointments,' upon salaries '*somewhat lower*' than are paid to Indian Civilians." Observe the subtle *virus* of falsehood that runs through the statement. The "higher appointments" may, in round figures, be estimated to be 250 in number. And one-sixth of these appointments, or forty in all, are "*gradually*" to be thrown open to Natives in the next twenty years ! This is the extent of their "entire agreement with Mr. Caird" and the measure of their loyalty to the "orders" of 1832, repeated over and over again in the fifty years that have intervened. Every one in India knows well, that even this ridiculous concession has been wrung from them only by my own bitter and stinging remonstrances upon the subject in the *Calcutta Statesman*, three or four years ago. They will *never* admit the Natives to high appointments as long as these sincere insincere professions are permitted to do duty in the room of actual performance of orders.

Mr. Caird makes one heavy mistake. He suggests that we should permit the Land revenue to be redeemed. The suggestion has been often made in my time, and Lord Stanley (Earl of Derby) in 1858 gave formal orders to permit it in Bengal. Sir Bartle Frere, advocate of every blunder that has ever been made, supported it vehemently. I opposed it strenuously. Happily there are no "funds" amongst the land-holding classes to redeem the revenue, and there never can be, while money commands such immense interest as it does in India. *The land revenue is our great sheet-anchor, and if we let it go our rule of India will end in a cataclysm.* Mr. Caird has adopted my views almost as a whole, and I am sure that I could convince him in a single half-hour's conversation, that to follow his advice in this respect would be to strike the key-stone out of the arch on which alone a new and sound superstructure can be built. We must hold by

the land revenue as our one hope of redeeming India from its present condition, and permit no tampering with it whatever. Mr. Caird seems to think, and he has been indoctrinated with the idea, I suppose, by Indian Civilians, that a freehold title to land means that the State shall never impose a tax upon it. Why, I ask? Is my house not mine, nor my horse, nor my carriage, because I have to pay a tax on them? Sir Bartle Frere and Sir Richard Temple have been the two leading authorities who have been preaching for twenty years that we shall never see successful finance in India, until we have got rid of the land and pledged the State never to impose a tax thereon. If these men had had their way, our position in India to-day would have been hopeless. We must hold by the land revenue to the last, for in nursing and developing it, and therein alone, lies all hope of redeeming the position.

*Postscript No. 2.*—When I look back upon the last twenty years, and recal the many important measures which during that period I have pressed upon the attention of the Government, often with passionate earnestness, but almost without fruit, and see to-day how fatal has been the neglect of them, I cannot but feel bitterness against the men who have blindly administered that government. It required a long fight after the Mutiny and Rebellion, to get what were called our Resumption proceedings (in particular the Inam Act of 1851) finally abolished, and four years of persistent agitation to wring from the Civilian body a full concession to prince and peasant, of the ancient custom and right of adoption. The agitation in neither case would have been successful, but for the terrible emphasis given to both questions by the events of 1857.

Had an Imperial guarantee been but given to the Indian debt in 1858, when, following Wingate's footsteps, I showed its justice and necessity, there would have been no Indian debt at all to-day. Had the monstrous folly of giving away the finest tea districts of India, with a pledge never to impose a land-tax upon them, been treated as the insanity it was, how different would the position of that great industry have been to-day, and the Government relations therewith! Had a settled policy of Public Works expenditure but been adopted, a great Public Works Ledger opened, and the accounts of the department kept absolutely distinct from the ordinary revenues and expenditure, India would to-day have been covered with a network of railways. Had the Government but been wise enough to impose an export duty upon Indian cotton during the American War, the ryots would have had no silver tires to their cart-wheels, but would have had the value of their fields doubled, by tramways and roadways all over them. Had the land revenue but been wisely administered and nursed, there would have been no wild land settlement of the Central Provinces, with its mushroom landlords to rack-rent the peasantry, and confiscate their occupancy rights. Our treaties with the Native States would have been honestly and loyally revised, and railways sent in all directions through their territories, under subventions profitable to both them and us. Had cheap tramways been introduced, the crops of remote districts, instead of rotting in the fields, would have

gone to feed the starving millions of the Deccan and Mysore. Had the old Indian Army been preserved, as I earnestly advised, there would have been no Army problem to perplex us, but an expenditure of £10,000,000 or £12,000,000 only, instead of £16,000,000 or £17,000,000, under the Horse Guards. There would have been no second Afghan War, with its £40,000,000 or £50,000,000 of expenditure, huge sacrifice of human life, and renewal of Afghan hatred; and no deliberate starving of the people to death in famine. Had the Legislature forbidden the transfer, there would have been no ousting of old proprietors from their ancient homesteads. We should have had no improvident loans, no wild income-taxes, no licence duty oppressions, and no silver difficulty, with the ruin it has brought upon the Government and private interests alike. I cannot recal the many instances in which, with clear insight, I have warned the Indian Government of the mistakes it was making, to the conviction of every class except the Government itself, and look back upon the record of it all without feeling how stolid has been the incapacity of the Government, and how deep too often its guilt, as with this Afghan War, in which not only by public appeal, but with urgent private remonstrances, I strove to turn the actors therein, aside from their purpose.

R. KNIGHT.

*November 10.*

## FURTHER MEMO. ON INDIA.

### *THE BENGAL LAND QUESTION.*

I COME now to a very important question—that of land in Bengal and the great rent quarrel in the province between landlords and tenants. It is now generally known that while the land revenue is the one great source of income on which the State depends in India, Lord Cornwallis imprudently settled its amount in perpetuity throughout the lower provinces of Bengal, and that this “permanent settlement,” as it is called, of the State demand was subsequently extended to a part of the upper provinces. The lower provinces of Bengal are the richest in India, consisting mainly of the great deltaic plains whose fertility is renewed every year by the overflow of the great rivers that discharge their waters into the upper part of the Bay of Bengal. Happily, there is no possibility of “exhausting the soil” in the deltas of the Ganges, the Brahmapootra, the Mahanuddy, and the Irrawaddy. The land is constantly re-fertilized by the silt which the rivers, in their overflow, annually deposit thereon. The population is very dense, but the soil is so productive that the lower provinces of Bengal and British Burmah export between them more than a million tons of rice, of the supply of which grain indeed, they have the monopoly of the world. The permanent settlement of the State share in the produce of the land was the first of the long series of errors of which our impatience has been the parent. One-third only of the land is estimated to have been under cultivation at the time when the permanent settlement was made; but as it was impossible to define the boundaries of the great zemindaree estates, the wastes have been encroached upon until there is not an acre of land in Lower Bengal that is not now claimed as private property by some one or other. The gross amount of the revenue at which Lord Cornwallis thus settled the State demand was a little over three millions sterling; while exact inquiry in the last few years, under the Road Cess Act, shows that the rental of the same lands, paid to-day to the private

landlords which the settlement has created, is, I believe, four or five times that amount. In other words, the "permanent settlement" of Lord Cornwallis has resulted in the growth of a "landlord" interest, of the middleman order, at ruinous cost to the State. As the land rose in value, the original holders from the State—the men with whom the settlement was made—leased it to others, and lived in idleness upon the margin between the State claim and the rental they got from the land. This process of sub-letting has gone to such extraordinary lengths, that when in 1873 I was preparing in the Bengal Secretariat the forms of the statistical returns that Sir George Campbell's Road Cess Act necessitated, I had to go down as far as the letter M, in an alphabetical series of the "middlemen," who lay between the original holder on the *toujee* list (official record) of 1792 and the actual cultivator of the soil in 1873. So rapidly and so enormously had the land risen in value, that in some districts, and in the short space of eighty years, no fewer than ten to twelve "middlemen" were living upon the margin of rental which Lord Cornwallis had so improvidently abandoned. This vast body of "middlemen" landlords thus live in idleness upon their share in the £10,000,000 or £12,000,000 of profit that lie between the State claim of £3,000,000 and the £15,000,000 of actual rental paid by the cultivator. The natural result has been incessant and bitter strife between the actual cultivator M, and the so-called landlord of whom he holds. It is this conflict that forms what is called "the rent difficulty" in Bengal. I have for many years been tending to the belief that the difficulty admits but of one solution, and that in this, as in much else, we shall have to retrace our steps, and rebuild what Lord Cornwallis pulled down. Vast as the task of surveying Bengal may be, private interests in the soil are so complicated that every attempt to settle the strife by legislation, has been introduced only to be abandoned. True statesmanship suggests, I believe, the conversion of the whole "middlemen" class into mere holders of Government stock. They have divorced themselves from the land: and it would be wise, I think, to resume what was unwisely alienated, and redeem every interest in the soil, making the cultivator hold once more directly from the State. The survey would necessarily be a slow and laborious one, but so many obvious advantages would arise therefrom, both economic and political, that I believe it would be wise to look the step fairly in the face.

If this rent quarrel admitted of any other solution that even looked hopeful, the case might be otherwise. The difficulty exists, and grows constantly in magnitude, threatening us with an agrarian war; and so many political advantages would flow from the

conversion of the host of "middlemen" we have created into "State annuitants," that I do not think the difficulty of the task should hinder our attempting it. It could not be done hastily, and we should ascertain at a very early stage of the experiment whether to persevere therein or not. I would take, therefore, a single pergunnah or two, and ascertain by actual experiment how we succeeded. The State would once more become the owner of a revenue unwisely alienated from it, while we might reasonably count upon its steady growth. This rent quarrel in Bengal is one of the great running sores of our administration, and it may at any moment assume alarming proportions. We might leave some of the greater zemindarees, such as that of Burdwan, untouched; but I would certainly try the experiment of retracing our steps in this difficulty, as I have already advised in the great matter of taking the revenue in kind. Whether the remedies I suggest should prove successful or not, they are remedies which face the difficulties to be met. It is nearly twenty years since I first avowed my conviction that we should have to retrace our steps in Bengal, and time has but strengthened a belief that first entered my mind in 1860 or, 1861. I repeat, emphatically, that what we want in India is statesmanship; not accountant-ship, nor the art of book-keeping.

It is necessary to bear constantly in mind that many of the difficulties which now beset our administration of the land are "economic" rather than "agricultural" questions. To deal wisely with this Bengal rent question, we should have a Commission composed of men who are familiar with economic disputes concerning the tenure of land, the fisc, national finance and currency, as well as with agriculture. The opportunities and resources in our hands in India are so numerous, so important, so wide-reaching, that it is an utter scandal to us that we should ever have permitted the silver difficulty, for instance, to arise. In the wise handling of the Bengal land question alone, there lies a natural and immediate solution of the Exchange or silver difficulty, and the great Public Works question. We want but the statesmanship to discern it. Let me show what I mean. It is admitted on all hands that the price of silver would certainly return to its normal value, were a demand of but £5,000,000 sterling a year for the metal to fall upon the market for a few years, to absorb the abnormal supply which the operations of the German Government have thrust upon it. Now, one of the most urgent wants of India is capital. The ruinous rates of interest that prevail are occasioned by the great scarcity of such capital. Well, the Government should try the experiment of increasing it, by forcibly converting the "fixed" capital sunk in the land of Bengal into



"floating" capital available for the purposes of trading enterprise, and as advances to the cultivator for improving the agriculture of the provinces. Let the Government boldly redeem but £5,000,000 sterling a year of the land from the hold of the non-improving middleman zemindar, paying him out *in silver* at so many years' purchase of the rental. In the difficulties in which we stand, would it really not be worth while to borrow £5,000,000 sterling a year in London for three or four years, to try an experiment of such overwhelming magnitude and importance? Let the State, I say, survey and redeem the lands of a single small district only, yielding a rental, say, of £250,000 a year, paying the middleman zemindar twenty years' purchase for the same, or £5,000,000 sterling *in silver*. I do not think it would be necessary to pay anything like so much. The value of ready money, loanable capital, is so great in India that the zemindars would in all likelihood be glad to sell at fifteen years' purchase. The ordinary interest on mortgage of real property in Calcutta is 12 per cent. per annum, while in the Mofussil (country districts), all over India, it runs from 25 per cent. up to 60 and even 80 per cent. I cannot express the sense I have of the perfunctory incompetency of our administration. We stand surrounded by opportunities for great statesmanlike measures, and our paralysis is absolute. Little better as rulers than the dumb idols in which the people put their trust, we have eyes, but see not; ears, but hear not; feet that walk not. What is to prevent the State putting an end at once to the silver difficulty in the simple way I now suggest, in addition to half a dozen other natural and obvious ways I have been pointing out for years? Let the State buy up but a fraction of the middleman zemindar's rights that were so unwisely *created* by our legislation, and we put an end at once to the rent difficulty over the area we redeem, while restoring silver with positive certainty to its normal value by the operation.

The balance-sheet will at once show an improvement of £2,000,000 or £3,000,000 sterling a year, while we force into circulation an amount of "loanable capital," the want of which is perhaps the chief economic want of the country at this moment. The moral effects of such a reform both upon the ryot cultivator and the middleman himself could hardly be over-estimated. We bring back peace into the villages, good temper, and a hopeful spirit. The State will never quarrel with the ryot over the rental, nor the ryot with the State; while the curse of a middleman zemindar will perforce have to engage in active industry of some kind to employ his money. Now all this may be done by our having the reasonable courage to borrow £5,000,000 a year in gold on the London Exchange for three, four,

or five years, *on the security of real property in Bengal*. Let us see how the operation would stand. I assume that the Government would give up the insanity of withholding the Imperial guarantee from the loan. It could then borrow £5,000,000 with ease at  $3\frac{1}{2}$  per cent., the dividends amounting to £225,000 a year. Now, it could buy silver at present rates (4s. 4d. per ounce) for this sum to the extent of Rs.6,00,00,000. For this sum we could purchase in Bengal "middleman" rights of Rs.40,00,000 a year. The operation, if continued, would rapidly raise the price of silver to its proper or normal value, when the State would have secured £400,000 a year rental, with an uncontested right to *the unearned increment of the future* to meet a liability of £225,000 only. The profits of the step would thus be enormous, while they would be shared by zemindar, cultivator, trader, and State alike. It is abominable that this silver difficulty should have so long been permitted to endure, to the cruel injury of the traders, merchants, and creditors of India, the injury of the whole mercantile world, and the bankruptcy of the Indian Exchequer, when half a dozen simple remedies lie in the hands of the Indian Government. We see only a part of the wrong, the injustice, the ruin which the fall in silver has brought upon the nations, while our control of the Eastern exchanges and our possession of India, place half a dozen remedies in our hands.

Finally, if the State will not do as I suggest, let it give legislative assistance to others to take up the work which is properly its own, and let a syndicate of great finance firms be invited to redeem a part of this "wondrous estate" we have in Bengal, with eyes too blind and sympathies too dull to be moved by its possession. Impossible as it seems to spare Mr. Gladstone from the direction of Home affairs, I could wish no grander close to his career than the Viceroyship of India, for three or four years' concentration of his great powers on this all-important problem. I feel—I cannot but feel—that I have an insight into the possibilities and necessities of our position in India more nearly adequate to our responsibilities than any one I am acquainted with; and if this is vanity or egotism—which I do not think it is—I ask to be forgiven for its display. To conclude: we want bold, original statesmanship in India—men who are economists, financiers, and statesmen—masters of the great principles of scientific agriculture, a successful fisc, and wise finance. We have had nothing but book-keepers hitherto, and India is dying under the hands of mere accountants and clerks, "having the honour to be" everything, but what the condition of the land demands.

It would be impossible at this distance of time to subvert the

Permanent Settlement without shaking the faith of the people in our integrity as rulers ; but we may buy up the rights created thereunder with nothing but advantage to all classes interested therein. I have said enough probably to show the overwhelming magnitude of the question to the State ; and if it is not prepared or not willing to move therein itself, I very seriously suggest that the position of affairs should be laid before a great syndicate of financiers, like the Rothschilds, Barings, Huths, and Goschens. Despairing of Mr. Gladstone's undertaking the task, who could be so fit as Mr. Goschen himself to direct the measures that would be required to make Bengal the basis of a great scheme for redeeming the whole financial position of the empire ? I repeat the statement, that never had any Government such complete control over the future of a country as we have over the fortunes of 250,000,000 of people who own our supremacy in India. The time has come when to delay the task of their redemption means that we shamefully abnegate our duties, and become mere selfish usurpers of a power that we refuse to exercise on behalf of the people whom we have pauperized and destroyed.

#### *CHANGES IN THE FORM OF GOVERNMENT.*

If we desire to rule India wisely, we must cease the practice of perpetually changing the Secretary of State, putting men like Lord Cranbrook into the appointment, not because they are fit for it, but because the convenience of party suggests the arrangement. Dare any man amongst us lay his hand upon his heart, and declare it to be his belief that Mr. Gathorne Hardy possessed any one of the qualities that the rule of 250,000,000 of people should lead us to search for, "as with candles?" The immediate result of putting him into the appointment, was his instant acquiescence in the Afghan War. Who can believe that Lord Derby would have sanctioned that war, the late Lord Lawrence, or the Duke of Argyll ? We govern India almost upon the open principle that any one will do to be Secretary at the India Office. At this moment, there is a general feeling that Lord Hartington is too good for the appointment, that he is thrown away in fact upon the India Office, and there is a tacit, though unavowed, hope that an early reshuffling of the cards will give him some post in the Ministry more attractive and more efficient from a party point of view. I appeal with deep earnestness to all parties in the country, whether what I say is not as true as it is mournful and discreditable to us as a people. Are we likely to ad-

minister the momentous trust in our hands successfully, while animated by a spirit like this? We sink to the level of mere usurpers in India, unless we are prepared to consecrate to the service of its people the highest powers which English statesmanship can produce. The Secretary of State of India should certainly cease to be a "party" man. He should be like Saul, head and shoulders taller than the ruck of the professional politicians whose one purpose in political life is the advancement of themselves. In everything but ability, in every moral fibre of his nature, the Indian Secretary should be the negation of that embodiment of sinister ambition which the career of the Earl of Beaconsfield exemplifies.

As there would be a danger, however, of a permanent Secretary of State becoming too strong both for the Ministry and the Parliament, it would be advisable, I believe, that there should be a standing Parliamentary Committee appointed for the oversight of Indian affairs. The Committee should not be a very large one, and might be composed of six members, three from each House, to whom all the proceedings of the India Office should be regularly submitted, *without reserve of any kind upon any pretext whatever*. Without some check of this kind, a permanent Secretary of State might probably become too powerful for the Ministry and the Parliament. It might therefore be wise to appoint a permanent Parliamentary Committee, to which all proceedings whatever of the India Office were submitted without reserve. Were such a Committee chosen from the few men in the two Houses who really know India, and were the proceedings of the India Office regularly submitted to their inspection, they would constitute an efficient "audit" of Indian affairs. They should have power to call for the most confidential, the most secret documents; and it would be their duty to bring before Parliament, and openly oppose therein, proceedings which they did not approve. They should have no power to do more than "report" to Parliament, and to lay bare before it the true character of our proceedings, that the nation might not be deceived and misled, as it now is, at all points concerning India. Such a Committee would be the "eye" of Parliament over all that was being done by the Indian Government. In the course of a very few years, the members who had been on this permanent Committee would know all that it is essential for Parliament to know concerning the details of our administration. The occasions would not be numerous when they would find it necessary to "report" at all; while their support of the Secretary for India in Parliament itself, would be a guarantee of the propriety and wisdom of his pro-

ceedings, as the Committee should, of course, be selected without regard to party.

And this great change in the character of the Secretaryship should be attended by a change of equal moment in the Indian Council. As now constituted, that Council is powerless for any good purpose. It has degenerated into a sort of outwork for defending the existing order of things in India, and for arresting all reform in our rule of that country. While the Council as now constituted is maintained, it will simply obstruct every reform that does not recommend itself to the conventional views and prejudices of its Civilian members. It should be done away with. It has become something very unpleasantly like a device for increasing the retiring allowances of men who have all their lives drawn immense allowances in India and amassed fortunes in that country, and to whom it is intensely pleasant to have their pension of £1,000 a year augmented by another £1,200 at the cost of the people of India, upon the pretext that they are earning this extra allowance by still devoting themselves to the service of that country. The English official members of the Council are allowed no such right, but draw only their Council allowances. Is it too much to expect that men who, upon the strength of their twenty-five years' service in India, are in receipt of very handsome pensions from its people, should on their retirement become an honorary Council for Her Majesty's Secretary of State? There is something degradingly selfish in our every arrangement concerning India. It is thought to be a great honour for Her Majesty to appoint the most distinguished of our public men at home to her Privy Council, without pay of any kind for the service required of them. Why should it be necessary to pay Her Majesty's Council of India, already handsomely provided for by the State, an extra salary of £1,200 a year simply for advising Her Majesty's Secretary of State an hour or two a week upon the conduct of its affairs? Let the Secretary of State be permanent, and let the Indian Council be an honorary body composed of retired Indians of all classes, with a reputation for ability and high character, whether they are official or non-official. Any distinguished Indian judge, lawyer, or merchant should be eligible thereto. Native gentlemen and Native princes might also be invited to sojourn in England, by the serious compliment of asking them to come here to advise Her Majesty what she must do for India to rule it wisely and well. The Council of India should be a kind of Privy Council which Her Majesty's Secretary of State could summon, to advise with him in emer-

gencies such as must arise in a rule so strange as that of the Indian Empire.

The only paid counsellors with which the Secretary of State should be hampered, should be his permanent under-secretaries—as at the Board of Trade—and the departmental secretaries in the financial, judicial, revenue, and other branches of the Administration. The Indian element should be kept in complete subordination, and great care shown in attracting original power of the highest order into the office of secretaries. What possible reforms can we look for, from a body of Anglo-Indian Civilian secretaries, with an Anglo-Indian Council at their back, and another purely Anglo-Indian Council in Calcutta? England won her Indian Empire by the force of English character, by men who had *no* Indian experience whatever, in the modern sense of the term; and if she is to retain that empire, it will be not by the semi-Orientalized Indian official, but by the vigour and freshness, the conscience and intellectual force, of the Anglo-Saxon counsellors of the Queen. The old East India Company's directors were a broader and abler body of rulers upon the whole, than the feeble Council we have set up in their room. The "official" bias was held in check in the former, by the strength of the mercantile element on the Board. Here, as in so much else concerning India, we should revert to ideas abandoned by us without sufficient forethought of what would follow.

#### REPRESENTATIVE ASSEMBLIES IN INDIA.

Another reform of the utmost moment in our circumstances is the institution of something like Representative Assemblies in India. We are constantly told by the Civilian body that the time has not come for popular institutions in India. And the time never will come in the eyes of these gentlemen. What we want in India is—Light. The secrecy with which the proceedings of the Government are guarded from public knowledge, is the real cause of such crimes against the people as the refusal to acknowledge the existence of famine in the North-west Provinces two years ago; of such counsels of meanness and dishonour against the Native Princes, as were exemplified in the arrangements for the abolition of the salt line; of such crime as the Afghan War, and the almost incredible falsehoods by which it was brought about and justified. We want Representative Assemblies in India, with the power of compelling the Government to submit its proceedings honestly and

without reserve to their criticism. It is Light, more than all else, that is wanted to put an end to the *Executive* tyranny that is constantly shocking the moral sense not only of the people, but of the great body of non-official Englishmen in the country. By depriving the educated Native population of all share in the administration of their own affairs, we strip them of that feeling of responsibility which the consciousness of power carries with it necessarily. What public opinion there is amongst them becomes mutinous : hostile to the Government because it is government ; disloyal to the Crown, and penetrated with hatred of the very name of Englishmen. Until we associate the people in some way with our rule, and administer it in public, so that the purity of our counsels and aims may commend itself to every man's reason and conscience, disaffection and hatred will accumulate on all hands against us, to bear its natural fruits in the final subversion of our rule, when it will deserve to fall for the selfishness, insincerity, and practical corruption which, constituted as human nature is, are the necessary fruits everywhere of irresponsible and secret rule. Of course, there are difficulties in the way of introducing Representative Assemblies into the country, but they are difficulties to be surmounted by honest purpose. Nothing could be worse, nothing more hopeless, than the present irresponsible and secret system.

#### THE GATES OF PARLIAMENT.

If England is ever to rule her vast dependency with more success than she has yet attained, we must make the appointment of Secretary of State for India a permanent one, independent of party altogether. Are we so bound hand and foot by traditions, that it is impossible for us to import a little "common sense" into the system by which we rule the destinies of 250,000,000 of the human race ? India is a study to absorb the undivided attention of the highest and noblest statesmanship England can produce ; and we persuade ourselves that we do our duty towards this vast part of the human family, by a system that makes it impossible for their chief ruler ever to have more than a smattering and superficial acquaintance with his charge. At whatever cost, at whatever inconvenience to "parties," common sense tells us that the Secretary of State for India should be subject to removal from his office only under emergencies of the gravest order. A lifetime spent in the study of Indian affairs fails to master them as they need to be mastered, while we adopt a

system under which the portfolio for India is constantly changing hands to meet the convenience of "party" necessities. Is it really impossible to find amongst our leading statesmen, a man gifted with talents and wisdom, and willing to consecrate both to this splendid trust as long as life and strength hold out for the work? If Lord Hartington would not accept the position, I hope I may be pardoned for saying that the Earl of Derby seems to be marked out, by his freedom from party associations, his perfect judgment, and long acquaintance with Indian affairs, as the very man to be Permanent Secretary for India, with a right to sit in the House of Commons as well as the Lords, whenever he deemed it necessary to address the Government and the country upon the affairs of its great dependency. We want original statesmanship here, as well as in India, to deal rightly with a trust of such overwhelming magnitude. Let the Secretaryship for India become, I say, a permanent appointment, and instead of giving him an antiquated and nominal Council that does nothing, and never will do anything, give him any number of Secretaries he requires, selected for their original powers and exact knowledge of India, of whom he may make a Council as often as he feels it necessary to concentrate the strength of the India Office upon the perplexing problems he has to deal with. The Civilian bureaucracy are ever telling us that India must not be ruled from Downing Street, but by Simlah. Constitute the India Office aright, and do away with that costly and demoralized incubus at Simlah altogether. No light ever penetrates the recesses of the Simlah records, nor will any ever be allowed to enter them, while the bureaucratic system lasts. India should be administered to-day *from England*, as every Indian bank and merchants' office in India is now ruled. Bring India close to the very doors of Parliament, and give a formal and settled allotment of time to the Secretary of State for India in both Houses, something to correspond with "Government Nights," as they are called in the House. With India in its present condition, arrangements should be made to bring it closer to Parliament a great deal than it now is, while divesting the consideration of its affairs of "party" aspects altogether. The thing is quite possible, and might be done at once. Lord Hartington's Budget speech was a great and noble effort, and makes me regret keenly that he is likely to take no more than a passing interest in India. H.M.'s Secretary of State for India is an appointment yet to be conceived and created. If Mr. Gladstone could but find the time to consider this great need, we might then reconcile ourselves for good to his enforced abstention from the consideration of Indian affairs.



*INDIA GOVERNED BY ENGLAND—NOT BY ANGLO-INDIANS.*

England herself must administer India if our rule is to be of advantage to the people and honour to ourselves. One would think it to be a truism to affirm that the mere handful of Englishmen in India have neither the original intellectual power, the earnest moral purpose, nor the special attainments fairly to represent the nation. No error could be more fatal than the prevailing one that the Indian Civil Service may be regarded as an epitome and reflection of the English nation. They are nothing of the kind. The Service is recruited, and ever has been so, by a succession of youngsters who leave the mother country with their character yet unformed, while that character is developed under peculiar and very unfriendly circumstances. Far too much has ever been made of the worth and the necessity of Indian experience. Valuable and necessary as it is, it would be desirable to dispense with it altogether, rather than abandon India to its uncontrolled guidance, as we now do. Few Englishmen pass many years in India without demoralization of some kind or other, and if the choice lay between abandoning India altogether to the "covenanted mercies" of the Civil Service, and the assumption of its direct rule by Parliament, we should do well to elect the latter. Our present bureaucratic rule of India by a handful of semi-Orientalized Englishmen has broken down, as we might have foreseen it would, and the time has come, when, by the miracle of the telegraphic wire, England should herself rule India in the strength of her own corporate national life and attainments. It is *here*, and not in India, that the intellectual power, the moral purpose, and the special qualifications of the English nation for empire are to be found. India lies outside the English nation, and when men talk of the blessings of "British rule," what they really mean is the freedom from outside aggression, which the material strength of the nation has secured to India, *plus* the more than doubtful advantage of having its affairs administered by a handful of Englishmen who are no true reflection of the national strength, wisdom, and virtue, but a poor and deteriorated and unflattering epitome of all.

When I look steadily at this great country, in the colossal grandeur of its strength, the achievements of its men of science, the enterprise of its merchants, its massive wealth, and the moral purpose and enthusiasm of which it is capable, I cannot doubt that England is worthy to rule the great dependency confided to her care

in Asia. But it is a pure trick of the imagination that invests the Anglo-Indian Civil Service with these qualifications. Were it a reality, we might well despair of our so-called "mission" in presence of its total failure. The truth is, we are ruling India independently of the English nation altogether. We have been persuaded into the belief that the only rule possible to us as a people, is the selection of twenty, thirty, or forty English lads every year as recruits to be drafted into the narrow regimental bureaucracy to which we have absolutely abandoned the task, upon the strength of their own interested assurances that *this* is the only way in which the nation *can* rule it. We simultaneously permit this small bureaucracy to keep their proceedings secret from us, whenever they deem it inconvenient to disclose them. We permit them even to make war, and to depose Princes, and to rule with complete irresponsibility the 250,000,000 of people whose affairs we nevertheless admit are administered by us as a "trust" only. Can we wonder that the mere handful of men to whom we thus entrust these vast responsibilities upon their own assurance that they, and they only, can discharge them aright, should have made a *fiasco* of our rule? At this moment, we cannot point to a single man in the whole Indian bureaucracy who is distinguished either in literature, or as a scholar, a scientist, jurist, or statesman. The latest efflorescence of the Service is represented to-day by Sir Richard Temple, who has left India with the hearty and honest contempt of all classes there, and comes home to speculate upon the chances of his being mistaken in this country for a statesman. Wonder is sometimes expressed that the Indian Services have produced so few eminent men. We have to go back a generation of years to find the last of them, and even then they may be told off upon the fingers. We have no right to expect *many* eminent men to be produced by a body numerically so small, while the system in which they are brought up is fatal to ordinary minds.

Instead of concentrating upon our Indian rule the vast moral and intellectual forces of the nation, we have made the task over to a covenanted regiment which we call the Indian Civil Service, which is numerically far too small to represent the intellectual and moral strength of the nation; while, by conferring absolute irresponsibility upon it under circumstances of constant temptation, we make its demoralization as certain as the fact of their incorporation. And so we have two Afghan wars within forty years, and I know not how many other wars, a terrible mutiny and rebellion, constantly recurring famine in which the people are suffered to die by millions, and at last universal disaffection and disloyalty amongst the Princes, and abject misery amongst the people. It is because

England does *not* rule India, but has delegated her rule to a body of men who, as a whole, have but one thought and one care, namely, to get through their service as pleasantly as possible, with as little actual residence in the country as they can, and as high pay and allowances, that our rule is a shameful failure.

### INDIAN EXPERIENCE.

Now all this must come to an end, if our rule is to be redeemed from its present reproach. England must *herself* rule India in the future, girding herself up for the task with nobler purpose than she has shown in the past, and concentrating thereon all the intellectual power and moral strength she possesses. We have "Indian experience" enough, I should think, in all conscience, and have had "Indian Commissions" enough. All that is to be known of India is already known *here* in London, just as well as it is in India. Simlah has betrayed us vilely and unscrupulously, and will do so as long as we permit her Secretaries to play the nation false, and conceal therefrom the true character of their proceedings. There is not an economic, agricultural, administrative, social, or political question connected with India on which we cannot here in London concentrate a hundred times the intellectual, moral, and special force that are to be found in India, while there is no poisonous official atmosphere here to mislead us. If we want Indian experience, we have it here in plenty, whenever we care to summon it into counsel; while we can bring it from any part of India in twenty days. For myself, I am sick to death of the words, for they ordinarily mean that the most common-sense decisions in the way of action are to be postponed indefinitely, while the double-barrelled Civilian Council, sitting one half in Downing Street and the other half at Simlah, are playing out the theme with variations never to be exhausted. In place of these Councils, which are purely obstructive, nine times out of ten, let the Secretary of State call the experts of the nation to his assistance when he requires enlightenment, and sift the counsels of "Indian experience" thereby. It is English economists, English specialists, English statesmen, English moralists, by whom we must rule India, and not by a half-Orientalized and more than half-demoralized body of Anglo-Indian officials. TEKEL is written pretty plainly upon their counsels, I think, in the light of the present state of matters in India. We want, undoubtedly, a great State Department of Agriculture, as Mr. Secretary Hume says, but it

must be from London that it is administered. The atmosphere of India will choke any new department set up there. We want a department that shall represent England's strength, to deal with the economic and agricultural difficulties that overwhelm us, and which Indian Civilianism has been fertile in producing, but has no power to solve: witness this *fiasco* of a Famine Commission, that might as well never have been assembled at all. Had that Commission consisted of English experts, assembled in London, with power to call "Indian experience" to its aid—which, in this case, would have meant turning Sir John Strachey, Sir Richard Temple, and Sir George Couper inside out—we should have had, long ere this, a Report that would have settled for all time the way in which these calamities should be encountered. I believe it to be essential to reform, that whatever measures are decided upon, should be inaugurated and conducted in London, the Calcutta Departments being allowed no interference with them whatever. And we should generalize this reform, and begin for the first time to rule India with the full intellectual strength of the English people, instead of the decrepit machinery we have set up in India, and left to the devices of bureaucratic skill.

I can well understand that many who have been accustomed to hear the Indian Civil Service highly spoken of—I myself have so spoken of it constantly—will find it hard to believe that my present condemnation of it is not too severe. But things move rapidly in India. In the last four years, we have seen the crime of this Afghan War perpetrated, with its attendant circumstances of falsehood and dishonour; the unscrupulousness of the Simlah departments in their proceedings towards Native prince and peasant alike; and the systematic deception they have practised upon Parliament in every branch of the administration. It is necessary to remember, moreover, that it is less of the ordinary ranks of the Civil service that I speak than of the heads of departments, the clique which constitutes the Government. The Administration seem to have lost all sense of decency and honour in their treatment of the Native Princes, and of common humanity in their treatment of the people. Wantonly engaging in war, they have cruelly neglected famine and pestilence at home. Their finance has been marked by dishonour, trickery, and falsehood; while the instinct of danger has led them to disarm the people and to gag the press. We have marched far in the last four years in India, and the demoralization has become complete. The people of this country can form no just idea, I believe, of what our government of India has come to be. Let me give an illustration

or two of what has come to be its ordinary *morale*. Suppose that one of the morning papers, say the *Times*, suddenly surprised the country by preferring in its leading columns specific and very grave charges against the Superintendent of Portsmouth Dockyard. The article, we shall suppose, bears unmistakable evidence that it has been written, or its facts supplied, by an official on the Superintendent's staff, and that every one in the Dockyard knows that the article must have been written by the Deputy Superintendent. The indictment is of a very grave order, as in addition to other offences, the Superintendent is charged with deliberately permitting material and work of a scandalous order to be put into the ironclads to which the national defence is entrusted. The charges are known to be true in the Dockyard itself, and the fact that the Deputy Superintendent had privately remonstrated in vain with his chief, and that there was nothing left to him but to acquiesce quietly in what was going on, or attempt to awaken public attention to the true state of matters. The article appears; and, instead of the Admiralty ordering an instant inquiry into the facts, the Superintendent is permitted to send a circular order to his staff, requiring every member thereof, on pain of the Admiralty displeasure, to say whether he is the author of the obnoxious article. The Deputy Superintendent refuses to reply to the inquiry, and very properly refers the Superintendent to the editor of the paper. He simultaneously, however, writes privately to one of the Lords of the Admiralty, avowing himself to be the writer, and explaining that no other course was open to him, as his private remonstrances had been ignored, and his object was to force the Government to call a Court of Inquiry into the charges, before which he might appear to give evidence. The charges are true, and are known to be true, but the Superintendent is a "good fellow," and has done every member of the Admiralty Board a service of some kind or other, by appointing his nephews or dependents to subordinate posts in the yard. There is no Parliament, let me suppose, to compel the inquiry, and the Lords of the Admiralty, taking advantage of the fact, send a letter of fierce reprimand to the Deputy, removing him from his appointment, and suspending him from all public employ. And *there* the matter ends; but the Superintendent is told to hang on till the scandal blows over, and then ask permission to retire upon his pension, which is granted him as a matter of course, Her Majesty the Queen being advised immediately afterwards to confer a decoration and title upon him for his long and valuable services.

Now, incredible as such a story must seem to the people of this

country, this supposititious case is *au pied de lettre*, the course which the Government of India has taken in the last three years, in connection with the great Survey Department of India. It is hard to say whether the Public Works Department, or the Trigonometrical Survey Department of India, under Major-General Thuillier, has been the more scandalously wasteful. Any properly constituted inquiry whatever into the administration of the Indian Survey Department would show, on the evidence of its own officers, how utterly scandalous was General Thuillier's long administration. The Deputy Superintendent of the Department (Lieut.-Colonel John Macdonald, now at Poonah) finding it impossible to effect any reform by private remonstrance, wrote at last, at my desire, two or three leading articles on the subject, which I published in the *Friend of India* in 1876. The articles were written at my own suggestion and request, and were published as editorials by me, in the hope of compelling the Government to institute the sorely needed inquiry. The administration of the department had for years been not only wasteful to the extent of millions sterling, but demoralizing and ruinous at the same time to the department itself. General Thuillier was charged in the articles with deliberately passing false survey work against the remonstrances of his own Deputy; and with the publication of survey maps that were pure fudge. At the time when these charges appeared against him in the *Friend of India*, there were positively *three separate and costly surveys* going on in the single district of Midnapore, when one only ought to have been prosecuted. As might have been expected under such a *régime*, work was being passed that ought to have gone into the fire. Now, I made every effort at the time (including a direct personal remonstrance on the subject with Sir John Strachey himself) to get an inquiry instituted; but General Thuillier belonged to what is known as the Simlah clique, and my efforts were useless. I even tried to force an inquiry in the High Court, by inviting General Thuillier to proceed against the *Friend of India* for libel. But it was in vain. There is no Parliament in India, and they know it well; and no public opinion that any of them care for. Every one knew the general truth of the charges, and that the Government did not *dare* to open the inquiry which I persistently demanded. My colleagues and I wrote as pointedly as we possibly could on the subject, but in vain. Colonel Macdonald was ruined and degraded, while General Thuillier was permitted to retire upon a large pension, after years of very gross maladministration. He has cost the people of India millions of money worse than misspent. It is frightfully personal, no doubt, to write in this way; but how

to write in any other, to throw a just light upon what our government of India has been of late years, I frankly do not know. It is not that the men who form the Government are worse than other men; it is that power without responsibility degenerates everywhere into unscrupulousness, when there is but a short step between it and actual corruption.

The people of this country can form no adequate idea of the utter defiance of opinion with which Indian officials of the ordinary type administer the affairs of our dependency. Counsels that in England no one would dare to name, are unhesitatingly put forward in India in the secrecy of the official Bureaus; as, for instance, the gross insult that was offered to Sir Salar Jung at the Delhi Assembly. The man of greatest mark and consideration at that Assembly was Salar Jung, but the Indian Foreign Office had resolved to snub him before all the Princes of the Empire, and they dared make Lord Lytton present him with one of the twopenny-halfpenny silver medals that were given to everybody and nobody on the occasion, telling him that he—the one Native Prince to whom the nation owes more than all others put together—had really been forgotten in the Viceroy's distribution of the gold ones. The insult was as gross as it was keenly felt, and I ask earnestly is conduct of this order to be tolerated, because it is a far cry to India? At present, all idea of national accountability for what is done in the secrecy of the official Bureaus is contemptuously laughed to scorn, because there is no public opinion in India sufficiently strong to hold them in check. As the result it is the general national character, and that only, that prevents our rule degenerating into an unscrupulous and absolute despotism of mere officials. The first Native Prince in India is dirt beneath the feet of the Secretary of the Simlah Foreign Office, and woe to the unhappy Prince who forgets the fact. Let Parliament bring but one of these offenders to its Bar, and the evil will be broken for all time.

#### *CYNICAL CONTEMPT OF THE PEOPLE.*

One of the most unhappy features of the administration is the almost cynical indifference of its members to Native sentiment and feeling. We have come to treat the people exactly as though they were stocks and stones, strangers to the passions, hopes, and fears that agitate ourselves. About three years ago, a hot-tempered

Irish lawyer, who was acting Judge for a few months on the Bench of the High Court of Calcutta, created a great scandal in the city by his conduct of the trial of an unfortunate young Bengalee banker, whom he had, with a great stretch of propriety, directed to be indicted for forgery and perjury, alleged to have been committed by the young man in the Small Causes Court. Janokey Nath Roy, the young man in question, belonged to the well-known family of the Roys at Dacca, who carry on business as bankers and zemindars both there and at Calcutta. The young man was well educated, and highly thought of by his English and native masters. He had been made a Justice of the Peace, and was distinguishing himself by the energy with which he was promoting the educational and social advancement of his community.

In suing a spendthrift and unscrupulous debtor in the Small Causes Court, upon certain promissory notes that were long overdue, the young man had rashly sworn to an incident connected with their execution, into which the most upright witness might have been betrayed without conscious wrong-doing. The incident, it was allowed, had no bearing upon the merits of the case; but the lawyer on the other side, seeing the mistake into which the young man's memory had betrayed him, led him on to swear very positively to his error. The defence was that the promissory notes were "forgeries;" and now that the plaintiff had innocently sworn falsely to an incident connected with their execution, the debtor threatened him with a criminal indictment for perjury if he did not pay him a lakh of rupees; and in spite of the too late repentance of the man for the conspiracy into which he had entered, the young man, Janokey, had formally to stand his trial in the High Court upon an indictment that charged him with "forging" the notes in question, and then perjuring himself to sustain his suit. The evidence made it so clear that the notes were truthful, that the indictment on that count had to be abandoned, when all that the interests of justice could possibly require was that the Judge should have gravely warned the young man before him of the great rashness of which he had been guilty, in swearing hastily to an incident as to which, as he now himself knew, he had been in error. Had it been a young Englishman who was in the dock, or a judge of the most ordinary fitness on the bench, this would have been the end of the trial.

But Acting Justice Kennedy had lashed himself into the belief, or affected belief, that the young man had a natural taste for perjury for its own sake, and should be made an example of. There was



something unpleasantly like malignity in the way in which he conducted the trial, bearing down every reasonable and ordinarily charitable suggestion of the defence, and utterly ignoring the high testimony brought forward to the purity and excellence of the young man's character. He was determined not to let him escape, and charged the jury with the utmost unfairness, after *changing the whole character of the indictment at the close of the trial, to give his proceedings even the semblance of propriety*. The jury were absent for some time, and at last came into court late in the evening with a special verdict; the prisoner was guilty, they said, of giving false evidence, but without intention. This, of course, was a verdict of acquittal. But it was late; great confusion and noise prevailed, and the Clerk of the Court caught only the first word "guilty," from the foreman of the jury; the prisoner's counsel doing the same. Late as it was, the Judge rose in a moment, and in a few passionate and most untruthful words, sentenced the young man to three months' imprisonment with hard labour. It was a sentence of civil death to a man in his position of life; and when his Counsel rose next morning in court, with affidavits in his hand showing that the verdict had been wrongly recorded (the foreman of the jury corroborating the statement), our Judge bounced off the bench in a rage, and refused to hear him.

The case was so disgraceful that I took it up warmly in the *Statesman* (Calcutta). But the young man had to go to gaol as a convict, and in spite of every appeal to the *Civilian Government standing in Her Majesty's place* to undo the wrong, so total is the want of sympathy with the Native, so cynical the indifference to their sufferings, that no redress could be obtained. Had Janokey been a young English merchant, the whole country would have been in an uproar, and his gaol broken open; but being a Native, no enthusiasm was possible in his behalf. I persistently demanded a reversal of the proceedings for weeks, when Mr. Secretary Mackenzie, of the Bengal Secretariat, at last assured me cynically that, for himself, he thought it better that any Native whatever, should "get three months" than that one of Her Majesty's Judges should come to grief. And so the Civilian Government of India, *representing Her Majesty*, instead of opening the prison doors, preferred to sustain the Judge, after going through the farce of asking that Judge himself whether he had really done any wrong to the young man! For consistency, they were obliged to follow the proceedings up by removing the young man from the Commission of the Peace; and after branding in this cruel manner as a convict, one of the most intelligent and hopeful young leaders of the Native Hindu com-

munity, they professed privately to him *that he would be able to live it down by good conduct!*

And this is what our rule of India has come to be by our abdication of our responsibilities as a nation, and by devolving them upon a body of men, whom we never call to account for what they do. I could give instance upon instance of similar scandals under Sir Richard Temple's short administration in Bengal. So gross and incessant were the scandals of his rule, that all classes were ready to hoot him out of Calcutta when he accepted the transfer to Bombay.

## CONFISCATION OR CONTRACT?

THE LAND QUESTION, IRELAND, NOVEMBER, 1880.

THE landlords of Ireland have at last issued an appeal to the United Kingdom against the oppressions to which the English Parliament has subjected them since the Union. It is no longer Mr. Parnell and his followers only, who denounce the Union. The landlords of Ireland, by the united voice of a general Committee of more than 500 in number sitting in Dublin, and with three honorary secretaries and three honorary treasurers to find articulate speech for them, tell us that since the Union has deprived them of the power of holding the majority of Irishmen in restraint, "by the fear of civil war, there is little to induce them to reside in Ireland" at all (pp. 36, 37). In Ireland, they say, "as in every other country in Europe, and in England itself, there is an anti-social, or disaffected class." Before the Union, the "minority of high-spirited, and wealthy, and educated men," whom they represent, know very well how to keep this communistic *canaille* in order, while that pusillanimous England of ours, which has absorbed their powers, can think of nothing but legislation whenever agitation arises amongst them (p. 21). And some 500 of "these high-spirited, wealthy, and educated" noblemen and gentlemen do not hesitate to send forth these views to the world as their contribution to the solution of the Irish Question. In so many words their recommendation is that we should blow the peasantry and their grievances into oblivion with a whiff of grapeshot. And this precious pamphlet is ushered into the world as the deliberate advice of the great body of Irish landlords. How much help the nation may hope to get from the counsels of the landlords in this crisis, is plain enough at last. Let the peasantry err as they may, it is pretty clear that a strong hand needs to be laid upon the landlords.

And now for the general merits of their manifesto, otherwise. In the first place, then, these Irish nobility and gentry in a body, tell us boldly that the Irish peasantry have no grievance whatever. They have therefore no remedy to suggest but the bayonet, a whiff of grape-shot, which this pusillanimous England decidedly will not hear of. These "wealthy and educated" gentlemen can tell you in a word the true cause of every trouble in Ireland. It is the "weeping skies" that hang over it and "melancholy ocean," that surrounds it, on the one hand, and the cowardice of England on the other :—

The evil to which Ireland is peculiarly subjected is the rise of agitation whenever the country is depressed, and the pusillanimous alarm of England whenever an Irish agitation rises. Instead of enforcing law, it begins to think of legislation. It forgets that there are things which no legislation can effect in Ireland. No legislation can remove its western coasts from their proximity to the "melancholy ocean." No legislation can staunch the constant rainfall of its "weeping skies."

Our educated, and wealthy, and high-spirited minority have therefore come to the conclusion that it is only the infernal climate of the island, and the infernal cowardice of its English rulers, that produce an Irish question at all. We ask seriously, whether it is not incredible that 500 Irish noblemen and gentlemen of

the highest rank in the kingdom should send forth a pamphlet of this order as their contribution to the Irish question?

Throughout the pamphlet is simply a passionate protest against every step that has been taken by the English Parliament to ameliorate the relations between the Irish landlord and his tenantry. It has been confiscation, pure and simple, throughout, and from beginning to end. The great legislative measure of 1860, "known as Deasy's Act," with its simple and equitable provisions, was nevertheless, confiscation; Mr. Gladstone's Act of 1870 downright robbery. Irish landlords, it seems, have never asserted the right of eviction unfairly or capriciously (p. 20); at all events, never in late years. And what is the use of Mr. Dillon's appealing at Clonmel to the landlordism of the past? "It is not with times gone by that we are dealing; we are dealing with the present. It is only demoniacs who live among the tombs; it is only ghouls that feed upon the dead" (p. 20-21). And yet, my brothers, it was English "legislation," not coercion, that put an end to this landlordism of the past, concerning all reference to which you are so sensitive and so indignant. And the presumption is that "legislation," and not coercion, is the remedy still needed, in view of the very singular admissions you have allowed in the statement of your case. Thus, you tell us, at p. 25, that "the great bulk of Irish proprietors . . . residing on their own estates manage their own affairs, and being thrown into personal contact with the people, they understand their ways. It is not proprietors such as these that over-let or under-let their lands. *They ask for moderate rents, and their tenantry are satisfied, and their rents are punctually paid.*"

Now, the italics are ours, and we pause. We ask the reader to look carefully at this statement, and to read it once more. We have here a precise and unqualified assurance, made in this grave crisis of affairs, by a great representative body of noblemen and gentlemen, with all the authority and earnestness they can give it, that the great bulk of Irish landlords are considerate and wise landlords, and that the result is that their tenantry are thoroughly contented, and their rents punctually paid. So then the great bulk of the Irish farmers are good and honest tenants, being made so by the considerate and wise conduct of their landlords. What then, is the answer to the enigma which the statement involves us in? Let the reader note the solution of it:—

Paradoxical as it may appear, the present crisis has arisen, not from the severity, but from the leniency, of members of the landlord class. The great Absentee Proprietors, in consequence of their absence, have let their lands on terms so far below the letting value that their tenants are afraid of losing the advantages which they enjoy, and clamour for Fixity of Tenure. The Western Proprietors, on the other hand, with a similar easy good nature, have permitted sub-letting and sub-division to such an injurious extent that families are settled upon plots of ground which are utterly insufficient for the maintenance of human life, and these families demand that their misery should be rooted in the soil.

So, then, it is the landlords, after all, who are the authors of the present state of matters, and the misery of the peasant is it seems an absolute fact. And coercion—a whiff of grape-shot—is nevertheless, the right remedy for England to put into the landlord's hands. To attempt to touch the evils of "absenteeism," or "sub-letting" at monstrous rentals, by legislation will be English pusillanimity. The proper thing is a "whiff of grape-shot" to end the misery of the peasantry. And "the sacred rights of contract," in some way or other, shut us up, it seems, to this one remedy of "grape-shot."

Ah! my brothers—wealthy as you are, educated as you claim to be, and high-spirited as you think your counsels, they are an abhorrence to right-minded

men. The "absentee" landlords' sacred rights of contract! The "sacred right" of demanding payment of rents after three years' failure of harvests, on penalty of eviction! If ever cause was ruined by its advocates, you have smitten your own cause down hopelessly. England will not resort to "coercion," but with legislative purpose to heal and cure the evils you yourselves admit, and are too selfish even to pity. The landlords have no remedy to propose but violence. Themselves admitting, nay, affirming, that it is bad landlordism, either in the shape of "absenteeism" or want of thrift, that has produced the present misery of the tenantry, they nevertheless demand that the State shall maintain what they call the sacred rights of this landlordism against the peasant revolt. To expropriate the landlord who has already divorced himself from the soil by never placing his foot thereon, but spending its substance in prodigal living in far countries, would be to violate the sacred rights of contract, would be confiscation. If the tenantry of this absentee lord fall into ruin under the blight of his rule, shoot them down if they rebel against him; nay, if they but take counsel together how to escape from his hand. This is all the guidance that the flower of Irish chivalry can give to that English people whom, according to this manifesto, they provide with their natural leaders—the warriors, orators, and statesmen who make England great amongst the nations. Is it not just possible, that to substitute the State as landlord in room of an absentee and unthrifty proprietary, might be wiser, more humane, more Christian, more statesmanlike, than to mow their tenantry down with grape-shot? The truth is this landlord manifesto, carefully looked into, is the strongest appeal yet made to the nation to adopt Mr. Bright's proposals in their integrity, and indeed, Mr. Parnell's demand that "private landlordism" should be put an end to once for all, over wide districts of the country. For, while laying the misery of the tenantry entirely upon the shoulders of absentee and improvident landlords, the pamphlet repudiates as impossible every suggestion whatever in the way of remedy. *Fixity of tenure* will not do, they say, for it is confiscation; *periodic re-valuation of rents* will not do, for it is confiscation; *the Ulster customs* will not do, for they are confiscation; *Compensation for eviction* will not do, for it is confiscation. Nothing will do but the maintenance of things as they are—absenteeism, bad landlordism and tenant misery and degradation—by a whiff of grape-shot. And it is the pusillanimity of this cowardly English people alone, that talks of legislation where coercion is the only proper remedy. The manifesto is a disgrace to the entire body of Irish landlords. Let the Ministry heed them not, but go straight forward upon the lines of ameliorative legislation. If it must be so, let them boldly "expropriate" the landlords who have brought perennial misery upon their tenantry, and perpetual embarrassment upon the kingdom. Let the Government take every reasonable step to compel obedience to the law, but let the coercion it *must* exercise be accompanied by strong and adequate legislation, regardless of the warriors, orators, and statesmen sitting in Dublin who have produced this precious manifesto upon the sacred rights of contract; in other words, the sacred right of the landlord to beggar and destroy the peasantry.

THE EDITOR.

## THE IRISH LAND QUESTION.

[By a Colonial Landlord.]

THOSE who wish to understand the Irish land question should read that able and most interesting work, "New Ireland," by A. M. Sullivan, M.P. In chapters xi. and xiv. he shows the manner and character of certain Irish evictions, where hundreds of people who were paying their rents with regularity were turned out and their dwellings pulled down. While honest and industrious tenants are thus evicted and ruined, we should not be surprised when we see them retaliating on their landlords. In these cases on the Scully estate the rent appears to have been £3 5s. per acre, and the tenants must sign a lease binding them to pay the rent quarterly, and to have it always paid one half year in advance. Tenants were also to pay all rates and taxes whatsoever, and to surrender their holdings on twenty-one days' notice, forfeiting, if evicted, all crops in the ground. Those refusing these terms must quit. In attempting to serve a notice of eviction, for refusal of lease, the tenants resisted the service, and a regular engagement ensued—two men were killed, the landlord, Mr. Scully, was severely wounded, and he escaped with his life owing to a suit of chain armour, which caused the exclamation of an opponent, "Arrah! how could the villain be killed, when he wore a helmet on his stomach!"

Mr. Froude, in his able and characteristic article in the *Nineteenth Century* for September, ignores the fact that the Irish soil which was confiscated when the country was conquered by England, and granted to Court favourites, was tribal property. If England had protected the interests of the original occupants of the soil, as she has been compelled to do in New Zealand, where the land was also tribal property (as has been mentioned in a previous article) centuries of warfare and oppression would have been avoided. Even now, if Irish rents were fixed by arbitration for terms of thirty years, or so, it would ultimately be highly beneficial to both parties. Another solution of the difficulty may be suggested, namely, the granting of leases in perpetuity, say at Griffith's valuation, the farms

being twenty acres or more, such leases to be forfeited by sub-division, or arrears of rent. This would lessen the number of small holdings and insure better cultivation; the sale of the smaller farms would enable the tenants to emigrate. As the case stands, tenants have no inducement to improve, but just the reverse. Their position prevents them from having any funds in reserve for a time of distress. In fact, the circumstance of any considerable amount being deposited in the Irish banks—say £30 on the average for each tenant—proves, to the satisfaction of certain persons, that rents are not too high! If rents are not too high on small farms, why should the tenants require to come to Britain to earn money to pay the rent? No doubt the farms are too small, but the tenant's interest therein being ignored, they can neither sell that interest nor emigrate.

Mr. Froude says truly that the produce of the Irish soil could be doubled, but that result cannot be expected while the doubling of the produce by the tenant's outlay leads forthwith to the doubling of the rent. The more liberal tenure of the Ulster holdings is quite as much in favour of the landlords as the tenants. The Lord Chancellor of England has said that "in tenant-right Ulster, since Arthur Young's days, the rental has more than trebled, while in the other provinces it less than doubled." William Stewart Trench, Esq., says: "I am decidedly of opinion that tenant-right is practically in favour of the landlord." Mr. Russell, another land agent, says that "rents are not lower where tenant-right exists." My experience leads to the conclusion that fixing the rents on Irish land by arbitration would not only give present satisfaction, but would result in a great increase of produce and of rental value.

Mr. Froude says the result of the passing of the "Compensation for Disturbance Bill" would have been that certain Irish tenants should not be obliged to pay their rents for two years. Had the Bill passed, Irish landlords would still have had the same means of recovery that exists in Britain. Take as an illustration of the Irish farmer's position, the facts mentioned in the *Spectator* of September 18th, by an English farmer of 1,200 acres (who is also a Yorkshire land-agent), about a district in Galway. He states: "I have no hesitation in saying that the value of the tenant's outlay in money and labour exceeds from three to six fold the unreclaimed value of the fee simple." It is not unlikely that these tenants are now paying rent on their own improvements. If two disastrous seasons should disable them from paying their rents, Mr. Froude would hand over to the landlords the tenant's interest, which is of much greater value than the fee. Of course, such tenants are unable to contend with their land-

lords in the law courts. One would think that a temporary bar to eviction would be reasonable under the circumstances. If the mortgagee were to seize and hold the landlord's property for a debt of one-twentieth of its value, he would say that circumstances alter cases.

Mr. Froude says, quite correctly, that we have unfitted the Irish people for freedom, and that we have never given them a firm, just, and consistent Government. We have insisted on transferring to Ireland our laws and institutions without considering their suitability. Of Queen Elizabeth's time he says: "Ireland wanted first a vigorous police, and next some effective spiritual teaching." The Irish have now a vigorous police, and they have in the past, paid for, but not received, "effective spiritual teaching." The conquest of a country does not entitle the conquerors to impose their creed upon the vanquished. He tells us further, that the legislation of that time resulted in the slaughter of tens of thousands of men, while tens of thousands of women and children crawled into the woods and perished of hunger. We learn also that after the downfall of the Stuart dynasty, Irish industry was deliberately destroyed by Britain. A Navigation Act ended Irish shipping. The Woollen Act killed their manufactures. The intense injustice of these laws produced a natural animosity which united Protestant and Catholic against the common oppressor. Such legislation led to smuggling, and a general defiance of all law. Both the Irish Church and Government were on a corrupt foundation.

It must be admitted that Protestant ascendancy has failed in Ireland. We have not yet tried the effect of equal laws, and the ascendancy of a righteous Government. We are told that obedience to the law should be enforced. I submit that it is equally imperative that the laws should be just and equal. Even the Land Act of 1870 gives only seven years' rent on eviction, but in the latest sale reported from Ulster, seven years' rent would be only £6 13s., though the market value of the tenant-right is £16. The Irish people can see that such legislation is but an instalment of justice. I may repeat the fact that according to the evidence of landlords and agents before the Devon Commission, the average value of tenant-right in Ulster is £16 10s. per acre. Mr. Froude says that after 1798 the moral authority of the Protestant gentry was almost extinguished. He thinks that Ireland had not enough of fire and sword at that time! He considers a Protestant ascendancy indispensable in Ireland, quite independent, it would appear, of its "moral authority." The ascendancy of a Protestant Church in Ireland, which was a receptacle for clergy whom they dared not to



promote in England, confirmed the people in the Romish faith. The more liberal policy adopted towards the Romanists in Canada has resulted differently. Irishmen can forgive the Papal See for handing them over to England, but they cannot forgive the proscription of their faith by their conquerors.

Mr. Gladstone is condemned for disestablishing the Irish Church and passing the Land Act, owing to Irish agitation. If there is no agitation, it is alleged that there is no necessity for reform; if there is agitation, no reform should be attempted while agitation continues! There is still too much cause for agitation in Ireland. The rack-rents claimed by many absentee landlords would be paralleled if we were to hand over the soil of Ceylon or Mauritius to supporters of the British Government, and let such owners spend what they could exact from the cultivators of the soil where they pleased, without spending anything on their property in improvements or otherwise. Without agitation we could not have had Catholic Emancipation, the Reform Act, the Ballot Act, the Irish Church and Land Acts, the Burials Act, nor the Repeal of the Corn Laws and Test Acts. Those who object to agitation should be ever ready to remove the causes by which agitation is produced. If we put down agitation but refuse to grant reforms, we may expect rebellion, if not revoultion. The Land Laws of Britain are bad, and the Irish Land Laws are worse. A vast extent of British land is being deserted by the tenants, as they have been working it for years at a loss. A small Berkshire property was bought forty-two years since for £13,000, and was let for many years at a rent of £550. Being vacant for some years, it was sold recently for £6,500, and is now let at £250. It is admitted that a reduction of rent that would meet present requirements may leave no income to some landowners, but the fault rests with such owners or their predecessors who encumbered the property. British rents have risen 23 per cent. during the last thirty years, but foreign competition now demands a still greater reduction.

The Irish Church was a scandal to religion and morality, and was dealt with accordingly. The Irish Land Laws were partially reformed, but are not yet framed on equitable principles. Neither party can reasonably object to arbitration upon rent. The system too generally adopted in Ireland, of charging an increased rent on the higher value that arises from the tenants' improvements, is most unjust. Some owners allow their tenants the benefit of their outlay for five years; others advance their rents forthwith. I have shown that Ulster tenants have thus increased the rental value in 300 years—some nineteen, others twenty-nine-fold. Some Irish owners

are reducing their rents to Griffith's valuation. If this were generally done, and leases were given in perpetuity on those terms, we might have peace and prosperity in Ireland. It would be still better if tenants who could pay 25 per cent. above that rate would thus be able to secure the fee in thirty-five years. If the Irish people, who are so deficient in trading and manufacturing resources, were enabled, as peasant proprietors, to consume their own produce, instead of sending it abroad to pay the rent, this change, together with the improved cultivation, would probably enable Ireland to support double the present population.

It is implied by Mr. Fronde that Mr. Gladstone does not understand Ireland. Those who do understand Ireland were astonished at his knowledge of the Irish Land Question. The Land Act would have been much more beneficial to both parties but for the obstruction of the landlords. Mr. Walter, M.P., estimates the proportion of English rent that is due to the landlord's expenditure at one-third. Mr. Caird estimates the landlord's outlay at £15 out of £50 in the capital value of the land. It is this one-third, or the £15 out of £50 that many Irish landlords wish to appropriate. Mr. Caird, in speaking of Ireland, asks whether it "can be said that landlords generally have expended any capital in providing necessary buildings on their farms; in that respect there has been no change (since Arthur Young's time), *but as regards the rent the advance has been enormous.*" The Devon Commissioners, who were all landlords, say: "It is admitted on all hands that, according to the general practice in Ireland, the landlord builds neither a dwelling-house nor farm-steading, nor puts fences, gates, &c., into good order before he lets to a tenant. The cases in which the landlord does any of these things are the exceptions." We find landlords writing in the *Times* whose statements are just the reverse of these facts. Even where improvements by drainage or otherwise are effected by a State loan, the tenant has usually to pay principal and interest, and is probably charged five per cent. in perpetuity on said loan as an increased rent, after having repaid such loan with interest. Unfortunately, there is a persistent endeavour on the part of many landlords to reap where they have not sown. I have said, on the contemporary authority of the "Montgomery Manuscripts," that the original rent, under the Ulster settlement, was one shilling per acre. Irish, and especially Ulster tenants, had by their labour and outlay increased the rental value tenfold, at the lowest estimate, by the time that Griffith's valuation was made. A noble landowner whose family experience goes back to the plantation of Ulster, estimates such increase in value at elevenfold in 250 years. There are extreme

demands by certain parties on both sides, but reasonable men can see their way to a settlement of Irish difficulties, provided that each party would submit to an equitable arrangement. The just rights of the landlords should be protected, and the results of the labour and outlay of the tenants as fully protected. If the views of either party were thought unreasonable, arbitration should be the means of arriving at a fair rent.

In dealing with Irish questions, we have allowed gross abuses to exist for centuries; and when dealt with, they were only partially removed. The Church Act, for instance, might have included the separation of the Theological Faculty from the Dublin University; while disestablishing the Irish Church. The Land Act, again, should have afforded equal protection to landlord and tenant. It is unequal laws which give rise to agitation and agrarian crime. I venture to say that fair and honourable dealing would produce as good results in Ireland as in other countries. The Irish people have many excellent qualities, but the antagonistic feelings of race and creed which we have too sedulously cultivated completely debar Protestant religious teaching amongst the Celtic population.

The "Portsmouth Custom" on a Wexford estate affords free sale and gives the tenants leases for thirty-one years and one life. Tenant-right on that estate is worth from ten to fourteen years' purchase on the rent, and there has been no eviction on this estate of 11,000 acres for thirty-seven years. The system affords security of tenure, free sale, and moderate rents. The owner is much better off than where ordinary southern landlordism prevails. The country (as well as the landlords and tenants) suffers in consequence of bad land laws. I may give an Australian illustration of the benefits of ownership as compared with tenancy. A tenant of the Crown having held a tract of country there for twenty years, at a rent fixed by arbitration, and having doubled its rental value by improvement, bought the fee, and by a very moderate outlay, again doubled its rental value. Another Crown tenant who bought land of better quality upon his run, by a moderate outlay trebled the rental value. This work would not have been done but for the purchase of the fee. The result was beneficial to the public as well as to the individual. As most Irish proprietors have not the means of either holding their estates on fair terms, or of improving them, Parliament should provide for the greatest good of the greatest number. It is the common practice to speak in disparagement of the Irish people, but Lord Desart, writing in the *Times*, says, "The Irish peasantry are just and honest, and far from stupid." As regards rents he proposes a revaluation to settle the rent. Mr. Dillon, M.P., has made a more

practical proposal on a small scale: in one case he offers a lease of 999 years at 1s. per acre above Griffith's valuation. Another farm he offers for the same term at a rent to be fixed by arbitrators mutually appointed. Such proposals, if generally made, should lead to an amicable settlement of the Irish land question.

It has been alleged that agricultural produce has increased in value since Griffith's valuation was made. We know that the rental value of British land, which had increased 23 per cent. in thirty years, has quite lately declined to a still greater extent. Many farms are now let at a reduction of 40 per cent., which does not indicate higher prices for produce. Not only are such prices lower, but both taxes and wages are higher. It is suggested for consideration whether Irish landlords, who are habitual absentees, should not pay all rates and taxes. Such owners, as they spend their rents abroad, give the transaction the aspect of a tribute paid by Ireland to a foreign country. British, as well as Irish landlords, should anticipate political changes, and make terms while they can. The Disraeli radical extension of the suffrage points to manhood suffrage, which, in Victoria, has resulted in a land-tax of 20 per cent. on the rental value of estates worth more than £2,500. This tax has been imposed expressly for the purpose of "bursting up" the larger holdings, and the tax is to be increased if necessary. The result of our borough suffrage, as shown by the late inquiry, was that votes were sold for 6d. and a pot of beer! This seems to indicate the necessity for a suitable qualification for voters, as well as larger electoral areas.

With reference to Griffith's valuation, Sir Richard says: "Having completed the valuation of Londonderry and Antrim, it corresponded very nearly with the rental of the London Companies, and of the large landowners, but was 25 or 40 per cent. under the rental of small proprietors; taking the average of the whole, the valuation proved to be about 25 per cent. under the gross rental of the country." It may be reasonably alleged that the rents imposed by the larger holders should be the standard rather than the rack-rents exacted by the small owners. This valuation was made from 1832 to 1851, and therefore chiefly before the repeal of the Corn Laws. There was no such competition in those days as we now have with foreign produce, nor, as has been mentioned, were rates and taxes or wages nearly so high. Many owners are still satisfied with a rent, which does not exceed Griffith's valuation, and this generally enables their tenants to live in comfort.

The case of the Maories of New Zealand has been mentioned. They still feel aggrieved, and a commission which has just reported

on their claims has decided in their favour. They have kept up a passive resistance for some time, and the prisons are filled with them. An impartial inquiry may show that Irish tenants have also good grounds for complaint. The Orangemen of Ulster are disposed to claim a monopoly of loyalty and conservatism. I shall, therefore, give an extract from the speech of the Chairman of a late Orange meeting at Donacloney :—

What does tenant-right practically mean in Ireland at the present time ? It means that the tenants' money, the tenants' skill, and the tenants' interest in the soil belong to and are violently taken possession of by the landlord. How ? you may ask. I will give you the facts of the case, which are not disputed. The present custom on several estates in Ireland is to charge 5s. or 6s. per acre on a change of tenancy, or on the death of a father, who goes down to his grave committing and commending his children to the mercy and love of God, and to the kindness and clemency of the landlord and all others. Terrible, however, to tell, the first act of many landlords is to put their hands into the orphans' pockets and thus become deliberate robbers. Now, what will this practice end in ? I answer—In the complete absorption and destruction of tenant-right, if, indeed, it does not end in a bloody grave and a fearful revolution, whose prime cause is the unsatisfactory and unjust position of the land question. And yet those landlords (who are well known to us) come before the country at election times with the cry of tenant-right in their mouths, as if they were public benefactors. The defence of such a practice is as lame as it is wicked and unjust.

To sum up the case : According to Sir R. Griffith, the rents imposed by the smaller owners were from 25 to 40 per cent. over his valuation, and also beyond the rents of the large proprietors. I find by "Tuko's Irish Distress and its Remedies," that upon thirty-five small farms near Westport, a reduction of 40 per cent. on the rent would bring it to Griffith's valuation. An English landlord complains that the offer of farms at a reduction of 15 to 50 per cent. on the rent does not secure tenants. Taking three Australian sheep farms at random, I find the rent imposed by the State reduced by arbitration from £10,500 to £6,000. Either submitting the rent to arbitrators mutually appointed, accepting Griffith's valuation, or selling the combined interest on joint account, would be infinitely better than the chronic warfare that exists in Ireland. The landlords might reasonably conclude that tenants who have at their own cost, increased the rental value tenfold, may fairly claim the benefit resulting from such outlay incurred in the future. Landlords who have exacted 30 per cent. beyond a fair rent for thirty-five years have thus been paid the value of the fee besides the proper rent ; but let that pass. We must not conclude that little was done by the Irish tenants in reclamation. We learn from "Boate's Natural History of Ireland," and other sources, that after the devastating wars that followed the Conquest the country became a "continuous

forest." I have seen a heavy forest in America upon land that had been out of cultivation only forty years. It was a condition in leases in the valley of the Bann, in Ulster, at one time, that the tenants should burn wood, not peat, so as to clear away the forest. In some of our colonies the cost of clearing forest land is from £8 to £10 per acre; but after 250 years there would be nothing to show for this outlay. I condemn and detest the horrible murders and outrages that are perpetrated in connection with the Irish land agitation. The wickedness and folly is not confined, however, to one party. Landowners, by injustice and oppression, in too many cases, begin the quarrel. Then we have the Rev. Mr. Kane, Rector of Tullylish, proposing that for every agrarian murder a few priests or agitators shall be shot. The Rev. Dr. Craig, speaking in the Diocesan Synod in Dublin, expresses the hope that the "time will soon come when a Protestant army will sweep disaffection from the land." At a recent meeting of landowners in Belfast, southern agitation was very strongly condemned, but there was no proposal as to the removal of the grievances which causes that agitation. As regards crime in the United Kingdom, the *Pall Mall Gazette* says:—

The proportion of the criminal classes, in and out of prison, taken together is about half as large in Ireland as in England and Wales. The proportion of convicts is considerably below one-half, and persons in places of punishment not much more than one-half. Moreover, while the proportion of inmates of reformatories is about the same, that of children in industrial schools is as 2½ in Ireland, to 1 in England and Wales, showing a prospect of still further diminution of crime in the next generation. As regards peculiar classes of crime we find that under the head of offences against property with violence, Scotland is about six times, England and Wales about 2½ times as criminal as Ireland; and under the head of "offences against morality" the proportion is as 12 to 5 against Scotland. It is fair to add, in the category of manslaughter the proportion is as 7 to 5 against Ireland, and in favour of Scotland; while under the one head of malicious injury to property it is nearly 5 to 1. Under the very general head of "minor offences" the figures are again favourable to Ireland in the proportion of 3 to 4 as against Scotland.

The condemnation of the present Government by the leading agitators shows that oppression makes wise men mad. In conclusion, I correct a mistaken estimate in a former article of the capital on deposit in the banks of the United Kingdom, exclusive of cash and current accounts. I had reckoned the amount at £170,000,000, but find, by the *Economist*, that such deposits average £520,000,000. Much of this capital could be most profitably used in developing the resources of the Irish soil.

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## MR. CAIRD AND THE GOVERNMENT OF INDIA.

THE silly optimism and blind credulity of public Home opinion in all matters relating to our Indian Empire are strikingly shown in the comments of the Press on the recently published correspondence between Mr. Caird and the Government of India. The late Government solicited Mr. Caird to act as one of the members of the Commission appointed to inquire into the phenomena of Indian Famines, and at the same time "Lord Salisbury expressed his opinion that apart from his special duties as a member of the Commission, advantage to the Indian cultivator might be expected to result from his inquiries, and from the advice which he would be in a position to tender to Her Majesty's Government." Accordingly, on his return from India, Mr. Caird drew up for the information of the Secretary of State for India, a report on the "Condition of India." The observations in this report fall under two heads—those which record facts, the results of Mr. Caird's personal experience; and, secondly, suggestions for the removal of what Mr. Caird believes to be defects in our present system of governing India. Unhappily for Mr. Caird, he is guilty of not believing that India is a country where infallible intelligence is occupied in ruling the best of all possible worlds; and the consequence has been that the press—London and Provincial—have fallen upon him as though he were a public malefactor. Appended to his report on the "Condition of India," is a criticism upon it by the Government of India. This criticism, as I shall show presently, is of the shallowest and feeblest character; and the very fact that it proceeded from the Government of India ought to have rendered the Press cautious in accepting its statements. It was certain that the Government of India would oppose a flat denial to both Mr. Caird's facts and Mr. Caird's suggestions, for the sufficient reason that to acquiesce in them was to write its own condemnation. No one really anxious to learn the truth could have failed to perceive this; but then, unhappily, the very last thing which the British public desires to know about India is

the truth. What they want are excuses which will enable them, without remorse of conscience, to shirk their responsibilities towards it, pictures of India which will not shatter into fragments the "Fool's Paradise," which they have substituted for the reality. Hence a criticism, bearing the signatures of such signal champions of strict accuracy and unimpeachable facts as Lord Lytton and Sir John Strachey, is accepted as if it were a mathematical demonstration. Hence, also, Mr. Caird is, as it were, "collared" by those faithful guardians of national self-complaisance, the editors of the daily journals, and hustled out of sight as a disorderly and obnoxious personage.

If people would only consider for a moment, they would perceive that there is a very strong *à priori* argument why the statements of Indian "pessimists" are likely to contain a considerable measure of truth. It is so clearly against the interests of the "pessimists" to insist upon them. Who are the men whom the Indian Government delights to honour—whom it rewards with lucrative appointments, with stars, crosses, pensions, public banquets, &c? Assuredly not "pessimists." The Indian official who points out what is evil and what is amiss in our Government of India, does so at the almost certain ruin of his official prospects. Who, for example, are the men who have reaped a rich harvest out of the war in Afghanistan? Are they those who fought against it from the beginning, who strove to the utmost of their power to save the nation from the sorrow, and the shame, and the blood-guiltiness inseparable from it, and whose prescience has been so completely justified by the event? Not at all. The men who have profited by this huge and costly iniquity are the men who aided in its perpetration, who either would not or could not see the consequences of the policy they were helping forward. The fact is that in our Indian Empire there is no profession which a man can adopt in which the risks are so small, and the returns so certain, as that of an "official apologist." These are the men whom the king delights to honour. And, on the other hand, there is no occupation so profitless—nay, so ruinous—as that of the so-called "pessimist." Even when his predictions are verified it profits him nothing, because what such a Government as ours in India detests above all things, is the independence of mind which originally inspired them.

Apart, however, from all personal considerations of this kind, if Englishmen did not wilfully shut their minds against the truth, they would perceive that nothing short of a perennial miracle could have preserved British rule in India from many and grievous defects. During the time we have been governing India, we have



also been governing a variety of other countries. How stands the record of our rule in these? The (now) United States found our rule so intolerable that, rather than submit to it, they freed themselves, at the cost of a long and terrible war. The Canadas were kept in a state of irritation just upon the verge of rebellion until, by giving them representative government, we gave up our "meddling and muddling." In South Africa, British rule has been remarkable for nothing except a series of wars against the Kaffirs, which are not to be surpassed in the history of mankind for their utter injustice. And lastly, there is Ireland—that admirable illustration of British sagacity, justice, and humanity. But when we turn from the effects of British rule in all these countries to the effects of British rule in India, we are required to believe that the same people who have failed so signally in every other quarter of the globe, have in this one most difficult country achieved an unalloyed success. In India we have exhibited none of that harshness and rapacity which drove our American colonies to revolt; in India we have shown none of that disregard of justice and mercy which marks our wars against the Kaffirs; in India we have entirely escaped from the blind selfishness, the unsympathetic stupidity which have characterised our dealings with the land and the peasantry of Ireland. To render this astonishing miracle still more miraculous, the task which devolved upon us in India was as stupendous a one as the imagination could well conceive. We undertook, the inhabitants themselves remaining in a state of complete passivity, to bestow upon India laws, institutions, and national character, to transplant the life of the West to the land of the East, and thereby regenerate Hindostan. The means we adopted for working out this tremendous revolution were as rude and futile as the task itself was gigantic and complicated. They consisted in shipping annually from this country a certain number of young gentlemen delegated to govern the people of India under the safe security of British bayonets. Successive generations of the young gentlemen thus shipped off, are good enough to assure us that they govern India exceedingly well; that, in truth, such governing capacity as theirs has never before been witnessed in this world; that this is the only way in which India can be governed; and that any attempt to curtail their powers, or extend the privileges of rational manhood to the people of India, will be attended by consequences of a very appalling character. And we actually believe the wild fantastic assertion. We lack the intelligence to perceive that the extraordinary self-complacency of these gentlemen, their sublime contentedness with themselves and their work, is a plain proof that they

have never apprehended the nature or the magnitude of the problem they imagine that they have solved. Anybody who, like Mr. Caird, ventures to state that the problem is not yet completely solved, we immediately hustle out of sight and hearing, and heap contumelious epithets on him, declaring especially that in making such an assertion he is guilty of a quite intolerable "arrogance." In a word, to quote expressions I have already used, a combination of silly optimism and blind credulity constitutes what is called public opinion in relation to our Indian Empire.

Mr. Caird's report on the "Condition of India" divides itself into "facts" and "suggestions." The "facts" are the following: The available good land in India, is nearly all occupied. The produce of the country on an average of years is barely sufficient to maintain the present population and make a saving for occasional famines. Scarcity deepening into famine is thus becoming of more frequent occurrence. It is unsafe to break up more of the uncultivated poor land. The diminution of pasture thereby already caused, is showing its effect in a lessening proportion of working cattle for an increasing area of cultivation. The pressure on the means of subsistence is rendered more severe by the moral disorganization produced by laws not adapted to the people. The people are not only dissatisfied with our legal system, but, while the creditor is not much enriched, the debtor is being impoverished by it. Our officers do not know the Natives as they used to do, when the Government was less centralised. The class of hired labourers has largely increased throughout India; but in consequence of the rise in wages not having kept pace with the rise in prices, the condition of this class in the agricultural districts is becoming increasingly hopeless. The agricultural system is to eat or sell every article the land produces, to use the manure of cattle for fuel, and to return nothing to the soil in any proportion to that which is taken away. The consequence is that Indian agriculture is becoming simply a process of exhaustion. An exhausting agriculture and an increasing population must come to a dead lock. No reduction of the assessment can be more than a postponement of the inevitable catastrophe, and no attempt by the Government or its officers merely to shift the burdens will meet the twofold difficulty.

So far Mr. Caird's remarks stand upon a solid foundation of fact. The Government of India makes a feeble attempt to question the accuracy of some of the statements, but (as I shall show) its assertions are flatly contradicted by the reports of its own officers. When, however, Mr. Caird passes from setting forth obvious and unquestionable evils to suggesting remedies for their removal, he

passes into a debatable region. The main objection we have to bring against this—the suggestive—part of his report, is that his suggestions are made too succinctly to allow of a proper estimate of their value. Mr. Caird does not give the reasons or the facts which have led him to his conclusions, or any hint as to how the present constitution of the Government of India is to be transformed into that which he desires to substitute. I do not think that Mr. Caird is to be blamed for his omission. His report would have expanded into a considerable volume, had he written out his opinions with all their supporting reasons. What I desire, in the following pages, to direct attention to, is the manner in which the Government of India has met these suggestions.

Mr. Caird considers that a first step towards improvement in India would be made by a large measure of decentralization. He would have each of the six great Provinces made directly responsible to the Home Government, but otherwise independent. He would, at the same time, secure the maintenance of unity and authority by giving the title of Governor-General to the Governor of the great Province of Bengal, with power in case of emergency to summon a Council of Governors of Provinces, and of the Commander-in-Chief of the Army to his aid. To this suggestion the Government of India makes reply as follows:—

In the first place, we may notice that the arrangements which Mr. Caird advocates would be almost exactly that which obtained towards the end of last century, and which was condemned as unworkable, before the Punjab, Burmah, the Central Provinces, Oudh, Sind, or Assam formed part of British India. At a time when it took weeks for letters to pass between Bombay, Madras, and Calcutta, and when British India contained little more than half its present area, it was found absolutely necessary to make the several provinces subordinate to the Governor-General in Council—that is, to the Supreme Government of India. It seems to us that no valid reasons can be adduced for, while many very strong reasons exist against, alteration of the system, which was forced upon the Court of Directors more than a hundred years ago, which successive Acts of Parliament have repeatedly ratified, and which is quite as necessary now, as it was in the year 1772.

The passage is conceived and written in the very spirit of the great Noodle oration. A hundred years ago the situation in India was this: The British territories were divided from each other by powerful independent States, with the rulers of which British Rule in India was engaged in a chronic struggle for existence. Instructions and orders could not be received from England to meet a sudden emergency in less than nine months or a year. In order, therefore, to give unity and decision to British action against a common enemy it was indispensable that the supreme authority on all matters should

be concentrated in a single person. But the position now is entirely changed. The formidable enemies which then menaced the existence of British rule in India no longer exist. England itself, which was then distant from India, a six months' journey at the least, has now, by means of the telegraph, been brought within six hours of it. Whatever other arguments, therefore, there may be against Mr. Caird's suggestion, this particular one, that it was not practicable a hundred years ago, is plainly absurd and irrelevant.

Again: Mr. Caird earnestly advocates a larger employment of Natives in the higher branches of the public service, both on grounds of justice and economy. To this the Government of India replies as follows:—

• We entirely agree in Mr. Caird's view that justice to the people of India, as well as motives of economy, require that we should extend the employment of Native Indians in the higher branches of the public service. . . . On a recent review of the Covenanted Civil Service in the provinces of the Bengal Presidency we found that the number of European officers employed in the higher civil offices had already been reduced from 929 (the number in 1874), to 838 (the number now in the ranks). We have before us, and have referred to the local governments for consideration, a scheme of recruitment whereby the total strength of Europeans in higher offices might ultimately be reduced to 571 for the whole of the Bengal Presidency. . . . This total will barely supply two European officers for each district, besides providing for absentees and occupants of superior offices. The result would be that some districts would be wholly manned by Native officers, and Natives would enjoy greatly extended powers and responsibilities. In our opinion the scheme could not be extended more rapidly without danger and detriment to the State.

It requires some experience of the dexterity in "shuffling" acquired by the Supreme Government in India, to understand the meaning of this paragraph. It reads as if the Government of India were really anxious to see Natives admitted to the "higher branches of the Civil Service," and is doubtless intended to be so understood. To the experienced eye it reveals a determination just the opposite. "The number of European officers employed in the higher Civil Offices has already been reduced from 929, the number in the year 1874, to 838, the number now in the ranks." The inference which the unwary would draw from this diplomatic statement, appearing where it does, is that this reduction represents a similar number of Natives admitted to these same higher offices which have been vacated by Europeans. They would be grievously mistaken if they did. The reduction represents so many appointments abolished, because they were found to be in excess of the needs of the administration. As regards the admission of Natives to the higher branches of the Civil Service, all that the Government of India has done is to draw up "a scheme of recruitment for consideration," and when

this "scheme" has been properly "considered," and carried into effect, say about the time of the Greek Kalends, "Natives will enjoy greatly extended powers and responsibilities." To assign any more definite date than the Greek Kalends for the carrying out of this precious scheme, could not be done, so the Government of India opines, "without detriment and danger to the State." And herein the Government of India is quite right. "The State," as understood by the Government of India, means the "higher branches of the Civil Service," as at present manned and recruited, and it is obvious that the admission of Natives could not be carried out without "danger and detriment" to the present monopolists.

But Mr. Caird, in his report, speaks of the notorious unpopularity of our courts of law among the Natives, of the widespread ruin and disaffection they have caused throughout India, and "the moral disorganization produced by laws affecting property and debt not adapted to the condition of the people." The facts are notorious. No one acquainted with India would dream of denying or doubting them. There is no thoughtful Indian official who has not lamented their existence, and acknowledged the political danger which they entail. The reader of the second article on "The Peasantry of India," which appeared two months ago in this review, will understand something of the magnitude of this peril. But the Government of India, sitting serenely on the Himalaya hills, is, if we are to believe its own statements, in entire ignorance of what is known to the whole of the rest of India. It has taxed its immense sagacity, but without avail, to discover what that "moral disintegration" can be to which Mr. Caird thus ominously alludes. The British Empire in India, as beheld by its discerning eyes, is one entire and perfect chrysolite; and the administration of justice is as flawless as all else in that favoured dominion. That a few ill-conditioned minds may be dissatisfied with it, the Government of India is not prepared to deny; "since Slander's mark was ever yet the fair," and it is in virtue of their excellence that our courts of law are obnoxious to certain small sections of the people in India. This is how this immaculate Government meets the calumnious aspersions of Mr. Caird:—

It is certainly true that the laws of British India compel people to pay their debts, and such compulsion is distasteful to the indebted classes of the population. But liability to pay just debts is not peculiar to English law. This duty was inculcated (? enforced) by the Mohammedan and Hindu laws, and it is difficult to see how any civilized community can exist without the recognition thereof.

Here the Indian Government intends to be sarcastic; but the

effort cannot be considered successful. If (as the Indian Government admits) the obligation to pay just debts was enforced by Hindu and Mohammedan courts of law, it is clear that it is not on this account that our courts of law are unpopular. But the Government then proceeds :—

We apprehend that our courts of law are sometimes unpopular with classes and persons. The explanation is not far to seek. We fear that among the people who feel such dissatisfaction are large numbers of the landholding and cultivating classes. Under British rule rights and property in land have acquired a saleable value which they did not before possess. The holders of such rights have availed themselves of the power of raising money on the security of land. They have often become involved in debt, decrees have passed against them in the courts, and their lands have been sold up in execution of decrees. Such people, no doubt, dislike our courts and our judicial system.

Mr. Caird had made an observation that "it is plain to any careful observer that the people are dissatisfied with our legal system." On this the Government of India had remarked that they "found it somewhat difficult to discuss" such a generalization, because they did "not know upon what data or facts" it was founded. It now appears that this ignorance was merely feigned, for here we have both the fact admitted and the cause explained. "Our courts of law are unpopular with large numbers of the landholding and cultivating classes," because they find themselves deprived, by the decrees of these courts, of their lands and other possessions. The inference which the Government of India desires to suggest is, that for such decrees these large classes have only their own improvidence and indebtedness to blame. The actual fact is (as I have shown in my articles on "The Peasantry of India"), that the ruin of "these large classes" has been caused primarily by the stupidity and rapacity of the Government itself, which forces both landholders and cultivators into the clutches of the money-lender; and secondly, by the enormous privileges conferred upon these money-lenders by the manner in which the law is administered.

In the article on "The Peasantry of India," I have given a variety of striking testimonies on this matter, but there is an abundance of the same kind still in my possession. Sir George Edmonstone, formerly Lieutenant-Governor of the North-west Provinces, traces the evil directly to the facilities given by our courts of law for the successful practice of chicanery and fraud. He writes as follows :—

Another cause, no doubt, of the pecuniary embarrassment of the landholders, and the subsequent alienation of their ancestral property, is . . . . the knavery and rapacity of the professional money-lenders. . . . . A striking instance of

this kind is given in the letter of Mr. C. Currie, the late officiating Collector of Bolundshuhue, and there is not a district in which very brief inquiry would not discover dozens of similar cases. It is deplorable that knavery of this kind should be rampant, and that *its success should be due in great measure to the action of our own institutions.*

More emphatic still is the testimony of Mr. P. S. Melvill, formerly one of the Judges of the Punjab Chief Court. He had been employed in the Punjab from its earliest days as a British Province, and became so impressed with the magnitude of the evil and its extreme danger to the Empire, that, in the year 1872, he addressed an official warning on the subject to the Government of India. In this, he says that he "knows it to be a fact that in the Jullundhur and Hoshiarpore districts, the very richest in the Punjab, where the assessment is admitted to be light, land has been, and is now being daily, transferred by sale or mortgage to money-lenders, in payment of old and new claims," without so much as a suit having been instituted, "the reason being that the debtor entirely despairs of any relief in our courts." I will now ask particular attention to the following story, as an illustration of the manner in which these immaculate courts of law compel people to pay what the Government of India euphemistically designates as "their just debts." The Thakoors, or landowners of a certain village, having got into debt, engaged (on pain of eviction) to pay off the debt, amounting to 6,000 rupees, by annual instalments of 500 rupees. This is what happened. The teller of the story is Mr. C. H. Crosthwaite, whom I have mentioned more than once in my articles on "The Peasantry of India," as a revenue officer of large experience and sound judgment:—

For five years the instalments were punctually paid. Two thousand five hundred rupees had been paid off, and the Thakoors began to think themselves out of the wood. In the sixth year, however, it happened by some accident that they were a few days late in paying the money into court. The money-lender, who had been watching them as a cat watches a mouse, petitioned at once for the execution of the original decree. The Thakoors pleaded that the delay was only trivial and accidental, but to no purpose. . . . No one, from the judge downwards, made any allusion to the justice and equity of the case. . . . The question before the court was not whether a most grievous and iniquitous wrong was about to be done, but merely whether the letter of the agreement had or had not been infringed. They wanted justice, they were given law. The pinching and parsimony of five years had all gone for nothing. They had lost at one moment all their land, and all their money they had paid besides. They knew that if their land was put up to auction it would fetch five or six times the amount due on the land. This, however, they were told could not be done. The money-lender had got a decree upon their land under certain conditions. They had not kept those conditions; and the money-lender was entitled to have his

decree executed . . . . . They left the court with frowns upon their faces and curses in their hearts. They still, however, as they said to themselves, had their lands. They had lost their proprietary rights. They could no longer boast themselves landowners. But the old fields—over which they had toiled year by year—still remained to them. No one could turn them out of the fields. They had still to learn what English law was. Before many days had passed, down came the money-lender. . . . . to settle the rents of his new property. He began doubling and trebling their rents. They sternly refused to agree with his terms; and he left them threatening vengeance. After a few days, ten or twelve of the most prominent landowners were served with summonses to answer suits for ouster, that had been filed against them in the Collector's Court. They pleaded long possession and occupancy right. The money-lender produced his decree. The collector informed them that when they pledged their proprietary rights, they had pledged their cultivating rights also, and the one went with the other. They were summarily ejected from their lands, and were glad to accept them back again at the money-lender's own terms. The money-lender's rental now stands as follows :—

Rental ... ..	Rs. 1218
Revenue paid to Government ... ..	„ 300
Profit... ..	Rs. 918

His claim with interest and cost amounted to 6,000 rupees. Out of this he pocketed 2,500 rupees in hard cash. For the remaining 3,500 rupees he has acquired an estate that has yielded him a net profit of 918 rupees for the last four years; not a bad investment on the whole. As for the Thakoors. . . . . they have not murdered the money-lender as yet. But if any one wishes to see rage, hatred, and despair pictured on the faces of living men, let him go some early December morning to the village of Birorce, and see the Thakoors shivering round their little fire of dung and straw in the village square.

These Birorce Thakoors are examples of those “large numbers of the landholding and cultivating classes,” who, as the Government of India admits, “dislike our courts and our judicial system;” and the impartial reader will, I think, be of opinion that they are abundantly justified in doing so. But, adds the Government of India :—

On the other hand, the educated classes, the great majority of the trading and industrial classes, and also the ryots or petty occupiers of the land, find our courts protect them from injustice, violence, and oppression. We believe that the bulk of the population value this protection highly. We observe that when it is proposed to remove any class of rights or claims from the cognisance of the courts to the discretion of executive officers, there is always much outcry and protest amongst all classes of the people who may be concerned.

Mark the singularity of the reasoning here. Our courts of law cannot be unpopular, because whenever it is attempted to substitute in the place of them the caprice of individual executive officers there is always a great outcry from all classes. The fact that there can be a lower deep of injustice than that of our courts



of justice has not yet dawned upon the intelligence of the Government of India. Individual caprice, if they are to be judged by their own statements, they appear to consider a preferable state of things to the reign of British Law, and one which nothing but the opposition of a benighted population, unaware of its own interests, deters them from establishing. One change, however, they *do* admit as desirable, and perhaps feasible. It is to "limit the power of appealing, for which the Natives have a strong regard." In their answer to Mr. Caird, this "power of appealing" constitutes the one definite flaw which the Government of India is able to admit in the machinery of our Indian Administration. It is characteristic of our method of ruling the people of India that the one thing which the Government of India is anxious to see abolished, is a practice for which they confess that "the Natives have a strong regard." The moment that any institution or practice wins the genuine approval of the people of India, it becomes, on that very account, "suspect" in the judgment of the Indian bureaucrat. The following is the explanation of his hostility to this "power of appealing": It needs that a man should have lived a considerable time in India to understand the vindictive hatred, as towards a personal enemy, which the Indian bureaucrat feels towards free and popular Government. And, as a necessary concomitant to this feeling, the Indian bureaucrat hates law quite as much as he hates liberty. His idea of law in India would be to reduce the judicial service in each district to a subordinate branch of the Executive. So long as the "right of appeal" continues this is impossible. The decisions of judicial officers are liable to be reversed by the judgment of Higher Courts of Appeal, but they cannot be set aside by the mere *fiat* of the Executive. Abolish the power of appeal, and the consequences would be that district judges, no longer subject to the control and supervision of the High Court, would fall under a strong temptation to fashion their decisions in conformity with the wishes of the Executive, by whom the greater part of the defendants who appear before them have been committed for trial. The abolition of the power of appeal would in fact go a long way towards the substitution of individual caprice, for that reign of law which, as we have just seen, the Government of India considers the inferior regimen of the two. It is an equally clear perception of this consequence which makes the Natives cling so passionately to this "power of appeal." In it lies the only possibility of so much as a partial escape from the harsh and arbitrary action of individual caprice. I know it is the fashion to speak of our Indian Civil Service as if every member in it were

an incarnation of benevolence and justice, and of nothing else. But it is really time to have done with nonsense of the kind. The war in Afghanistan, the exploits of Sir Bartle Frere, and the eulogies thereon of Sir Richard Temple, are in point of fact typical of that special variety of benevolence and justice which inspires our Indian Services, military as well as civil. The gallows which Sir Frederick Roberts caused to be erected in Kabul, is emblematic of the kind of law which they consider best suited to the needs of an Oriental people. And it is no exaggeration to say that but for the "power of appeal," whereby the judicial branch of the Public Service is linked into a separate department independent of the Executive, our district courts would, before long, be little better than a useless and costly machinery for giving effect to the foregone conclusions of the Executive.

Mr. Caird, in his remarks on the "Condition of India," says that the soil itself is undergoing gradual deterioration. In so saying he gives expression to a notorious fact. But of this, as of everything else going on in the dominions committed to its charge, the Government of India affects to be entirely unconscious. It writes as follows:—

The question whether any deterioration of the soil is going on has been long and widely debated, but the Government of India is not aware that any decisive evidence has been produced on either side.

This astonishing Government, then, it would seem, has never heard of the vast tracts of land sterilized by our irrigation canals. But the best commentary on the above remark will be furnished by the following extract from a book lately published by the chief of the Indian Department of Agriculture, as the result of his observations during the last fifteen years:—

That the gradual (and, perhaps, later, suddenly rapid) deterioration of the major portion of our cultivated land is, unless a totally new system be inaugurated, inevitably impending, can be denied by no one conversant with the subject. *It is impossible for Government to disbelieve this; they may think, and perhaps rightly, that it will last their time, but they cannot doubt as to what they are preparing for their successors. . . . Yet again, from another and distinct source, ruin and desolation, more palpable and speedy in its course, though more limited in its operation, await vast tracts in North India, unless the voice of reason can gain a hearing, and science be allowed to guide agriculture. . . . Come it quickly or come it slowly, the ultimate result here also is certain; and unless a radical change is effected in existing arrangements, we know, as definitely as we know that the sun will rise to-morrow, that the time must come when some of the richest arable tracts in Northern India will have become howlingly saline deserts.* (Hume's "Agricultural Reform in India," pp. 42-43.)

Could anything be in more complete opposition than these words

and those which I have quoted from the reply to Mr. Caird? And it must be remembered that the official whose duty it has been to keep the Government of India acquainted with the agricultural condition of India is the very Mr. Hume, from whose book I have made this extract. The Government of India goes on:—

*The principal steps we are taking to check or remedy the deterioration of the soil consist in efforts to spread a knowledge of improved methods of agriculture, of the use of manures, and of the benefits of deep ploughing and fallows; we are also increasing the supply of firewood, so as to set free for the land manure and refuse which are now largely used as fuel.*

I request particular attention to the words in the above extract which I have italicised. They refer to the operations of the Forest Conservancy Department, and a brief account of what is really meant by the benevolent expression, "increasing the supply of firewood," will set in a striking light the candour and ingenuousness which mark the whole of his reply to Mr. Caird. In speaking of the operations of his Forest Department, I limit myself, from want of space, to their operations in the Bombay Presidency.

Until within recent times, such an item of receipt as Forest Revenue was unknown in India. At present, in the Bombay Presidency, it amounts to more than twelve lakhs of rupees, or upwards of £100,000. "Increasing the supply of firewood" means, therefore, an additional burden to that amount on the already overburdened shoulders of the Bombay ryot. The way it has been managed is this. From time immemorial, the peasantry of that Presidency enjoyed certain rights in reference to the forests around them. They were at liberty, without charge, to cut wood for fuel, for the erection of fences, for the construction of agricultural implements, &c. So matters went on until the year 1839, when the English Government, on the plea of building ships, forbade the indiscriminate cutting down of teak and black wood. However, no material privilege of the tenantry was injured until 1847, when a regular Forest Department was organised. This was followed by an interdict forbidding the cutting of timber altogether, but prohibiting any interference with the right of the peasantry to gather fuel. At the same time, all intention of imposing a tax on trees was disclaimed. In 1866, a Circular was issued, which was nothing else than an act of high-handed robbery. It declared all trees on the lands belonging to ryots, to be not their trees, but the property of Government. This harsh order was followed up by another in 1870, which deprived the peasantry of their right to gather fuel in the Government forests. This right was now put up to auction, and

sold to the highest bidder; and ryots who continued to exercise their ancient right of gathering fuel were prosecuted for theft in the criminal courts. Thus we find what the Government of India delicately describes as "increasing the supply of firewood" was in actual fact a confiscation of private property and ancient right, and the imposition of a new tax upon a starving and destitute peasantry. Want of space compels me to end here for the present. But there is hardly a single paragraph in the Government of India's reply to Mr. Caird, which is not as misleading as those which I have subjected to examination in the foregoing pages. But enough, I think, has been done for my present purpose. That purpose is merely to give one more proof of how completely the spirit of prevarication has got possession of the Government of India. This reply is the handywork of the same ingenious spirits who invented the "fiction" of "the insult" to Sir Neville Chamberlain's Mission; who first denied that there was famine in the North-west Provinces where men and women were dying of hunger by thousands a day; who, when that was no longer possible declared they had provided relief in abundance for a famine which they had just asserted did not exist; who produced a series of imaginary surpluses; who estimated that an army of 70,000 men could be kept in the field for a whole year, at a cost of £1,000,000 sterling; and who, either in person, or by the lips of highly salaried official apologists, are never weary of repeating that they are the men, and that wisdom will die with them. It is impossible to ruffle the immeasurable self-complacency of these gentlemen, or convince them that there is anything in the entire continent of India which has not been included in their philosophy. To all inquiries, to all demonstrations, they will reply, as in effect they have replied to Mr. Caird: "We govern India, and that being so, the Government is beyond the reach of criticism as a matter of course. Be good enough not to interpose yourself a second time between the wind and our nobility."

ROBERT D. OSBORN.

## THE ZULU KING AND PEOPLE.

THE English public—or, at all events, a portion of it—is anxious to “hear the last of” the Zulu War, the Zulu King, and all concerning him. This is not, perhaps, an unnatural desire, seeing that it is far from pleasant to have the fact again and again forced upon our notice that we have behaved exceedingly badly, and without the slightest excuse, towards a people who had never acted in any but the most friendly manner towards us. Were the wrong an absolutely irreparable one, past and gone, so that no act of ours could undo any part of it, or had we even done all that lies in our power to repair it, perhaps it might be well to leave the dead past alone; not to rake up its ashes, not to publish our own misdeeds. But if, as a rule, a national crime is almost irremediable, it is very far from being so in our present case.

The “national crime” may fairly be considered an established fact. A very large proportion of Englishmen have openly acknowledged that the Zulu war, with all its direful consequences, was as unnecessary as it was unjust; few, even of those who vainly strive to prove it a necessity, profess that it was just; perhaps those only do so now who were personally concerned in the matter. It has been commonly said that the Zulu war threw out the late Ministry, and we have certainly impressed foreign Powers with the idea that it has been universally condemned amongst us. The *Nation*, an American paper, of June 10th, says, “In Great Britain itself this war has been condemned with almost entire unanimity.” In fact, we have confessed our fault; but of what value is such confession, unaccompanied by the slightest attempt at reparation? What faith can be placed in our utterances, since, although as with one voice we have disowned the iniquity, we still allow it to be carried on? We have, as it were, rent our garments and cast ashes upon our heads in the sight of neighbouring nations, but meanwhile we calmly persist in the course which we profess to deplore, and are careful, amidst our grief, not to unclose one finger of our hold.

What can we do? We cannot bring the dead to life again—

neither the noble English leader, who, with his brave little band, gave their lives in the vain hope of covering their comrades' retreat from Isandhlwana, nor the many other gallant men who fell on that and on other days; nor yet the thousands of untutored Zulus, who, in their unswerving devotion to their king and country, deserve the name of heroes too. These are all in better hands than ours, and can suffer no further wrong.

We cannot bring the dead to life again, and we cannot even restore at once the faith in England's word which, until last year, characterised the Zulu people; yet although we cannot do even this latter at a stroke, there is much that we may do towards it, and towards regaining their gratitude and good-will. There are many thousands yet remaining who groan under the tyranny which we have imposed upon them, and for whose relief, if our protestations of indignation and contrition are anything more than empty words, some decided step should at once be taken. A large proportion of the Zulus having been slaughtered, the remainder are placed under a Government which is repugnant to them; and their King, whom we now know to be an innocent and worthy man, a remarkably good specimen of his race, is a captive in a distant country—distant, at all events, to the Zulus, who know nothing of sea-voyages.

It is already plain that Sir Garnet Wolseley's settlement of Zululand is as great a failure as it deserved to be, from the carelessness and ignorance with which it was made. Of the petty chiefs set up to rule by that undoubted general, but doubtful statesman, eight at least earnestly desire the return of their King; another, John Dunn, is naturally looked upon by the Zulus as a traitor; and yet another, the honest and faithful Basuto chief Hlubi, with his gallant little band of horsemen, while thoroughly deserving some recognition for their services from the Government, is about the last man who should have been placed in authority over the Zulus. In the first place, Hlubi cannot speak a word of Zulu, though many of his followers can; and in the second place, this little body of Basutos have cherished a bitter feeling against the Zulus since the disaster at Isandhlwana, in consequence of the death of their master and leader, Colonel Durnford, to whom they were singularly devoted.\* The

\* Less than a year ago Hlubi came to see the present writer, and brought a Zulu-speaking Basuto, with him to act as interpreter. The writer, who speaks Zulu, but not the language of the Basuto, endeavoured earnestly on this and other occasions to soften the bitter, revengeful feeling nursed by these poor, faithful fellows (and, unhappily, encouraged to the utmost by many white men) by

Zulus themselves are thoroughly dissatisfied with the settlement, and the statement triumphantly made of late as a proof that English interference is already bearing good fruit, namely, that a good many Zulus are leaving their country to seek work and wages in the colony, helps, if correct, to prove that we have made their own country uncomfortable to them.

It was asserted beforehand by those who certainly ought to have known something of the matter—Sir T. Shepstone and others—that the Zulu monarchy would fall to pieces as soon as touched, that the people were groaning under the sanguinary yoke of their King, and would be thankful to escape from it.\* Lord Chelmsford entered upon the campaign declaring that “we have no quarrel with the Zulu people,” while at the same moment he was sweeping off their cattle, and shooting down the herdsmen who resisted;† and although, before very long, he threw off the hollow pretence, yet again, at the end of the campaign, when the whole nation had been made to feel our enmity to the full, when we had slaughtered without stint and tortured without mercy, Sir Garnet Wolseley once more echoes the parrot cry, “We have no quarrel with the Zulu people.” In fact, towards them our expressed intentions were of the kindest; we only wished to relieve the Zulus from the intolerable tyranny in which they lived.

The results have completely falsified all predictions. Blind leaders of the blind were those who encouraged Sir Bartle Frere to go to war. The Zulu power did *not* fall to pieces when touched; the Zulu army did not desert their King and come over to us in a body as soon as we had crossed their borders. This, it was eagerly explained, was only because the unlooked-for success of his generals at Isandhlwana had given the King a temporary popularity and influence over

pointing out in how different a spirit he whom they thus lamented would have wished them to act, of whom it had already been written, “A soldier! prompt at duty’s nod, but leaving vengeance unto God.” At that time, however, it was useless to talk to them on the subject.

\* Complaints have been made that all Cetshwayo’s family are greatly annoyed and ill-treated by Zibebu (one of Sir Garnet Wolseley’s kinglets), in whose territory they were placed, and who had appropriated the cattle which should have supported the King’s children, and insisted that Umpande’s sons themselves should work (e.g., build a kraal) for him, saying that if they had not begun before “the next moon” he would turn them out of his country. Zibebu had also ordered that all Cetshwayo’s personal effects should be burned or buried (the Zulu custom after a person’s death) as the King was now dead; and further, that in future no Zulu living in his district should swear by Umpande, or by Cetshwayo, or by Cetshwayo’s mother, but by Zibebu and his father and mother.

— † Pp. [c. 2242] pp. 4, 5, 6, 7 and [c. 2308] p. 39.

the people, which would vanish when a reverse came, as come it must, sooner or later. At last it came; the Zulu army was dispersed at Ulundi, the King a fugitive for his life, all his power gone. Now was the time for the people to show their hatred of the fallen tyrant. \*What was there to prevent their betraying him into the hands of his enemies, and so buy their own safety? Nothing but loyalty and love.

We all know what took place. The Zulu people (against whom still we had no quarrel!) were treated with the utmost rigour, nay, with a barbarity which is a disgrace to us all \* in order to force them to betray their King; yet they would not do it, and it was found necessary to frighten a woman before the pursuers could get upon the track of the fugitive King.

Still some persistent supporters of the war maintained, that while Cetshwayo was alive and uncaptured, his people could not divest themselves of the idea that he might yet return in power, and therefore dared not wrong him, lest he should retaliate upon them at some future time.

But what can these ingenious people find to say to the latest chapter in Zulu history? The mail† from Natal brings us the strongest possible proof of the dissatisfaction of the Zulu people with the present management of their country, their devotion to their King Cetshwayo, and the glaring falsehood of the accusations which have been brought against him.

On May 24th, a large company of Zulus, including two of Cetshwayo's brothers, and (with attendants) numbering over 200, arrived at Bishopstowe, on their way to the Government at Maritzburg. No such deputation had ever come down before, nor had any of the King's brothers ever visited Maritzburg. It appears that a number of Zulu chiefs and Headmen had been to Mr. Osborn, the resident in Zululand, and began to state their complaints to him, when he stopped them, saying that he was not put there to hear such complaints. . . . he was appointed only to hear and see whether Sir Garnet Wolseley's laws were properly carried out! They then—without entering further into the matters about which

\* "They got Umbona down on the ground in a crouching attitude, and kicked him with their boots all over his body, so that he was all over bruises and brought up blood in consequence; and they burnt him on the breast with brands taken out of the fire, the marks of which are only just healed over."—From account of treatment of a Zulu to force him to betray the King, given by the heads of the Zulu Embassy to Natal, in May, 1880.

† Written in August.



they had come—asked leave to go down to the Natal Government, which he granted them in the form of a “pass,” to proceed to Maritzburg, “in order to pay their respects to his Excellency.”

After several attempts they obtained an interview with the Administrator of the Government, and stated to him the business on which they had come, viz., to make certain complaints as to the treatment they received in Zululand, but especially to ask for the restoration of Cetshwayo to Zululand under any conditions which the British Government might think fit to impose. They were referred back again to Mr. Osborn, who would be instructed to hear all such complaints, and report them in writing to the Natal authorities.

It is to be hoped that the poor fellows will receive eventually some good results from all this weary sending backwards and forwards, involving, and perhaps intended to involve, great loss of time, as well as of hope and spirit. And in order that there may be any such results, it is well that the statement and request of the Zulu Embassy should be generally known and understood. The nation was powerfully represented by those who composed the Embassy, the principal persons being Ndabuko, only brother of Cetshwayo by the same mother, and Shingana, his half-brother, with other important members of the royal family of Zululand accompanying them. Three of Sir Garnet Wolseley's thirteen chiefs sent representatives of themselves and their people, and stated that four others desired to do so, but were prevented, either accidentally, or through fear of getting into trouble, and that many other chiefs were of the same mind.

It is a striking fact that the foremost to entreat for the return of Cetshwayo is the man who might most readily put forward a claim to the throne on his own account—Ndabuko, the brother already mentioned, being himself the next heir. He is described in letters from Bishopstowe as a grave and dignified person, over six feet in height, and in every way a fine specimen of his people. The party remained at Bishopstowe until June 5th, being detained there owing to the elder prince ailing for some days, and his horse breaking down. During this sojourn good opportunities were afforded of making inquiries, from persons of rank, and likely to be well informed, as to certain points on which Sir Bartle Frere had repeatedly brought very grave charges against the King. The information obtained from the chief men assembled together corroborates what has already been said in defence of Cetshwayo, and gives new light on several important subjects.

1. The charge against the King of arming his people with guns, with the intention of attacking either Natal or the Transvaal, is

entirely denied, and it appears that he somewhat unwillingly permitted the introduction of fire-arms through the persuasions of John Dunn, who evidently made a good thing of it himself.

2. The King never sent an Impi against the Boers. At the time when Sir T. Shepstone went up to the Transvaal, a message reached Cetshwayo that "Somtsen (Sir T. Shepstone) was going up among the Boers, and it was feared that they might be stiff-necked, and that he might be in difficulty. Cetshwayo must, therefore, send a force to the border, to be ready to help him if necessary." And this, they said, was all he did. And as to the force sent by the King into or towards the disputed territory in 1878, it was to keep order, if possible, on the border, and the "military kraal" (so-called) which it attempted to build was, as the Government was told at the time by Colonel Durnford, R.E., "being constructed that order may be kept amongst the Zulus here residing, who owe allegiance to the Zulu King alone, and in the interests of peace. . . ."\*

3. The charge of killing girls for disobedience to the marriage laws was discussed, and the Zulu princes gave a detailed account of each one of the (eight) cases which had really occurred, showing that in no single instance was the King responsible for what was done, having indeed expressed his displeasure at the action taken in the matter by some of the chiefs and great men, and his sympathy with the bereaved parents.

4 and 5. The further charges against the King of continually killing his people without trial, and for trifling faults, or for none at all, were utterly denied by the princes and chiefs. They said that, far from this accusation being true, Cetshwayo has always shown a merciful disposition. During his father's life-time he made a practice of saving the accused by asking that they might be given to him. He then sent them to a certain kraal to belong to his own people. When he began the practice, this kraal consisted of three or four huts only, it now has four circles of huts, and every man in them is an accused *umtagati*,† whose life Cetshwayo has saved. He has always contrived to protect the accused as much as possible, and eleven kraals were mentioned by name as cities of refuge to which he was in the habit of sending those "smelt out" by the witch-doctors, in whom, indeed, he seems to have had but little faith.

6. On being questioned about Cetshwayo's formidable reply to Sir H. Bulwer's message about the killing of girls, which was trans-

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\* (2144, p. 237).

† Evil-doer, or, frequently, wizard.

lated to them from the Blue-book, they expressed the greatest astonishment and incredulity. "Was it on paper?" they asked. Being told, "No; it was brought by messengers, by word of mouth," they asked again, "Who brought it?" and recognized one of the two names mentioned as that of a man who had left Zululand for a crime, and is now living in Natal. "But," said they, "he could never have been sent with a message to the King. We never heard of it. When did they come? What Indunas were in attendance? Who received them?" When told that they were said to have been received and answered by the King at a private audience, they ridiculed the idea, saying, "Who could possibly have got to the King by himself without being seen? They would first go through the Indunas, and would then be taken by the Inncekus to the King. It is impossible. We never heard of such a message. . . . No! if you ask us about that message, we say that to us it appears a pure invention; and that the people who carried it were, as it were, ploughing in winter, preparing the ground for the crop to be sown in the spring—preparing for *this*!"

From the above, it appears that the message, described again and again by Sir Bartle Frere as a "brutal and defiant answer," and so often used as a powerful argument against the King (although it rests solely on the unsupported statement of two messengers from the Natal Government, one of them a man of no character), was probably never sent by the King at all.

The words quoted above were spoken by Shingana, a younger half-brother of Cetshwayo, Ndabuko, the elder prince, saying only a few words now and then in a quiet, dignified way. But he now took up the word, speaking evidently under the influence of strong feeling, till his voice shook with emotion. He said: "No; we do not understand it. For there has never been known one like him among us Zulus before—so good, so kind, so merciful. Our fathers, who were old when we were born, all say so; and we, who have grown up with him till we are as old as you now see us, we have seen no one like him. For those three kings who were brothers, our fathers, they killed people, great and small, and for a little thing, a mere nothing—it was their custom. But he is of an entirely different nature; he shrank from shedding blood. And if a wrong or insult were done to himself, he would never kill for it. Nay, if a man carried off one of the royal women, he would not kill him, but said, 'Let him marry her properly, then!' Our fathers killed their relations too, they made nothing of them. But he—he collected us all who were the children of his father, and gave us all our head rings, and told us to marry, even us lads, and he made marriages

also for the girls, our sisters, whereas Mpande had forbidden them to marry, saying, 'If they marry, we shall be having everybody belonging to the family of Senzangakona.\*' But he, our brother, took us all under his arm, saying, 'Let the children of my father be happy!' He never killed, except for grave offences; the whole country swarms with people who owe their lives to him, and who fled to him as the merciful prince who did not kill. He never attacked any one; he stayed quietly at home as he was advised. He never wronged any one. There is none like him—none!"

Here he stopped, almost breaking down, and the others assented with a heavy sigh.

Umkungane, maternal uncle of Cetshwayo, gave the following account of the treatment of the King as a prisoner:—

"I was there at our death" (*i.e.* the capture of the King). "I was in the hut with him when they surrounded us."

"Where did you leave him?"

"I never left him; he sent me to get some snuff for him. They surrounded us about mid-day, and took us that night to a kraal. They shut us inside a hut, with nothing either to eat or drink, and set soldiers with guns to stand round it, and did not let us out next morning until they were all on horseback ready to start. They went on at once, till at mid-day we stopped at Umtungweni, a kraal of Mnyamana. Here the white people ate, and one and another took one of their little breads [biscuits] from his pocket and held it to the King, who took it, and handed it to me, who ate it; he never tasted it. We went on, Mkosana in front, then the King, behind him Sigadi, then mounted white men. I was last of the string, for he had told me to take care of the girls. But he was very tired; his leg pained him, and the skin was rubbed off his toes with walking till they were quite sore. The white men kept hurrying us on, till at last Sigadi lagged behind, doing it with a view to making his escape. They went in front of him, urging on the King, with their horses almost on top of him, till he called out to us, 'Where are you, my people?' When I heard that, I left the girls and ran forwards to get between him and the horses; but they fired at me—here's the mark [of small shot] upon my breast—and struck me, and drove me back, and the horses went on driving and annoying him.' But when we came to a stream and had to cross it, I managed to get in behind him, and the horses worried me, which did not matter.

\* The royal house.

"Then, when it got dark, and we were going through thick bush, Sigadi disappeared, slipping into the bush, and the white men fired, and fired, after him. Then another disappeared, and another, they firing always after them, until eight men and boys and one girl had disappeared. I do not know that any of these were killed,\* but one was killed afterwards. The King had asked leave to send me to fetch him some snuff; but this was refused, and they offered him a little tobacco, which also he handed to me, and told me to watch for an opportunity to go and get some snuff. At last, late at night, we reached the kraal Undasi. 'Here,' said he, 'will be your opportunity!' and so it was; for a great crowd of people, white men and Natal Kaffirs, came out to look, having heard that it was the King, and I slipped away. I heard afterwards, from one of the party, that a young man . . . tried to escape, but was shot and killed there, at Undasi, and that the next day, when they reached the Black Imvolosi, the white men stopped and slaughtered a beast, saying, 'the King must be hungry.' They offered him the *inkonyama* [royal tid-bit] and said that he must eat quickly; but he merely looked at it. So they said, 'He refuses it,' and put him at once into a waggon and took him on. For he had told them that he 'could not go so fast on foot, he was too tired;' said they, 'then he should ride;' but, he said, 'that was impossible; as he had never tried to mount a horse since he was a lad.' They insisted, and he refused, and then they laid hands upon him to force him to mount, until he shook them off, and they gave it up. 'And we Zulus,' said he, 'we held our breath—we could scarcely contain ourselves—to see that, and we unable to do anything!' All this I heard afterwards.

"But when I left the King I came to his kraal Ukubaza, to one of his mothers who lived there. I got the snuff, and wished to return to him at once. But she asked, 'Do they give him any food? With what does he moisten his throat?' And I told her, 'They have given him no food.' 'Then,' said she, 'stay here till daylight, that I may send you to him with a gourd of *ishwala*' [native beer.] So she persuaded me, and I stayed. But as I was going next day with the snuff, and two boys carrying the *ishwala*, we met a man, who said, 'O, you are there, are you? Where are you going to?'

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\* The Special War Correspondent of the *Times of Natal*, dating Ulundi, August 31st, 1879, writes: "Escort with Cetshwayo just arrived; King walked into camp; has only twelve followers, of whom five are women. Dragons captured originally twenty-three; but Friday evening eleven tried to escape; five were shot, others escaped. . . ."

You won't find him at Undasi . . . They have put him into a waggon and taken him away alone by himself. By this time he is at Euhlabatini.' The boys, who were carrying the *tshwala*, fled on hearing this, and I wished that I was dead. . . . And after some days I met the son of —, whom I had left with the King, and I asked him, 'Have they killed him?' And he said, 'No. I left him alive. But they were taking him on to the sea. They gave us young men gray blankets'—and truly he was wearing one—'and the girls too have all of them blankets; they are not killed.' Then my prayer was that I might be with him—that wherever they took him I might go, and be killed, if he was killed, by the same death with which they killed him. And that is my prayer still. And truly, without him, we have no wish to remain above ground."

It is no longer possible to deny that all arguments for going to war with the Zulu King on behalf of the Zulu people have fallen to the ground. The heart of the nation is with the King, and while he is a captive in another land the Zulus will never settle. There are elements of danger, or at all events of trouble, in the situation; and unless the King is restored to his people there will undoubtedly be disturbances in the country. Sir Garnet Wolseley's "settlement" will not stand much longer, and England's choice lies now between Cetshwayo as King, with a British Resident, and an independent Zulu Kingdom, not friendly as before, but burning for revenge. Their Embassy shows, in fact, that the nation is not broken up, even by the loss of their King; and who can say what they may not attempt to revenge their injuries, now that the restraining influence of Cetshwayo's rule is removed? They may, perhaps, make some of the attacks upon Natal, their refraining from which under their late King was a matter for surprise to the whole world.

Our only *safe* and *wise* course, as well as our only just and right one now, is to restore the Zulu King to his people, with whatever pretence of magnanimity and generosity, with whatever pomp and show of power we please, and under whatsoever restrictions and conditions it may be thought wise to impose.

As a just and honourable nation there is no other course open to us, and if we do not take it—and that soon—if we allow this man, whom we have wrongfully attacked, and now unjustly detain captive, to sicken and die under a restraint contrary to all his previous habits of life, we shall deservedly fall under the contempt of the civilized world.

The common answer to any suggestion as to the restoration of the Zulu King is, "Oh! that is impossible;" but no sufficient reason, or no reason at all, follows the assertion. I challenge the

production of any reason for keeping Cetshwayo a captive for another month, which cannot be demolished completely by any one who has studied the subject.

One of the feelings predominant in the Zulu King was a firm belief that the continuance of his own power and well-being depended to a great extent on the good-will of the British Government. It has been apparent in his words and in his deeds—in every message received by the Natal Government from him (with the exception of the one repudiated on his behalf by his people) and notably in his forbearance towards his enemies, through long years of encroachment and annoyance, in deference to English counsel.

It was not necessary to strengthen this belief in the power of England, but at all events it will not be lessened now that he has been forced to try his strength against us, and has been beaten. Let him then return and rule the Zulus once more, and we shall have a grateful people for our neighbours, who will forget the many wrongs we have inflicted upon them in their thankfulness for his return.

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\* In his own country, the Zulu King was in the habit of taking a six miles constitutional to keep down the family tendency to stoutness which he inherits. In his confinement at Cape Town he has been allowed no exercise whatever.

## EAST INDIANS.

### AN APPEAL BY A MISSIONARY.

WE are not quite sure that the exact meaning of this designation is generally understood in England. It is applied to a certain stratum of the population of Hindustan proper, numbering somewhat less than a hundred thousand, and the section so named consists of a mixed race arising from intercourse between natives of the country and persons from European lands, chiefly from Portugal and the British Isles, and are hence called "Eurasians" (Eur + Asia). They are further called "country-born people"; but this term is likewise applied to Anglo-Indians—*i.e.*, persons born in India of English parents. Sometimes also they are termed "half-castes," but never except through ignorance or intentional rudeness. They are, therefore, what in the Southern States of America would be described as "people of colour," embracing what would there be meant by mulatto, quadroon, octoroon, etc. In Ceylon they are usually called "Burghers"—a term which commemorates the occupancy of the island by the Dutch, and tells of intercourse between them and the native people.

The class of persons so designated represent consequently every conceivable stage of mixture of blood and every conceivable shade of colour, from the red or reddish brown of the pure native through all the stages of fairness up to the healthy hue of the Scotch. In connection with this point some remarkable and unlooked-for phenomena occasionally transpire. Thus it not unfrequently happens that the extremes of colour appear in the children of one family and of the same couple; we have even known instances in which some of the members of a family have been so fair that they might be taken for persons of unmixed European descent, while others of the same family have been so deeply committed to the native colour that they have all their lifetime been taunted by the natives with the imputation of having abjured the religion and customs of their ancestors for the sake of aping the dress and manners of the con-



quering race. Curiously enough, it sometimes happens that East Indians whose countenances do not reveal so much as a trace of native colour become the parents of children whose colour, visage, and hair betray at a glance the Indian side of their ancestry; so that in the event of marriage with an East Indian, however free from "colour," there is always a likelihood of the colour of the children relentlessly proclaiming facts which their immediate relatives may have been fondly hoping would now pass from memory. This fact is borne out by a case that occurred within our own knowledge, and a misunderstanding of a painful nature arose between a couple whose first child was perfectly fair while the second was as dark as the child of a native.

As might have been anticipated, pride of colour is apt to be with the East Indian, a distinct characteristic. As a general rule it may be said that no Englishman sees anything in his mere colour to be particularly proud of; he may think of it for a moment, and it then vanishes as a matter that does not awaken any interest. The East Indian, on the other hand, cannot so easily banish from his mind a consciousness of the difference between his own particular shade of colour and that of the people, especially the people of his own class with whom he meets. The circumstance would be the less noticeable if the comparison were confined to the two extremes by which they are surrounded, the genuine native on the one hand, and the European on the other. The fact is, however, that the comparison of colour is almost entirely limited by them to persons of their own race; the least shade of colour either way being among many of them an occasion of invidious remark. Parents, hence, watch with deep if not anxious interest for the exact shade of colour which is to mark their offspring. What may be the reason for this sensitiveness on the subject of colour is a point on which it is easy enough to dogmatize, but not so easy to clearly determine; as, however, it is a point which affords very considerable scope for ingenious conjecture, there have been, as will have been anticipated, a variety of different opinions expressed regarding it. One thing is only too painfully evident, and that is that in the mind of the East Indian there is associated with the question of his colour something far different from a mere consideration of race, nationality, or place of birth; for even the most innocent or inadvertent allusion to it will give him concern, and is apt to be followed by ranklings and misunderstandings bitter and long continued. Such extreme sensitiveness is not easily accounted for, by any mere accident of race or colour; and there are few spectacles more painful to witness than that of a whole race of people whose sense of some delinquency or

imperfection of whatever sort, for which they are in no way responsible or blameworthy, constitutes just that "quick" place by which it is possible for any person, intentionally or otherwise, to inflict upon them incalculable pain, and which renders them to a large degree both uncompanionable and unworkable.

So evident is all this to any one of ordinary powers of observation residing in India, that it is an understood maxim of good breeding among English people there, so far to ignore the question of even the birth-place of the East Indian as to habitually *assume*, in conversation with them, that they are members of the conquering race; while they themselves quite commonly allude to a visit to England as "going home," even though they never left the shores of India. There is, consequently, among most of them not the faintest semblance of the existence of the sentiment of genuine patriotism so common to nearly all other races of people. We say "nearly," for the only exceptions we know of are the Jews and the Gypsies, in the latter of whom the chief general characteristic is loyalty to something akin to the Ismaelitic instinct of general outlawry, while in the former it is national and religious. To make an appeal, therefore, to this powerful sentiment would meet with but a very imperfect and circumscribed response, for any enterprise calling for spontaneous national *esprit de corps*, or even for any organization requiring mutual and self-sacrificing help. Men of this class, who happen to have been fortunate enough to have passed a year or two of their youth in England, will even fix upon the date of their return to their native country as the point of time from which they reckon the period of their residence in India; and on this principle we have known a man of fifty years of age say that he "came to India five and thirty years ago!" This innocent subterfuge is, of course, most likely to be had recourse to by persons of fair complexion. What are they ashamed of? Though born in India, it would hardly be possible to offer them a keener or more unpardonable insult than to speak of them as natives of the country (even though the term native be used in the most qualified and harmless sense) or to make allusion to the circumstance in any way. And yet there is, in regard to the East Indian, so strong a prejudice, that even Anglo-Indians of pure European parentage would be apt to feel slighted, if not insulted, if by inadvertence any person, who might be supposed to be aware of the unpleasantness that hangs about the subject, should speak of them as "East Indians." The whole truth apparently lies in this, that the East Indian knows how great the chances are that there would be a germ of truth in whatever insinuation might perchance

be intended, while the annoyance of the Anglo-Indian would appear to arise from nothing more than the sense of groundless and gratuitous insult.

Bearing all this in mind, many persons have been led to conclude—wrongly, as we believe—that there is in the mind of the East Indian, a lurking consciousness that at some time of his ancestry, more or less remote, there was what Browning has called a “blot on the ‘scutcheon;’” though it does not by any means follow that the implied irregularity has in every instance really taken place. Any one who is acquainted with the state of morals in English society in India a century or so ago, will readily understand that persons of respectability who belong to the mixed race would wish all allusion to the question of ancestry avoided, as all such persons would be almost sure to have clinging to them the opprobrium entailed by the irregularities of their progenitors; and it is easily intelligible how this opprobrium may still continue to make itself felt, although in many cases it is wholly undeserved. Nothing, therefore, could be more reprehensible than the too common practice of many of our uneducated fellow-countrymen in India of twitting these unoffending people with their colour, and with allusions to the possible cause; for, besides the coarse selfishness of thus taunting persons who have it not in their power to retaliate in equal terms, there may not be even the merit of common truthfulness in the implication. We are very much of opinion, however, that the sensitiveness of the East Indian on this subject of colour, is not as a rule attributable to the lurking memory of the “blot,” for the lineage of many of them is known by themselves to be without it, though, of course, there is always a possibility that innocent persons may feel the suspicion of the stigma more sharply than others. What is needed is to find a principle of classification that shall really include all persons belonging to the race, for it is a matter beyond dispute that they all of them suffer in a greater or lesser degree the pain to which we refer—rich and poor, young and old, male and female, learned and illiterate, we know of no exception excepting in point of degree. The only principle we know of that covers all cases, and at the same time supplies an adequate explanation is that there is a *sense of inferiority* common to the race. We believe that the thing which is so painful to the mind of the East Indian is this subtle emotion, which is kept alive by the constant operation of an accumulation of circumstances on every hand. It would, however, be in our judgment a mistake to attribute the defect wholly to this, or to any other single cause. For such a widespread state of feeling there probably

is a combination of causes. What the other causes are, we hope to show as we proceed.

### THEIR DISADVANTAGES.

The disadvantages which beset the Eurasian are so numerous, that it is almost impossible to think of him at all without also thinking of them. Situated as he is, between the upper and the nether millstone, between the European on the one hand and the Native on the other, he has everything to depress him, nothing to cheer; and if he succeeds in extricating himself it is almost a miracle. His special disadvantages attend him with the remorseless tenacity of his own shadow, and are as inseparable from him as his colour. Hence, although we now propose to specify his peculiar disadvantages under a separate heading, it will be at once perceived that it is impossible to lose sight of the unfortunate drawbacks that attach to him, at whatever point we view him.

As already intimated, the Eurasian labours under the disadvantage of having been very imperfectly educated. Here and there we find among them an exception to this rule; but these are but few, and are owing to circumstances known to be exceptional, and which are distinctly and clearly traceable. There are many Indian schools designed for the training of Eurasian and Anglo-Indian children, whose advertisements and prospectuses are promising enough to impose upon any one, but their actual outcome is very slipshod and superficial. Speaking generally, the best education obtainable in India is sadly imperfect, if we judge it from a European point of view. Many persons set up as school-teachers there, who were never trained with a view to the scholastic profession, and who have adopted it merely because they were never taught any special business by which they might earn a livelihood; and there are many teachers again whose presence in India at all, it is difficult to account for on any other principle than that they had no prospect of earning an income at an occupation in any community requiring efficiency and thoroughness. There are many educational establishments in India that profess to teach Greek and Latin, and lose sight altogether of the fact that what is most needed by those who have to work for their living, is a sound and sensible education in "the three R's." As their very conditions of life in that country render such old-world knowledge a superfluity and luxury, and not a necessity of existence, the pupils know of no motive for applying themselves to such useless drudgery; and the consequence is that persons lay claim to high education who have

not been educated at all. In aiming after a high education they have failed both in that and in the primary, which is of much greater importance to their real welfare. Some of the so-called "High" schools in India are manned with teachers from our national Universities; but the classical education they impart is found too often to be nothing better than an empty name, while they neglect, as too common-place for their notice, that elementary education which is everywhere so essential to success in practical life. The result is that Indian schools very rarely breed scholars such as might open in different parts of the country educational establishments of their own, where thorough-going training might be obtained. The same motive which induces other men to go to India operates in the case of schoolmasters; and provided the income be secured, the one consideration is—as little work and as much furlough as can be obtained. "Pay," "promotion," "furlough," "privilege leave," "sick leave," and "leave on urgent private affairs"—these, and not productive work, too often fill the horizon of the teacher, who escapes away from the activities of English life to the snuggeries of British India. We knew a widow in humble circumstances who was anxious to do the best she could for her son, and sent him to one of the most pretentious of these schools, to study "the classics." When the boy had spent three years at the Latin grammar, a friend of the family ventured to test his progress, and in doing so made the interesting discovery that not only was he ignorant of the forms of the infinitive moods of the conjugations, but that he could not even decline the word *mensa*. The thing achieved was not education at all, but a misappropriation of the widow's earnings, an abuse of public confidence, and a cureless waste of some of the best years of the young man's life. His so-called classical education so unfitted him for the life of an educated man, that he is now labouring in some poor capacity on the railroad. The case is not exceptional; it is typical: the exceptions lie the other way. Something might perhaps have to be said on the ground of natural dulness; but the pretentiousness of the educational establishments of India designed for Eurasians, is only equalled by the utter unsoundness of the work they do, and the extravagant rates at which they charge for it. Meanwhile, the victim of all this imposture, is the East Indian. The European happily has friends in his native land to whose care he can entrust his children during the most important years of their life. East Indians enjoy no such advantage; and even if they did, they do not for the most part possess means to enable them to avail themselves of it.

. Thus far we have spoken of the best educational advantages available to the class of persons who are doomed to no better education than can be obtained in India. If such are the best, what shall we say of the remainder? There are educational institutions of a more or less public character, to which the children of some East Indians are sent, such as the Martinière and Doveton schools; but these, though subsidized in some degree by Government, are the results of private beneficence. The charges, moreover, for attendance at these schools are such as to remove them quite out of the reach of the majority of the class of persons we are referring to. Eurasians are for the most part, exceedingly poor; and whatever can be earned by the working members of the family, is required for the common expenses of life. If they are ever to be raised out of the condition in which they now are, a reproach, not to themselves, but to us, a determined effort must be put forth by Government to impart to the rising generation among them, a sound, sensible education, with facilities for acquiring a practical knowledge of trades and professions in which they would not be outbid, or undersold, by natives.

Another thing that militates against the welfare of the class is that they have no voice in the government of the country, in which they suffer in common with all the people of India, including the non-official English. In the case, however, of the last-mentioned class of persons, there is this mitigating consideration, that they are most of them mere "birds of passage," who are looking forward to the time when they shall take up their abode permanently in their native land, while to the Eurasian, India is "home." At present, the Government is a bureaucratic despotism, in which the members of the ruling corporation find it convenient, generally speaking, to endorse the sentiments and the policy of the man who happens for the time being to be their president, viz., the Viceroy. It may, indeed, seem anomalous that a Government like that of Britain should, after all these years of absolute and irresponsible power in India, be found to have done so little towards helping our fellow-subjects there, in the art of self-government; but the fact remains that no class whatever of *the people* is represented in the Council-room of the Supreme Government. If our object in India is to rule the people wisely, we must not neglect the great Eurasian element but enlist its co-operation and good-will; and if the people of India are ever to be represented in the Council of the Supreme Government, that representation will be but partial and unsatisfactory, which does not take account of this important stratum of the population.

But to our thinking, the most disheartening of all the disadvantages with which the Eurasian has to contend, is the invidious distinction made by Government between him and the Native. Men are wont to sneer at missionary organizations, because of the special interest they avow in the spiritual welfare of the Native,—not knowing, apparently, that missionaries, like the ministers of Christ's Gospel all the world over, are concerned for the spiritual well-being of *all* men. But what shall we say of a Government that withholds countenance altogether from the Eurasian. All the philanthropy which Government displays towards the people of India is laid out for the especial good of the purely native part of its subjects. For these are founded schools and colleges, for these are provided school literature, scholarships, and foundations, while for the Eurasian (as also for the Anglo-Indian who happens to be sunk in ignorance and want) absolutely nothing—as far as our knowledge goes—is done. The only provision made for them by Government, is the gaol; besides this there is for them not even a workhouse or a lunatic asylum. All this is one-sided philanthropy.

Now, I have not a single word to utter in disapproval of the elevation of deserving Natives to any position which they may be found capable of occupying with safety to the public good: my purpose is merely to point out that the Native rises because he is a Native, that is, because he is the special *protégé* of the ruling Power, and that the East Indian and poor Anglo-Indian remain "in that position in life to which it has pleased God to call" him, for no more intelligent reason than that he is not a Native, and does not fall within the meaning of the Government notion of patronage. Let Government abandon this invidious and unwise policy, and it would find that the East Indian would pay as a *protégé* as well as the Native does, and that he is as capable as the Native of maintaining with dignity, and with credit to his patrons, any position. Considering by what instrumentality this despised class came into existence, the British Government does really *owe* them the consideration which it now so unreasonably withholds and misdirects. If the Native has a claim upon the Government because he is of our own flesh and blood, much more has the East Indian. The least, at any rate, that Government can do for the race, before it can righteously lay claim to having discharged its moral obligations towards them, is to dispense its favours with an even hand, and cease to make the accident of birth a reason for laying classes under unmerited and insupportable disadvantage. Clearly the policy that would alienate the minds of people who have such and so many claims upon us as Eurasians have, and

allow them to starve and perish, is a policy which, however much it may gratify misguided notions of philanthropy, must end badly.

It is not our object here to enumerate *all* the disadvantages of East Indians; we have mentioned only the chief ones. But, numerous and formidable as they are, they ought not to be fatal to the improvement of these unfortunate people. History has proved by unnumbered examples, that there is no disadvantage absolutely insuperable. Given the indomitable perseverance that will not be disheartened by repeated failure, the transparent uprightness of character that will keep no terms with wrong-doing, and let there be combined with these the genius of fixing upon a given aim in life, and steadily working up to it, and we have qualifications which, in spite of all social disadvantages, and in spite of moderate natural capacity, are sure to conduct their possessor to a career that shall make him honoured and useful in his day and generation. And what is thus true of individuals is no less true of classes also: whatever man has done, man may still do; and we know of no East Indian who, if he is but prepared to supply the moral qualities we have named, need feel himself hopelessly consigned to an unhonoured and useless life. But let him beware of "making haste to be rich;" that is not an object worthy of any man. Riches are, indeed, more likely to come into the possession of a man endowed with those qualities than into the possession of any other man, even though this man begin life with a fortune large enough for most men at the close of it. The secret of genuine happiness for the Eurasian lies, as it does for all other men, not in wealth but in contentment; if, therefore, Eurasians, however disadvantageously circumstanced they may be, desire to be honoured, and noble, and good, let them rise above the petty foibles which have proved so disastrous to their race; let them meet and master their peculiar difficulties, and not succumb to them; and let them know that the mettle of a true man is shown, not by what he can accumulate, but by what he really is—not so much by the uncertain and unsatisfying riches he acquires as by the character he lives and the good he imparts.



## THE EXCHANGE DIFFICULTY.

THE renewed depression in Exchange (India) leads us once more to ask how long the present state of matters is to be endured, through the perfunctory administrative incapacity of the Home and Indian Governments. The India Office has but to send down to the City to-day, to ascertain for itself, from the men whose whole lives are passed in the transaction of exchanges, that the system on which the Secretary of State "finances" the wants of the Home Treasury, violates every maxim by which the private merchant or the Exchange Banks, guide their operations. The highest authority upon Exchange probably in the world, called upon us the other day on this subject, and formulated the following common-sense propositions thereon:—

I. The Indian Government are dealers in Exchange with this disadvantage, that their rivals and customers know their hand, and make their own game accordingly.

II. The East India Company, although they sometimes made mistakes, were more wise in their generation; they kept their own counsel, and worked the Exchanges from both ends, to the frequent disgust of the merchants, but to their own advantage.

III. When it suited them, they sold bills on India in London; and when it did not they bought London bills in India.

IV. A judicious action now on these principles, would soon bring Exchanges up to 2s., and the value of silver would rise in proportion.

V. No man in any trade would take the world into his confidence. By such action, the Indian Government victimizes itself hopelessly.

We, in the next place, wrote upon the subject to another great "Exchange" authority in Scotland, and received the following answer:—

November 20, 1880.

I have to acknowledge yours of the 17th inst., with enclosure herewith returned. The accompanying remarks on Indian Exchange were written three or four years ago, I believe in October, 1876, and as nothing has transpired to induce any change in my opinion, I have transcribed what I then wrote in case it may be of any use to you in writing on the subject.

As to the present mode of drawing upon India followed by Government,

I consider it altogether unreasonable to expect that the withdrawal of such a large amount of money from India as that which is required, could be effected on any other than the most unfavourable terms, so long as the state of account between the Governments at home and abroad is *kept constantly before the public*; because the success of such operations depends almost wholly on the secrecy with which they are conducted.

I have no doubt whatever, that the practice of intimating the requirements of Government, and inviting tenders for their bills ought to be discontinued, as it affords what may be considered undue facilities to such as have to place funds in India, while in effect it is wholly adverse to Government, and to all who have to receive money from that quarter.

*Memo. on Indian Exchange.*

"To any one accustomed to consider the causes by which rates of exchange are influenced, it ought to be by this time abundantly clear, that the long-continued and now extreme depression of rates between India and this country has been caused chiefly by the heavy drawing of Council bills, and not, as is generally supposed, by the increased supply of silver; and further, that there cannot be any material or permanent improvement either in rates of exchange or the market for silver, so long as heavy drawing is continued.

"Under ordinary circumstances, the rate for Council bills should be determined by the price of silver in this country and the rate of exchange ruling in India; but as the amount for which the Indian Council is open to draw, is so large in proportion to the whole amount of exchange arising from the Indian trade, the position of the Council becomes virtually that of a forced seller of bills, as there cannot be demand for any considerable amount of Council bills except on terms more favourable to the buyer than could be obtained either by drawing on England or transmitting silver to India. Hence the low course of exchange that has been ruling with only slight variation since the monetary crisis of 1866 up to 1873, when a further depression was caused by the decline in the price of silver, owing to the increased supplies of that metal; but this decline was aggravated and confirmed by the continued drawing of Council bills, the effect of which upon the silver market being a forced depression of the basis on which the rate of exchange should be fixed. Hence also the anomaly of a heavy and regularly sustained demand for remittance to India by Council bills, when in accordance with the usual theory in regard to the balance of trade, the real demand should have been, not for *outward*, but wholly for *homeward* remittance.

"The difficulty of the position, so far as the Government is concerned, lies not only in the large amount of funds to be obtained from India, but also in the mode that for years past has been followed to effect the transmission; because if it is really the case that the consequences of heavy drawing have been as above stated, it must be a grave mistake to assume that there can be little or no material difference between the operation of drawing in England for the *whole amount required*, and that of drawing only for *one half*, and having the other half remitted from India.

"Regarded as a question of Exchange balances, there would be no difference of results between the operation of drawing for money at one end and that of having it remitted from the other; but in actual practice, and more especially where large amounts are involved, the results as affecting rates of exchange, would be widely different.

"From this it would appear that the policy formerly followed by the Court

of Directors of operating at both ends would cause far less pressure upon the Exchange market than that which was subsequently adopted and still continued of drawing for the whole amount of requirements at one end, and also that the particular cause of operation has become of much greater importance than ever it was before, seeing that the amount involved is increased from three or four to upwards of 15,000,000.

"Looking, therefore, to the present position of matters, and the probable consequences of decided action, the most prudent course that could be adopted would be to revert to the former practice of double operation, and to stop drawing on India, so that the exchange and silver markets may have sufficient time to recover from the unusual pressure to which they have been subjected.

"OBSERVER."

Now, all this has been pointed out over and over again, in the last five years. The private merchant or broker, who should act as the Government does, would be deemed insane by every one. If the action of our officials resulted in their own private loss, as individuals, they would discern instantly the un wisdom of the course they are pursuing, but the loss being that of the public, it is a matter of no concern to them whatever. Were the Exchange question left to be dealt with by ourselves, we would bring it back to normal rates within six months; and with it the price of silver, with nothing but gain to all classes. With £60,000,000 of produce leaving the Indian ports every year, and with a State Rental of £20,000,000 to receive every year from the soil of India, the Government can positively think of no way whatever of obtaining its £15,000,000 of Home Charges but by the ruinous method of drawing for the amount from London!

## HOME AND FOREIGN AFFAIRS.

It is impossible to read without feelings of strong indignation, the daily record of Irish outrages which appear in the London papers. We allude to the burning of farm-houses, the wanton destruction of hay and other property, and the cruelties perpetrated on individuals who have rendered themselves obnoxious by the payment of rent, or the occupation of land from which tenants have been evicted. These cowardly acts reflect the deepest disgrace on the Irish character, and especially upon the leaders of the Land League. Mr. Parnell and his associates may disclaim all liking for such acts and their perpetrators, but they cannot escape the responsibility of having stimulated and encouraged them by the violence of their speeches. Mr. Parnell, it is tolerably clear, cares very little for the Land Question in and for itself. The master passion in his mind is an unreasonable and vindictive hatred of England; and he uses the land grievance merely as a lever for effecting a separation between Ireland and England. Hence his references to "buckshot Forster;" to Irish sympathizers dwelling in America; and his extraordinary bitterness against the Government. A Land Bill which really healed the sores of the Irish peasantry would be a great calamity to Mr. Parnell, as presenting an insuperable obstacle to the great object of his political desire; and, consequently, with a true though (probably) unreasoned instinct, he recognizes in Mr. Gladstone and his colleagues, enemies to be much more dreaded than in Lord Beaconsfield and his associates.

But neither the excesses of Land League orators, nor the outrages perpetrated by the Irish peasantry, are a reason for withholding strict and ample justice from Ireland. On the contrary, a candid Englishman must acknowledge with shame, that it is at least doubtful if, in any other way, Ireland could obtain the justice that is her due. Already this agitation has largely smoothed the way for a comprehensive Land Bill next session. It has compelled all the leading London journals to send "Commissioners" to the disturbed parts of Ireland, and from their reports Englishmen are rapidly passing from a condition of complete darkness into something like a right apprehension of the state of things in Ireland. The blindest worshipper of the Established Fact will find it impossible to ignore such revelations as those which have been made respecting the management of the Lansdowne Estates, the abject and inhuman condition to which the Connemara peasantry have been reduced, the steady and rapid diminution of the cultivated area, the deserted aspect of many of the towns, the decline of the fisheries, &c. From all points, in fact, light is at last pouring in upon Ireland and disclosing a degree of selfishness and rapacity on the one side, and of misery and poverty on the other, which could not be paralleled outside of the dominions of the "gentlemanly Turk." While, too, the outrages which occur cannot be condemned too strongly, it must not be ignored that they are confined within a limited area. Fully three-fourths of Ireland is in a condition of exceptional

order and quiet. A "landlord," writing to the *Standard*, states that his rents have been collected with more than ordinary facility; and that his agent, who collected rents to an amount of £40,000, declared that such had been the rule in his experience during the current year. In this fact lies the justification of the Government in not applying to Parliament for extraordinary powers of coercion and repression. And we trust that they will not be shaken in this determination by such taunts and calumnies as those in which Lord Salisbury thought fit to indulge a short time ago at the Cannon Street Hotel. Lord Salisbury apparently judges the language of other men, by his own standard of truthfulness. Remembering, it would seem, how he planned to deceive both Parliament and the nation as regards the war in Afghanistan, and the secret agreement with Count Schouvaloff, he appears to consider that he is justified in attributing the same kind of conduct to Mr. Bright and Mr. Chamberlain, and the Radical element generally of the Ministry. These gentlemen, it is true, have disavowed any liking for Irish outrages, and have declared that they would not hesitate to apply to Parliament for a Peace Preservation Act, if they thought it would do any good. But Lord Salisbury is far too astute a man to be deceived by empty verbal assurances. He knows, by his own personal experience, their entire worthlessness. Mr. Bright, in reality, greatly approves of these outrages. He would regret to see them repressed or diminished. Why? Because, but for them, a Bill for the spoliation of the landlords would "fall very flat indeed." The "spoliation of the landlord," as our readers are well aware, becomes an accomplished fact when a landlord is hindered in appropriating to his own uses the capital of his tenant.

Mr. Bright, speaking at Birmingham, sketched the outlines of a Land Bill for Ireland which we hope we are not too sanguine in supposing to be not dissimilar to the one which the Government will bring before Parliament next session. The most important suggestion in this sketch is that the Government should devote a sum of £20,000,000 to the systematic reclamation of waste lands, and the settling of peasant proprietors on the land thus reclaimed. It is, however, hardly to be hoped that a satisfactory Land Bill will force its way through the Lords as yet. The primary business of that august assembly is to stop all reform until the very verge of civil war has been attained; and in Ireland, we are at present only "within a measurable distance." It will be possible to hold on for another year to their rents, and their legal privileges, without actually bringing about a crash.

Lord Ripon has made a declaration at Lahore, that it is the purpose of the Indian Government to return to the policy of Lord Lawrence. This may be accepted (we suppose) as an authoritative announcement that the Government have resolved to withdraw from Kandahar not later than the spring. As every other part of the "scientific frontier" has already been evacuated, our abandonment of Afghanistan will then be complete. But it is premature to indulge in any exultation. We have a long way to go yet before we shall be clear of the wood. And for the doubt and danger which darken the immediate future, the country has to thank the hesitation of the Government. Not a word of explanation have we heard either from Lord Hartington, the Government of India, or from any other official personage, to explain why we are wintering at Kandahar. This reticence, we are quite certain, has not been dictated by any desire to emulate the late Government in evading Parliamentary criticism and the control of public opinion. No reasons are given, because there are none to give. We have adopted a policy so indefensible, so irrational, that

silence and a trust in the chapter of accidents, are now our only protection. The complete cessation of intelligence from Kabul is a proof, we fear, that either Abd-al-Rahman has been dethroned, or that he is acting against us. On the Herat side we know that Eyoub Khan is preparing to renew his attack, and the communications in rear of Kandahar are again threatened by the Kakers and other hostile tribes. If we retain a garrison at Kandahar during the winter, it is hardly possible that it should not be seriously assailed before six weeks or two months have passed away. It is probably safe to anticipate that the Afghans will set about such an enterprise in some irrational fashion which will enable us to baffle them with little loss of life and the expenditure of not more than £2,000,000 or £3,000,000 in addition to all the war has cost us up to date. But on the other hand, no operation could be easier to a general, at all competent, than to reduce our Kandahar garrison to extremities. Indeed, without any attack, the difficulty of feeding the garrison will be no small one. "Six weeks ago," says the *Bombay Gazette* of Oct. 30, "fodder had almost disappeared from the country between Jacobabad and Kandahar. At Quettah the want of fodder was even so great that there was not sufficient to feed the sick transport animals. . . . To get supplies up the Bolun Pass it is necessary to feed the transport animals on the way; they eat very nearly as much as they can carry and as there is not an ounce of fodder in the Pass itself, the limit to the amount of supplies procurable from India is easily reached. It was to meet this difficulty that the Kandahar railway was planned, but, unfortunately, it has not been completed. . . . This is the situation which we are complacently asked to regard with entire equanimity. The Government of India cannot too soon take thought for the provisioning of the troops which it has resolved to keep in Southern Afghanistan for the winter." Meanwhile, we have the victorious general, Sir Frederick Roberts, among us, and that hero is being entertained, as is the manner of our nation, at a succession of public banquets. And yet General Roberts's career in Afghanistan is stained by the execution of brave enemies taken in battle—an act that will obtain for him in history an immortality of dishonour—and marred by many grievous blunders. It was not to be expected that these should be remembered against him after the relief of Kandahar. Those who know the secret history of this most iniquitous war, and are capable of looking at a military operation otherwise than through a distorting glass of immense power, must be content to possess their souls in patience, till these entertainments have been all eaten and disposed of. The fame of General Roberts is one of those reputations which will hardly outlive the breath of the applause which has inflated it to its present dimensions.

The banquet in honour of Sir Bartle Frere requires a passing notice at our hands. Having returned to this country stained with the blood shed in an unjust war, his friends and admirers felt that some public process of purification was indispensable. This conviction was shared, we regret to see, by the Archbishop of Canterbury and Lord Shaftesbury; nor can it be considered strange that this should be so. Sir Bartle Frere is an eminent evangelist, according to the modern conception of one. He is always ready to discourse on the beauty of the Christian religion from a missionary platform; but both the Archbishop and Lord Shaftesbury must have felt that a man holding forth upon peace upon earth and goodwill among men, attired in garments stained with blood, was a spectacle to cause unbelievers to scoff. Accordingly, two hundred Jingoës agreed to dine together—(this is the established British method of purification)—in honour of the man who had so vigorously translated into action the principles of their peculiar code of

politics and morality. The Archbishop pronounced an epistolary blessing upon the pious ceremony; and the purification was completed by an oration from Sir Richard Temple.

Sir Richard Temple did not mince matters. He attributed to Sir Bartle Frere every excellence, moral, intellectual, artistic, domestic, social, and political which have ever appertained to man since the race came into existence. Sir Bartle Frere was possessed of "elevation of sentiment, loftiness of thought, nobility of soul." Sir Richard Temple felt himself positively dizzy as he dilated upon "his personal accomplishments, his artistic culture, his literary ability, his varied attainments, his remarkable apprehension—(whatever that may be)—his capacity for great and varied affairs, his comprehensiveness of vision." In addition to all this, Sir Bartle Frere was "the example of a true patriot." He had "readiness to assume, to sustain, and to vindicate responsibility;" he had "faithfulness, fidelity to every sort of human duty, for the sacred name of religion, and the service of Almighty God." He was, in fact, the most astonishing man that had ever appeared on God's earth, and Sir Richard Temple was willing to vouch for the fact, upon his solemn word of honour. Sir Bartle Frere replied to this ridiculous rhodomontade in a strain of equal absurdity; and neither the one speech nor the other would be worthy of a moment's attention, were it not for the serious manner in which they have been taken by the press. It shows how dense is the darkness which prevails regarding India, that these two gentlemen—Sir Bartle Frere and Sir Richard Temple—are regarded as eminent examples of successful Indian administrators. It is supposed that their Indian careers were "brilliant," and that their names are held in honour and affection all over India. It is no exaggeration to say that these notions are not merely incorrect, but that they are directly the reverse of truth. Our Indian empire rarely produces a first-rate man. And it is all but impossible that it should, because under a Bureaucratic system, originality and independence of mind, and a stern adherence to principle, are all but fatal barriers to a man's advancement. It would, perhaps, be unjust to range Sir Bartle Frere and Sir Richard Temple very much below Sir George Couper, Sir John Strachey, and others who might be mentioned; but, indubitably, they were more completely "found out." This is the circumstance which distinguishes them from the illustrious fraternity to which they belong. No official having achieved high place, ever left India so thoroughly and completely discredited as these two men.

Sir Bartle Frere, during his unscrupulous career in South Africa, has merely reproduced the salient traits which marked his course in India. There, as both in Calcutta and Bombay, he was the subject of an ephemeral popularity, which finally gave way to a general feeling of distrust mingled with contempt. Sir Bartle Frere achieves popularity by making himself the spokesman and executor of whatever current of thought or feeling chances to be rushing along with the greatest clatter. When the Bengal ryots struck against the oppression and rapacity of the indigo planter, the voice of the European community in India was, as may be supposed, entirely in favour of the planters. British rule (so all but a few Englishmen combined to shout) could not be maintained, unless these mutinous ryots were put down with a strong hand. Foremost to give legislative expression to this sentiment was Sir Bartle Frere. Again, when Bombay was seized with the speculating madness which brought it to such utter ruin, the Judges of the High Court, in vain entreated Sir Bartle Frere to take legislative precautions to avert the collapse which was otherwise inevitable. But the speculators of Bombay declared that these men were behind their time, and that was sufficient for Sir

Bartle Frere. He flung in his lot with the speculators, rather than be denounced as "a man behind his time," and Bombay was ruined. When it was too late, and, indeed, the very day when the final crash came, Sir Bartle Frere gave his sanction to the Act which for two years previously the highest authorities around him had been in vain entreating him to pass. We have mentioned these two salient facts in Sir Bartle Frere's Indian career, because they serve to explain the wrong-doing of which he was guilty in South Africa. "Imperialism" being the prevailing tendency of the moment, and expressing itself with a deafening loudness and vehemence, Sir Bartle Frere, true to his antecedents, became its devoted and fanatical exponent. He set at naught elementary principles of political morality more outrageously than any Jingo among them all; bodied forth more gigantic schemes of Imperial extension; and slaughtered his fellow men, without a misgiving. Hence his popularity. The European colonists being greedy for the property of the Kaffirs, Sir Bartle Frere at once became greedy beyond measure. He outdid them all in rapacity. He urged on schemes for disarming whole continents of Kaffirs, and reducing them to the condition of serfs to the European settlers. Hence his popularity among the colonists. Sir Bartle Frere, in a word, is in a sense "all things to all men," but not at all in that sense which the Apostle Paul endeavoured to be. The contagion of human feeling is too strong for him, and overmasters his reason and his conscience. Instead of being the strong man his admirers would have us believe him to be, he is a reed shaken by every wind that blows. But Sir Richard Temple is about to publish a book on India. It will be the duty of THE STATESMAN to subject that book to a very searching examination, and Sir Richard Temple's career and character as an Indian administrator can hardly fail to come out pretty clearly under the process.

Meanwhile the evil deeds of Sir Bartle Frere in South Africa are producing results strictly in accordance with them. It is daily becoming clearer, that the Cape Colony is incapable of quelling the storm which Sir Bartle Frere's congenial subordinate, Mr. Sprigg, has raised up around its borders. England will be compelled to interfere. What hope is there that the interference will be productive of just and beneficent results? Very little hope indeed. A deputation recently waited upon Lord Kimberley for the purpose of extracting his views on the subject, and they are of the most discouraging kind. We did not expect much from the Colonial Office. Lord Kimberley spoke, and at considerable length; but his speech was simply an appeal to the commiseration of his audience. Before Mr. Sprigg, Lord Kimberley represented himself as a crushed worm, helpless alike for good or evil; at the same time, his lordship informed the deputation that he had written to him not to disarm the Basutos, and that was all he could do. There was not the least chance that Mr. Sprigg would listen to his entreaty. Lord Kimberley has proved a sound prophet. The great Mr. Sprigg has treated his admonitions with the contempt he anticipated, and the Basuto war has broken out and already assumed formidable dimensions. What, under these circumstances, are Lord Kimberley's relations with Mr. Sprigg? Is he indignant with the man who has dragged this country into a cruel, costly, and cowardly war? Not at all. Lord Kimberley may be said to kiss the hand that smote him. He "deeply sympathises" with the colonists, nay, even with Mr. Sprigg. He is indignant with the Basutos. And the reason? Because they are "rebels against the Crown." Mr. Sprigg, it appears, is not a man who has been carrying out a high-handed and arbitrary policy in defiance of the warnings and remonstrances of Her Majesty's Secretary of State for the Colonies. He is "the



Crown," and it is the duty of Lord Kimberley to yield him an obsequious obedience. We have referred to this monstrous fiction that the Basutos are "rebels against the Crown," in order again to enforce what we have more than once insisted upon. Either we must sever our connection with the Colonies, or we must see that the supremacy of the Crown is a reality instead of the fiction which at present it is. "The Crown" is a misleading term, and the absurdity of Lord Kimberley's contention that the Basutos are "rebels against the Crown" will be at once apparent if for "the Crown" we substitute "the British people."

The British people have no more control over the action of Mr. Sprigg than they have over the changes of the moon. Mr. Sprigg, in complete independence, goads the Basuto Kaffirs into rebellion, and then a Colonial Secretary calmly assures an assembly of rational Englishmen that the Basutos are at war, not with Mr. Sprigg, but with the Crown, *i.e.*, with us, the British nation. Now if it be admitted that the Basutos are under any obligations of loyalty towards the British nation, we are under a corresponding obligation not to leave them to the dealings of obstinate animals like this Colonial Premier. We can claim no obedience, except in so far as we offer protection. Now what we contend is, that the British nation cannot interfere to any useful purpose between Colonial aggression and the Basutos, or any other Kaffirs. It can only interfere in one way, as it will have to do before long in this Basuto war, and that is by siding with the wrong-doers against the weak and unoffending. It suits Lord Kimberley to ward off the inquiries of a deputation by pretending that the Basutos are "rebels against the Crown," and therefore unworthy of the sympathies of a Colonial Secretary. Nay, official personages have so steeped their minds in verbal fictions, that it is possible Lord Kimberley made the statement unconscious of its absurdity. But those whose minds are capable of apprehending facts, know that in this war, the Basutos are entirely in the right, and Mr. Sprigg and his partizans entirely in the wrong. How long, we ask, are Englishmen prepared to steep themselves in innocent blood? If they are weary of these things there is only one way out of it. It is a short and simple one. Cut the connection which binds the Cape to ourselves. If we have the courage to do this, not only shall we be exempt henceforth from the infamy of periodically massacring hordes of brave savages, but the massacres themselves will cease. The Cape Colonist will very speedily discover how to live at peace with the races around him, when he can no longer fight his wars vicariously. And among the minor blessings of the new order of things, will have to be reckoned this, that Colonial Secretaries will no longer find it necessary to stultify themselves, by attempting to cajole their hearers into receiving as good wheat, the empty husks of constitutional fictions.



# The Statesman.

No. VI.—NOVEMBER, 1880.

## Correspondence.

### THE ABOLITION OF THE SALT LINE.

TO THE EDITOR OF "THE STATESMAN."

SIR,—You ought to be made aware of the true nature of the negotiations carried on with the Native States of Kattiawar, in regard to the abolition of the Salt Line frontiers of that province. The demands made upon these States were so manifestly injurious, that they could not but meet with stout resistance from them. The States were asked, in plain words, to consent to assign their Salt Works to the direct control of the Government Salt Department, in consideration of the payment of certain sums as compensation. The works were to be managed within their territory, by the British salt officials. The Native States could not acquiesce in proposals which would lead to the introduction of a divided authority within their territory, some of the salt works being situated in the heart of their capital cities. Accordingly, I now understand that the authorities have so far given in as not to require these States to hand over the control of their salt works to the Salt Department; but in other respects, the stipulations are as stringent as ever. The States are to limit the salt works to the number and places required by the British Government, to raise the price of salt to the level of that in British territory; to keep an account of salt manufactured and sold, and to see that in no case is salt sold at a less price, or is smuggled, and that no salt is exported by sea from any of their ports to any place in British or Native territory without payment of the excise duty to the British Government. The result of these negotiations is that the poor people in these States who used to supply their wants in regard to this important necessary of life in the cheapest manner, and who used salt for agricultural purposes, will now have to pay heavily for it, or forego its use as much as they can. The important point involved is whether the British Government, in pursuance of a fiscal policy, the avowed object of which is to cheapen salt, can consistently, and with any show of fairness, be the means of levying a heavy tax on the population

of Native States that have hitherto supplied themselves with the necessary of life in the cheapest manner possible. But it is vain to enter into a question of fairness or unfairness, when the great object of the Finance Minister is how best to bring the Native States within the scope of British taxation.

Bombay, 1880.

## THE INDIAN MEDICAL SERVICE AND THE TAXPAYER.

TO THE EDITOR OF "THE STATESMAN."

SIR,—When Lord Lytton, with the assistance of Sir John Strachey, had got the finances of India into a complete state of muddle, it became necessary to make extensive reductions. The Public Works Department was the first to claim attention, and the result has not met with public approval, as we all know. The Indian Medical was another of the departments, in which it was determined to make great reductions. This service had hitherto stood very high in the estimation of the Medical Schools, for which it attracted the best of the young men choosing the public service as a career; but a glance at the results of the examinations in August last, will show that for the first time the marks of the Indian candidates are much below those of the British Army candidates. It is believed throughout the service in India, that Sir J. Strachey, in framing his plan for reorganizing the Medical Department, was assisted by Sir J. M. Cunningham, Sanitary Commissioner with the Government of India, who is a personal friend of the great finance minister, and has managed that the changes introduced shall materially benefit himself, although he has lent himself to the sacrifice of his own service. The appointment of Sanitary Commissioner with the Government of India has been abolished, and Dr. Cunningham has been appointed Surgeon-General of Bengal, in succession to Dr. J. F. Beatson, although his position is anomalous, inasmuch as all the military officers in the Bengal Service are under the Surgeon-General of the British Army, and Dr. Cunningham is over the medical officers in civil employ, though he will also be referred to regarding men in the Military Department, and recommend them for promotion. The Service regards this as being tantamount to the abolition of their head, and to subordinating them to the Army Medical Department. It happens, however, that by the rules of the Service, Dr. Cunningham was not eligible for promotion. He was till recently a surgeon-major, and as it did not suit him to claim promotion to deputy surgeon-general when his turn came, he might not have it hereafter; and besides, to promote a surgeon-major to be surgeon-general is opposed to the Warrant of May, 1873, which directs that promotion shall be from deputy surgeon-general to surgeon-general. Such an appointment would have been impossible under any Governor-General but Lord Lytton. That Viceroy always showed the greatest contempt for the rights of others when he desired to serve a friend, and on one occasion was with difficulty prevented from promoting to be deputy surgeon-general a *protégé* of his own who was low down among the surgeons-major. The promotion of Dr. Cunningham, though a gross act of injustice, is defended on the score of economy. For years past, the head of the Bengal Medical Department has maintained that the appointment of sanitary commissioner was unnecessary, and that the duties could be more efficiently performed by the Surgeon-General; but, of course, Dr. Cuning-

ham maintained that this was entirely a mistake until it suited his own selfish purposes to advocate the same proposal. In addition to the above change, many deputy surgeons-general were abolished—viz., five in Bengal, two in Madras, and two in Bombay; but in consequence of administrative medical officers being attached to the Government of Bengal, the North-Western Provinces, the Punjab, and Central Provinces, the actual loss to the Service is two deputy surgeons-general for each of the three Presidencies. To make up for this loss, an ingenious device was fallen upon and offered by way of sop, or as compensation—namely, to confer the rank and privileges of deputy surgeon-general on sanitary commissioners, after they had completed twenty-six years' service. It is evident that this sanitary commission would supersede very many of their seniors. But men in the Service say that this is a military service, and they wish to know why such advantages should be conceded to officers in Civil employ; they further point out that sanitary commissioners, as it is, enjoy great advantages over their comrades in executive charges, whether civil or military, as they are permitted to spend the hot season on the Hills. They further ask why sanitary commissioners should be singled out for this distinction, and whether they are supposed to be more entitled to exceptional treatment than principals and professors of medical schools, inspectors-general of forts, medical storekeepers, or many others that might be mentioned; they even venture to wonder whether Dr. Cunningham being the head of the Sanitary Department, and Lord Lytton's desire to promote Dr. Bellew, has anything to do with it. Looking to the public interests, it is evident that a man of twenty-six years' service is not as a rule in the best trim for undertaking the duties of sanitary commissioner as understood in England, though to be sure it seems pretty easy in India, consisting of pleasant tours in the cold weather and spending the hot season at the Hills writing a report. Men in the Service also point to Dr. Liddesdale's appointment as an indication of how this rule may be worked, as he will not have served twenty-six years for some three or four years to come, while at this moment not a single sanitary commissioner in India has attained the rank and privileges of deputy surgeon-general. Other irregular promotions besides Dr. Cunningham's have disgusted the members of the Indian Service. Dr. Cornish, in Madras, was made surgeon-general over the heads of many of his seniors. Dr. Payne, who had refused promotion years ago, and was, therefore, ineligible for promotion, subsequently was made surgeon-general to the Government of Bengal, and what is more extraordinary, was allowed to hold several executive charges at the same time, but then he was a personal friend of Sir A. Eden, and in the days of Imperialism the latter was allowed to job to his heart's content. Another little job was the appointment of Dr. Hewlett to be Surgeon-General of Bombay over several of his seniors, but I have heard the Doctor had been at school with Lord Lytton. Officers of the late Honourable East India Company's Service, whose services were transferred to the Queen, believe that their advantages as regards promotion and otherwise have been guaranteed by Act of Parliament, and that such acts of Imperialism are contrary to such guarantee.

The Indian Medical Service has thus suffered grievously. In the same way several of the higher appointments of the Army Medical Department have been abolished, yet as a whole the latter service has gained greatly, though much to the loss of the Indian taxpayer! By a recent "Army List" it appeared that the Army Medical Department in Bengal consists of eighty-five surgeons-major over twenty years' service, and sixty under, besides sixty-five surgeons—total 213. There were in Bengal nine brigades of artillery and fifty batteries, six cavalry,

and thirty-four infantry regiments. The old scale of medical officers was one surgeon-major per brigade or regiment, one surgeon for each battery, two surgeons for cavalry, and three for each infantry regiment, which would require nine surgeon-majors and fifty surgeons for the artillery, six surgeon-majors and twelve surgeons for the cavalry, thirty-four surgeon-majors, and 164 surgeons for the infantry, so that there are ninety-nine surgeon-majors in excess of requirement. These latter are performing surgeon's duty, and many of them are in medical charge of batteries of artillery, and of small depôts and small detachments. Now the average difference between the pay of a surgeon and surgeon-major is 500 rupees a month, so that the Government of India has to pay about 50,000 rupees a month, or £60,000 a year, in excess of what it ought, were the country not flooded with surgeon-majors doing surgeon's duty. *In some regiments, there are three surgeon-majors.* It would surely be better to retrench in this direction than to break faith with the Indian Medical Service. Unfortunately, however, the Surgeon-General with the Government of India is mixed up with the Government, and is not likely to move. So long as candidates did not apply for the British Medical Service, and there was a lack of members in the lower rank, there was possibly no help for it but to send senior medical officers to India; but now, when candidates are entering the Service freely, there seems no good reason why the taxes wrung out of the poor in India, should be expended on senior and highly-paid medical officers doing the work of juniors.

H. E. I. C. S.

*Note.*—We publish this letter—which is from an officer in high position—simply to show the anarchy into which we are drifting in India in all departments. India is flooded with surgeon-majors on high pay, to save the English taxpayer.  
—ED. S.

## EDITORIAL NOTES.

FROM the day this journal was established in London we have never ceased to warn the nation that the only right course for it to pursue is to withdraw from Afghanistan altogether. The statement that the Government is consulting "high authorities" at Simlah as to the propriety of our withdrawing from Kandahar would be disbelieved by us altogether, but that our forces are yet there. Who are these "high authorities" but the very men who counselled the insanity into which the nation has been betrayed, and whose reputations are committed to a persistence in the crime. Thus we hear of Mr. A. C. Lyall proceeding to Kandahar to confer with Colonel St. John as to the propriety of the withdrawal. The reputations of both men, meanwhile, are so committed to the keeping of the forces there, that it is simply a solemn farce to ask the opinion of either upon the matter. There is but one course for the present Government to adopt, and the weakness that fails to discern it will prove fatal to the administration. In the first place we have no moral right to occupy Kandahar, a consideration that ought to have settled the question from the first. France would have as much right to occupy Belgium at this moment as we have to occupy Kandahar. The nation has been betrayed into a gigantic crime against the Afghan people, and instead of our continued presence holding out any hope of the re-establishment of a settled government among them, we have only to stay there to make such government an impossibility. There are but two courses open to us—forcible and complete annexation, or instant and complete withdrawal.

WE foresaw very early, from the whole tenour of the news that reached this country in the early summer, that there was no reasonable likelihood whatever of Abd-al-Rahman maintaining himself as ruler at Kabul after the withdrawal of our forces. The counsels that invited him to Kabul to take the place of Yakoub Khan seemed plausible enough, but they emanated from the very men who had deposed Yakoub and brought him as a State prisoner into British India. There is not one of these men whose counsels or opinions are worth the paper they are written upon, while they are the "high authorities" by whom the present Government is weak enough to be led. How is it that the Government could not find out what was ascertained clearly enough in India, by every one but these "high authorities"—that there was no hope whatever of Abd-al-Rahman being able to maintain himself at Kabul? And he is now said to be murdered, while anarchy reigns in the city, and all communication with India is cut off. Now, in June last, we wrote as follows:—

The situation in Kabul at the present moment is this. Our presence in Kabul has aroused against us the hostility of what are called the "great tribes," by which are to be understood the Ghilzais, the Kohistanes, the Wardaks, and the Tarakzais. These tribes, or at least the larger part of them, appear to be united in upholding the claims of Moosa Khan, the son of the expatriated Yakoub. Besides this party, there is that of Abd-al-Rahman

Khan, the strength of which is uncertain. Now it is plainly impossible to satisfy both these parties; nay, more, it is absolutely certain that whichever side we take, that side will immediately be discredited by the fact of our patronage. Try as long as we may, there is no escape from this dilemma. For us to endeavour to set up a ruler in Afghanistan is to make civil war a certainty as soon as we are out of the country. It is, unhappily, more probable than not, that a civil war is inevitable under any circumstances. But the probability is to a certain extent diminished if we leave the chiefs of the "great tribes" in absolute freedom to choose their own ruler—be he Moosa Khan, or Abd-al-Rahman Khan.

Again, in September, we wrote:—

Abd-al-Rahman Khan, the Ameer whom we have decided to recognize, has not as yet been either killed or expelled from his capital. The one or other event will, in all probability, be postponed until we are fairly out of the country. It is very improbable, we are assured, that Abd-al-Rahman Khan will be accepted as Ameer by the Ghilzais, so long as Yakoub Khan or his son is alive. Meanwhile it would be interesting to know what the Government propose to do with Yakoub Khan. Nobody any longer suspects him of having been an accomplice, either direct or indirect, in the massacre of the British Embassy. But, at any rate, all the accounts agree in the utter helplessness of Yakoub Khan to quell the riot; and to this day no reason has been given for his deportation to India, and his detention as a State prisoner. No reasons have been given, because there are none to give. His deportation was one of those blind proceedings which the Government of Lord Lytton identified with "the practice of Statecraft in its more occult branches." What we would suggest to the Government is that they should transform Yakoub Khan from a State prisoner into a State guest, and hold him in reserve as the Ameer of Afghanistan when Abd-al-Rahman Khan has been expelled. That Abd-al-Rahman will be expelled, there is, we imagine, but small doubt.

How is it, we naturally ask, that the Government could not discern all this as clearly as ourselves? The answer is plain enough: there are no "high authorities" to mislead us. In other words, we are not guilty of the folly of asking the authors of the crime and their accomplices, how to escape from its results.

THE pretence is constantly put forward that the wisdom, or otherwise, of occupying Kandahar as an advanced post against Russian aggression on the North-west Frontier, is a question upon which military men only, can rightly express an opinion. The doctrine is an exceedingly convenient one for the military reputations that are committed to the insanity of the advance. Emphatically, it is *not* a question of strategy, but of plain common sense. We owe the project of the advance entirely to the impatience of inaction natural to a body of military loungers, longing for active service in any direction, and upon any pretext whatever. We have read every line that has been written upon the subject in the last thirty years, and we say boldly that the counsels which have been urged upon the country, at intervals throughout the period, by the Rawlinson school have been downright insanity. At the time of the Crimean War, we were told by these monomaniacs that we ought to drive Russia out of Georgia, and place an English fleet in the Caspian Sea! Sir Henry Rawlinson is, to all intents and purposes, mad upon the subject, and has been so ever since he was shut up with General Nott in Kandahar in 1841. The General took his real measure as an adviser, at that early period, and, although he was the so-called Political Agent, set him and his counsels aside altogether. There are men who learn nothing even from the teachings of experience, and Sir Henry Rawlinson is one of them. We owe the present crime to the mischievous re-publication in 1875 of his old vagaries upon the subject, and to the fact that some lively Frenchman, in conversation with Colonel Pomeroy Colley (now Sir Pomeroy), told that excitable gentle-

man, that we were in the position of a beleaguered fortress in India, holding the Suleiman mountains as our ramparts, but with the enemy in possession of the *glacis* of Afghanistan. And poor Colonel Colley, our military expert (!), forthwith persuaded himself that the imaginative Frenchman saw the realities of the case, and converted purely idle talk of this order into sober strategical facts. That it is only by the wildest stretch of imagination we can convert either Afghanistan into a *glacis*, or the Suleiman mountains into ramparts, never occurred to our military expert. Instead of laughing at the Frenchman's amusing conceit, this officer, who was the military adviser of Lord Lytton, persuaded that poor Bohemian ruler that the ramparts ought immediately to be occupied in strength, and the *glacis* beyond it, in Afghanistan, seized by ourselves before Russia could establish herself there. Unhappily, as Carlyle tells us, we live in a world of 800,000,000 of people who are mostly fools; and no exposure of the contemplated and wild absurdity and wickedness of these military counsels, could obtain even a hearing at Simlah. A few clear-headed men—the men who are *not* fools—saw the insanity of the counsels which the Viceroy was adopting. The chief author of them, instead of being brought before the House of Commons for examination, has been sent to Natal as Governor. And we think this great empire can last, with patent incompetency of this order, promoted to honours and to high place amongst us, while we are in the midst of the calamities which it has just brought upon us. The history of this Afghan crime should be searched into to the bottom. It has given a wrench to the stability of our empire, that a few men discern clearly enough, but which the many "fools" do not even suspect. Though all the military experts of the country combined to assure us that we ought to occupy Kandahar, they ought to be replied to with ridicule as the only proper answer. Suppose we do occupy Kandahar, and post 20,000 men there—or twice the force these experts counsel—does it really want any acquaintance with technical military knowledge to warn us of what *must* be the inevitable result in the event of a Russian invasion in that direction? It is allowed on all hands that, for any rational hope of success, Russia must pass the vast waste of desert and mountains that intervenes between Turkestan and our present outposts, in such strength as to be able to place 100,000 men in the field upon the Sindh frontier, provided with all the appliances of modern warfare, transporting in mass the vast *impedimenta* of modern armies in the field. And these military experts imagine that we could defeat an invasion of this order by occupying Kandahar with ten, or fifteen, or twenty thousand men. If the invasion were ever attempted, it would have to be in such strength as would cut off any garrison we could place at Kandahar, as hopelessly as if it were shut up in the moon. The Russian forces would draw a line of circumvallation round it, and march on, leaving it to starve or to surrender. Our sense of the folly is so overwhelming that we cannot write courteously of its authors. Their dreams have been shown to be dreams a hundred times over in the last thirty years; but men being "mostly fools," fall victims to the mannderings of a Rawlinson and Colley as often as they came to the front. Even if the cost of maintaining military occupation of Kandahar were not absolutely prohibitory, it would be as absolute, as total, as dead a sacrifice of military strength as the veriest military idiot, instead of expert, could counsel. Kandahar is virtually 800 miles from the Indus. If the Russians or any other enemy were really invading India in such strength as to create just alarm, true military strategy would compel us to order the garrison at Kandahar to fall back upon our present



frontier, to save its being cut off and sacrificed. Mr. Gladstone's Government has but one course to follow, which is to fall back upon the old frontier at once, and patiently strive to renew friendly relations with the people we have so infamously outraged. To prevent a third repetition of the same crime, Parliament ought to bring every actor therein before its bar for examination, from the Earl of Beaconsfield downwards. The insolence of the Tory Opposition, is the natural and direct result of the forbearance of the present Government. Instead of instituting a national inquest into the crime that has been committed, there is a manifest but most unwise desire to let it pass into oblivion. We shall be told that Sir Bartle Frere, the prime mover in the guilty business, has been relegated into private life; but is not Colonel Colley promoted to be Governor of Natal? It is not thus that England will be governed in the future, if she is to take her place amongst the nations as "the standard-bearer" of the banner which has for its device "Righteousness exalteth a nation." It is because the counsels we denounce have been basely immoral, that we deal with them as we do. It is not the intellect that has been at fault, but the moral sense; and the language of indignation is the only proper language to be used towards the authors.

In a letter to the *Daily News*, General Low opportunely reminds us of the late Sir James Outram's warnings on this subject. In 1854, Outram, in uncompromising language, recorded his views thereon. The minute is too long for insertion, but the following extract will suffice to place his views on record:—

Assuming the incredible hypothesis that Russia and Persia united could bring into friendly Afghanistan such an imposing force and so well provided with every requisite as should render them independent of the resources of the country . . . and that they were fully prepared at Kandahar . . . the general commanding the Scinde army would have the choice either of awaiting within the Scinde frontier to oppose the invader after the passage of a fifty mile desert, which he could only attempt to cross in detachments, would be cut off in detail; or himself to pass the desert and concentrate his army at Dadur to attack the enemy the moment he emerges into the plains; or, having crossed the desert, to await at Bagh . . . while the entire force of the enemy had descended into the plain, when he would move forward to the attack.

The latter," adds General Low, "is the course I would myself adopt, because it would enable me utterly to annihilate the force, who would have no retreat but the Pass, and we well know how flying and defeated men would be dealt with by the ruthless Kakurs and other tribes of the Pass, in their attempts to escape by that way." We are sick to death of the excuse pleaded for this crime, on the ground of "military experts" having advised it. *Who* are they, but the men who were bent upon the crime for their own advancement? For thirty years, there was a consensus of opinion amongst military men against the advance; and we are to take the Colley and Macgregor lot of interested advisers, as the true military "experts" to guide the nation. A nice mess they have made of it!

No one can say that the farmers of the English counties have been unduly given to agitation on the subject of the land. They have shown themselves a long-suffering and patient body, and the generally good character of their landlords has largely contributed to make them so. But the evils incident to the tenures of

land in this country are too manifest and too ruinous to be longer endured. In the words of Mr. Howard, at the late Conference of the Farmers' Alliance, England presents to the world a very anomalous spectacle: "We are the richest country in the world; we have a large accumulated capital seeking investment, a redundant population, a surplus of skilled agricultural labour of such quality as perhaps no other country possessed; and yet our fields are languishing for want of that very capital and labour, of which we have a superabundance. Capital has long been repelled from agriculture by restrictive covenants, by game reservations, by insecurity of tenure, by the absence of legal right to improvements, by impoverished owners, by miserable homesteads, and by undrained land. Those who had pursued this course had, he believed, done so unwittingly; but they had, nevertheless, been sowing the wind: he hoped they would not reap the whirlwind." The Conference adopted the following four resolutions:—

1. That in the opinion of the Committee the subjects which most directly affect the interests of tenant farmers, and call for the immediate attention of the Government, are those set forth in the programme of the Farmers' Alliance: namely, to stimulate the improved cultivation of the land, especially by obtaining security for the capital of tenants invested in the improvement of their holdings; to obtain the abolition of class privileges involved in the law of distress; to secure to ratepayers their legitimate share in county government; and to obtain a fair apportionment of local burdens between landlord and tenant.

2. That this Conference urges the Government, with a view to stimulate the improved cultivation of the land, to pass a compulsory act for giving security to tenants for capital invested in the improvement of their holdings; and that the compensation for the unexhausted improvements be left entirely to the discretion of arbitrators, whose award, or that of their umpire, shall be final.

3. That this Conference urges the Government to pass a measure for improving the system of county government, on the principle of the direct representation of the ratepayers.

4. That in the opinion of this Conference local burdens should be so apportioned that the landlord will be charged with the rates on agricultural land, and the tenant rated upon his house and premises only.

We appeal to every honest mind whether there is anything unreasonable or inequitable in these demands; and if there is not, why are they not granted? Why are we to fight for the next twenty years over the legalizing of claims that every honest man sees ought not to be contested at all? And yet the landlords as a body will fight against them to the death. And if the country permit them to remain there, we shall see the bishops in the Upper House lending all their influence to the maintenance of injustice sanctioned by law. Are we enemies of the episcopal office because we write thus? Let the conscience of every Bishop answer for us. Were we sitting upon that bench of lawn sleeves, we sometimes think that our very first act would be to ask permission of the House to bring in a Bill to enable us to withdraw from a position which, by some fatality, some evil and persistent mischance, placed us ever in the terrible position of supporting what was wrong, and prevented our devoting ourselves to the spiritual life which our office claimed from us as the very *raison d'être* of its existence.

In its usual weekly telegram from Calcutta published by the *Times* of Monday, the 11th of October, the following sentence appeared: "The story lately started " by some papers regarding the alleged loss of the Mysore Crown jewels has, after " a full inquiry, been contradicted by the Government." Until the mail of the 10th of October arrives here, we shall not be able to know exactly what "the story" is, and what is "contradicted." We have very little doubt, however, that

the correspondent of the *Times* alludes to the action that has been taken during the present year by the *Calcutta Statesman*, in calling attention to certain official documents proving that in 1872 an unauthorized, unsanctioned, and unreported rearrangement of the Mysore jewels took place, of which nothing was heard either at Bangalore or at Calcutta for five years, when an explanation was required of a very striking discrepancy between the actual value of a jewel issued and its value according to the original catalogue. Major (now Lieut.-Colonel) C. Elliot, C.B., and Mr. C. Rungacharloo received the thanks of the Chief Commissioner of Mysore and of the Government of India in 1868, for the "scrupulous care and fidelity" with which they had carried out "the difficult task of cataloguing the Maharajah's property," and for "the excellent arrangements made by them for preventing any spoliation or loss." ("Mysore Papers," 385 of 1878, pp. 72, 92, &c.) The work performed by Major Elliot and Mr. Rungacharloo was deliberately and elaborately performed in the presence of a large party of Palace officials; and, as we have subsequently been told, with the assistance of a jury of experts. The catalogue included a minute description and rough valuation of each jewel. ("Mysore Papers," 385 of 1878, pp. 93, 94.) And yet Mr. Gordon, the present Chief Commissioner, when asked for an explanation of the singular discrepancies accidentally discovered, stated in an official memorandum, dated the 5th of September, 1877, that he had in 1872, in company with Mr. C. Rungacharloo, found "a great number of similar inaccuracies" in the catalogue, for which the same Mr. C. Rungacharloo, in company with Major C. Elliot, had, in 1868, received the thanks of Government. And this was Mr. Gordon's first official report of the six weeks' rearrangement of the jewels, which he took upon himself to carry out, without leave, in July, 1872. Rumours were current last year in Mysore and Hyderabad that if an independent examination of the Mysore jewel-rooms were instituted by Government, great deficiencies would be found, variously estimated at from one-fifth to one-third of the property which had been so minutely described and valued by Major Elliot in 1868. The *Statesman* hazarded no opinion as to the fact or extent of the loss or deficiency, but rightly insisted on the official proof of irregularity and negligence, and on these grounds called for a strict investigation. What, then, has been contradicted by Government? We give an absolute contradiction to the statement that there has been a "full inquiry" into this matter. There has been no real inquiry at all. The ordinary routine reference was made to the official dignitary whose mismanagement is in question, and an intimate friend and actual subordinate of his own was delegated by him to make an inquiry and report. The Chief Commissioner of Mysore, Mr. J. D. Gordon, deputed one of his assistants, of long standing, Lieut. Colonel Hay, to associate himself with Mr. C. Rungacharloo, the other person specially implicated, for the purpose of making the return for which the Government of India had called. Mr. C. Rungacharloo having been continuously in charge of the jewels for twelve years, having been engaged in making the authorized arrangement and list of 1868, with "a great number of inaccuracies," and also the unauthorized arrangement of 1872, with or without a new list, and with or without corrections, and being still left in charge, and in possession of the Chief Commissioner's confidence, Colonel Hay can have looked at the jewels and the catalogue only with the eyes of this custodian, according to whose design and by whose hands, we have good reason to believe the return and the beautiful tabular statements that embellished it were constructed and drafted. In consequence of the delay that has taken place, great obstacles will, probably, stand in the way of a real investigation. But no full inquiry has yet been

\*made, while, from the aggravation of scandalous rumours, the necessity for such an inquiry is more urgent than ever. Nor is this the only subject that calls for inquiry in Mysore.

THIS Mr. Rungacharloo, Revenue Commissioner and Secretary, formerly Controller of the Maharajah's Household, is said to have gradually purchased, at nominal prices, chiefly from inmates of the Palace, their relatives and friends, lands to the annual value of nearly Rs.60,000, say £5,000 a year, on the borders of the river Cauvery, at Bannoor, in the Seringapatam talook, about fifteen miles east of Mysore, watered by the Chiksagur channel. This same official is also declared to have lands irrigated by the Cauvery, of the annual value of Rs.20,000—say £2,000 a year more—near Gangeshwari in the Talkad talook, about fifteen miles west of Mysore, and to have had the Malavelly and Mysore "plough-tax" road diverted, so as to run alongside his estate, which, although a narrow strip, is nearly eleven miles long. He is said to have received the contract money himself from the talook, and to have had the road made under his own directions. Even if there should prove to be some exaggeration in the reported extent or value of the lands acquired by Mr. Rungacharloo, neither his position nor that of the acquiescent Chief Commissioners would be improved; for there are peremptory orders on record against officials in the Mysore service acquiring landed property in the districts in which they serve. Several officials have, in fact, been dismissed the service for infringing this rule. Is it possible that several successive Chief Commissioners can have been ignorant of the acquisition of this fine estate within the province by an official who arrived there but twelve years ago with no fortune but his salary? And if they were not totally ignorant of this laying of field to field, and of the way in which it was done, how is it that an exception to a rule, universal throughout India, can have been made in favour of the former Controller of the Household, the present Revenue Commissioner and Secretary? We know, indeed, that some of the Chief Commissioners of Mysore were kept in ignorance for years, of such trifles as "burglaries" in the Palace, of the six weeks' manipulation of the Crown jewels in 1872, and of the numerous inaccuracies then alleged to have been found in the lists for which Major Elliot and Mr. C. Rungacharloo had received the thanks of Government. But this acquisition of a large landed estate is not exactly a trifle, or a thing done in a corner, and the present Chief Commissioner, Mr. Gordon, has had the advantage of acting as Guardian to the Maharajah, in close communication for some years with Mr. C. Rungacharloo, and must have known much of which his predecessors may have been unaware. Is it true that Mr. C. Rungacharloo has gained an extraordinary ascendancy over the counsels of the present Chief Commissioner? These are questions that have long agitated the bosoms of the notables and population of Mysore; and it might be as well for the responsible authorities not under local or professional influence—if, indeed, any one above a certain rank is ever to be held responsible for anything—to insist on some *real* inquiry into these matters, and not a sham routine reference to the persons implicated.

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MR. H. N. LAY points out in a letter to one of the morning papers, that the statement commonly put forth to the effect that the "legalization of the import of opium into China" was wrung from the Chinese under terror of our arms, is contrary to fact. Mr. Lay writes as follows:—

There is no truth whatever in the allegation; and I do not think, in fairness to Lord

Elgin's memory, or in justice to all concerned, that I ought to observe silence any longer. Jointly with Sir Thomas Wade, our present Minister in China, I was Chinese Secretary to Lord Elgin's special mission. All the negotiations at Tientsin passed through me. Not one word upon either side was ever said about opium from first to last. The revision of the tariff and the adjustment of all questions affecting our trade were designedly left for after deliberation and arrangement, and it was agreed that for that purpose the Chinese High Commissioners should meet Lord Elgin at Shanghai in the following winter. The Treaty of Tientsin was signed on the 26th June, 1858; the fleet was withdrawn; and Lord Elgin turned the interval to account by visiting Japan, and concluding a treaty there. In the meantime the preparation of the tariff devolved upon me, at the desire no less of the Chinese than of Lord Elgin. When I came to "opium" I inquired what course they proposed to take in respect to it. The answer was, "We have resolved to put it into the tariff as 'Yang yoh'" (foreign medicine). This represents with strict accuracy the amount of "extortion" resorted to. And I may add that the tariff as prepared by me, although it comprises some three hundred articles of import and export, was adopted by the Chinese Commissioners without a single alteration, which would hardly have been the case had the tariff contained aught objectionable to them. Five months after the signature of the Treaty of Tientsin, long subsequently to the removal of all pressure, the Chinese High Commissioners, the signatories of the treaty, came down to Shanghai in accordance with the arrangement made, and after conference with their colleagues and due consideration, signed with Lord Elgin the tariff as prepared, along with other commercial articles which had been drawn up in concert with the subordinate members of the Commission who had been charged with that duty. The Chinese Government admitted opium as a legal article of import, not under constraint, but of their own free will deliberately.

Lord Elgin was certainly not the man to force the import of opium upon the Chinese Government, and it was due to his memory that Mr. Lay should make this statement.

THE Chinese Ambassador in London, two or three years ago, when receiving a deputation upon the subject of the trade, affirmed that his Government was in earnest in wishing to stop the trade. But he pointed out that opium could be produced elsewhere than in India, and that "it was necessary that some arrangement should be made, not with England alone, but with other countries as well." We naturally hesitate to say one word to discourage a movement springing from motives so pure and philanthropic as those which actuate the Anti-Opium Association; but *are* they quite sure that the use of the drug is the unmixed evil they assume it to be? We are ourselves by no means sure that it is. It is positively asserted that the climate and conditions of life in China are such, that for many of the population opium is a positive necessity. The Chinese are crowded, we are told, along the banks of the great rivers, which are so densely populated that in many places the villages float on rafts. For miles on either side there is a belt of marsh and swamp, succeeded by rice fields. These are inundated for a part of the year and dry for the remainder, and opium is a necessity as a preventive against malaria. We are told also that in this country, in Norfolk, Lincolnshire, and parts of Essex, opium-eating is not uncommon, and that its tendency to shorten life is hardly, if at all, more perceptible than that of tobacco, and that for those liable to ague or rheumatism it acts as a tonic. Let no one suppose us to be apologizing for the opium-eater. We simply say that our own reading upon the subject through a long course of years, has made us sceptical of the strong statements that are now and again made as to the effects of the drug upon the Chinese population; and that the impression has grown upon us that the liquor traffic which we tolerate in this country, produces evils out of all proportion greater. How then, while we permit the distillery and the

gin-palace to exist amongst ourselves, can we consistently engage in a crusade against the consumption of opium in a remote country, which itself grows and manufactures the drug upon a gigantic scale, and, either from insincerity or weakness, is unable to give us any assistance in our crusade? We may be wrong, but it is our belief that if we prohibited the growth of the poppy to-morrow throughout India, the Chinese Government would find fifty excuses for postponing indefinitely, any effective prohibition of the same order in China. There remains the great question: Have we a right to prohibit either the cultivation, or the manufacture? We doubt if we have.

SINCE this note was in type, we see that Mr. Lawrence Oliphant confirms Mr. Lay's statement, in a letter to the *Daily News* :—

I was appointed in 1858 Commissioner for the settlement of the trade and tariff regulations with China; and during my absence with Lord Elgin in Japan, Mr. Lay was charged to consider the details with the subordinate Chinese officials named for the purpose. On my return to Shanghai I went through the tariff elaborated by these gentlemen with the Commissioner appointed by the Chinese Government. When we came to the article "opium," I informed the Commissioner that I had received instructions from Lord Elgin not to insist on the insertion of the drug in the tariff, should the Chinese Government wish to omit it. This he declined to do. I then proposed that the duty should be increased beyond the figure suggested in the tariff; but to this he objected on the ground that it would increase the inducements to smuggling. If my memory serves me, the official report which I made at the time contains an account of what transpired on the occasion; but under any circumstances, I trust that the delusion that the opium trade now existing with China was "extorted" from that country by the British Ambassador, may be finally dispelled.

If we may judge from Lord Elgin's private letters at the time, he was in no mood to force the legalization of the traffic upon the Chinese. He had formed a most unfavourable opinion of the whole China trade, and his letters speak with mingled disgust and indignation of the tone which he found prevailing amongst our merchants. The measures which he had to enforce against the Chinese, were most repugnant to him, and he stigmatized in strong language the course of procedure that had brought about the war. The legalization of the traffic was, doubtless, seen by the Chinese authorities themselves to be the only course for them to adopt, and Lord Elgin reluctantly shared their conviction.

AN officer of high standing in India writes to us from the Deccan, privately, under date of 28th August last, as follows :—

I cannot let a mail pass without writing to express the pleasure with which I read your papers on the Condition of India and Indian Finance. . . . I am going to retire at the end of the year; the service is too degenerating to stay in. I shall leave it, knowing that the only obstacle to my own success has been that I would never condone what was false. The sure road to ruin in this country is to tell the truth. I conscientiously aver that if I had been deaf, dumb, and blind, I might have risen to the highest honours. Nearly all who rise crawl up stairs on their knees, kissing the footsteps of the Secretary.

You may quote the enclosed extract as the opinion of a man who has witnessed the agricultural misery of the people for twenty-three years, and who, as a sportsman, has seen their private life, and received the confidence of hundreds of them. We are in a fool's paradise. Our rule is hated, and so anxious are the people to see any change, that there will be a general uprising, unless we speedily restore our prestige in Afghanistan.

It was a very wise thing to send out reinforcements at once. The first regiment will reach Bombay next week, and for the next five or six, reinforcements will come in week by week. This will send the needed impression through the country of our strength.

(Extract referred to in the Letter.)

The writer has frequently been told in the North-west Provinces, the Punjab, Scinde, and the Central Provinces, that the sudden introduction of cash assessment was the first great cause of debt amongst the agricultural class. "We had the grain, *Sahib*, and it was worth a great deal more than the rupees I had to pay; but what could I do? I had not got the carriage to take it to the bazaar, and I had not ready money to pay for the hire, so we borrowed the rupees on our grain to pay the collector, and the *duniya* took our grain at a quarter its value. We commenced by borrowing on our grain; before long we were buying it back and borrowing on our land. If the *Sirkar* had introduced the money payments gradually, I might have kept my land to this day." We believe this is true, and that such radical changes in the fiscal system should have been made gradually. Doubtless the monotonous strength of our iron rule has its advantage for the money-lender rather than for the spender. Formerly the unthinking mass promptly resented on the persons of unfortunate holders of grain stock the results of a rise of prices which were caused by scarcity. But in point of fact, nearly all classes had their share in the harvest, and as the village artisan depended upon his authorized allotment, so did the cultivator look to his zemindar for food and seed-grain. Very little ready money circulated amongst the village community. Perhaps some flash Sowars or Sepoys, if any were quartered in the vicinity, might possess a little money, and a well-to-do cultivator would bring back a few rupees from the town in exchange for the many pieces of cotton woven by the women of his household; but, as a rule, the simple wants of the rural society were satisfied by sharing in the harvest and interchange of commodities, the growers of cereals exchanging with those who grew sugar, tobacco, and luxuries. Thus to this day, where Natives are left alone, do they still follow their own customs in exchange and barter.

The writer adds: "I am driven out of the Service by sheer disgust at the degradation which the word 'service' means in my mind, instead of honour. You did not notice in your reflections on the low *morale* of to-day that, under the East India Company, individualism, when justified by results, was honoured: under the Queen's Government, it is considered as dangerous as hydrophobia."

ABOUT two years ago Mr. Gladstone described our Indian rule as depending upon "a Cabinet which dreads nothing so much as the mention of an Indian question at its meetings; on a Secretary of State who knows that the less his colleagues hear of his proceedings the better they will be pleased; on a Parliament supreme over all, which cannot in its two Houses muster a score of persons who have practical knowledge or experience of India, or a tolerable knowledge of its people or history." (*Nineteenth Century*, No. 19, 1878: "England's Mission.") Now, if this is true—and every well-informed Englishman knows it to be true to the letter—what reproach to us, as a people, could be deeper? And the result of it is exactly what might have been expected. Conceal it from ourselves as we may—and the devices of our self-love are infinite for the purpose—our rule of India is a shameful failure. We have handed it over to the administration of an irresponsible bureaucracy, who conduct all their proceedings in secrecy, and who systematically conceal the true nature of those proceedings from the nation. In our last issue we attempted to lay bare to the nation the real character of the measures by which the Government of Lord Lytton succeeded in carrying what is known as "the abolition of the Salt Line." Since we wrote that article we have received intelligence of the death of one of our victims, in the person of the Maharajah of Jaipur. We knew the Maharajah of Jaipur personally. He was justly regarded as one of the most enlightened of the Native Princes. He was an exceedingly amiable and well-intentioned man, and had the interests of his subjects at heart. The last time we saw him (Nov., 1878) he told us how deeply he felt the wrong done to him in these salt arrangements. "They [the British Government] came to me," he said, "seven years ago, with professions of

generous regard for me and my people, and persuaded me to give the Sumbhar Salt Lake into their management. They have ended by compelling me to raise the price of this necessary of life to the millions of my poor subjects to the same enormous rates charged by the British Government to their subjects. I shall be disgraced in the eyes of my successors by the wrong I have been made to do to my subjects." Knowing that no trace of the true proceedings would be allowed to find a place in the official records, but that our officers would conceal the whole in the demi-official correspondence from the public, we urged the Prince to allow us to see the papers. The Maharajah, in common with every other Native Prince in India, was in terror of the Simlah Foreign Office, with but too good reason; and he was afraid to let us have the papers. We then applied repeatedly for them to the Government of India, through the Press Commissioner, the appointed channel. They would not bear the light, and so we could not get them.

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Holkar we do not know; but we have a part of the record of the proceedings in his case. His resentment, again, is bitter. He feels that he has been deliberately cheated, and if he dared, he would fling away the scabbard and fight us. If we were Holkar, we should feel as *he* does—as we all should under such treatment. We are almost in despair. Secrecy and irresponsibility have done their natural work in India, and, short of corruption, the Indian Government does not care what proceedings it lends itself to. Parliament should insist upon seeing every communication—official, demi-official, and private—that has passed between the Princes and our own officers. The *true* record lies buried in their private communications with each other. The Princes should be invited to tell us, without fear, how they have been used, through some agency that will not succumb to the "official atmosphere" that poisons all who breathe it in India, and that has vitiated the Famine Commission. There was but one upright way of making this reform, and that was by inducing the Native Princes to adopt our own salt monopoly system, remitting equivalent taxation of other kinds to their subjects in its place. But though the sin was our own, we could not make up our minds to forego it, *without a profit* upon its abandonment! We ought to have been willing to make heavy sacrifices to carry it: we preferred to make its abandonment profitable, at the expense of the Native Princes and their subjects. The result is that we are hated and despised by them, as we deserve to be. We have ever had a deep sympathy with the Natives of India, and it has made us quick-sighted, we suppose, to see their wrongs; how fatally is our rule demoralized; and how ruinous it has become to the masses of the people. If they could throw off our yoke, all classes would hail the revolution. Our Foreign Office does not know what "honour" means in its treatment of the Native Princes. We thought we could do a good stroke of business at their cost: we have delivered our "stroke," and made the Princes more than ever impatient of our supremacy. The mournful thing is that the Services produce instruments in any number to carry out such proceedings. We have no right to look for active loyalty to our rule, but we might have secured the good-will and contentment of all classes, by unselfish and honourable courses towards them. As it is, we are hated—let who may tell the nation the contrary—hated by the educated classes, for our exclusion of them from all positions of influence and emolument; by the people, because of their misery under our rule; by the Princes, for the conduct of the Indian Foreign Office. We treat peasant and Prince alike, as though they were stocks and stones, without the passions that agitate the human heart everywhere.



## THE REFORM OF LONDON GOVERNMENT.

AMONGST the measures enumerated by the Prime Minister, a few months ago, as problems awaiting solution at the hands of a Liberal Parliament, the reform of the government of London occupied a prominent place. For the inhabitants of the metropolis it was perhaps, the most urgent question of them all. It may be true that this urgency has not been hitherto emphasized by a widespread agitation throughout London, or by any claim unitedly advanced by existing representative persons or institutions, but it is none the less true that opinion in London is rapidly maturing upon it, and that the strength of such opinion is generally co-extensive with the spread of accurate knowledge of the subject.

• The absence of anything like an extended and accurate knowledge of the circumstances, origin, and character of the authorities which exercise municipal rights over them, has done more than perhaps, anything else to retard effective agitation amongst Londoners for reform. It is difficult to formulate schemes of reform without deciding how such systems as exist are to be adapted to, or made to coalesce with, them. If the whole question could be dealt with independently of existing authorities, the task would be comparatively easy. To construct upon a *tabula rasa* a municipal edifice following the lines of the Municipal Corporations Act, 1835, with such modifications as experience in large boroughs might suggest, and as the exceptional character of the metropolis would require, is a much easier matter than to establish a municipal system into which the powers that be may gently merge, and which in one single authority may preserve the continuity of them all. It has always been the peculiar claim of modern Liberalism that through its agency old institutions were adapted to new conditions, and the wishes of the governed received constantly increasing expression and influence in the councils of those who govern. No greater work lies before it in the future than the application of this power to the government of London.

The great obstacle in the path of past civic reformers has always been the method of dealing with the Corporation of the City. The presence in the centre of the metropolis of a powerful

and historic body possessing a municipal life and a long corporate record is one of the most serious difficulties of the situation. Jealous of its "privileges," and anxious to preserve them even at the expense of the surrounding populations, the City authorities have always offered their most strenuous opposition to every proposition of reform. From 1835 to 1880 the obstructive action of this Corporation has been constantly the same, and vigilant and highly-paid officers are retained to watch over the interests of the City, to devise means to repel any assault on its privileges, and to defeat any measures which might have, even distantly, a prejudicial effect upon it.

The Municipal Commissioners of 1834 presented their report upon the Corporations into which they were instructed to inquire, in instalments. The 183 Corporations upon which they at first reported were duly reformed by the Municipal Corporations Act, 1835. At the time when that Act was passed the Commissioners had not completed their report upon the Corporation of London. If they had been able to present their report upon London at the same time as the rest were presented, there is no doubt that London would have been included in the schedule to the Act. The address of the House of Commons, moved at the commencement of the Session of 1835, pointed out the advisability of placing Municipal Corporations under "vigilant popular control," and it was not suggested that the City of London should be dealt with in a different or more lenient manner from that in which other Corporations were dealt with. The Commissioners ultimately presented their report upon the Corporation of London and the Livery Companies in 1837. It is by far the most comprehensive and valuable document which has ever been prepared upon the subject, and the views of the Commissioners as to the necessity of immediate reform are absolute and conclusive. The question as to the form which it should take is also considered, and they say: "We do not find any argument on which the course pursued with regard to other towns could be justified which would not apply with the same force to London, unless the magnitude of the change in this case should be considered as converting that which would otherwise be only a practical difficulty into an objection of principle." They express themselves unable "to discover any circumstance justifying the present distinction of the City area from the rest except the fact that it is, and has been long, so distinguished."

They discarded the idea of the establishment of separate independent municipalities, which has seemed to some reformers as presenting a possible solution of the difficulty: "We hardly antici-

pate that it will be suggested, for the purpose of removing the appearance of singularity, that the other quarters of the town should be formed into independent and isolated communities, if, indeed, the multifarious relations to which their proximity compels them would permit them to be isolated and independent. This plan would, as it seems to us, in getting rid of an anomaly, tend to multiply and perpetuate an evil." At the time when this report was written there were no central authorities performing in London any portion of municipal work ; and the subsequent establishment of the Metropolitan Board of Works, whilst it has emphasized the opinion of the Commissioners as to the impossibility of having isolated communities in London, has also shown that if such communities were established in the form of separate municipalities, the functions which would be allotted them would be scarcely, if at all, larger than those possessed by the present vestries, and would, therefore, not be likely to attract men whose services would be of advantage to the community.

When the report of the Municipal Commissioners was presented in 1837, a change had come over the relations of parties, and the separate measure which Lord John Russell had announced his intention of introducing with respect to London was never introduced. The influence of the City was exerted to prevent it, and exerted successfully. The threatened defection of the representatives of the City if the measure was brought forward, and the ultimate election of Lord John Russell as one of the members for the City, postponed indefinitely the reform of London government. The manner in which the City influence was exercised was most discreditable, and was made the subject of strong denunciation by Lord Brougham in the House of Lords in 1843, when he brought forward a motion for an address to the Queen, praying her to take into consideration the report of the Commissioners, with a view to the introduction of a measure for the municipal reform of London. Lord Brougham then expressed the opinion that not many months would elapse before the reform which had been given to the other Corporations would also be extended to the "giant abuse"—the Corporation of London. But he was mistaken. No reforms of any serious magnitude have been introduced into the action of the Corporation of London from that day to this, and in some respects the changes which have taken place have been for the worse.

The Commission appointed in 1853 to inquire into the state of the Corporation of London did not adopt in their entirety the suggestions of their predecessors, but they made many recommendations with respect to the reform of the Corporation, most of which, however,

notwithstanding the power of internal reform possessed by the Court of Common Council, have remained disregarded. This Commission was composed only of three members, and its recommendations, although possessing much less weight than those of the former Commissioners, were more in favour of separate municipal organizations. With respect to the character of the Corporation and its government, their criticism is scarcely less severe than that of the Commissioners who reported in 1837; and they point out that, notwithstanding their attention had been called to it, there had been no systematic reform carried out by the Common Council since the issue of the previous report. Their recommendations included the grant of a new charter for the Corporation; the election of the Lord Mayor to be in the hands of the Common Council, instead of being vested in the members of trading companies "who are not necessarily connected with the City by property, residence, or occupation." They proposed that aldermen, instead of being elected for life, as at present, should be elected for six years only; they recommended the abolition of the Court of Aldermen, and the reduction of the number of City wards, each ward to return one alderman and five councillors. This last proposal would involve the reduction of the number of the present Common Council by two-thirds. Their recommendations also included the abolition of the electoral powers of the Common Hall; the incorporation of the Metropolitan and City Police; the removal of the right of market control claimed by the City for seven miles round St. Paul's; a revision of the establishments of the Corporation, so as to have a more economical arrangement and a more satisfactory audit; and an extension to the City of various provisions of the Municipal Corporations Act, including the restriction upon borough authorities mortgaging their lands without the consent of the Treasury. They also suggested the creation of a Central Board to control public works affecting the whole metropolis. These recommendations were as moderate as could well be conceived, and they had the peculiarity of endeavouring to harmonize the continued existence of the City with the extension of municipal institutions to the metropolis. Not one of these recommendations for reform has as yet been carried out. The City remains unreformed and unregenerate as ever. The Municipal Councils have not been created, and the Metropolis Management Act, 1855, under which the government of outer London was entrusted to vestries and district boards, and the construction of its main drainage to the Metropolitan Board of Works, falls very far short of carrying out the mild suggestions of these mildest of Commissioners. The idea that any reform in the Corporation was

possible was indignantly repelled by civic authorities when they read the report of the Commissioners; and the proposal contained in the Municipality of London Bill, 1880, whereby the old Corporation should be merged in a new municipality, could not have been received with a greater tempest of indignation and disapproval than that with which the City greeted the suggestions we have quoted.

In 1856 Sir George Grey introduced a Bill proposing to reform the City on the lines of some of the recommendations of the Commissioners. Owing, however, to the great pressure which the authorities of the City brought to bear upon him, on the theory that it was necessary for them to have time to study the measure, he was compelled to postpone the second reading, and eventually to withdraw the Bill. The opposition to it within the walls of the City by the individuals affected, and by the authorities of the Corporation, was of the most violent kind, and the highest constitutional authority amongst them pointed to revolution as the possible results of the carrying of the measure. Sir George Grey promised to re-introduce the Bill in 1857, but once again the Corporation were too strong for him. In 1858 he again brought forward a measure for the better regulation of the Corporation of London. It bore, in several respects, marks of change for the worse, but it might, if it had passed, have proved of some use as a stepping-stone in the right direction. It was read a second time on February 12th, and then, upon a motion of a representative of the City, it was referred to a Select Committee. The appointment of this Committee was delayed as much as possible, and the influence of the City was brought to bear in the nomination of its members. Various other methods of delay were adopted, both before the Committee and in the House of Commons after the Committee had reported. Ultimately the manoeuvres of the representatives of the City were successful, and this Bill also was withdrawn. In 1859 Sir George Cornwall Lewis introduced a Bill on behalf of the Government. It was introduced in July, and was, therefore, necessarily withdrawn. But the influence and action of the City had, year after year, so emasculated the mild reforms suggested in the Bill of 1856, that the City were anxious to be allowed to introduce Sir George Lewis's measure as a private Bill. Another measure introduced in 1860, and equally worthless, was also withdrawn by the Government.

The Bill of 1860 was the last that was introduced on the authority of any Administration with the purpose of dealing with the reform of the Corporation of London. Abandoned by the Government of the day, the question of London reform was afterwards brought before the House of Commons through the agency of

private members. In 1867 Mr. John Stuart Mill (then the representative of Westminster) introduced a measure for dividing the metropolis into ten boroughs, each with a mayor, aldermen, and burgesses, and for the transfer of the property and authority of the vestries. This Bill was withdrawn, but in 1868 re-introduced, together with a measure providing for the constitution of a central Corporation. This latter measure was stopped through the agency of the City upon the standing orders of the House. These provide that notice must be given by advertisement in the preceding month of November, where Bills affecting the private property of Corporations are brought before the House. If we mistake not, the Metropolis Management Act passed through Parliament without such notice being given, and any measure dealing with the whole metropolis ought, as it seems to us, to come within that precedent. But the Corporation of the City, anxious by any means to prevent even the simplest measure of reform becoming law, successfully invoked this standing order, under which Mr. Mill was required to expend several hundred pounds in advertising to the City, proposals of reform with which they were already perfectly familiar. This standing order had also been successfully invoked against Sir George Grey's City Police Bill, in 1863, and its bearing must be carefully considered by any persons proposing reform in the future. The lesson to be learned from the action of the City is, that whether a proposed reform be small or great, they are prepared to exhaust every means of opposition in order to prevent its becoming law, or even being discussed.

After Mr. Mill's exclusion from Parliament, Mr. Buxton undertook, in 1869, the conduct and introduction of his Municipal Reform Bills. They were discussed upon the second reading, and, after the Home Secretary had assured the House that the subject should receive the consideration of the Government, they were withdrawn. The assurance of the Home Secretary being unfruitful of results, Mr. Buxton, in 1870, again brought the subject before the House. His proposals were embodied in three Bills; one for the establishment of nine boroughs besides the City, and for the government of each by a Warden and Councillors. A second Bill, called the Corporation of London Bill, was drafted with the object of extending over the whole of the metropolis the Corporation of the City, with certain variations of its system, and with elected representatives from the various boroughs. A third Bill constituted the metropolitan area into a county. The Bills were read a second time, and referred to a Select Committee, where they found their grave. The Government remained supine upon the question; and

again, in 1875, Lord Elcho and Mr. Kay-Shuttleworth brought the subject before the House of Commons in the form of a Bill for the establishment of one single Municipal Government for the whole metropolis. This Bill constituted the first attempt to carry out in a complete manner the suggestions of the Commissioners of 1835. It was in principle the same as the Municipality of London Bill, 1880, but there is considerable difference in detail. For the purpose of representation at the Central Council created by Lord Elcho's Bill, the metropolis outside the City was divided into nine municipal districts, each of which was subdivided into four wards. The number of members of the Central Council was to be 220, of whom twenty were to be sent by each of the nine districts, and forty by the City district. Perhaps the most important distinction which exists between the Bill of 1875 and the Bill of 1880 consists in the provision contained in the former that, except with the consent of the City representatives, the Council shall not expend the property of the City elsewhere than in the City district. In the Bill of 1880 the property as well as the authority of the City is merged in the new body. The Bill of 1875 was withdrawn before reaching the second reading, in order that Lord Elcho might proceed by resolution; but no opportunity was afforded to introduce it. In 1878 Mr. Kay-Shuttleworth, in a series of resolutions, brought the matter again before the House of Commons, but with no satisfactory result.

The Municipality of London Bill, 1880, was a more elaborately complete scheme than any of those which had preceded it. Introduced by Mr. Firth, Mr. Thorold Rogers, Mr. T. B. Potter, Mr. W. H. James, and Mr. Brand, during the short session of the new Parliament, it never had an opportunity of being publicly discussed. But the object of the promoters was probably attained by the presentation in a complete shape of their final judgment as to the form which a new government for London ought to take. The settlement of a problem so vast and intricate, and involving so many vested interests, can scarcely be effected unless it be taken in hand, or, at any rate, prominently supported, by the Government of the day; but a distinct and considerable service has been rendered to the cause of reform and to any Administration that may undertake it by the elaboration of this scheme. When it is understood that it embodies the wishes of the largest number of intelligent Londoners, who have independently examined the question, and that it utilizes the experience of the last forty years of effort, it will be admitted that any Government dealing with the question is bound carefully to consider the provisions of the Bill, and, except for good reason, will not act wisely in disregarding them.

The Bill affirms in its preamble, and elaborates in its clauses, the principle of one central representative municipal authority; and probably it is around this principle that the fiercest fighting will take place whenever any project for London government comes before Parliament for discussion. But the logic of events has supplied a most potent argument in favour of the principle of one single authority rather than a congeries of municipalities, even if there were, for some general purposes, a union of them all in some central body. In 1855 the Metropolis Management Act created the Metropolitan Board of Works, mainly for the purpose of carrying out a scheme of main drainage for London. The control of lighting, paving, cleansing, dusting, and watering, and the construction of the smaller sewerage, was placed in the hands of thirty-eight vestries and district boards throughout London. It was supposed that the London vestries would become municipal bodies attracting the best men of the various districts. The district boards were formed by the union of some of the smaller vestries. The Metropolitan Board was a body to be elected by the vestries and district boards; and it was supposed that, being composed of the elect of the elected vestries, a scheme had been devised under which the ablest and most independent men would come to the front. But the result has not realized the expectation. The elections to the vestry are seldom known, and where known are generally disregarded. Cases constantly occur in which the number electing is actually less than the number to be elected, and the names of the members and the character of their rule are frequently utterly unknown to the vast majority of the inhabitants governed—a state of things under which healthy criticism is impossible. The Metropolitan Board of Works consists of less than fifty members, and although it expends money by millions, the people of London know very little about it, and it is rare to meet any one who knows even the names of half a dozen of the men to whom such enormous powers are confided. But the Board supplies a remarkable argument in favour of the scheme for one municipality only. Confessedly weak in its constitution and in its composition, the Legislature have gone on, year after year, imposing new duties upon it, affecting the whole metropolis. From main drainage it soon was entrusted with the control of streets and buildings; and, acting through its surveyors, the Board now regulates the width of streets, the numbering of the houses, the elevation and size of buildings, the preparation of sites, and the character of dangerous buildings. The Board has acquired for London a large number of commons and open spaces, with an aggregate area of some hundreds of acres. It has also embanked the Thames,



at a cost of some millions sterling; it has completed the most extensive system of main drainage ever executed; it has purchased and freed for the public most of the bridges over the Thames; it has formed many new streets, and executed some improvements, at enormous cost. Queen Victoria Street, Northumberland Avenue, and Garrick Street are examples of its work in this direction. It has cleared sites for artisans' dwellings in various parts of London, and since 1865 it has managed the Fire Brigade and the arrangements for the prevention of fire throughout London. The investigation and inspection of "baby farms," of locomotives on roads, of tramways, of cow-sheds and slaughter-houses, are only some of the duties which the Legislature has imposed upon this body; and there can be but little doubt that it would have imposed many more but for the feeble and non-representative character of the Board. No argument could be clearer than that advanced by the Board when introducing their Water Bills in 1878, that those who controlled the Fire Brigade should also control the supply of water which it required; and if the Government had been dealing with a representative body constituted by direct election, there can be no doubt that both gas and water supply would have long since been under popular control. The absence of such a single representative, reliable authority represents the loss of millions to the inhabitants of London. In their report last session the Water Committee propose to constitute a Water Trust "in the absence of any single municipal authority."

If a scheme of separate municipalities were introduced, the first question that would arise would be as to the functions which should be given them. It must not be forgotten that when the Legislature gave such diverse powers to the Metropolitan Board of Works, they did so with the vestries in existence, and possessing both time and money to carry them out, if they could be better carried out by a local than a central body. It must, therefore, be taken to be true that when new powers were given to the Metropolitan Board they were such as, in the judgment of the Legislature, a central body could best carry out; and if a series of municipalities were created, it cannot be supposed that they would be entrusted with powers which had been once given to this central body. It is difficult, then, to see in what way their jurisdiction would be wider than that of the present vestries. If it were merely the same as the present vestries, where is the probability that a different class of men would be attracted to them? But, on examination, it will appear that most of the functions now performed by the vestries would be better done by a single authority. The paving of our streets is often entrusted to

surveyors of little knowledge and experience; and the maintenance of so many different systems and establishments throughout London results in great extravagance in some districts, great parsimony in others, and absence of unified system in all. Lighting should also be in the hands of a central body. At present the different vestries pay to the same company different sums for the supply of the same quantity of gas. The subsidiary drainage, now done by vestries, ought to be in the hands of the body that does the main drainage; and, indeed, it may be doubted whether there are any functions discharged by the vestries that could not be better discharged by a single representative body, employing a staff of competent workmen.

The Municipality of London Bill proposes to make London a county of itself, by the name of the County of London. The Municipality of London is to be incorporated, and to be the governing authority within this area. The old title of Lord Mayor—which, we believe, dates back to the early Plantagenet period—is retained; and the scheme provides for the election of aldermen and common, or—as they are termed—“municipal” councillors. For the purpose of their election, the metropolis is divided into forty municipal districts, of which the present City division forms one, and each of these districts sends one alderman and five councillors, making a total of 240 as the number of the Central Municipal Council. This number is slightly in excess of the numbers of the Common Council of the City, and, having regard to the work performed by one-sixth of the number at the Metropolitan Board of Works, it would probably be found sufficient if aided by an efficient permanent staff. The Council is to be subject to re-election every three years, and would therefore be in the fullest possible manner a representative body. The example of the London School Board shows that there would be no serious danger of losing by such frequent election the continuity of municipal life. We believe that something like a quarter of the present members of the School Board were first elected members in November, 1870, and the change at each election is not sufficient to injure or mutilate the work of the Board. The division into forty municipal districts is illustrated by maps attached to the Municipality of London Bill. The dividing lines are, as a rule, along public roads, and whilst the central districts have an estimated population of 100,000 each, the outlying districts have some slightly smaller number. But the outlying districts are increasing in population, and if each of the forty districts had 100,000 inhabitants, the aggregate would be 4,000,000, which is about 250,000 more than the present population.

One of the most noticeable features of this Bill as distinguished from measures which have preceded it is the perfectly logical system on which it is constructed. The existence of the present City area is not considered further than to constitute it a municipal district. The City Corporation, with its property and charters, is merged in the new municipality, and its authorities are transferred to it with just the same surgical hand as the authorities of the Metropolitan Board and the vestries are transferred. It is evident that whenever reform does come it must embrace the merger or extinction of the existing forms of London government, and it would be difficult to devise a simpler method of change than that contained in this measure. It even provides for certain representatives of the various governing bodies acting for a time on the new Council, so that it would have the full benefit of whatever municipal life or knowledge now exists in London. It may suit the Lord Mayor to term such proposals as these destructive; but under them, whilst it is true that the present Corporation, in its narrow and stinted character, would disappear, it would be rather a transformation than a death, and there would arise from its ashes a new and powerful body, which should have the confidence and represent the wishes of the whole metropolis. The Bill contains more than 100 clauses, providing for the various methods of dealing with existing interests, and modifying them so far as may be necessary.

The central principle is the government of this metropolis by one single municipal body triennially elected by the inhabitants, instead of the present disintegrated, non-representative, and inefficient system. There are some people who think that the details of municipal work could not be properly performed by a body of this kind, but a careful examination of what is now done by the Metropolitan Board and by the London School Board ought to dispel this idea. The London School Board has, it is true, local assistance from Managing Committees nominated by the Board, just as a central Poor-law system would probably always require the assistance of local bodies with special knowledge of the district and of its inhabitants. The need of such local assistance is not, however, so manifest in cases of paving, lighting, sewerage, and so forth. In case, however, the Council should come to the conclusion that local assistance is needful in any branch of their work, they have power to nominate assistants, as Managers are now nominated by the School Board for London.

One of the most serious evils from which the existing Metropolitan Board of Works, City Corporation, and London Vestries have suffered is the character of the men who compose them. Not-

withstanding the apprehensions that were entertained at the time of the constitution of the Metropolitan Board of Works that it would usurp political power and make itself dangerous to the public peace, it has proved to be a very innocuous and politically inoffensive body. None of the existing London governing bodies have succeeded in attracting to themselves in any considerable numbers the best class of the citizens of the metropolis, whilst it is notorious that in some of them tradesmen have been constantly able and willing to use their official position for advancing their private interest. In his "Representative Government" Stuart Mill says: "It is quite hopeless to induce persons of a high class, either socially or intellectually, to take a share of local administration in a corner by piecemeal, as members of a Paving Board or of a Drainage Commission. The entire local business of their town is not more than a sufficient object to induce men whose taste inclines them and whose knowledge qualifies them for national affairs, to become members of a mere local body, and devote to it the time and study which are necessary to render their presence anything more than a screen for the jobbing of inferior persons under the shelter of their responsibility."

There can be no doubt that the form in which London government now exists amply illustrates and justifies Mr. Mill's observations. But there is much reason to hope that if a single central municipal system were constituted, the prospect of taking part in the work of a local parliament ruling the destinies of four millions of people would prove attractive to the best men in every class of the community. The highest of the commercial classes would contribute their representative men; science and art would be anxious to have a voice in a body where that voice might be used to their advantage. Every class of the community would make an effort to have its interests represented and enforced; and amongst the hundreds of men now living in seclusion in London, after exercising important administrative functions in all parts of the world, there would be not a few who would be both willing and anxious to place their ripe experience and power at the service of the community at such a Council Board. No man could safely predicate the future of London under an effective municipal government. We cannot doubt that a reform of its municipal institutions will be one of the earliest questions with which the Administration will deal; and an examination of the history of the subject and of the various schemes which have been proposed, impels us to the conclusion that the only satisfactory solution of the problem lies in the creation of a single representative Municipal Council of a type somewhat similar to that which is elaborated in the Municipality of London Bill, 1880.

## IRISH DECLENSION: AND HOME RULE.

THERE is no assertion more frequently met with in the numberless speeches and articles which have been called forth by the present agitation in Ireland than that of the late Chancellor of the Exchequer, some months ago, that "the improvement which has taken place of late years in the material condition of Ireland has been most remarkable." Men of all parties seem inclined to echo the phrase, and to shrink from candidly examining the facts of the case [for themselves, and forming an independent judgment. Sir Stafford Northcote did not furnish his audience with figures, or facts of any kind, to support the assertion; but fortunately, the very full statistics that are issued annually from the Registrar-General's Office in Dublin, enable us to satisfy ourselves as to the present and past condition of agriculture in that country; for it is to agriculture that the final appeal must be made in the case of such a country as Ireland, where, with the exception of Belfast and the surrounding district, manufactures on a large scale are almost unknown. The land is the very life of the Irish peasant, and if we find that the land is increasingly cultivated, and the peasantry gaining in prosperity, we can afford to look on the want and unrest of the present period as the effect of transient causes, to be deplored, no doubt, but not as a ground for declaring that the whole system of agricultural economy has failed. On looking over the returns for the last thirty years, we are at a loss to discover where the Chancellor of the Exchequer found his "remarkable improvement." In 1847, Mr. Labouchere, then Chief Secretary, made a statement in the House of Commons as to the extent of land under cultivation in Ireland. There were, he said, 1,500,000 acres of potatoes, 4,000,000 of oats, and about 2,000,000 of wheat, flax, and green crops. Coming down to 1878, the last year for which the full returns have been published, we find but 846,985 acres of potatoes, 1,412,637 of oats, 154,011 of wheat, and 329,942 of turnips. Surely there is something here at least worth explaining, some-

thing that can scarcely be disposed of jauntily by mere assertions of "most remarkable" improvement.

It may be answered that we are forgetting the fact that a terrible famine and pestilence devastated the island between these dates, that the prosperity of the country received a blow which is answerable for this alarming decrease, and that if we take a period less in extent, and further removed from the famine year, we shall find signs of recovery. Instead then, of thirty years, let us take twenty. In 1858, when the country might have been expected to show signs of recovery, the figures were—potatoes, 1,159,707; oats, 1,981,241; wheat, 546,964; and turnips, 338,202. Here we can at once compare the beginning and end of a period within the memory of most of our readers, and it must surely require a Minister "with a light heart" to call them years of prosperity for agricultural Ireland. Every crop has decreased steadily since 1858 until we find that far over a million acres have fallen away from the production of crops. What has become of this land? Turning to the meadow and pasture, we find, in the same period, a total of half a million acres added to land under that heading; but this still leaves us with another half-million unaccounted for. What has become of it? There is but one answer. In these twenty years of "prosperity," half a million acres have relapsed into a state of waste and barrenness! While Irishmen, and women and children, were dying by the roadside, or filling the almshouses, or finding their way to America with hatred and revenge in their hearts, the land that they had lived on and clung to till the roof-tree fell and the hearthstone was desecrated by the "crowbar brigade," was becoming a wilderness, dragged down and swamped, as it were, by the action of unnatural laws, which withheld it from those who were ready and eager to till it.

But the Land Act, we may be told, has changed all this, and our years of prosperity date from that. Let us look then, at the last five years. In 1874, the Act being in force for four years, we find 4,251,968 acres returned as "bog and waste." In 1878 there were 4,651,527. Surely the improvement is long in coming; nearly 400,000 acres gone out of even the semblance of cultivation in five years. If we were reading of Turkey or of Egypt, we would moralize over the "effete despotisms of the East;" but in Ireland——! Year by year, the drain goes on; year by year, the cereals and the grain crops show the same falling off; year by year, the only figures to show an increase are the tracts of pasture where once there were men—and the bogs!

There is another Irish industry which properly developed, would

be second only to agriculture:—we mean the fisheries. Considering the insufficiency of the quantity, as well as the quality, of the food-supply of the average Irish peasant, the importance of an abundant supply of fish will be at once apparent. Nature has done her part. The coasts teem with food, great in variety and almost infinite in quantity. We have no accurate statistics of the numbers of men and boats employed previous to the famine, but there is good evidence that no part of the population suffered in those years more than the fishermen of the south and west coasts. In 1853, when their numbers must have been enormously reduced, the number of men engaged in fishing was given at 49,208, and of boats 12,381. What signs of improvement do we find after ten years have elapsed? In 1863 the number of men had fallen off to 48,601, and of boats to 11,375. There is not much progress visible there, and in the next ten years the decrease is still more marked. In 1873 there were only 29,307 men and 7,181 boats, and in 1877 they had fallen to 20,395 and 5,382 respectively. In this case, the falling away appears to increase with every year of Sir Stafford Northcote's "remarkable" improvement.

In face of figures of this kind, it is idle to talk of prosperity in Ireland. The Marquis of Hartington said some time ago in a debate on English Agriculture, that if the facts alleged by the advocates of Protection were established, they would show that the land system of the country had "virtually broken down;" but who can deny any longer that the agricultural system in Ireland has collapsed utterly and miserably? It is this fact that gives to the present agitation, in the words of Mr. John Morley, "elements of equity and internal strength that cannot be ignored." We were told that the disappearance of small farms would be a blessing in disguise; they have disappeared with a vengeance, and are still disappearing, and the result is that cultivation is declining along with them. A late writer tells us that "Ireland is the destined home of *latifundia*." Was he thinking, when he wrote the word, of the sentence of Pliny, which, says M. de Laveleye, is "the one sentence that explains all ancient history;" and did he not think that the historian of the future would have to write it "*latifundia perdidit Hiberniam*"?

This is not the time of day to enter into a discussion on a subject so thoroughly threshed out as that of landlordism and peasant proprietorship. Small holdings on insecure tenure have failed in Ireland, but are large holdings succeeding any better? But when has small *ownership* failed? We should not judge of this from an insular standpoint, but remember what Mr. Morier has

told us, that "England is the only civilized community now existing in which the bulk of the land under cultivation is not in the hands of small proprietors." Does this not throw the burden of proof on the advocates of *latifundia*? Mr. Gladstone, twelve months ago, declared it needless to quote "the ample, undoubted, undisputed authorities who recognized the connection between creating a small proprietary in Ireland, and the real welfare of Ireland in its highest interests." Has the case been weakened or strengthened since then? So long as Ireland remains poor and discontented, she will be a weapon in the hand of every enemy of England, a tool ready for the use of every agitator. Surely it is time that this perpetual shame and disgrace was at an end.

One of the chief questions of our domestic policy is the future attitude of the Liberal party towards Home Rule. That of the Tory party is easily described. It puts its back against the wall, stops its ears, and shouts about the dismemberment of the empire. We have seen this sort of thing before. We have also known the "sweet and lovely wall" turn out to be a very movable partition indeed, at the signal of the great stage-manager. "Thus have I, Wall, my part discharged so; and being done, the wall away doth go;" the leaners against it turn round, rub their eyes a little, and seeing no barrier, walk obediently on. The Liberal party has never used much the great defence of cotton-wool, and we hope will never do so; nor has it ever believed much in insuperable obstacles. Its strength and its weakness alike has been that its most original members are apt to take each new question on its merits, and act according to their own opinion, without taking much heed to practical possibilities: Such is likely to be the case now. Some Liberals are willing to listen to what Home Rulers have to say for themselves, and consequently the cry is raised that the Liberal party is coquetting with Home Rule. The phrase is neat, and effective in election speeches. But if a starving man demands your money or your life, and if you show him the tip of your revolver, and give him a letter to the Charity Organization Society,—Is that coquetting with highway robbery? Yet that is precisely what Liberals like Lord Ramsay and Mr. Waddy were ready to do. They saw that some hundreds of thousands of our fellow-subjects think that they have reason to complain of the manner in which they are governed, and send representatives to Parliament to say so for them; and they considered it right that inquiry should be made into the grounds of such complaint, and the manner in which any real injustice may be redressed. Were they not acting strictly in accordance with the principles of the great party to which they belong? Other members of it



may think that a *prima facie* case for inquiry has not been made out, and such are right in refusing to vote for it. The question in its present stage is one which ought not to be either adopted or rejected by the party as a whole, but on which the only right course for the great leaders is to leave their followers free. The adhesion of the Home Rulers alienates many of the Whigs, and throws the mass of fluctuating opinion into the arms of the Tories. But "Will it pay?" is not a question for honest politicians; our duty is to ask simply, "What is just?"

It is easy to raise a cry about being false to one's country, much easier than temperately to study an intricate question; but those are really injuring their country most who, by passionate and prejudiced outcries, intensify that sense of injustice which Ireland still retains. Great injustice has been done her in the past; but the best Irishmen recognize her present good-will, even though it may have been somewhat blunderingly expressed in action. England really wishes to do what is right by Ireland, but she has an unfortunate national knack of making herself disagreeable, and no faculty of entering into other people's feelings. How then, can she ever know what Irishmen want, if she will not listen while they tell her? They have been telling her, with a vengeance, what they want—about the distress, through speech after speech of passionate eloquence, some nonsense, much earnest statement, and irreconcilable invective; and England, shocked into silence by the shadow of famine, sat and listened, and tried to help. Why should she not listen upon this other matter, before she is compelled?

It is not simply the will-o'-the-wisp of restored independence that dances before the eyes of Home Rulers; they have solid practical grievances that appeal to the English mind. Sir Joseph M'Kenna has stated that Ireland pays far more than her share towards the Imperial revenue, taking income tax as the standard; this, if true, is a direct violation of the terms of the Act of Union. We are not now concerned with investigating this statement; we are inquiring what are the complaints made. We are also told that the immense expense and difficulty of getting private Bills through Parliament hinders many useful public works, and doubles the cost of those which it does not hinder. Englishmen fume enough over the difficulty of pushing through a private Act, but the expense is much greater to Irish promoters, who, besides paying the usual enormous fees to English lawyers and officials, have to bring their witnesses from a greater distance, and to go backwards and forwards during times of tedious delay, at a great loss of time, and with profit to no one but the London and North-western Railway. For instance, half

the expense (in round numbers) of the Newry Waterworks was the cost of obtaining a private Act. The same was true of the Greystones Waterworks. We have in mind a case in which a gentleman went on with a scheme of public utility with the Board of Works, until he found that a private Bill would be necessary: he then gave it up. All this is a real loss to the country, and a just ground of complaint. The fact is, the roads to Parliament are choked with business, both public and private; congestion has been long established, and it is no wonder if inflammation shows signs of setting in. To make a clearance of Irish local affairs, would be a relief to the House and to the United Kingdom.

Again, we are reminded that in public matters, even those of a non-political nature, there have been great difficulties thrown in the way of Irish reforms. The boarding-out of pauper children had to be agitated for years, before the present rules were sanctioned. The great majority of Irish members voted steadily, through division after division, for Sunday closing in Ireland, backed up by strong demonstrations of public opinion at home, before they were allowed to carry their point. It was little wonder that the Irish nation felt sore at being obliged to keep its drinking-shops open on Sunday against its will, to please English publicans. The gist of the matter we believe to be this. There is in Ireland a sentimental wish—steadily decreasing among the upper classes, but in full force among the lower—for an entire legislative separation from England. This, sober-minded Irishmen do not desire, and Englishmen will never grant. But there is also a belief, not at all sentimental nor confined to the lower classes, that Ireland is unfairly taxed, that the agreement made at the Union has been broken, that useful public works are hindered by the expense of carrying the necessary Bills through the Imperial Parliament, that the press of business therein makes it impossible for Irish affairs to receive proper consideration, and that they are deliberately postponed to English interests. The Obstructives are ready with the reply, that the only way of getting attended to is by making themselves a nuisance. Obstruction should be put down with a steady hand, wasting as it does the time of a body that has none to waste, and aggravating its difficulties; but it can only be justly suppressed if its main justification is removed. When then, such complaints as the above are made, and Irish self-government is proposed as a remedy for them, we hold that there is a nucleus of reason in the demand of the Home Rulers, whatever froth of nationalistic nonsense may foam around it, and that individual Liberals have a right to look through the one

into the other, and to vote for an inquiry into these grievances and their possible remedies, without being called traitors to their country. It is impossible to give the Irish all that they ask, but that is no reason why we should not give them what they have a right to; and such giving will be effectual in winning the friendship of a long-alienated race, if it be ready, graceful, and sympathetic. But alas! grace, readiness, and sympathy have not hitherto been the characteristics of our dealings with Ireland, or with any other conquered country; and they are not likely to be promoted by outcries such as we have heard from the Tories against Liberals "coquetting with Home Rule."

## PUBLIC WORKS WASTE IN INDIA.

[By a P. W. D. Man.]

To those who are practically acquainted with the working of the great Indian Departments, by which so many millions of money are annually spent, the difficulties in the way of reform are not by any means so great as they necessarily appear to be to the financiers of this country, who, viewing the subject from a more or less theoretical standpoint, are ready to think the case hopeless. The same remark applies in great measure to the Finance Minister of India himself; for, while he may possess an unlimited acquaintance with the estimates upon which he constructs his budget, he has no practical knowledge or control whatever over the actual expenditure as it goes on day by day any more than Prof. Fawcett, Mr. Bright, or any other authority in Parliament on Indian matters. He cannot possibly ascertain for himself whether the sums budgetted for in the various departments are warranted or otherwise. It is the subordinate officials alone who can judge rightly of the expenditure in their respective departments. I had seven years practical experience of the working of the Public Works Department, in which so many millions have been spent; and I think a plain statement of facts will show that the waste in this department is enormous. The instances I shall adduce are not isolated cases, but typical of the working of the whole department.

There was a masonry bridge, about four hundred feet in length, to be erected over the river Hindun, near Delhi. The Executive Engineer, in charge of the division of public works in which this part of the river was situated, had had the work in hand something like six years, and had succeeded in building only three brick piers. Six years previously, he had received instructions to draw up a plan and estimate for an ordinary brick-arch bridge to replace the one destroyed during the Mutiny. After a considerable time had elapsed, the plans and estimate were prepared, submitted, and sanctioned; and the Executive Engineer went to work to take his first lesson in bridge-building. The building of piers was, of course, a work on which he could not possibly go astray; for all he had to do was

to order them to be built, and the commonest native bricklayers would experience no difficulty in attending to such an order. He next proceeded to construct the arches ; and here it would have been well for the public money had he simply given the order, and trusted the work to his subordinates, instead of superintending it himself ; for an old sub-engineer in charge of the work assured me that the Executive Engineer had actually squandered 50,000 rupees in experiments of various kinds in building the first arch, which ultimately had to be abandoned as an impossible work ! The bed of the river was composed of sand, and liable to constant disturbance ; but instead of providing against this, by removing the sand to a sufficient depth to obtain a good foundation on which to rest the centring for his arch, he took no notice of this unstable condition of the bed of the river, but simply filled in the space between the piers with earth, and constructed the arch over this earthen centre. The consequence was, he never could complete an arch without some settlement taking place, which in every case, as a matter of course, destroyed the arch, and the work had to be done over again. In this way, together with other foolish experiments, five years were wasted, a large sum of money thrown away, and the idea of a masonry bridge abandoned as an impossible work. Another estimate was then prepared for an iron-girder bridge, which had to be procured from England at considerable cost. But before this arrived, a splendid masonry bridge had been built by the railway people over the same river, and within about a quarter of a mile of the Government bridge, at a spot where the bed of the river was more sandy and less stable than the site of the one in question. Now the incompetence of one man, it may be argued, goes for very little in a large public department like the one on which I am writing ; but consider what this series of blunders involved. He himself had charge of a very large division of public works, in which many thousands a year were spent ; his immediate superior, the Superintending Engineer, had charge of three or four divisions, in addition to this ; and he, it must be presumed, was not incompetent to correct the blunders of his subordinate, since he, the Superintendent Engineer, was supposed to personally inspect his divisions (called a Circle) twice a year. Here, then, we trace this incredible incompetency to an official in charge of the Circle in the Public Works Department, in which tens of thousands a year are spent on public works. This is bad enough ; but what shall we say to the fact that the Chief Engineer of the North-west Provinces was supposed to inspect the large works in this province once a year, and did actually see this particular work several times ? But even apart

from his personal inspection, he must have been perfectly aware of the whole of the facts, from the reports it was his duty to receive and examine from time to time; and especially from the report which declared a masonry bridge to be impossible of construction at that place, where there had actually been one before. I will venture to affirm that there is not an assistant to any civil engineer in England who would not detect the incompetency of a man who gave such a reason for the impossibility of building an arch bridge as that report contained. The Executive Engineer's salary was over £1,000 a year, in addition to large sums for travelling and other expenses. This was certainly the worst instance of ignorance I ever witnessed; but it is more or less typical of nearly all the engineers of the Public Works Department of India, with whom I came in contact.

There is scarcely a building in India which is completed on the original estimate. In almost every case there is what is called a supplementary estimate, and not infrequently the original estimate is but a fraction of the ultimate cost of the building. Most of the buildings—barracks and other large structures—that I saw in the Upper Provinces contain the most glaring faults in design—the greatest pressure often falling upon the weakest part, and requiring in consequence double the quantity of material that would be necessary if designed in accordance with scientific principles. Many will be able to call to mind the falling down of the double-storied barracks in various parts of India before they were, in some cases, completed. This was not altogether due to faults in design, but in part to another cause which I will explain presently. This resulted in sending many of the pseudo-engineers back to their regiments. But the inquiry was allowed to drop, and the phenomenon of large expensive buildings tumbling headlong to the earth before they were completed, by the sheer force of their own weight, was allowed to pass as something inexplicable and peculiar to India. And, no doubt, it was peculiar to India, for such a thing was never before witnessed in any part of the world. The faults which caused these barracks to fall down are inherent in all the public works throughout India.

My remarks, it will be said, embrace a sweeping charge against the officers of the Public Works Department; and yet I am but stating simple facts. The military element predominates in the department; and if we consider the antecedents of most military officers, and the influence under which their minds are formed, we must come to the conclusion that they are ill-adapted for the work of engineers. Everyone will admit that if a number of young officers were taken from the Army in England, sent to an engineer-

ing college for a year or so, and then put to engineering works; there would be little hope of success in any undertakings which might be entrusted to them. The military atmosphere and spirit are the most uncongenial possible for the formation of engineers. The Army is looked upon as a gentlemanly way of occupying one's time—as, in fact, a sort of aristocratic lounge; and there are few officers who do not acquire a tone and bearing utterly at variance with the duties which civil engineers have to perform. Indeed, I think nothing could be more dissimilar than the influence of the two professions. It is true military officers have to pass through an engineering college in India before they receive their appointments; but before they enter they have grown to manhood without any previous training in the profession, either theoretically or practically; and while at college their studies are almost entirely confined to cramming in subjects which are of very little use to them when they are called upon to work. Beyond estimating, surveying, and drawing, I know of no part of the curriculum pursued at these colleges which is of much practical utility. The great feature of their studies is mathematics, pure and mixed. To make a thorough engineer, a man must, of course, be a good mathematician; but few are ever called upon to use their knowledge of mathematics, either to construct or to apply formulæ. This knowledge is given in small pocket-books, in tabulated form, which most engineers carry about with them. The time spent in such studies is lost; it is, in fact, worse than lost, for it is subtracted from time which ought to have been given to more useful studies; such, for example, as the way to list good lime, good bricks, and other materials; the practical way of laying bricks in walls, fixing and adjusting joints, &c. I have seen an engineer kick a native contractor for supplying what he conceived to be bad lime, when, in reality the materials to which he objected were little nodules of *pure lime*, and that which he approved of nothing but dirt! As soon as an officer gets his appointment his difficulties and studies are all over. He has no master to please, on whom his success depends; he has but to go on in accordance with the "Code," and the instruction of his superiors, and his promotion comes in due course. He takes a regular canter round his works in the morning, looks at them from a distance (I am now supposing him to be in charge of station-works—roads are different), goes home to breakfast, attends his office—in his own bungalow generally, where he has a staff of native clerks who do all the office work—signs his name as *baboo* lays the papers before him, and the estimates as they are presented by his European subordinates; and these duties over, his professional

\*work for the day is done. Very rarely do you see a military officer enter a building in process of construction, plan in hand, and anxiously scrutinize the various parts, to see that it is progressing in accordance with the plan, or that the *materials are of the quality specified in the estimate*. Military notions do not accord with climbing up ladders and over wet walls and dirty scaffolding, testing the quality of bricks, lime, wood, &c. So far, then, as the military element is concerned, I do not see how the department can be otherwise than a military expensive shift, if not a downright failure. I have not yet spoken of the military subordinates, sergeants, and privates. It must not be inferred, however, that they do not play an important part in the department. It is true they are not so incompetent as the officers, but their failings in other respects are even more disastrous than the ignorance and carelessness of their officers, which I will explain presently in connection with the failure of the double-storied barracks.

Although the military element predominates, and is almost absolute in the subordinate class, there are a good many young civilians sent from this country for employment in public works. It might, not unnaturally, be supposed that civil engineers would, in a measure, correct the errors of the military; but, unfortunately, these young men, when they arrive in India, possess very little knowledge of their profession, either practical or theoretical; and being frequently inferior in point of education and intelligence to the military subordinates over whom they are placed, the two classes do not work well together. I believe the civil element would, under more favourable conditions, develop into ordinarily good engineers; but instead of settling down to their work, and seriously striving to make themselves acquainted with the methods of their profession as pursued in India, they begin to ape the ways of the military officers among whom they are thrown, and belonging to a different class of society, a great portion of their time and energy is absorbed in anxiously striving to assimilate their manners with those of a class to which they had heretofore been strangers. This may seem strange to people in England, where the business by which we live is a most serious thing to us. But life in India is very different to life in England. A man's profession there, does not occupy so great a part of his time and attention as in this country. He is brought more directly into personal contact with his associates, and his happiness and comfort are dependant in a great degree upon them. Moreover, the young men sent out as engineers have rarely had any practical experience in their profession, having been employed



in this country in very subordinate capacities. How, then, can it be supposed, all things considered, that these young men are going to turn out good civil engineers? Cooper's Hill College, where young men are now trained for employment on public works in India, may in time make a great improvement in the civil element of the department, but there has not been time yet to form any judgment upon the subject. The men sent out by the railway companies are good, practical, working engineers, who know their work well. When the Punjaub and Delhi Railway was near completion, one of the subordinate engineers was taken into the Public Works Department, with the rank of Superintending Engineer, and employed on the Government railway from Delhi to Ajmere. This young man had military officers under him, was the companion of colonels and majors, many of whom held inferior rank to himself in the department; and what was the result? Why, from a good, practical, hard-working engineer he became what is known as a *burra sahib* (big swell), and in six months from his entering the department, he was an altered man. He rode fine horses, wore kid gloves at his work, and his speech, which was before plain and earnest, now became an absurd mixture of jerks and drawl, in his attempts to imitate his military companions. None of the men employed under him knew anything of railway construction, and the result was that a year was spent in surveying about twenty miles of level country, which had to be done over again. For this playing at constructing railways, he received a rise of salary, and each of the engineers under him a step of promotion.

I have referred to one of the causes of the double-storied barracks having proved so wretched a failure—faulty design; but this, as I stated, was not the main cause. These barracks were built of stones of irregular shape, laid in walls without due regard to what is called breaking point; and the mortar, which ought to have been made of lime, was little else than mud, without the slightest cohesive power. Indeed, mud would have been better than the material used; for there is some little binding property in mud, whereas the stuff in question fell to pieces with the slightest pressure, crumbled like so much dry dust. If the walls of these buildings had been composed of tolerably flat stones, laid so that the joins overlapped one another, they never would have fallen, as they did, by their own weight; but would have stood for years, provided, of course, they had been fairly well designed. The interior parts of the walls were, in great part, composed of rubbish, the outer and inner facings being tolerably even and the

stones fairly well laid. Can we wonder, then, that buildings so constructed, and with such materials, fell before they were completed? It would have been a matter for surprise if they had not. It would be impossible to do such work in England. No workmen could be found to pass such work through their hands; and certainly no engineer or his assistants would allow it to pass; and as to the contractor, he would ruin himself for ever, for he would never be entrusted with other work. "But," one would say, "surely such dishonest scamping could not escape the observation of all the Europeans employed on the work?" Nor does it. The overseers know pretty well what constitutes good lime and other materials, and spend a good portion of their time on the works; but these men are nearly all amenable to bribery, and so long as they get their *dustoorie* (per-centage) care little what kind of work is given. It is customary throughout India for some one to receive a per-centage on all money spent on public works. Sometimes the engineers themselves take bribes, but this is not so general as with the subordinates; with the latter it is almost universal, and the result is paralysing to the efficiency of the department.

There is nothing, of course, peculiar in the soil, atmosphere, or materials of India to produce such phenomena as large, expensive buildings tumbling headlong to the ground, and in others large cracks and rents in solid masonry walls through which you could thrust your arm. This could only be brought about by causes which admit of easy explanation; yet, strange to say, no one has hitherto given an explanation. Speaking from memory, I think these barracks cost the public something like £5,000,000!

The item for repairing roads in India is a very large one in the yearly estimate. This is considered by the Public Works employes as the most lucrative part of the department; and every one is anxious to get charge of a road division. In addition to a thick coating of road metal (called "kunkur") once in three years, there are what are called special repairs, and fifteen rupees a mile per month allowed for maintenance. These repairs and maintenance are done by contract; chiefly native contractors, but sometimes Europeans. Let us see what the actual cost of labour amounts to, and how much goes into the pockets of the contractor and others. It is the custom for a contractor to keep three or four coolies and a mate for every five miles; each coolie means three and a half rupees, and the mate in charge of them five rupees a month, making altogether say nineteen rupees, which, together with a small outlay for road metal, say ten rupees for the five miles, a month, amount to twenty-nine rupees, for which Government pays seventy-five rupees.

So that for every seventy-five rupees paid for road maintenance in India the actual cost of the work does not amount to more than twenty-nine. The item on this head for the whole of India is a very large one, and when we take into account the cost of other kinds of road repairs, such as special and periodical repairs, on which the difference between actual cost to contractor and amount paid is equally great, the total loss amounts to a very large sum indeed. As I stated above, every three years the roads are supposed to be re-coated; one may ask, how can the difference between cost of work to contractor and amount paid him be so great in this item? The answer is simple. The estimate provides for a certain thickness of metal, and this is reckoned in cubic feet; the contractor invariably supplies but half the quantity; so that instead of a coating, say six inches in thickness, the road gets but three inches. In this way there is a *saving* to the contractor of just half the amount of his estimate, which, added to his legitimate profits, will be found to constitute a difference quite equal to that between twenty-nine and seventy-five.

I will now give a few facts respecting another item of Public Works expenditure. For the repairs of buildings there is what is called a "Requisition Form"—that is, certain officers in a station have the power to sanction expenditure on repairs to buildings to the extent of 200 rupees on each repair. There is no restriction as to the number of "requisitions" they have the power to sanction, within certain limits, so long as each repair does not exceed the 200 rupees. This power is vested in the Executive Engineer, the barrack-master, officers commanding regiments, the commissariat officer, and two or three others. The *modus operandi* is as follows: The barrack-sergeant and the overseer of the Public Works Department in charge, are generally on very good terms with each other. It is the duty of the former to inspect certain parts of the buildings weekly, and report to his superior, the barrack-master, any repairs required, when the requisitions are made out and sent to the officer commanding the regiment which occupies the buildings for his signature. After being duly signed by the barrack-master and the commanding officer, they are forwarded to the Executive Engineer, who passes them on to his subordinates for the purpose of having recorded, on the face of them, the work required and the cost. This being done, they are signed by the subordinate and returned to the Executive Engineer for his sanction to begin the work, from whom it comes back in due course bearing his signature in token that the work is sanctioned. The overseer then puts the work in hand, and when completed (?) it is signed again by the overseer and Executive Engineer,

and passed on to the barrack-master and commanding officer, who each likewise again attach their signatures, in attestation of the work having been satisfactorily performed. Now it would naturally be supposed that a document bearing all these signatures, each of which is held to signify that the work has been well done, would not possibly admit of dishonest work in any shape. And yet what are the actual facts? Only two persons of all these officials really know anything about the work, whether it has been done or not, or even if it was required;—the overseer and the barrack-sergeant. These two individuals are constantly on the look out for means to multiply requisitions, and it is on their representation that the different officers sign them. Whether the work has been done or not, they know as little as the man in the moon. The money for the work is paid to the contractor; but there is always an understanding between him and the overseer, who knows to a trifle how much the work has really cost, and makes his bargain accordingly. If, for example, a requisition is sanctioned for half a dozen new door frames, at, say 180 rupees, and the contractor, instead of supplying them, merely smooths and repaints the old, the overseer knows that four or five rupees will cover his outlay, and acts accordingly. The barrack-sergeant has to be conciliated, but being a person of small pay and humble aspirations, he is satisfied with a moiety of the spoil. This is a fair representation of "Petty Repairs." I do not say that every requisition is framed as a deliberate fraud; but I maintain that the work really done, in the aggregate, bears a very small proportion to the actual cost. The item for repairs is a very large one, and the reader can form some idea of the waste of public money on this head. It is impossible to imagine a more absurd arrangement to ensure the work being done, or one better calculated to defeat the object than this requisition arrangement. Must it not be evident to anyone with a grain of common sense that papers, sometimes many daily, bearing the signatures twice over of all these men, cannot have been inspected, and that the business must become only routine and mere form? No doubt these signatures are attached very much in reliance upon one another. Every one is responsible and no one is responsible; and the result is the Indian Budget shows a yearly deficit. There are many buildings in India, the repairs to which during the last few years, would have built them twice over.

## EXPORT OF GRAIN IN FAMINE.

IN noticing the Indian Famine Report, we have expressed the conviction that, with the exception of the few pages of dissent therefrom, by Professor Caird and Mr. Sullivan, it is not worth review. All that is of value in the Report has been said before, while in one or two very important points it directly traverses the teachings of all experience in the treatment of these calamities. The Commission was framed simply to save Lord Lytton, Sir John Strachey, Sir Richard Temple, and Sir George Couper from the just indignation of the people of this country.

Every one knows that Lord Northbrook averted the great calamity that impended over the Lower Provinces in 1874, by his timely and resolute determination to meet it in the same spirit in which we enter upon the calamity of war. For the first time in modern history, he formally laid down the principle, that the STATE WOULD CONDONE EVERYTHING BUT FAILURE: the failure to save the people alive. The necessity of acting upon this principle had been pointed out and insisted upon for years. The cause of every failure in the past, had been the Civilian tradition that it was Utopian to expect to save the people alive at such periods. Famine, we were assured, was but one of Nature's methods for getting rid of the surplus population of the soil. It was, no doubt, right for the State to give some assistance to the people at such times, but the real danger was the giving too much. It was the province, moreover, of private charity to relieve the popular distress; but whether that were so or not, the State could not possibly undertake to carry the people through it. The cultivators of India had ever been accustomed to such calamities. Like the eels, they had got used to skinning. They had resources in the wild produce of the jungle, and with their simple tastes could pull through famine very well, by help of wild fruits and flowers, leaves and edible roots.

In a country without any provision by law for the poor, or any great centres of private wealth like our European cities, in which private charity can be organized, and from which it can be administered, such a policy meant the abandonment of masses

of men, women, and children to starvation. No Civilian dreamed of anything so wild as spending a couple of millions of money, still less five or ten millions, if necessary, to avert their doom. It was quite right to spend a hundred millions—nay, five hundred—in war, forty millions twice over in forty years, for seizing “a scientific frontier” that did not belong to us; but as to spending money upon saving millions of toiling peasants, with their wives and little ones, alive, it was a benevolent dream of “the statistical nuisance” who edited the *Indian Economist*. Now Lord Northbrook had put an end, as every one hoped, to a policy that had just before starved a million and a quarter of people to death in the North-west, and another million and a quarter in Orissa. Without hesitancy, he declared it to be the duty of the State to charge itself with the responsibility of saving the people alive at such periods; and, with Sir George Campbell as his lieutenant, who held the same conviction, he entered upon his task in the same spirit in which Lord Lytton and Sir John Strachey, four years after, plunged into the Afghan War. The result was that not a death from starvation is believed to have occurred throughout the famine. It was headed effectually by Lord Northbrook’s measures, the principle which animated him receiving universal commendation. But his measures proved costly, and this cost was made the occasion for reverting to the old Civilian way of treating these calamities, as soon as his back was turned. He had made a mistake at the outset; a mistake that swelled the cost of his relief measures out of all proportion to the actual need. As soon as famine was clearly seen to be impending, Sir George Campbell had advised that the export of food from the country should be stopped. Lord Northbrook was unwilling to take this step, and, fortified by the opinion of Mr. Murray, the Chairman of the Calcutta Chamber of Commerce, determined to leave the export of rice to go on as usual, and to import upon Government account the food grains which he resolved to distribute at numerous centres of relief throughout the distressed districts. The operation was gigantic, and proportionately costly. Four hundred thousand tons of rice were imported from Burmah, Saigon, and Siam into Bengal, to be elaborately distributed, at enormous labour and cost, throughout the famine tracts. Now the course of events showed clearly that had the export of rice but been stopped at the outset, to arrest its flow from the producing districts to Calcutta, the Government imports might have been dispensed with almost entirely. It was simply this error that made Lord Northbrook’s noble relief measures so much more costly than they need have been.

Now the Famine Commissioners found that, while reversing Lord Northbrook's policy in all else, Lord Lytton had imitated this unfortunate error, and they at once proceed to justify as follows:—

The prohibition of exportation was in the beginning of the century looked on as the first weapon in the Government armoury, and it was suggested in 1807 in the Orissa famine, and again in 1873, in the case of Bengal; but the arguments brought against it by Lord Northbrook on the last occasion are, we think, unanswerable, and such suggestions will, it may be hoped, never be repeated, or if repeated, never entertained. These arguments were concisely summed up by the Secretary of State, who said that nothing could justify such a measure except reasonable certainty that the exports would so exhaust the resources of India as a whole as to render them insufficient to supply the wants of the distressed districts, and that no such result was even probable.

With this paragraph before us, we reasonably doubt whether the Commission ever saw Lord Northbrook's arguments upon the point. The subject is of such deep importance to India that we append Lord Northbrook's minute to this article, and the reply that was made thereto at the time. India depends entirely upon herself for the food required to sustain her population alive. We urged this fact upon the Commission while it was sitting in India with much persistence, impressed strongly with the conviction that the export of food should be arrested whenever famine is seen to be approaching. A very few minutes' reflection suffices to show that there are no markets from which food can be drawn to India under the attraction of high prices. Because England is able to draw wheat in fleets from California, Canada, and Australia, for the supply of ten millions of her population, the thought is entertained that India might do so too. But when famine overtakes any part of India, its population must perish, unless some other province of India can supply it with food. The one mistake made in the treatment of the Behar and Bengal famine of 1873-74 was the not recognizing this fact; and the attempt was made to supply the distressed districts with rice drawn from distant Saigon. Political economy was supposed to teach that the markets should be left free at such periods, and that we should trust the attraction of high prices to draw food in the required quantities from distant markets. But there are no such markets in this case. The exhaustion of the food stores of India, and her absolute dependence upon her own fields for their replenishment, invest the question with an importance to which the Commissioners are stone-blind; while they venture to condemn by suggestion and inference Lord Northbrook's importation of food on Government account into Behar in 1874, only that they may justify Lord Lytton's refusal to do the same, and distribute Government stores

of food throughout the famine districts of Southern India in 1877-78. Lord Northbrook wisely refused to trust to "the ordinary operations of private trade," and by so doing saved the people alive; while Lord Lytton—that is, Sir John Strachey—acted upon "the true principle" of leaving "the supply and distribution of food to private trade." The result was that 5,000,000 to 6,000,000 of people perished, through adopting the "right" principle: and this by the admission of the Commission itself. Lord Northbrook was wrong, and Lord Lytton and Sir John Strachey right. At all events, so say these precious Commissioners. Mark the careful balancing of matters, however, at paragraph 159, where they say:—

At the same time that we recommend the general principle of abstention from interference with private trade in the supply of food to any tract suffering from scarcity, we admit that there are exceptional cases in which the Government may find it necessary to intervene. The success of relief measures essentially depends on there always being grain to be bought by those who receive money wages, and grain to be distributed to those who receive food; and it is an important duty of the Government officials who superintend the relief to see that this assumption is verified, to make all necessary arrangements with local or with distant merchants for the supply of grain, or in the last resort to lay in a stock to be drawn upon in the event of failure.

But this is precisely what Lord Northbrook did, and what the Duke of Buckingham wished to do in 1877, but was forbidden to do by Lord Lytton with such fatal results. Private trade can *never* be trusted to meet the wants of the people in remote districts of India, with neither railway nor any other efficient carriage near them. In the first place, there is no importing machinery in such districts, nor any private trading enterprise to improvise it. There is, moreover, the consideration, which this Commission never glances at, that the chief use of the Government stores is to keep prices below starvation rates. A mere scarcity of food makes prices rise out of all proportion to the actual deficiency in quantity, and the banian (grain dealer) uses his opportunity without remorse. Nothing was more noticeable throughout the distressed districts of Bengal in 1874 than the fact that the chief use of the Government stores therein was the keeping "prices" below starvation ranges. They were rising in spasms to extreme rates of four and five seers (eight pounds to ten pounds) the rupee, when Lord Northbrook wisely resolved that ten seers should be held to be the highest limit that the people could pay without actual starvation. In accordance with this order, the Government stores were used more to control prices than to supply the people with food. The limit of ten seers proved sufficiently high to attract into the distressed districts all



the food that the railways could possibly carry from the private traders of Northern India; but the people would still have perished but for the presence of the Government stores limiting the exactions of the grain dealer to prices which, though they meant great privation, did not mean starvation. The necessity of similar steps being taken in 1877-78 was constantly urged upon Lord Lytton and Sir John Strachey, and their reversal of Lord Northbrook's policy was as determined as it proved fatal to the people. Now the Commissioners perversely approve the one error that Lord Northbrook made, because *Lord Lytton imitated it*, while they all but censure his great and successful measures, that they may justify their reversal by Lord Lytton. Such is the natural result of sending Commissions to India, and permitting the Government of India to nominate their members. Lord Lytton and Sir John Strachey were allowed to select their own judges. The result is a report that deserves only to be cast into the fire, while the miserable people of India have to pay a very large sum of money for its production. Two or three economic experts, sitting in London, and making an honest inquiry into the facts, would have produced a report of complete condemnation to the Government, but full of hope to the people, whose future is sacrificed in this document, simply for the sake of the damaged reputation of the worst Executive Government India has ever had. As the matter is of importance, we may add that the Chairman of the Calcutta Chamber assured the writer of this article, just after the famine of 1874, that he felt he had made a mistake in hastily advising Lord Northbrook to allow the export of rice to go on. And now for Lord Northbrook's Minute, that the Commissioners declare to be unanswerable.

### PROHIBITION OF EXPORT OF RICE.

*Minute by His Excellency the Viceroy.*

No. 50 T, October 22nd, 1873.—When information was first received of the certainty that a portion of the winter rice crop would fail, the Government of Bengal recommended that "the export of rice to foreign countries from the Indian dominions should be stopped."

No. 3300, November 7th, 1873.—That recommendation was shortly afterwards repeated in the somewhat wider terms "that the exportation of food-grains from British Indian ports might be prohibited," and it was urged that if the larger measure was not approved, at any rate the export of common rice from Bengal ports should be prohibited.

November 21st, 1873.—At a later period the British Indian Association recommended that the export of food-grains from British India, with the exception of Burmah, should be prohibited.

None of these suggestions have been adopted by the Government of India. As the question is one of great interest, I wish to state the reasons which led me to decide against their adoption during the time when it became my duty to exercise the full powers of the Government.

I did not think it necessary to discuss at length the proposal for the prohibition of the export of all food-grains from Indian ports, including Burmah.

The exports of food-grains from India consist chiefly of rice. Setting aside Bengal for the moment, about 700,000 tons of rice are exported annually from British Burmah, and 100,000 tons from Madras.

To have prohibited the export of rice would probably have inflicted a fatal blow on the trade of British Burmah. This is a sacrifice which I hardly think could have been seriously contemplated, especially as the Burmese rice is not usually consumed by the people of Bengal, and such quantities of it as either the Government might require for the distressed districts, or the trade might wish to purchase, were easily available without having recourse to such a measure.

The export of rice from Madras is almost entirely to Ceylon. I cannot look upon Ceylon as a "foreign country" on account of the accident that it is under the Colonial Office, and not under the Secretary of State for India. I think Ceylon is entitled to be treated as an integral part of British India; and we had no hesitation in assuring the Governor of Ceylon, who expressed some anxiety on the subject, that the usual export from India would not be stopped.

There is a small but increasing export of wheat, chiefly from Bombay and Kurrachee; to have stopped this could not have materially affected supplies in Bengal, while it would have inflicted great injury upon the districts from which the trade is supplied.

The practical question appears to me to be whether the export of common rice from Bengal should have been prohibited; and to that proposal alone I will address such further observations as I have to make.

It will be convenient in the first place to state exactly the facts of the case.

In the year 1872-73 there was a larger export of rice from Bengal than in any year since 1864. The figures of the year 1872-73 may therefore be taken to show the extreme quantity of rice which is likely to be exported during the coming year.

The total exports of rice from Bengal ports amounted in round numbers in the year 1872-73 to 526,000 tons.

About 80,000 tons of this consist of "table rice," which, from its quality and price, is not suited to the ordinary consumption of the people. It could hardly have been intended to interfere with the export of this class of rice; for to have done so would have withdrawn from the growers means which they require in order to provide themselves with cheaper descriptions of food.

The total export of common rice was, therefore, in round numbers 446,000 tons; of this, 189,000 tons were sent to British Indian ports, including Ceylon; 160,000 tons to the West Indies, Mauritius, and other places where the consumers are mainly Natives of India who have emigrated; and the remaining 97,000 tons to other parts of the world, principally to Great Britain and the Persian Gulf.

For my own part, I entertain a strong opinion that it would have been very unwise to have interfered with the inter-portal trade, and that it would have been wrong, at any rate without considerable notice, to have stopped the main

supply of the usual food of Bengal coolies in the colonies ; but even if the whole export of common rice had been prohibited, the amount, reduced as it must necessarily be from the rise of prices, would be inconsiderable in comparison with the food-supply for a population of 66,000,000, who require about 30,000 tons of food a day. It may, I think, be assumed that the addition taken by itself could have made no considerable difference in the general price of rice throughout Bengal.

It is said, however, that the action of Government in prohibiting the export of rice would have given confidence to the country, and have had a great effect in reducing prices.

It is very probable that, had the export of rice been prohibited, the action of Government would have had the effect of considerably lowering the price of rice. The confidence, however, that might have been thus produced would not have been justified by the addition which would have been made to the supplies of food.

One of the greatest safeguards against a famine in India, as in every country, lies in the diminution of consumption which naturally results from the rise of prices which the anticipation of scarcity occasions ; and I can conceive no interference by Government more unwise than the reduction of prices below their natural level at the beginning of a period of scarcity. This would have been the effect which would probably have followed a prohibition of exports. The addition that would have been made to the general supplies of the country would in that case have been soon absorbed by the increase of consumption which would have been the result of an undue lowering of prices.

I will assume, however, for the purpose of argument, that I may be mistaken in my estimate of the effect which would have been produced upon prices by the prohibition of exports, and that the measure would have produced no undue reduction of prices. Consumption would, upon this assumption, not have been unduly stimulated, and there would have remained a distinct addition to the food-supplies of the people.

Even on this assumption, I am of opinion that the advantage which would have been derived for the time would have been dearly purchased by the probable consequences for the future.

It seems to me that an export trade in food-grains is a great advantage to a country in the condition of Bengal, raising its own food-supplies, having no import trade in food, and whose population is poor. The existence of such an export ensures the production, in ordinary years, of more food than is required to meet the demands of the people. The natural rise of prices in times of scarcity must divert a portion of the ordinary export to home consumption, and thus a reserve easily and readily available is habitually maintained.

For example, the years 1865-66 and 1866-67 were years of scarcity, and the exports of rice from Bengal fell from 695,341 tons in 1864-65 to 336,211 tons in 1865-66, and to 222,659 tons in 1866-67. In the three months of October, November, and December last, the exports were 64,425 tons as compared with 113,277 tons in the corresponding months of 1872.

It follows that any measures that would diminish the export trade in common rice from Bengal would weaken the power of the country to meet any future period of scarcity. Trade is readily diverted from one channel to another. The interference of Government with its free course may easily destroy it. If we refuse to supply our ordinary customers at any price, we oblige them to have

recourse to other markets, and it is impossible to assume that when we want them again they will return to us.

Bearing in mind, therefore, the permanent harm that might be done by an interference with the export trade in food-grains, and being satisfied that the Government could without difficulty bring in a larger quantity of rice than is exported even in ordinary years, I had no hesitation in preferring the latter course, and I see no reason to doubt the correctness of the conclusion at which I then arrived.

In these remarks I have purposely abstained from alluding to the objections to an interference with the export trade of India, which depend upon general considerations connected with trade and finance, as I have desired to look upon the question entirely with reference to the present and future food-supplies of the people.

NORTHBROOK.

January 30th, 1874.

*Note by Editor.*

THE Commissioners perfunctorily tell us that this Minute is unanswerable. It was answered, the moment it appeared in India. The strongest passage it contains seems to be the following:—

It seems to me that an export trade in food-grains is a great advantage to a country in the condition of Bengal, raising its own food-supplies, having no import trade in food, and whose population is poor. The existence of such an export ensures the production, in ordinary years, of more food than is required to meet the demands of the people. The natural rise of prices in times of scarcity must divert a portion of the ordinary export to home consumption, and thus a reserve, easily and readily available, is habitually maintained. It follows that any measure that would diminish the export trade in common rice from Bengal would weaken the power of the country to meet any future period of scarcity. Trade is readily diverted from one channel to another. The interference of Government with its free course easily destroys it. If we refuse to supply our ordinary customers at any price, we oblige them to have recourse to other markets; and it is impossible to assume that when we want them again they will return to us.

All this is so well expressed, that it would not be easy to heighten its force. It is undoubtedly a great advantage to Bengal that it produces in ordinary years a supply of food more than sufficient for its own wants; in other words, that the people place under rice cultivation every year, a larger area of land than is required for home consumption. This is done because there is a remunerative export for the margin, and this margin becomes a sort of insurance against famine. But, we reasonably ask, of what use is this margin, this

insurance, if the people are never to benefit by it? Of what use is an insurance against scarcity if, in a season of failure, the margin is still to be exported? Having no import trade in food, the people are happy, we are told, in growing, year by year, more food than they consume, as the surplus becomes a sort of insurance against seasons of failure. Plainly so; but only upon the supposition that *the surplus is retained in the country at such seasons*, for home consumption. Of what value is it otherwise? The people of Bengal have, say, 34,000,000 acres of land under food for their own wants, and another 1,000,000 acres for the supply of the export demand. Now if in a season of scarcity, when the 34,000,000 acres have yielded no more than the ordinary produce of 20,000,000, the people can appropriate the produce of the 1,000,000 acres grown for export, they are gainers by so much; but only upon the supposition that they retain it.

The export supply, in so far as it is an insurance against famine, might as well cease to exist, unless the export is to be stopped at such periods. Unless the export is prohibited, its growth becomes the occasion of aggravating the sufferings of the people. The export demand, by the supposition, is a normal drain of so many hundred thousand tons of rice a year, produced by the margin of soil devoted to its growth. Unless then, this demand be suspended or prohibited when failure has occurred, the people are exposed to a heavy and gratuitous competition from this demand being set up in its normal strength upon their already deficient supply. Say the land has yielded, as in 1873, but one-third of the usual harvest, and that the export represents the ordinary produce of 1,000,000 acres. It is then clear that if this export demand is to be satisfied, it will this year absorb the produce of 3,000,000 of acres instead of 1,000,000; when, instead of mitigating the calamity, it will indefinitely aggravate it by the people having to compete with the foreigner for possession of their already narrow harvest. It is strange that Lord Northbrook should have overlooked this. If the export demand is to be of any use to the people in periods of dearth, it can only be so by stopping the export at such times altogether, and retaining the whole produce for home consumption. To secure myself against a short supply of potatoes, I may choose in ordinary years to grow enough for myself and for my next-door neighbour; but if, when failure comes, and the land has not yielded enough even for myself, I am to admit his claim to his customary share thereof, I had better have left the business alone. There is this peculiarity too, in the foreign demand for rice, that it is the demand of a competitor who is prepared to pay almost any price for it. Now, our perfunctory

Commissioners overlook these very obvious reflections, and say that Lord Northbrook's Minute is unanswerable.

And this brings us to the consideration of another fallacy that is very widely indulged on the subject. The export, we are told, is but 300,000 or 400,000 tons a year, after all; and that it is not worth making a fuss over the retention of so small a quantity as this, when the harvest has failed by 8,000,000 or 9,000,000 of tons, as in 1873. Observe the error that is here made. The harvest has fallen short of the normal yield by this enormous quantity; and the export is but 400,000 or 500,000 tons a year. But this export has to be supplied, not from the aggregate food stores of the country, but from the comparatively small stock that is available for the supply of the urban classes. The fact is quite overlooked, while it has the most vital bearing upon the question. Of the 17,000,000 tons of food annually grown in Bengal, by far the larger part never leaves the hands of the growers, the agricultural classes, who, after reserving seed for the next harvest, and a supply sufficient for their own sustenance and that of their labourers, sell the remainder. Whenever the agricultural classes in India are well-to-do, the bulk of the harvests never goes into the market at all. The urban population is so small, moreover, that it is doubtful whether more than a fourth of the harvest finds its way into the open market. Now, in a season of famine, a fourth of the harvest, after allowing for seed, will mean but 1,000,000 or 1,500,000 tons of food. This small quantity, therefore, represents the saleable food stores of the country, and it is upon this small stock that the whole force of the export demand falls. With saleable stores of but 1,000,000 or 1,500,000 tons in all, a demand of 300,000 or 400,000 tons for export becomes a most serious matter. And yet this consideration is overlooked altogether in every discussion we have seen upon the subject, and has plainly never presented itself to the Commissioners. The export demand falls, we say, entirely upon the supply of food available for the urban classes, after the growers have appropriated the bulk of the harvest for their own wants. The export ought, therefore, to be stopped the moment a failure of harvests is ascertained, and every effort made to supplement its narrow yield by importation upon such a scale as the Government can compass.

But we are told, finally, that "if we refuse to supply our ordinary customers at any price, we oblige them to have recourse to other markets; and it is impossible to assume that when we want them again they will return to us." All this is a mere *petitio principii*; for, so far from its being "impossible" to assume that

they will return, it is a matter of certainty that they *must* return. Were there any reasonable ground for fearing that, by suspending the export while the crisis lasts, we should destroy or even seriously imperil the rice trade of India, we admit frankly that that contingency should make us pause. But the fear is chimerical, and cannot be allowed any weight whatever. So long as India can grow rice, there is not the remotest prospect of her being beaten out of the field by other lands. We are compelled, therefore, to say plainly that Lord Northbrook made a great error in not prohibiting the export. We might reasonably suppose, from his whole line of argument, that there was some hope of the Indian ports becoming emporiums for grain in the same way as our own; whereas the very reason that makes it necessary to prohibit the export, is the fact that there is not the remotest hope of the food-supplies of India being augmented by private shipments from abroad. In so far as its supply of food is concerned, India is isolated from all other lands, and would be left to starve, by private enterprise, the country being too remote from other sources of supply, and prices too uncertain in famine, to permit the hope of our ever seeing a fleet laden with food entering the Hooghly or the Bombay Harbour, though the people were perishing by millions. The objectors speak as though India were one of the ordinary food-importing countries of the world. As a matter of fact, there is but one country that imports food upon any large scale; namely, our own manufacturing island home. Every other nation grows its own food; and the grain trade of the world would hardly exist but for the English demand. In India we may just as well expect consignments of food from the moon, as through private enterprise from abroad. A few cargoes of wheat might reach Calcutta from Australia, or a cargo or two of rice perhaps, from Saigon or Bangkok; and that would be all. What we are, therefore, doing by permitting the export to go on during famine is, to use a vulgar but expressive simile, attempting to fill the cask through the spigot, while letting it run out at the bung-hole. And the Famine Commissioners blandly express their hope that after Lord Northbrook's Minute upon the subject, no one will again be found to counsel the suspension of the export trade. As to the "cruelty" of stopping the ordinary supply of rice to the coolie labourers in Ceylon and the Mauritius, is it not infinitely wiser that these small bodies of men should be supplied from Burmah or Siam, when the growers of the rice themselves need it? There could be no difficulty in furnishing these localities with the small supplies they want from these sources. Sir George Campbell's Report on the Orissa Famine of 1866 was a piece of honest work

of the utmost value; the Report of these Commissioners is fit only for the waste-paper basket or the fire, always excepting the few really valuable pages of dissent recorded by Mr. Caird and Mr. Sullivan.

*Further Note on State Granaries in Famine.*

It has been remarked that "precaution against famine depends not on the extent of cultivable or of cultivated land, nor on the proportion which such land bears to the actual population, but rather on human forethought and thrift so applied to the circumstances as to make provision against such contingencies as occasion death." It is the absence of this wise forethought in barbarous or half-civilized nations, though scanty in population and with abundance of fertile soil, that causes them not seldom to suffer the worst extremities of famine. Four seasons of famine have overtaken us in India within the last fourteen years, and the last of the calamities found us as unprovided with a policy to meet it as the first. It is not that there has been *no* forethought in the matter, but that it has been conventional and inadequate. The precautions to be taken against famine in India, are threefold, and if wise, we shall take them all. It is idle to be pitting irrigation works against State granaries, and railways against both. A wise Government in our circumstances, will take *every* reasonable precaution in its power against famine. Now, it has long seemed to ourselves worthy of the closest consideration whether in seasons of plenty the Government ought not to establish public granaries, especially along the line of the Upper Ganges and the Jumna, to hold a constant reserve of 1,000,000 tons of food. The formation of such reserves would be a task of no real difficulty, as Mr. Caird points out, if spread over a few years, while the existence of such granaries would rob these periods of recurring drought of their chief terrors. A million tons of food would feed a population of 10,000,000 for six months, and we may reasonably hope that, with the extension of State railways in the country, we are not likely to see any famine that would exhaust a reserve of this order. The very formation of such granaries, moreover, if properly gone about, would give the Government an opportunity of redeeming the cultivators from the hands of the money-lenders over wide tracts of country. In particular, it might enable us to rescue the unhappy ryots of Oudh from their present state of indebtedness and wretchedness. Instead of a bountiful harvest placing the ryot deeper in the Sowkar's books than ever, as it now does, the Government, by receiving its land revenue in kind at such seasons, on considerate terms, might gradually redeem the cultivator from the hands of this class altogether. The possession of these food reserves by the State would at the same time prevent the price of food rising to famine rates, as it now does, in every recurring season of drought. We find uniformly, that prices rise at these periods far beyond the rates that the scarcity justifies, all classes suffering to enrich the holder of grain. By establishing State granaries high up the country, on either side of the Doab on the river-front, the State would be able to float down supplies in any quantity that might



be required to the lower provinces, or deliver them to the railway system for transport in any direction. The main reserves should be held in the North-west, where famine is so incessant. A million tons represent 27,000,000 of maunds, and such a reserve might be formed, in the course of a very few years, at a cost of but £3,000,000 or £1,000,000 sterling for the food itself. The cost of the buildings would, of course, have to be added; and here we should have to make careful inquiries as to the Native methods of storing grain, as what has been done under Native rule before our time can be done by ourselves. Methods of preserving grain for fifty years together were, we are told, not uncommon under Native rule. Until some step of this kind is taken, or, at all events, its impossibility or unwisdom demonstrated, we refuse to believe that, as rulers of India, we have discharged our responsibilities either to its people, to civilization, or to humanity. Bearing in mind that there are no foreign sources of supply open to India, and that even if there were, it would be impossible to find transport for them on the required scale, and, lastly, that the poor cannot hoard food for themselves, the duty of the State seems to ourselves to be measured simply by its abilities. Our circumstances are analogous to those of ancient Egypt, when the Hebrew Minister, Joseph, was appointed to carry her people through what was probably the severest famine on record. Egypt, like India, was the granary and store-house of the surrounding nations. There was no country for her to draw upon for food, to supplement her deficient harvest. In these circumstances, Joseph was divinely instructed, as we profess to believe, to take advantage of the succession of abundant harvests that preceded the famine, to establish vast State granaries. Then, as now, years of plenty and of scarcity came in cycles; and if our statesmen were wise, they would see, we think, in the course which the Egyptian Minister was directed to take, the course we should ourselves imitate. Let the State perfect the railway system of India, and establish public granaries upon the right scale, and we shall have done all, perhaps, that human forethought can suggest to protect the people from the worst horrors of these calamities. We shall never be entitled to say so while this natural and most reasonable precaution is neglected. Few countries need to import food at all. The consequence is that the surplus harvests of the world are, normally, of very small extent. England is about the only country that steadily imports corn, and but for her demand, a sea-borne trade in grain would hardly be known in the world. Normally, every country grows its own food and stores its own reserves. India does so; but the poverty of the masses of her people, their hand-to-mouth existence, and the distances which have to be traversed in carrying food in times of dearth, make it incumbent on the State to form public reserves of grain in such positions as may protect the widest area possible from actual starvation. Our relief works and charitable efforts have ever been a failure, except under Lord Northbrook. In the last famine (in Rajpootana) we spent £150,000 and let 1,300,000 people die; and a resolution of the Supreme Government then congratulated every one all round upon what had been done. Public granaries were a regular institution under Native rule in India, and the system was worked, we are told, somewhat as follows: "There were forts near most of the large towns in every district. These forts (represented by our Thaseels) were the residences of the officials, and a portion of each was set apart for the reception of grain, which was stacked underground. A certain portion of the revenue was collected in kind, and part of this was stacked for the use of the officials, the Army, and dependents of the Durbar, besides a surplus for failures in crops and general distress, which was much more frequent than now. When the

market prices rose, the granaries were thrown open to the public for sale by retail, the general restriction being from eight annas to one rupee per man per diem. The distribution, or sale, was checked and supervised by the Soobahs, who, being natives, and generally landlords in the neighbourhood, knew exactly the circumstances which surrounded them." We can see no "lion in the way" of our doing the same, but many and striking advantages. All that Mr. Caird proposes is that the possibility of establishing and working such granaries should be fairly tried. Whether we act upon Native precedent or not, the fact remains that it is the professed belief of most of us that the Divine Wisdom itself, when taking forethought of and making provision against famine, adopted this very means, and no other. To say that it is "antiquated" is to say nothing, and as little to commend the railway and the canal to us instead. We doubt if we shall ever encounter famine with success, without all three precautions.

## EMIGRATION.

[By a Colonial Landlord.]

EMIGRATION from Great Britain has been conducted hitherto in a haphazard and unprofitable manner. We overlook the advantages that would result from directing the stream of surplus labour more largely to our own colonies. An effective labourer arriving in the United States is considered worth £200. We find that it costs £238 to raise and educate a pauper in our workhouses, and a labourer is of more value. We allow much of our best labour to go to the United States, where the people consume only 8s. per head of our manufactures; but if sent to Australia, their consumption would be £17, if to the Cape colonies £3, and to Canada £2 per head. In other words, for want of organization and a little outlay, we give away for 8s. that which is worth £17.

The cost of passage to the Cape and Natal (being second class) averages £23; New Zealand, £16; Australia, £14; Canada or United States, £6 6s. If the mother country were to pay one-third of the cost of passage, and the colony and the emigrant the same proportion, it would be more profitable all round than existing arrangements. The colonial agents should still make the selection. In many cases colonists, being relatives, would individually pay the emigrants' share of passage, and also see to their welfare on arrival. As regards Australia, the emigrants would consume double the amount of our products, and produce double the amount to meet our requirements, that they could do in this country. One year's trade with such emigrants, when in Australasia, would cover the British share of the passage-money. There would be the further advantage of the trade with the progeny of such emigrants. The want of outlets for our manufactures suggests the propriety of shifting the surplus population in a more systematic way. We can spare even our best workers better than going on, as Americans say with truth that we do, allowing five men to do the work of three.

The present system, or rather want of system, causes a large proportion of the people to drift into pauperism. In that capacity they cost £10 per head annually in maintenance. It would be better to

divert those who might be the paupers of the future to our colonies, and thus secure good customers and loyal citizens. By going to Australasia, for instance, they can compete with America in the production of meat, wool, tin, copper, gold, and wheat for our use, and take our goods in return. The Australian colonies spend some £300,000 per annum in immigration. If we were to co-operate with them, it would be mutually advantageous, and greatly accelerate progress. It may be mentioned that the imports and exports of Australasia now exceed those of Great Britain eighty years ago, and are nearly equal to those of British India; ten years will probably turn the scale.

Canada and the South African Colonies have also a great future, and settlement should be aided in these cases also. This course would be directly advantageous to Britain. Emigrants to the United States become aliens in comparison to our own colonists. Foreign competition will send many of our farmers abroad, and the greater will be our surplus labour. Australia with a yield of 11 bushels per acre, America with 12, and New Zealand 30 bushels of wheat per acre, can sell it here, if need be, at 30s. per quarter. Those countries are likely to send us meat much more largely than heretofore, and in a condition to suit our requirements.

Victoria, which is the most democratic and demoralised of our Australian colonies, does not assist immigration, but favours "protection to native industry." The natural result is observed: trade is so dull that 1,200 men are now employed in relief works, while the other colonies are prosperous. Even those who pay their passage to Victoria, in many cases, shift to other colonies, to which many thousands of immigrants are brought by the State. It is to be hoped that we shall not make further leaps in the dark, in the Disraeli style, of extending the suffrage. Mr. Gladstone was working on safe lines when the matter was taken out of his hands. If the suffrage could be levelled up and down in town and country on the latter basis, it would tend to stability. This by the way.

We should consider the possibility of relieving the pressure of the Indian population, by removing the surplus to Northern Australia, or other tropical climates. Former generations of the Chinese would not hear of emigration, but now they are not to be kept at home. The old checks on population in India—intestine wars, infanticide, sutteeism, and famine—are pretty well abolished. If we do not find means of relief from the increasing pressure of population, we must expect periodical famines. It is with the Indian population as with the stock on Australian sheep runs. The amount of sustenance is double in the best seasons to that of the worst. The

surplus stock may be sent to the meat-preserving or melting-down establishments, but it is a very serious case with a vast destitute population. There is much scope for settlement in the South Sea Islands, where the population is dying out without being replaced. Indian or Chinese labour might be introduced, by families, and settled, as has been proposed, in Northern Australia. We have been depopulating the South Sea Islands by a nefarious labour traffic, with no good results to any of the parties concerned. As the Chinese have, under great difficulties, opened a way for their surplus population, to some extent, we should provide similar relief for India.

To return to the home position. Taine, in his "Notes on England," remarks that the English have large families, but, owing to the extent of our colonies, and the enterprise of the people, they are quite as well provided for as the smaller families of the French. It is admitted that the British people have done well in the past, but that should not prevent them from doing still better in the future. This will be effected the more readily if they are distributed in the localities where the greatest results can be produced. It is not the best economy, for instance, to send British labour to compete with that of the Caffres; though the native labour is less effective, the race being acclimatised, it would be cheaper. In fact, the native race has more vitality in that climate, especially towards the Tropics, than the European race. The case is reversed in Australia, where the aborigines never attempted the cultivation of the soil, and required on the average 16,000 acres as the hunting ground of a family. This area affords fifty farms of 320 acres each. Such farmers in South Australia export a ton of wheat for each head of the whole population; and there are other exports of an equal gross value. The aborigines, though very well provided in food, clothing, &c., by the State, and allowed to hunt as usual, are dying out so fast, that twenty years hence very few will remain. The northern territory, where sugar and cotton are being grown largely and profitably, would probably support an Indian population four hundred times greater than the aboriginal maximum. In the southern territory and in New Zealand we could locate millions of the half-starved and down-trodden Irish Celts and other surplus British population.

It is the practice in the Australian colonies to open the land to selection. When the choice has been made the selector pays 1s. or 2s. per acre yearly, and when 20s. per acre has been paid, without interest being charged, he gets his title-deeds for 320 acres at a cost of 30s., the property can also be transferred for 30s., and the title is guaranteed by the State. In New South

Wales the selector pays 5s. per acre cash, with interest at 5 per cent. on the balance, for an indefinite time. He may also get a grazing right, free of charge, to three times the area selected.

If the State were to provide, in conjunction with the colonies, for the removal of our surplus population, people need not be so "thick upon the ground" as they are in some barren parts of Ireland. If the surplus were sent away from any part of these kingdoms, labour would soon fill up the vacancies. As the case stands, thousands of the small tenants of Ireland cross the Channel to earn the rents paid for their holdings. In former days Irish and British mothers would rather have had their sons laid in their graves than see them go abroad; but as that feeling no longer exists, many would fall in with any scheme of emigration. The writer has heard a highlander complain bitterly of his being turned out of a miserable holding in Scotland, though the family have now many thousands of acres in fee in Victoria. Many of the sons of Irish farmers are now more independent in the colonies than the majority of British or Irish landlords. Much of the land in the Scotch highlands and in the mountainous parts of Ireland, is only suited for game or pasture, as compared with the virgin soil in the colonies, where a large proportion is ready for the plough. A small farmer in Australia, with the assistance of a ploughman, put in sixty acres of wheat; by means of two double ploughs, each drawn by three horses, working long hours and changing the horses at noon, they ploughed between them six acres per day. By means of a locally invented harvesting machine, three men can garner ten acres per day, leave the straw standing uncut in the field. The straw is afterwards burnt off, or ploughed down.

The farmers and labourers of Great Britain and Ireland are wasting their energies and their means at present. The rents that are paid do not enable the farmer to compete with the foreign producers, and there is the further difficulty of our absurd game-laws, land-laws, and law of transfer. The transfer of land is so cumbrous that it lessens its value by 5 per cent. The law of entail is also a great obstacle in the way of improvement.

We can spare selected emigrants, as we have done hitherto, with positive advantage to the country, but we should make education more universal. The south of England labourer could, by this means, be advanced to the status of the Scotch labourer, who is worth a higher wage by one shilling per day. If our pauper children were boarded out and sent to proper schools

with other children, they could be put on a level with our present labourers. The people of America and of our colonies are more intelligent than the British people, education being more universal. An American writer, with characteristic self-appreciation, says that "God sifted the nations of Europe, and planted America with the finest of the wheat."

Mr. Vere Foster, who did noble work in assisting Irish emigrants during the famine period, both by his means and in conducting them across the Atlantic, has recently offered a bonus of £2 each towards the passage of girls from distressed districts in Ireland. This offer was limited to £1,500. His experience shows that the young are the most suitable emigrants. Mrs. Comstock, an American Quaker lady, is arranging for the location of the coloured refugees arriving in vast numbers in Kansas, by providing forty acres of land for each family, and giving them five years for payment. There is room enough in our Australian colonies for a population of one hundred millions, though vast numbers in Ireland, India, and elsewhere, are on the borders of starvation. The hunting ground of an aboriginal family would afford forty acres to each of 400 Indian families, or 320 acres to fifty British families. These aborigines prefer such occupation of their country, as they thus secure food without risk or trouble.

A word in conclusion about emigrant families having no resources. Young people with few children may find employment readily enough, but with a number of children or "encumbrances," the case is different. Single men or women who are able and willing to work should have no difficulty, they can adapt themselves to circumstances, and can go into the country more conveniently. They take their labour and talents to the best market.

CHARLES WILSON.

*Cheltenham, Oct., 1880.*

## THE NEW INDIAN GOLD MINES : AURIFEROUS QUARTZ OF SOUTHERN INDIA.

THE recent discovery of vast traces of ancient gold mines in the south of India establishes beyond reasonable doubt the true locality of the *Ophir* of the Scriptures, while it explains the extraordinary statements made by Indian historians as to the enormous quantities of gold which were found in the country by the invading armies of the Mohammedans, from the expeditions of Mahmúd of Ghazai, in the eleventh century, down to the plunder of Delhi by Nadir Shah, just before our own appearance upon the scene in the last century. It is strange, we think, that so much difficulty should have been expressed by students concerning the *Ophir* of the Bible, in view of the plain statements that are made concerning the port from which the ships sailed, and the products which were the objects of their voyage. To bring these statements into one view, they are as follow :—

And King Solomon made a navy of ships in Ezion-geber, which is beside Eloth, on the shore of the Red Sea, in the land of Edom. And Hiram sent in the navy his servants, shipmen that had knowledge of the sea, with the servants of Solomon. And they came to Ophir, and fetched from thence gold, four hundred and twenty talents, and brought it to King Solomon. (1 Kings ix. 26-28.)

Now the weight of gold that came to Solomon in one year was six hundred threescore and six talents of gold, beside that he had of the merchantmen, and of the traffick of the spice merchants, and of all the kings of Arabia, and of the governors of the country. (1 Kings x. 14, 15.)

And all King Solomon's drinking vessels were of gold, and all the vessels of the house of the forest of Lebanon were of pure gold; none were of silver: it was nothing accounted of in the days of Solomon. For the king had at sea a navy of Tarshish with the navy of Hiram: once in three years came the navy of Tarshish, bringing gold, and silver, ivory, and apes, and peacocks. (1 Kings x. 21, 22.)

And all the drinking vessels of King Solomon were of gold, and all the vessels of the house of the forest of Lebanon were of pure gold: none were of silver; it was not any thing accounted of in the days of Solomon. For the king's ships went to Tarshish with the servants of Hiram: every three years once came the ships of Tarshish bringing gold, and silver, ivory, and apes, and peacocks. (2 Chron. ix. 20, 21.)

And the servants also of Hiram, and the servants of Solomon, which brought



gold from Ophir, brought alnum trees and precious stones. And the king made of the alnum trees terraces to the house of the Lord, and to the king's palace, and harps and psalteries for singers: and there were none such seen before in the land of Judah. Now the weight of gold that came to Solomon in one year was six hundred and threescore and six talents of gold; besides that which chapmen and merchants brought. And all the kings of Arabia and governors of the country brought gold and silver to Solomon. (2 Chron. ix. 10-14.)

After this did Jehoshaphat king of Judah join himself with Ahaziah king of Israel, who did very wickedly: and he joined himself with him to make ships to go to Tarshish: and they made the ships in Ezion-geber. Then Eliezer the son of Dodavah of Mareshah prophesied against Jehoshaphat, saying, Because thou hast joined thyself with Ahaziah, the Lord hath broken thy works. And the ships were broken, that they were not able to go to Tarshish. (2 Chron. xx. 35-37.)

Jehoshaphat made ships of Tharshish to go to Ophir for gold: but they went not; for the ships were broken at Ezion-geber. Then said Ahaziah the son of Ahab unto Jehoshaphat, Let my servants go with thy servants in the ships. But Jehoshaphat would not. (1 Kings xxii. 48, 49.)

The difficulty which students have found or imagined in these statements, has arisen from the supposed necessity of finding the Tarshish spoken of in the last extract as situated upon the Mediterranean shores. The fact that these Tarshish fleets are distinctly said to have been built in Ezion-geber, the situation of which on the eastern arm of the Red Sea, has never, we believe, been doubted, might have sufficed, we should think, for the assurance that the Tarshish of their destination must necessarily be sought in the Eastern seas, unless we are to adopt the extravagant hypothesis that they rounded the Cape of Good Hope, sailed along the whole western coast of Africa, and entered the Mediterranean through the pillars of Hercules, the modern Straits of Gibraltar. The mention of alnum (almug) trees in particular, points to the southern coast of India; no doubt, we believe, being entertained that the alnum is simply the sandal-wood of the Malabar and Coromandel Coasts. That the quantity of gold received by Solomon was immense is, of course, certain; but Mr. Eastwick (*Gentleman's Magazine*, July, 1880) seems to strain the text when he assumes that during the whole forty years of that monarch's reign he steadily received 666 talents of gold annually.

On the authority of Scripture we must conclude that the gold brought to him by way of the Red Sea alone amounted to 3,330,000 lbs. weight of gold, or in round numbers about £160,000,000 sterling. The mines, therefore, that produced this enormous sum must have been equal in productiveness to those of Australia. Now the gross produce of the Australian mines from the first discovery of the gold fields in 1851 to the 31st December, 1868, was £147,342,767 sterling (see the "Gold Fields of Victoria," by R. Brough Smyth, p. 7). What could be got from the washing of auriferous sand in Arabia or Tofala to make up anything

like such a sum as this, and *a fortiori* the still greater sum that reached Solomon? But the fact is, those who have written on the subject of the import of gold into Palestine had no idea of the now well-established fact that immense gold mines existed in the south of India.

That the gold came from India, and from the very localities in which these new Indian mines are now working, there is, we think, no reasonable doubt; but that it was produced in such masses as to supply Palestine alone with the quantities Mr. Eastwick affirms, is certainly not warranted by the texts on which he seems to rely. On the other hand, that the Princes of India amassed enormous quantities of the metal, through long centuries of its production and accumulation, may be very well believed. As Mr. Eastwick's statement on this point may be regarded as a summary of the historical notices of this fabulous wealth, our readers may like to see it:—

The extraordinary statements made by Indian historians as to the enormous quantities of gold which were found by the Muhammadan invading armies in India, are substantiated by irrefragable evidence, by the testimony of the writers of other countries, by contemporary inscriptions, and above all by existing facts.

To begin, then, with the Indian historians; we are told that Mahmūd, of Ghanzī, made twelve expeditions into India, and that in each he amassed a great treasure. Not to take up too much space, let the seven first expeditions be disregarded, to come at once to the eighth. Now Firishtah, writing of this expedition, says that Mahmūd found in Mathura, in Central India, five great idols of pure gold, with eyes of rubies, each eye being worth 50,000 dinārs (the dinār = 9 shillings), and another great idol which produced 98,300 *miskāls* of pure gold, that is, about 12,000 ounces, and that the Afghan king returned to Ghanzī from this one expedition with 20,000,000 of dinārs, or £9,000,000 sterling. No wonder that after this success he erected a mosque, which was called the Heavenly Bride, and surpassed in magnificence all the buildings of that time, and that he caused to be made of the spoils a throne and a crown of gold, weighing 1,500 lbs., or nearly  $\frac{3}{4}$  of a ton. In his twelfth expedition Mahmūd captured the temple of Somnāth, in which was an idol 15 feet high, filled with precious stones, and the treasure taken on this occasion exceeded that acquired in all the former expeditions, though, besides the enormous sum which was got in the eighth which has been already mentioned, there was taken in the fourth at Nogarkat "a greater quantity of gold, silver, precious stones, and pearls, than was ever collected in the royal treasury of any prince on earth," consisting of 700,000 gold dinārs, 700 *mans* of gold and silver plate (the *man* being probably 25 lbs.), 200 *mans* of pure golden ingots, 2,000 *mans* of unwrought silver, and 20 *mans* of jewels.

It might be thought that expeditions that were rewarded with so many millions of dinārs, and such immense treasure of other kinds, would have denuded India of its wealth; but we shall see presently that the spoil of Southern India far exceeded even that which had been taken in the North. Nor is it possible to dismiss these statements with an incredulous smile. The vastness of the plunder taken by Mahmūd is convincingly attested by the splendour of the edifices he erected at Ghizni, and by the sudden uprise of the empire which he founded there. The still greater spoil captured in the Dakhan is yet more clearly proved

by the wealth which displayed itself at Dihli in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. That city had been taken by Vikram about the beginning of the Christian era, and dismantled, the seat of empire being transferred to Ujjain. For four, or, according to some, for eight centuries, Dihli remained comparatively deserted and impoverished; and when it was beginning to recover under the Chokans, it was taken by the Muslims, and again, in the fourteenth century, it was twice depopulated by the Emperor Tughlak; yet, in the centuries following, here is found in it a profusion of riches such as to astonish the world, especially during the reign of Sháh Jahán. The throne of that monarch, with its gold and precious stones, was valued at twelve millions sterling; and we see in the Táj, and other magnificent buildings of that time, what countless sums must have been expended in the matter of building alone. Whence came this wealth? Let the statements of Firishtah be heard in reply. Deogarh, probably the ancient Tagara, was a vast city, of which nothing but the fort now called Daulatábád, and some mouldering ruins on the neighbouring plateau, remain. This place was besieged in 1254 by Áláu 'd dín, the general of the Emperor Jalálu 'd dín Khiljy, and not taken, so far at least as the citadel was concerned, and there the treasure was deposited. It was ransomed, and the ransom is stated to have amounted to 17,500 lbs. of gold, 175 lbs. of pearls, 50 lbs. of diamonds, and 25,000 lbs. of silver. We may infer from what was paid as ransom how much treasure remained to the Rájah of Deogarh; but, vast as it may have been, it was eclipsed by what was found in a capital much farther to the south, Dwára Samudra. Malik Káfúr, the fortunate general who captured this place, presented to Áláu 'd dín, who by the barbarous murder of his uncle had now obtained the throne of Dihli, 812 elephants, 20,000 horses, and 96,000 *mans* of gold. As each *man* weighed 25 lbs., this offering in gold consisted of no less than 2,400,000 lbs., or over £100,000,000 sterling. Here two things are to be remarked—first, that the more the Muslims advanced to the South, that is, to the place where it will be shown that mines existed, the greater was the golden treasure they required; and, secondly, that they discovered that there was no silver coinage in this southern province, but that the common coin was the golden *hún*, or pagoda, and a gold fanam, worth only 6d. During this expedition of Malik Káfúr, we are assured by Firishtah that his soldiers threw the silver that fell into their hands away, as too cumbersome where gold was found in such plenty. No person wore bracelets, chains, or rings of any other metal than gold, while all the plate in the houses of the great was of beaten gold; neither was silver money at all current in that country, should we believe the reports of those adventurers. To come to more recent times: “Nádir Sháh found in the treasury of Kábul £2,500,000 sterling, and effects to the value of £2,000,000 more, in which were included 4,000 suits of complete armour, inlaid with gold. Such was then the poverty of the now really poor Afghánistán; and it was indeed poverty, as compared with the riches which Nádar captured in Dihli. In the public treasury he found in specie nearly £4,000,000 sterling; in the private vaults £2,500,000. The jewel office was estimated at £30,000,000 sterling, including the famous throne, which was valued at more than £12,000,000. The royal wardrobe and armoury were reckoned worth £7,000,000 sterling. Eight millions were raised in specie in the city by way of contribution, and about £10,000,000 in jewels; all which, together with horses, camels, and elephants, amounted to about £62,500,000.” In another place the historian says that the whole of the treasure which Nádir carried away amounted to £80,000,000 sterling. We need not add to this what is said by Wasaf of the wealth of Kales Dewar, Rájah of Malabar,

who in 1809 had accumulated 1,200 krores of gold, equal to 1,200,000,000 of dinars (the dinar = 9s.), enough to girdle the earth with a four-fold belt of bezants (see Colonel Yule's "Marco Polo," p. 382, note 6 on ch. xvii.).

It is no idle surmise, then, adds the writer, "but an assured inference, ascertained by an accumulation of facts, that the mines which in former times enriched India with an unparalleled supply of gold, will ere long pour forth a fresh supply." Mr. Eastwick's hopeful conclusion is that the result of these recent discoveries "will be to restore our great empire in the East to that flourishing condition which seems of late to have been almost despaired of."

Mr. Crozier, late of the Madras Civil Service, sends us an interesting note concerning the discovery of these new Indian mines, which, he says, brings to his recollection a personal incident occurring to himself in the year 1854, when he was officially connected with the Wynaad district:—

A magisterial case led me to the vicinity of these gold mines so recently discovered. The day after my arrival I saw, from my tent, a number of hill people busily engaged in the water of a neighbouring stream, sifting and washing the sand in huge hand-trays. On my approach they left their occupation for their jungle homes; and it was only after some days they could be induced to return and resume their work. I submitted some of the gold dust which I saw thus obtained to my superior, the late Mr. Conolly, at Calicut, with a brief account of the locality, the method of obtaining it, &c. I sent also some specimens to this country, with a few small gold coins (Fanams) believed to have been manufactured from this or other source in the neighbourhood (both of which are now in my possession). The place I refer to was many miles distant from Nellialum, marked in the map accompanying the prospectus and report, as the site of these ancient mines, now again to be worked; and in a direct line from them to Calicut and the ocean. I learnt that these wild hill villagers gained a sufficient (though small) subsistence from these washings.

As to the Ophir and Tarshish of the Jewish Kings and Chronicles, Mr. Crozier says:—

The subject of most interest to myself (and, no doubt, to many others) at the present time, is the apparent confirmation of hitherto ambiguous and doubtful passages of the Bible referring to Ophir and the country whence Solomon obtained, through King Hiram and his fleet, the gold, the ivory, the spices, the peacocks, the apes, the sandal and other woods mentioned in Holy Writ; all or the most of which are, to my knowledge, to be met with in abundance in Wynaad. The wild elephants, at the time I allude to (1845), were so numerous and injurious in the pepper, coffee, sugar, and other estates, that a large reward was annually given by the Government for their destruction; and the peafowl and monkeys were in such numbers and so noisy and tame (being looked upon by the natives as sacred animals) as to cause a residence there disagreeable. The derivation of the names peacock and ape is from Sanscrit and Tamil (the vernacular languages of India) and they are not of Hebrew origin. I am not aware that the precious stones

enumerated are actually to be found in that part of India; but we know in the neighbouring island of Ceylon they are still most abundant and various; and doubtless, then as now, there was a constant communication with (and exchange of produce on) the coast; and it is more than likely that Hiram's fleet touched there during the voyage of the three years, also mentioned.

It may be objected, by some who have made this subject their study, that the gold used by King Solomon was from Tarshish, a town in Spain of similar name, and thence obtained by the Phœnician mariners sailing from Tyre; but Dr. Smith and other antiquarians of biblical research by no means seem to consider this a settled point. The contrary is probably the fact, and that ports on the Red Sea and Persian Gulf were the places of embarkation and return of the "ships of Tarshish."

Josephus expressly and unhesitatingly affirms that the land to which Solomon sent for gold was anciently called Ophir, and "was the Aurea Chersonesus, which belongs to India" (Antiq. viii. 6, 4). The Septuagint translators, who could hardly have been misled, seem also (according to Dr. Kitto) to have never doubted it to be India. The Aurea Chersonesus of the ancients, says the same writer, is "known to have been the modern Malacca, the natives of which still call their gold mines *ophirs*." Heeren observes that Ophir, like the name of all other very distant places or regions of antiquity, "like Thule, Tartissus, and others, denotes no particular spot, but only a certain region or part of the world, such as the East or West Indies, in modern geography." The mention of Malacca in this association naturally recalls the traffic of the spice merchants (1 Kings x. 14), and suggests the propriety of prospecting in "the Straits," for the gold mines which Dr. Kitto tells us that the natives of Malacca still call "*ophirs*."

The most interesting passage in Mr. Eastwick's essay is, perhaps, that which refers to the ancient inscription that encircles the base of the great Temple at Tanjore, which brings down to the twelfth century, proof of the vast quantities of the metal then existing in India:—

The inscription is round the base of the great temple at Tanjûr, and would, if written out in a straight line, extend perhaps the length of a mile, and the translation would fill a thick quarto volume. This inscription, written in an obsolete and difficult character, has been deciphered by the learned Dr. Burnell, and in a pamphlet printed by him on the 12th November, 1877, and called "The Great Temple of Tanjore," he thus speaks of it: "Nearly all these inscriptions—there are only two or three of a later date—belong to the reign of Virâ-Côla, or from 1064 A.D. to 1114. During the reign of his father, Râja-râja, the Cōla power recovered from the defeats it had suffered from the kings of the Deccan, and, beginning with a conquest of the Telugu sea-coast, it soon became an object of alarm to the kings of the North. Five of these formed a confederacy and were defeated. The Cōlas then conquered not only the whole of the Deccan,

but invaded Bengal and Oude, and reduced the kingdom of Ceylon to a miserable state. The whole of India, which in the eleventh century remained subject to Hindoo kings, then became subject to Virā-Cōla, and he was, beyond doubt, the greatest Hindoo king known to history. As these inscriptions state, he did not spare the kings he conquered, and the enormous plunder which he gained became the chief means of building and endowing the great temples of the South. But his conquests cost the Hindoos a heavy price in the end; his kingdom soon fell to pieces, and by the middle of the next century it had become so insignificant that the Singhalese, who had already shaken off the Cōla yoke, invaded the Tamil country. The vanquished and plundered Hindoo kingdoms of the Deccan and the North fell an easy prey to the advancing Muhammadans, and in 1310 they conquered the whole Tamil country, and established a Muhammadan dynasty at Madura, which lasted for about sixty years. Thus all the spoils of India came into the hands of the Muhammadans almost in a day, and were taken to Delhi. The full importance in Indian history of Virā-Cōla's reign is only to be gathered from this inscription, but it contains other information also of great value. It proves, *e.g.*, that in the eleventh century gold was the most common precious metal in India, and stupendous quantities of it are mentioned here. Silver, on the other hand, is little mentioned, and it thus appears that the present state of things, which is exactly the reverse, was only brought about by the Portuguese in the sixteenth century. These inscriptions will also throw much light on the history and geography of India in the eleventh century, of which we at present know so little, and also on the constitution of the village communities, a subject that is now of deep interest to the students of customs and comparative jurisprudence."

We must wait until the translation of this extraordinary inscription is published to ascertain whether the "stupendous quantities of gold" of which it speaks are declared to have been taken from the mines which exist in the country then subject to the Rájá, who was the author of the inscription. But even if no such mention should be found, there is the fact that the mines belonged to him, and that they were unquestionably being worked at the very time he caused the inscription to be made. These mines are situated in the Wynád country, at the distance of about 200 miles to the north-west of Tanjúr. The first thing to be noted with regard to these mines is that they have been extensively worked from a very ancient time. In 1832 Mr. Nicholson, an officer who was directed to make inquiries regarding them, reported that "the whole of the lower slopes of the Wynád hill ranges were mined throughout." It was subsequently ascertained (see the *Madras Mail* of June 17, 1875), that in the neighbourhood of Deválá, in the same district, there was not a hill-side to which water could be turned, where the whole surface soil had not been washed away; every stream had been diverted from its course, and the bottom washed out. Every reef had been prospected, and the underlie, where easily got at, turned over. Mr. O. Pegler, a gentleman who had been sent to examine the mines, reported on the 22nd November, 1877, that there appeared to be no limit of the extent of these workings, both ancient and modern, and that he observed evidences in every direction, both of mining on the reefs and washing on the hill-slopes, generally beneath the western escarpment of the outcrop of the reefs. Mr. Pegler further mentions many places where he remarked traces of underground mining operations, and mostly carried out with skill and organized plan. In one place he discovered a complete chain of pits, extended on sets of triangles, comprising twenty-seven shafts in all, these workings being of some age, and no doubt of

great depth, though as all old shafts are apt to fill up, their real depth was necessarily a matter of pure speculation. From all this he came to the conclusion that a sound system of mining was followed in those days, and that considering the absence of science and the want of application of improved machinery, the intelligence of the miners of that date must have been very great, and could only have been arrived at by years and generations of application to mining pursuits. These ancient miners sank rows of triple shafts along the reefs, one shaft for drawing up material, another for the ingress and egress of miners, and a third for ventilation and unwatering, serving as a sump, and always deeper than the workings, and the workings were carried in honeycombed chambers to each side of the line of pits. Without doubt the ancient miners used underground fire to break up the lodes or reefs; the third shaft here played an important part in supplying the necessary air for combustion, and the sump allowed the water to settle so as not to interfere with the burning. This underground burning is practised now in Germany and other countries. In the Wynád they evidently worked the chain of pits and line of operations up the slope, so as to facilitate drainage and the ascension of smoke. After opening out sufficient ground, they filled in the fuel, and lighting the fires, left the mines till combustion was completed, and they then found much of the reef broken up and easily removed. The pyrites contained in the vein-stone would sustain combustion, and considerably tend to break up the stone. On securing the quartz at surface it was evidently spalled, that is, broken by the hand into small pieces, and the poor stone rejected, as is now done in Cornwall and elsewhere, and then again calcined in order to decompose the pyrites, and finally crushed, probably by means of large hard stones in cavities in stone bedding. It was then washed, and if mercury was procurable in those days, amalgamated with it. Evidently the inducement must have been great to have caused such extensive and well-organised works to be carried out. Now the antiquity of these workings is established in the first place by their skilful organization, which could have been arrived at only after the experience of centuries, for there were no scientific books, no lectures, no School of Mines to instruct the workers of those days—nothing, in short, but the results of experience handed down by oral tradition to teach them. In the second place, the age of the workings is shown by their vast extent.

The importance of these modern researches and discoveries can hardly be exaggerated. We still think that, instead of leasing "mining rights," or making "concessions" of such rights to private companies, the Government of India should concentrate its own resources upon the enterprise, instead of leaving it to others. The latest Company in the field is the Colar Gold Mining Company, whose prospectus appears in the daily morning papers. We received some months ago an interesting brochure upon the Mysore mining districts from the pen of Mr. A. H. Anderson, under whose auspices the Colar Company is being formed, for "mining" a block of land lying directly between the "workings" of the Mysore Gold Mining Company on the one hand, and the Madras Company on the other. Concerning these reefs, Mr. Anderson writes:—

At one place near a small outcrop from the reef in question, a shaft was

sunk, and at about 50 feet depth a small drive made, from which over nine tons of quartz were taken—some of the stone with gold visible in it, some with no appearance of gold at all. Pounding and amalgamating machinery had been erected, and from these nine tons of stone 27½ oz. of gold were obtained (as previously stated). Further on, however, another shaft had been sunk, the reef tapped, and the stone reported “barren;” water in quantity was come upon in the “drive” first mentioned, large capital seemed necessary, and for a time work was suspended. Now work has been resumed, and is being energetically and successfully proceeded with. The stone declared worthless has been found quite the reverse; natives had soon carried most of it away or broken it up on the spot, and it actually contained gold to over an ounce per ton! More stone from an adjacent part of the reef has been got up and tested; and, still further to prove matters, at fifteen and thirty feet further on, two fresh shafts have been sunk, the one eighteen, the other fifty feet deep; and the stone, tested at the office of Mr Brough Smyth—the eminent mineralogist from Australia, now employed by the Government of India specially to aid with these and similar discoveries—was found to contain gold in quantity such as would realize the wildest ideas of quartz-miners. The reef has just been laid bare 100 feet longitudinally, and quartz is being quarried out; it commences at a thickness of seven feet, and at the foot of the present working is twelve feet thick. It is estimated by high mining authorities that, supposing that one reef to extend to the depth of only 300 feet, to work it so as to obtain—i.e., raise—100 tons per day, it would last for over sixty years. (*Mem.*—In Australia we had seen sinking on reefs, rather with the reefs, to depth of 1,000 feet, and know of sinkings, both there and in California, of over 1,500 feet.) In this stone the gold is throughout, and even when invisible with a magnifying-glass, no vein-stone tested has as yet yielded so low a return as half an ounce per ton. Diggers know what that means, for six penny-weights to the ton clears all costs and leaves a profit!\*

All the accounts received on the spot and elsewhere, all the geological and other facts here roughly narrated or sketched out, are the mere etchings, in pencil as it were, for a landscape in a setting of gold which will yet materially affect the currency question, and go very far towards settling matters with regard to our Indian exchanges.

The high premium at which the shares of the various Companies are quoted, would seem to justify the sanguine hopes with which the enterprise is started. We have no quarrel with it, but we still think that if these ancient “workings” justify the expectations so widely entertained of their results, under treatment by modern processes, it is the State, and not private Concessionaires, that ought to be in the field. It is in the Wynaad district on the one side (Malabar coast), and Mysore on the other (Coromandel), that these discoveries have been made, and should gold be really obtainable therefrom in the quantities which Mr. Brough Smyth and others anticipate, a very important contribution will have been made to the solution of the Indian Finance Problem.

\* By latest returns from Australia three pennyweights does that.



## A STATE DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE FOR INDIA.

[By the Editor.]

It happens very opportunely that the head of the late Agricultural Department in India (Mr. Secretary Hume) has made the abolition of his office the occasion for publishing a remarkable pamphlet on the condition to which the masses of the agricultural population in India have been reduced under British rule. Mr. Hume's contentions are precisely those which I have myself long pressed upon the Government, and it is, perhaps, desirable that I should show how fully Mr. Hume confirms all I have said as to the condition of the soil and the position of the cultivator. And first, as to the *Exhaustion of the Soil*, Mr. Hume writes :—

Agriculture in India has become, and becomes daily, more and more what Liebig happily designated a system of spoliation. Deep as the purse may have been, and rich as much of our soil unquestionably was, it is clear that a time must arrive when, by continually taking out a great deal and putting back very little, both purse and soil are exhausted. Unlike the European peasant, the Indian husbandman more or less fully realizes the evils of this system ; it is only on compulsion that he robs his mother soil, and it is only in comparatively quite recent times that this spoliation has acquired the alarming intensity that now characterises it. Only fifty years ago, when jungles and grazing grounds abounded, when cattle were more numerous, when much wood was available as fuel, there was actually a much greater amount of manure available and a very much smaller number of fields on which to spread it. The evil is a growing one, it is one of gigantic magnitude, and though, like all great causes, it operates slowly, no one who has really watched agriculture for years in this country, can doubt that its effects are already showing far and wide ; no one who understands the question can doubt that they will develop with most disastrously increasing virulence as years run on.

Here, again, is a question in regard to which there can be no doubt. How quickly or how slowly a perpetually cropped and rarely, and then only scantily, manured field will become thoroughly exhausted and unculturable, depends, of course, on what we may term the original capital of that field, and on the proportion that may exist between the disbursements and receipts ; but it being admitted that the former are and have been for years greatly in excess of the latter, and that this disproportion is increasing, the ultimate result is certain. That the gradual (and perhaps later suddenly rapid) deterioration of the major portion of

our cultivated lands is, unless a totally new system be inaugurated, inevitably impending, can be denied by no one conversant with the subject.

It is impossible for Government to disbelieve this; they may think, and perhaps rightly, that it will last their time, but they cannot doubt as to what they are preparing for their successors. And it is not as in other countries, where the land is private property. It is its own land that Government is allowing to go to ruin, its own financial blood that it lets run to waste. This is the sole goose that ever would or could lay golden eggs for us, and we are smiling as it is slowly starved before us, and will not make a single effort worthy of the name to arrest the catastrophe.

#### EFFECTS OF IRRIGATION.

Notwithstanding the enormous additional areas brought under cultivation, notwithstanding our vast irrigation schemes, and our improved and really admirable systems of settlement, our land revenue (excluding Burmah, still almost virgin soil, and making allowances for annexations, such as those of Oudh, the Punjab, &c.) has, if the rise of prices be taken into account, remained stationary, if it has not actually decreased. Yet the agricultural masses (there are more of them, no doubt) are, to say the least, neither wealthier nor better fed, taking the country as a whole, than they were seventy years ago. The sole explanation is, that the older tilled lands, as a body, yield now lighter crops than they formerly did.

This is what almost every experienced and intelligent cultivator in Upper India will tell you is the fact in regard to all but that little circle of fields skirting each inhabited site, which gets the great bulk of what little manure is available. This, too, might be gathered by comparing what was reckoned in the "Ain Akbari" as a full yield for several descriptions of crops in the Agra, Muttra, Mynpooree, and Etawah districts (in regard to which the Emperor's information must have been accurate), with the known yield in these same localities at the present time.\*

Yet again, from another and distinct source, ruin and desolation, more palpable and speedy in its course, though more limited in its operation, await vast tracts in Northern India, unless the voice of reason can gain a hearing and science be allowed to guide agriculture. In Oudh, the Punjab, and the North-west Provinces, the soils mostly contain an appreciable admixture of saline particles. With the construction of high-level canals, the subsoil water-level is raised, the surface flooded, the earth yields up its soluble salts to the water, which again restores them (but on the surface) as it passes away in vapour. At first the result may be good, and marvellous are the crops that have been raised in the Doab on the first introduction of canal irrigation, owing to the first slender doses of potash and chloride of sodium.

\* As the result of scores of careful personal experiments carried out in the Allyghur, Mynpooree, and Etawah districts, the writer would state fourteen bushels an acre of wheat to be a high average for good fields, *i.e.*, fields with which their cultivators are fairly satisfied; in other words, for the more successful fields, of the best land, which alone is used for wheat. The "Ain Akbari" gives nineteen bushels as an average yield in those days. I need not say how far both these figures fall short of the yield of well-tilled first-class lands, in East Norfolk for instance.

But nature works on blindly and unceasingly. The water below searches out one by one each soluble particle in excess of the particular soil's capacity of retention, and, as it slowly creeps up by capillary attraction, leaves these ever behind it on the surface. Time passes on, some crops begin to be unprofitable ; in the hottest time of the year, a glimmer as though of a hoar frost overspreads the land. The land grows worse and worse, but ever night and day nature works slowly on, and the time comes when, abandoned by the cultivator, the land glitters white and waste, as though thickly strewn with crisp, now-fallen snow ; never, alas ! to melt away, except under the rays of science. Along the little old Western Jumna Canal, thousands of fields are to be seen thus sterilised. Along the course of the mighty Ganges Canal—a work, as it were, but of yesterday—the dreary wintry-looking rime is already in many places creeping over the soil. Come it quickly or come it slowly, the ultimate result here also is certain ; and, unless a radical change is effected in existing arrangements, we know, as definitely as we know the sun will rise to-morrow, that the time must come when some of the richest arable tracts in Northern India will have become howling saline deserts.

It is impossible for me to heighten the force of this statement by a word ; and it is that, be it remembered, of the Government itself, speaking by the head of its own so-called Agricultural Department. The soil of India, except in its Deltaic regions, is being steadily and rapidly exhausted, and if the nation closes its eyes to the fact, preferring still to live in the fool's paradise created for it by lecturers like Dr. Hunter, and certified to by the *Times*, I, for one, do not care to contemplate the future.

And now, as to the character of that poor, improvident, thriftless creature, the Indian ryot, for whom the Famine Commissioners are so concerned lest the State should do too much. Let us see what Mr. Secretary Hume says about him :—

A theory is at times gravely maintained, even in India, that the ryot is a thriftless, reckless fellow ; that no matter what he gets, he will always spend more than his income ; that it matters nothing whether the rent he has to pay is high or low ; that he rather likes than otherwise having a balance *against* him at his banker's ; and that do what one will, he *will* always be in debt. Nothing can convey a more thoroughly and utterly false conception of our agriculturists as a body. That these, in common with the entire population, high and low, do, in accordance with immemorial custom, spend a great deal more upon marriages than, according to *English* ideas, any similarly circumstanced sane man ought to or would, may be at once admitted. Any real, vigorous, and persistent action to check this common form of extravagance, taken under sound native advice, would be a real blessing to the country. But, after all, this is the poor fellow's only extravagance ; these are almost the only white days in his dull-coloured life of toil and pinching, and unless he is singularly blessed (or unblest?), there are not many of them, and for the rest, a more careful frugal being is not to be found on earth. He hates debt ; he hates the usurer's name ; let any stroke of luck befall him, and see how soon the monstrous account against him is settled. This is not the case merely with individuals ; the population of whole provinces

(like Guzerat and Berar, owing to the abnormal profits from cotton during the American War) have similarly cleared themselves.

Fools are scarce nowhere, but only show our ryots how to free themselves from the toils of the money-lender, and how to keep out of his books, and none need fear that the great mass of them will long remain plunged in their present comparative misery; for misery of a kind it is.

A very happy natured, contented race, as a whole, are our village husbandmen, and they have their little amusements and festivals, and when harvests are very good, pretty much all that, with their simple habits, they need. The picture is not all black, or how could we or any one hold the country? But withal their lives are very hard and toilsome, and through it all too many are pressed with debt. Good crops ease the pain a little, and the village merry-making brings a temporary forgetfulness, but the sore is always there, and except in very good seasons, multitudes for months in every year cannot get sufficient food for themselves and their families. They are not starving, but they are hungry; they get less than they want and that they ought to have.

No doubt they make the best of it, and keep cheerful under pressure that would crush men of more advanced races; but this very childlike nature involves dangers, and we may see from the Deccan riots and sporadic cases occurring constantly everywhere, that, quite independent of the necessities of agricultural reform, and quite apart from the duty of ameliorating a lot on the whole so unenviable, cogent political reasons exist for grappling with this growing evil of indebtedness.

It is due to the patient, frugal, and not unintelligent husbandmen of India to admit freely that, looking to the conditions under which they labour, their ignorance of scientific method, and their want of capital (and all that capital enables a farmer to command), the crops that they do produce are, on the whole, surprising. So far as rule-of-thumb goes, the experience of three thousand years has not been wholly wasted. They know to a day when it is best (if only meteorological conditions permit) to sow each staple and each variety of each staple that is grown in their neighbourhood; they know the evils of banks and hedges, dwarfing the crops on either side and harbouring vermin, and will have none of them; they accurately distinguish every\* variety of soil, and, so far as the crops

\* Nothing, indeed, is more perplexing than the enormous number of names applied by Native agriculturists to soils, the more so that probably almost every district rejoices in at least a dozen purely local names which are unknown elsewhere. There is no real confusion, however. Native cultivators as keenly appreciate the smallest differences in the relative qualities of different soils as do the best European farmers; but the fact is that, independent of names indicative of the quality of the soil (and often to the entire *exclusion* of these), they make use, in describing their land, of names having reference to external conditions, the frequency or recency of cultivation therein, its situation as regards inhabited sites, &c., its position as upland or recently formed alluvium, its occupation for pasture, fields, or gardens, its external features, &c., &c. Nothing is more common than to hear soils referred to, as such, by names which really only indicate features or circumstances altogether external to the soil itself and independent of its intrinsic quality. This is no doubt inaccurate, but it is very natural, since the value to the agriculturist of any land will often depend far more on these external circumstances than on the inherent quality of the soil, which latter, moreover, will,

they grow are concerned, the varying properties and capacities of each ; they fully realize the value (though they can command but little) of ordinary manure, ashes, and the like, and recognize which are most required by which kind of crops ; they know the advantages of ploughing, in most cases as deep as their imperfect implements and feeble teams will permit, and of thoroughly pulverising the soil ; and they also recognize where, with a scanty or no supply of manure, it would be folly to break the shallow-lying pan. As for weeds, their wheat-fields would, in this respect, shame ninety-nine hundredths of those in Europe. You may stand on some high old barrow-like village site in Upper India, and look down on all sides on one wide sea of waving wheat broken only by dark-green islands of mango groves—many, many square miles of wheat, and not a weed or blade of grass above six inches in height to be found amongst it. What is to be spied out creeping here and there on the ground is only the growth of the last few weeks, since the corn grew too high and thick to permit the women and children to continue weeding. They know when to feed down a too forward crop ; they know the benefit of, and practise, so far as circumstances and poverty permit, a rotation of crops. They are great adepts in storing grain, and will turn it out of rough earthen pits, after twenty years, absolutely uninjured. They know the exact state of ripeness to which grain should be allowed to stand in different seasons ; in other words, under different meteorological conditions, to ensure its *keeping* when thus stored ; and equally the length of time that, under varying atmospheric conditions, it should lie upon the open threshing-floor to secure the same object.

Imperfect appliances, superstition, money troubles, and the usurer's impatience, often prevent their practising what they do know, but so far as what may be called non-scientific agriculture is concerned, there is little to teach them, and certainly very few European farmers could, fettered by the same conditions as our ryots, produce better, if as good, crops.

Vitally connected with the exhaustion of the soil, and the character of the ryot, or peasant cultivator, is the diminution in the agricultural stock of the country. Here, again, I simply reproduce what Mr. Hume says upon the subject, in confirmation of my own assertions :—

The paucity of cattle is due almost entirely to the incredible losses of stock sustained from starvation and different forms of cattle disease. The consumption of their droppings as fuel is due to the impossibility, in some places, or expense, in others, of procuring wood.

Over a great portion of the empire, the mass of the cattle are starved for six weeks every year. The hot winds roar, every green thing has disappeared, no hot weather forage is grown, the last year's fodder has generally been consumed in keeping the well bullocks on their legs during the irrigation of the spring crops, and all the husbandman can do is just to keep his poor brutes alive on the chopped leaves of the few trees and shrubs he has access to, the roots of grass and herbs that he digs out of the edges of fields, and the like.

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as time goes on, be often greatly modified by the former, as where "*bhoor*," or light sandy soil, becomes in course of time, by proximity to a village, constant cultivation and manuring, a kind of "*do mut*" between garden mould and rich loam.

In good years he just succeeds ; in bad years, the weakly ones die of starvation. But then come the rains. Within the week, as though by magic, the burning sands are carpeted with rank luscious herbage, the cattle will eat and over-eat, and millions die of one form or other of cattle disease, springing out of this starvation, followed by sudden repletion with rank, juicy, immature herbage.

Many years ago, the writer, when advocating the establishment of Veterinary Colleges, estimated the average annual loss of cattle in India by preventible cattle disease of one form and another, at fully 10,000,000 beasts, roughly valued at £7,500,000, and subsequent experience and inquiry have led him to believe that this estimate materially understated the case.

The Indian climates, varying as these do, appear to be specially favourable to cattle. Every one who has kept cattle here knows that if moderately fed, and given plenty of work and kept away from contagion, they never seem to be sick or sorry, but work on, hardy and healthy, from youth to extreme old age. They are very prolific too. If our poor beasts only had reasonably fair play, the whole empire would swarm with cattle, and cattle able to work the heaviest ploughs, and, in soils and situations where this was necessary or desirable, to plough as deep as you like.

But what can be expected under existing conditions ? Annually a rigid Lent, too often merging into actual starvation, followed by a sudden gorging with unwholesome food. The people are keenly alive to the dangers of such alternations, and labour hard to prevent the latter, or they would not keep a single head alive ; but despite all their care, their losses are enormous. In bad years, whole provinces are devastated. But a few years ago more than half the cattle in Oudh were lost during two successive bad seasons.

And be it noted that it is not only the supply of manure that this fearful mortality amongst the cattle, and their resulting paucity, so greatly restricts ; it is the little hoarded capital of the peasant, the very mainspring of agriculture in India, that is thus flung away. There is nothing new in all this ; everybody in India, Government and people, all know it, after a fashion, but beyond putting a single veterinary surgeon in a couple of provinces to try and train a score of native cow doctors, nothing is done. Nothing ever will be done until there is a special and properly organized department, whose sole business it is to look after it.

Mr. Hume says nothing about the deterioration that is so manifest in the quality of the stock. The bullocks, over wide tracts of country, are dwindling to the size of sheep, under the stress of chronic starvation. Now, these are the facts of our position, as opposed to the fictions with which this country is constantly amused as to the blessings of British rule. I shall make one more extract from Mr. Hume, to show how all this has come about. The extract is lengthy, but its importance precludes my making any apology for its introduction :—

It is necessary to realize the radical changes that our courts and revenue systems combined have wrought in the position of our agriculturists. Previous to our rule no private person had, broadly speaking, any property in the soil.\*

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\* We must perhaps except lands given to Brahmins, saints, &c., for temple, mosque, or other religious or charitable purposes ; but even these were, properly speaking, inalienable.

All proprietary right, in the sense in which we at home understand the word, vested directly in the State, or vicariously in some powerful chief or official. All that the people as a body enjoyed were a high class of occupancy rights, heritable but not transferable. A man might be deep in debt, but you could not interfere with the land he held, for that was not his, but his ruler's; and such rights as he possessed therein were personal to himself and family, or, in some cases, clan; and if any outsider had obtained possession, the State would have stepped in and resumed the property. No doubt, if sufficiently bribed, the local officials would, and often did, wink at transfers, but these were opposed alike to custom and tradition, which then constituted the law, such as it was, on this subject. There was, therefore, in those days no great inducement to money-lenders to advance money to landholders or cultivators of any degree, still less was it their interest to tempt those to take money, which they really did not want, in order to make an extra display at a wedding or a durbār.

They lent money, but only at enormous rates of interest; but this was not unfair, as they never hoped even to recover the principal, while for such interest as they were to get (a widely different thing from what was written in the bond) they were dependent on the will of their debtor, or the rare, paternal interference of some superior, who, appealed to with suitable presents, would say, "Come, Rambuksh, you owe the Sahoo Sahib a lot of money, and you have paid him nothing for two years; you just satisfy him by some proper payment on account, or it will not be well for you."

And even such interference was rarely needed, for the people are naturally very honest; the creditor had no object in cheating, because he could, as a rule, only expect to get what he could convince his debtor was justly due; while as for the debtor, though he had no intention of paying off his creditor, whose debt was perhaps six generations old, and who moreover never expected this, still neither had he any objection to make, from year to year, such payments on account as he could afford, and as, according to custom (everything was custom in those days), were fair and right. It was a point of honour with him, and the Natives of India had a very keen sense of honour; they saw many things from a different point of view to what we do, but they kept, I think, as a whole, closer to their standard than we as a nation have ever kept to ours.

It was almost a point of honour with them to defraud the State, to make false statements to superiors, &c., just as it used to be for boys to rob their master's garden, and mislead him whenever possible; but it would have been as base in their eyes to cheat or bilk their friend, the family banker, as it would have been for the schoolboy to steal from one of his own companions.

So there was debt in those days too, but it hurt nobody; the banker got his annuity so long as things went well, and even if in bad times he got little or nothing, he knew that there were always strong arms and sharp swords ready to defend him if things went wrong with him; each party was dependent more or less on the good offices of the other, and so far from being enemies, they were friends, bound together by the remembrance of many acts of mutual kindness; and if by chance they could not agree,—and men, though both honest and well-meaning, will at times fall out and differ,—they called in a party of respectable neighbours and friends (whose intervention only cost a good dinner), who heard all both had to say, effected a wise compromise, and settled the matter. There was no appeal; the brotherhood, or mixed jury, as the case might be, had spoken, and the matter was at an end.

But with the enlightened rule of the British Government all this was to

cease. Brimful of philanthropy, we could not let well alone, or, indeed, believe that anything could be well for others which was not in accordance with what we thought good for ourselves. With our innovations, our exotic systems of land and law, we have dissolved the bonds of society, we have turned peace into war, we have arrayed every class against that on which it was most dependent, capitalists against landowners, landlords against tenants, every man almost against his fellow. There is not, I believe, a single wise and good Native of India who will not freely admit that, whatever the failings and shortcomings of individual officers, the motives and intentions of the British Government, where India is concerned, have, on the whole, been pure and noble. But I fear that there is not one who would not condemn, in terms stronger than I have the heart to use, the cruel blunders into which our narrow-minded, though wholly benevolent desire to reproduce England in India has led us.

We began by conferring proprietary rights (the poor people, no ownership in the soil, mere serfs ! ) ; or where, as in Bombay, we stopped short of this, we gave additional strength to occupancy rights, and made these transferable. Every one knows the European arguments about enhancing the value of rights by making them transferable. Such a great thing to enable them to be brought into the market ! Buying and selling, as a wise writer once said, is an Englishman's idea of Paradise, and in the most unselfish spirit we desired to introduce our Native fellow-subjects into this same Paradise.

No one saw that the people were, on the whole, happy and contented as they were ; that their past sufferings, where they had suffered, were due not to any defects in their position or rights as established by custom, but to those rights having been ignored, and that custom having been over-ridden.

No one seems to have realized that the tenures of a country are the outcome of its whole past history, ever, as time rolled on, adjusting themselves to the varying conditions and relations of the different classes of the community ; that they must necessarily, therefore, be, under the circumstances, those best suited to the country ; that though they may require change as these conditions and relations vary, it must be

“ Change that broadens slowly down from precedent to precedent ; ”

and that any sudden and arbitrary, externally imposed, change must, however noble the impulse that prompted it, involve new and necessarily unsuitable combinations. Human institutions, to be healthy, must grow where they are to stand.

Not so reasoned our predecessors. They gave a new value to the land, by rigidly limiting their demand on the soil—a good thing, quite in accordance with the people's ideas of what a good prince should do,—and they conferred partial proprietary rights (which no one wanted or appreciated) wholesale, and they made all the rights they created or acknowledged in the soil transferable.

Up to our time such rights as existed were entailed in the strictest fashion ; creditors could not get hold of the land, even during the lifetime of the debtor. We raised the character of the rights, but cut off the entail without the consent of the heirs. At first this did no great harm. Nobody understood the change ; our people then were no lawyers, courts were few, and administered simple justice according to equity and good conscience ; and the majority of civil disputes continued to be settled by the people amongst themselves in the old fashion.

But as time passed on new and new laws were continually made, and courts were multiplied and gradually multiplied into courts of law, where justice sat fettered by codes, and whence equity and good conscience had been banished



for contempt of court, and a swarm of professional pleaders (good and bad, but specially the latter) spread over the length and breadth of the land, and village verdicts ceased to carry weight; and in the simplest matter, which formerly would have been settled on his own village platform by his own brethren and elders, and rightly settled in an hour, a man now had to put up with wrong, or walk twenty miles to court, and fee pleaders, and waste a week or more, and many weeks' earnings, and all as often as not merely to see the wrong triumph; or, if successful, to be dragged yet another fifty miles, on appeal to a higher court, where there were even more expensive pleaders to fee, and more time and money to waste, dangling about the court-house steps or compound, dogged by peons and emissaries of the underpaid native subordinate officials, all threatening loss of his case, unless he bribed, bribed, bribed. And if he,—*O fortunatus nimium*,—gained his case here too, and prepared to start for his neglected fields, a half-ruined and yet partly happy man (for Natives acquire a passion for litigation, just as Europeans do for drink or gambling), lo and behold, a second or special appeal on some miserable quibble of law, evolved out of clumsily drawn statutes, and he is dragged away yet another one, two, or three hundred miles to the provincial capital, where, after wasting months, and spending all he had with him or could borrow, in fees to lawyers and bribes to hangers-on of the courts, he, as likely as not, finally loses his case. Constituted as our civil courts are, the chances on each hearing do not preponderate largely in favour of real justice being done. What exactly the chances are of this happy event occurring three successive times in one case, I leave those who make "the odds" their study, to calculate.

Winning or losing, he often returns utterly demoralised to his home; he has heard all the pleadings—quibbles and fictions on his side, quibbles and fictions on the other side—and he has listened to many other cases besides his own, and has been impressed with the fact that, on the whole, *dishonesty* is the best policy, and henceforth this conviction shapes his dealings with his banker and his neighbours. His banker, on his part, is in no way behind his debtor; indeed, having necessarily more to do with the courts, he earlier, as a rule, became a convert to the gospel of fraud; and the temptation to him was immense, for lands are saleable now, and the impossible rates of old bonds entered as a matter of form, when no one dreamt of repaying capital, are now enforceable, and the principle can be recovered too, and every landholder of every degree can be sold out of house and home.

And perhaps our man is sold up, and the banker buys his land, and takes possession, and then—now and then the inherent love of his ancestral lands, his strongest passion, is too strong for the poor homeless wretch, and one evening in the dusk, when the unwary usurer, who has paid a visit to the village to see his new purchase, is wending his way homewards, there is a rush and the heavy thuds of a club, and the gallows ends the tragedy which our blundering philanthropy has so elaborately prepared.

And similarly, be it noticed, though it is a digression, that our laws and courts have set landlord against tenants, and converted too many of both classes into sad rogues. In the old days there was no talk of tenants-at-will, and tenants with occupancy rights, and so on. No doubt every landholder, where such really existed, *could* evict any tenant he chose; and if a man seduced his neighbour's wife (they were poor ignorant creatures), or otherwise insulted or offended the community, evicted he was; but custom barred, and far more effectively than any British law or court, any arbitrary exercise of this power; and the landlord who might any day have to defend his Penates against a

Maratha inroad, an imperial functionary, or a band of dacoits, was obliged to keep good friends, on the whole, with the mass of his cultivators, on whose strong arms the safety of his property and the honour of his house might at any moment become dependent. Both classes were bound together by ties of mutual obligation and inter-dependence; but we, with our ill-starred mania for exact systems of law, have dissolved the bonds, and have converted into antagonists the two great classes on whose harmonious co-operation not only their own welfare, but in many parts of the country the progress of our land revenue, so materially depends.

Let others write panegyrics on those who "first planted the seeds of a civilized system of jurisprudence in India;" I, looking sadly now on the Upas tree that has crowned their labours, can only say:—

Ille et nefasto te posuit die,  
Quicunque primum, et sacrilegâ manu,  
Produxit, arbos, in nepotum  
Perniciem, opprobriumque pagi!

No doubt it may startle some to propose that we should in these respects retrace our steps, and eschewing the highly seasoned and artistic messes of civilization, revert to the simple fruit and herbs of our unenlightened predecessors. But the case stands thus: The country is on the high road to bankruptcy: sudden and arbitrary reductions in all directions, not impossibly really wasting more money than they seem to save, will of course be resorted to, and a nominal equilibrium restored for a while.

No such measures, however, can restore the finances of a growing country to a healthy condition any more than cutting off strips from the ends of the legs to let in as gussets into the seat, is calculated to place the trousers of the growing boy in a permanently satisfactory condition. He is bound to outgrow them, and the country is bound to outgrow the existing revenue, snip and patch, botch and tinker as you will.

The only source from which you can derive that large increase of revenue which the empire must have hereafter if it is to continue to flourish, or even exist, is the land; and from the land this increase is not to be got so long as throughout wide provinces all classes of agriculturists are crippled by poverty and debt.

No one can doubt the sincerity and earnestness which make this extract so mournfully eloquent. Pity is it that Mr. Hume did not say it all before. I have been affirming it, and calling the attention of the Government to it, until sick at heart of my fruitless toil. Here is the true picture, then, of the condition to which British rule has reduced the noblest dependency a nation was ever permitted to possess; and this picture is painted, not by the "*melancholy pessimist*" of THE STATESMAN, but by the Civilian Secretary of the Department of Agriculture, now that his office is abolished. A crucial proof of what our rule is, is to be found in the little province of Mysore. With but 5,000,000 of inhabitants, and a square mile of water to every fifteen square miles of land, Mysore has become, under our Civilian rule of the last fifty years, an epitome of what

all India is becoming; and the all-important question is—the remedy.

To hope that the people will ever be redeemed from their misery by the bureaucracy which has produced it, is to hope for the impossible. I would steadily diminish the strength of this body, and gradually substitute an educated Native Civil Service for the officials by whom we are attempting to administer the affairs of a people from whose social life they are separated by an impassable gulf. I would contract steadily the area of our direct rule, and divest ourselves wherever we could of everything but the military supremacy of the country. Thus we ought to hail the opportunity that gives Mysore back to the young Rajah coming of age, and stamp out the opposition there is in India to the transfer. In the same way, the Berars should go back to their rightful owner, the Nizam. I would extend the jurisdiction of every well-governed Native State in the country, forming new treaties with them, readjusting their tributes, and dividing the Imperial pecuniary responsibilities amongst them. I would reward conspicuous Native merit by the creation of new feudatory States. Thus we might well acknowledge Travancore's admirable rule by extending his borders, and keep steadily in view the policy of retiring from the direct administration of the country. The process could only be gradual, of course; and, simultaneously, I would establish a new governing body of Englishmen in India, side by side with the Civil Service, but with distinct duties.

#### CHANGES IN THE CIVIL SERVICE.

THE special need of India at this moment, is a wisely organized department for administering the land. Our Settlement officers, who are the pick of the present service, and our Forest officers, might be transferred almost in a body to the new department; but it would not do to confine the appointment to these services, nor to put Indian Civilians at its head. The highest statesmanship that England can furnish should be enlisted for its conduct, with a picked staff of men thoroughly familiar with economic and agricultural questions. For it must be remembered that the matters that have to be dealt with are economic rather than agricultural, and that it has been a crude and ill-digested political economy that has been the parent of almost all our errors in India. Thus an implicit belief in "private landlordism" betrayed Lord Cornwallis into the error of the permanent settlement. The same belief is nursed to this day in India, and but

fifteen to eighteen years ago, led the Supreme Government into sanctioning the incredible land settlement of the Central Provinces, with which Sir Richard Temple's name is so disastrously associated. About the same time, Sir Bartle Frere induced the Government of Lord Canning to give away, in blocks of 3,000 to 30,000 acres, the finest tea-lands of Assam, to pure land-jobbers, with a State pledge never to impose a land-tax upon them! A land-tax, he said, was fatal to all agricultural prosperity; and if he had had his way, the land revenue of India would to-day have had no existence. Custom House and Excise duties were to fill the Treasury to overflowing, through the prosperity of the landed classes; while an income-tax and direct house-rate, or licence-taxes, were all preferable to a land-tax. In the same way we were assured that it was altogether barbarous to collect the land-tax *in kind*, and that it must, of course, be paid in money, the trifling consideration being overlooked that there was no money to pay it in. Again, the sacred principle of "freedom of contract," we were loftily told, required us to repeal the ancient usury laws of the country, to leave the wealthy zemindar to enforce what terms he pleased upon the peasant cultivator, and to abandon the ignorant ryot to the tender mercies of the shrewd bania. Sir Bartle Frere positively filled the gaols of Bengal in 1860 with peasant victims of the indigo planter, by a Criminal Contract Act, which he then tried persistently to fasten as a permanent measure upon the Indian Statute-book. The political economy of the Indian bureaucracy has ever been a travesty of what economists really teach. It has culminated in starving millions of the people to death in successive famines, political economy forbidding all interference, they said, of the State with the grain trade. The simplest measures of common sense for the relief of the people have been refused in my time, by the political economy of the bureaucracy. It would be easy indeed to show that it has been the crude, unintelligent application of its supposed principles to a condition of things of which the economist never dreamed, that has been the main cause of the present misery of the people. The counsels of Sir Bartle Frere and Sir Richard Temple in particular, have been an embodiment of what "political economy" has ever been amongst Indian civilians. Cursed with a morbid dread of being thought an inch behind their time, India has been abandoned to them as a *corpus vile* to be experimented upon, until the people are reduced to extremity. We must find the statesmanship and technical ability required for the new department, in England itself.

In view of the special work which Indian Civilians are called to engage in, I do not see how it can be questioned that their training

should be of a very different order from what it now is. The Service is divided into two great branches, known as the Judicial and Revenue. Now, a race of foreigners so alien as ourselves to the social life of the people, can never hope to produce really successful judges in India. The Judicial service should consist almost wholly of Native judges. No English judge should preside in any Court of original jurisdiction. The High Court judges of Calcutta have repeatedly declared in the last few years that our Native officers administer justice with far greater efficiency than English Civilians. It is but natural that it should be so. English appointments, therefore, to the Judicial service should be restricted to the Courts of Appeal or Review. Candidates for the Indian Civil Service should be required to make their election of this branch of the Service before they go up for competition. The subjects in which they are examined should have a direct bearing upon the duties to be assigned to them in India. For the Revenue, or Executive branch, the present curriculum—which may be described generally as that of exact scholarship and learning—I think, is a mistake altogether. Exact scholarship and the higher mathematics, if not altogether thrown away in the Executive appointments of the Indian Service, are certainly not the special qualifications so much needed therein, and which are nearly lost sight of. What we want in an Indian collector, first of all, is that he should be a thorough business man. Now, much scholarship generally unfits a man for such work as a collector has ordinarily to discharge, rather than qualifies him for it. The great work of the collectors in India is that of administering the land, with magisterial powers added thereto, and his education should be such as to give him special preparation for this work. Instead of inciting him to concentrate his powers upon Greek and Latin, and the higher mathematics, his education should undoubtedly be modern. He should be thoroughly grounded in the natural sciences, should have a knowledge of practical and scientific agriculture, should be something of an engineer and economist, and so familiar with the modern European languages that he should turn from choice to modern scientific literature and research, instead of to the classics, for the cultivation of himself through life. To send a young Civilian to India with tastes for nothing but classical literature or the higher mathematics, which is what we seem to aim at, is to do our best to unfit him for the special work to which his life will have to be devoted. On the other hand, let him go to India full of interest in the discoveries of modern science and their bearing upon the welfare and advancement of society, and he will find himself well equipped for the problems in the treatment and solution of which his life has to be passed. I

believe it to be almost wasted time that is given to high scholarship and to such studies as Sanskrit and the higher mathematics. We prescribe a curriculum of studies for the Indian Civil Service that would necessarily lead an uninformed person to suppose that we were educating a body of professors, instead of collectors of revenue. A Civilian who knows but little Greek or Latin, and nothing of Sanskrit or the higher mathematics, may make an admirable collector; but the Civilian who knows nothing of agriculture, nothing of chemistry, nothing of trade and manufactures, nothing of engineering, nothing of social science or political economy, nothing of the great controversies of modern times in which the progress and well-being of the nations are bound up, cannot possibly make a good collector. He will be deaf and blind and dumb, let his scholarship be what it may. We have never yet formed a just conception of what our Indian administrators should be. Thus their acquaintance, as scholars, with the languages of the country is of far less moment than their perfect mastery of the colloquial in which the common people express themselves; while such a knowledge of French and German as should open to them the storehouse of literature in those languages would be worth Greek, Latin, and mathematics to them ten times over.

In a word, what we want in India for successful administrators are thorough business men—the men who would be likely to succeed as engineers, agriculturists, manufacturers, merchants, contractors. We train the young Civilian at present precisely as if we intended to make a professor of him, instead of an energetic, pushing man of business, who has to be the leader of a multitude of poor who will look up to him as their patron and guide. The results of our error are manifest on all hands. We have a “Service” that takes but the most perfunctory interest in its work, and generation after generation of which passes away without ever discerning the wants, the possibilities, or the teachings of the position. Holding these views, and seeing clearly our present failure, I would change the whole curriculum of study for the Indian Civil Service. Every young competition-wallah should make his election for the Judicial or Revenue branch of the Service at fifteen or sixteen years of age, and then direct his studies accordingly. Let the prescribed curriculum be what it may for the Judicial service—and I am not sure that we should not do away with the branch altogether—the education of the collector and magistrate should be directed to making him an accomplished gentleman farmer, junior partner in a great foreign mercantile house, or a great manufacturing firm, in which a knowledge of modern art and science is indispensable.

to marked success. We want, in a word, men of high business capacity for trades and professions in India, where we are searching for premature scholarship and precocity in high mathematics.

The English public have been so long accustomed to hear nothing but laudations of the "blessings of British rule" in India that I can well understand, of course, the difficulty with which they will receive my own humiliating exposition of its results. The few Natives of India who visit England, come to it either in very early life for a professional education, or as merchants, and as the latter, they belong to the class whom our rule has proverbially benefited. Very few of these gentlemen have any knowledge of the Mofussil of India, or of the comparative merits of British and Native rule. Born and brought up in the great Presidency towns, they see English rule only under its most favourable aspects. Thus, neither the Native students in our Inns of Court, nor Native merchants who reside in London, are able to enlighten English opinion as to the broad, general effects of our rule in India. They meet moreover with more or less kindly hospitality in London, and are too ready, in return, to swell the chorus of praise in our favour. A notable exception now and again arises, in the person of a Dadabhoj Nowrojee, who insists fearlessly on unpleasant truths; or a Lal Mohun Ghose comes to England on a mission that is semi-articulate only, but the true meaning of which is—that there is wide-spread disaffection to our rule amongst the educated Native classes, of whom he is the almost youthful representative. The Anglo-Indian newspapers have little authority in England, and so widely reflect, unfortunately, the views and prejudices of the dominant race, that very little exact information as to the general effects of our rule is to be found in their columns. The administrative reports of the Government of India conceal everything that the nation ought specially to know, and be made aware of. It would be idle, of course, to expect that these reports should ever depict administrative failures in any but very subdued colouring. As a rule, they are pure *couleur de rose*, from one decade to another; while Executive wrong-doing and injustice are never heard of therein at all.

There are agencies moreover at work, to actively deceive the people of England, as to what our rule and its results really are. There are Anglo-Indian newspapers for instance, notably the *Pioneer* of Allahabad, conducted with but one purpose, namely to rescue from the reprobation of home opinion, official proceedings that do not bear to be truthfully reviewed. It is from a few exceptional men in the Civil Service itself, that the truth about India is ever told in this

country at all, while the number is "legion" who are engaged in supplying the *Times*, the *Daily Telegraph*, the *Saturday Review*, and the magazines, with apologetic and laudatory articles about our rule, the subtle falsehood of which is almost incredible. Parliament and the Ministry, and sometimes the India Office itself, are thus kept in ignorance of the true character of our proceedings in India, and the task of enlightenment becomes one almost of despair.

It is these facts that invest with so much importance the admissions which occasionally find their way into print in this country, from the pen of men like Mr. Pedder, ex-Secretary to the Bombay Government, and now Secretary in the India Office; Mr. Allan Hume, ex-Secretary of the Government of India in the Department of Revenue, Agriculture, and Commerce; and Mr. H. P. Malet, ex-member of the Bombay Council.

The mournful fact is, that wherever our *direct* rule has gone in India, the longer or shorter period of illusive prosperity that commonly attends its introduction, has ended in the pauperization of the people. No more favourable conditions for the success of our rule could possibly have been asked for than those which attended its introduction into Mysore; while it has proved a deadly blight upon the province. The secret of our failure is not far to seek. We are committed to an unjust, selfish, and hopeless system; while our eyes are blinded to the fact, by our interest in the maintenance of things as they are. The case of Mysore is a crucial one, and we cannot concentrate attention upon it too closely, for the Indian bureaucracy have ruled Mysore just as they willed. Every advantage that it was possible to give them, or possible for them to seize, they have had. There has been no interference of any kind with them to hamper their action, while they have had the singular advantage (in India) of being able to retain the entire revenues of the province for expenditure within its own borders. The Imperial Treasury at Calcutta, which drains the revenues of our own provinces away from them, to defray our vast military expenditure and Home charges, together £30,000,000 a year, has made no claim upon Mysore. The province pays simply a tribute of £200,000 a year to the Treasury; the remainder of its revenues is all its own, and has been spent within its own borders. And now, after fifty years of an administration free from all impediments and hindrances whatever, and with profound peace throughout the period, and after filling the province with highly paid English officials, and excluding Native gentlemen from the service of their own country as incompetent, this astonishing bureaucracy has contrived to starve to death in the last four years 1,250,000



of the people, by their own admission, out of a population of but 5,000,000. They have run the Treasury simultaneously £1,000,000 sterling into debt, and, if report speak truly, have permitted one-third of the State jewels to be made away with, no one knows how or by whom. Now here plainly is an opportunity of seeing what our present rule, under the most favourable circumstances, can accomplish. It is absolutely impotent for good; selfish to the last degree of immorality; fatal beyond expression to the people. The Government of India, in its resolution on the subject, admits that the late dreadful sufferings of the people were brought about by its failure to "understand the phenomena" of the famine. Every one else understood the phenomena; the Government alone could not. After starving to death a full fourth of the population, *with the province full of highly paid English officers*, we are about to hand the territory over to its young native Prince, with £1,000,000 of debt tied round his neck. This is Civilian government, with every advantage it could ask for. Can we wonder at the condition of our own provinces under a rule like this, a rule weighted in our case with the heavy exactions we make upon the people's industry?

## HOME AND FOREIGN AFFAIRS.

NEVER since the present Government took office has the political outlook been so unsatisfactory as it is at present. Danger and difficulty are gathering around us on every side; so true is it that the evil that men do, lives after them. For it is the seed sown by the late Government which is producing this disastrous harvest, although it cannot be denied, we fear, that our present rulers are responsible for much that is occurring at present. Where, as yet, the action of the Government has been wholly without blame, is in their endeavour to obtain the execution of the unfulfilled clauses of the Treaty of Berlin. The utter shamelessness of the organs of Jingoism, and the ignorance of those who read these journals, could not receive a more striking demonstration than in their comments upon the Eastern policy of the present Government. It is their own Treaty which Mr. Gladstone and his colleagues have been endeavouring to get carried into effect; and this, according to these honest and patriotic journals, is an act of unspeakable cruelty to the Turks, and of folly so far as "British interests" are concerned. This much-belauded "settlement" of the Eastern Question, the very journals who sang its praises are now not ashamed to confess, was intended to remain a dead letter. From Jingoism, however, one expects to hear neither the voice of honesty nor that of common sense, and it is satisfactory to know that though its powers of vituperation appear to be enhanced by misfortune, it is otherwise impotent.

In expressing our approval of the resolution of Mr. Gladstone and his colleagues to execute the Treaty of Berlin, we must not be understood to express approval of that Treaty. The opposition offered by the late Government to the execution of the Treaty of San Stefano, we never hesitated to stigmatize as a crime of unrelieved blackness. Its immediate effect was that many thousands of Russian soldiers died cruelly of sickness who would otherwise have been restored to their native land, their wives, their children, or their parents. It prolonged a period of anarchy, murder, and turbulence over Macedonia, Thessaly, and the Ottoman Empire generally—and all for nothing. The alterations made in that Treaty by the Berlin Congress were utterly useless to Great Britain, while they had the effect of largely diminishing the area of South-eastern Europe which had been emancipated by the Russian armies. The only good and useful result obtained by the Congress of Berlin was that it established the right of Europe to interfere in the internal concerns of the Ottoman Empire. But the establishment of that right created, of necessity, a corresponding duty. Europe stepped in between victorious Russia and prostrate Turkey, and dictated the terms on which the strife they were waging should cease. Those terms were all in favour of the beaten side. Having compelled Russia to relinquish the enforcement of the San Stefano Treaty, Europe is bound to see that the Porte does not evade the carrying out of the engagements to which it pledged itself at Berlin. But it is also urged onward to this by considerations of expediency not less than by the dictates of honour and good faith. The Ottoman Empire is plainly falling to pieces. Nothing that Europe can either do or abstain from doing will avert that catastrophe; and the only question at issue is, whether the Ottoman

Empire shall be violently shattered into atoms from internal anarchy, or quietly "taken to pieces" under the supervision and regulating control of the Western world. To effect the latter alternative, the concert of Europe is indispensable. So long as all the Great Powers act together in unison, selfish aims and ambitions can find no room in which to operate. Mr. Gladstone and his colleagues discerned this clearly from the beginning, and their policy hitherto has been attended with a success which proves the correctness of their foresight. It is at the present moment menaced by dangers more formidable than any it has previously encountered; but they are dangers which ought to have been foreseen at the outset, and it is to be hoped they were. From the beginning, it was obvious to any one acquainted with the ways of Turkish diplomacy, that the Porte would strive in every way to destroy the European concert, and failing that, would make no concessions of any importance except under actual coercion. This fact had dawned even upon the darkened mind of Sir Henry Layard; so that, for men in general, it may be presumed to have become sun clear. The cession of Dulcigno, which the Liberal journals appear to think, indicates the intention of the Porte to surrender along the whole line, appears to us to indicate an altogether contrary determination. We interpret it as a last effort to break up the European concert, by means which are much more likely to succeed than open insult and defiance. Supposing Dulcigno to be duly given up to the Montenegrins, it appears almost certain that Austria, Germany, and France will take advantage of the opportunity to withdraw from the concert—at least, in so far as direct coercive measures are necessary. Such an act may be of the greatest service or the greatest injury to the policy of our Government in South-eastern Europe, according as it has been foreseen and provided for. It is to be presumed that Mr. Gladstone and his colleagues knew how far they themselves intended to go in compelling the Porte to carry out the mandates of Europe. Nor has it been at any time doubtful that just so far as Great Britain was prepared to go, Russia was prepared to follow. If the European concert has been founded on a recognition of this fact, then the secession of three Powers from active participation in these demonstrations ought to have no other effect than to give greater rapidity and vigour to the action of the two or three which remain. The essential point is, that France, Germany, and Austria should not withdraw their moral sanction and approval of a policy of coercion; and it is not too much to expect from the foresight of Ministers, that before proceeding to press their demands upon the Porte, they made certain of this moral sanction. If they have done so, the cession of Dulcigno (if ceded it be) is an earnest of future success; if not, we fear it will prove the beginning of failure; and what failure means is clear enough.

It was when all hope of effective European intervention had passed away, that Serbia and Montenegro declared war upon the Porte. It was when Europe, following the example of Great Britain, selfishly abdicated its right of interference in the internal affairs of the Ottoman Empire, that Russia declared war against the Porte. We are again in face of a similar combination of circumstances. The populations of the Ottoman Empire are waiting, with arms in their hands, to see if Europe is prepared to do anything for them, or if she, as hitherto, intends to limit herself to verbal remonstrances. Peace and war hang trembling in the scales. If Europe will go on, resolutely and honestly, in a policy of coercion until the Sultan has fulfilled his Berlin engagements, then the peaceable dissolution of the Ottoman Empire is, in all probability, secured; but if the Great Powers shrink, in pusillanimous fear, from fulfilling their duties—if, in the spirit of Cain, they

sak, "Am I my brother's keeper?" and wash their hands, Pilate-like, of this Ottoman Empire, then the war and anarchy which they desire to avert, they will have rendered inevitable. In any event, the Ottoman Empire will be broken to pieces; but the manner of its disruption depends upon the degree of foresight and courage which was possessed by Mr. Gladstone's Cabinet when it set about re-establishing the European concert.

We are still without information as to what policy the Government intend to pursue in relation to Kandahar. The Khyber Pass is to be again made over to the Khyberees; the evacuation of the Kurram Valley is to commence on the 1st of November; the value of the Pisheen Valley is found to have been "greatly overrated" (at least, so the Quetta Correspondent of the *Daily News* informs its readers); so that the only obstacle now remaining to a resumption of the ancient Indian frontier, is the unaccountable weakness and vacillation of the Cabinet respecting Kandahar. The report is that they have given up the matter in despair, and devolved upon the Indian Government the burden and responsibility of coming to a decision. How much of truth there is in this report, we are unable to say. It is, unhappily, but too consistent with the weakness which the Government have hitherto displayed, to be summarily dismissed as unworthy of credence. We heartily hope that it is not true. It must not be forgotten that though Lord Lytton has been removed from the Government of India, that Government remains in other respects almost unchanged. The men who would have to decide on the propriety or otherwise of remaining at Kandahar, would be the very men who throughout abetted Lord Lytton in his evil policy. However, we cannot believe that the present Cabinet has determined to give so severe a shock to the moral sense and confidence of its supporters, as would be the result of a resolution to incorporate Kandahar in the Indian Empire. They have done much to grieve that moral sense and weaken that confidence. The deplorable indulgence meted out to Sir Bartle Frere—an indulgence which has now borne the bitter fruit of a Basuto War—shows that the Cabinet does not participate in that keen sense of disgrace and humiliation which moved the nation at the last General Election, to desire so earnestly to make atonement for the crimes which had been done in its name. But notwithstanding this, and much else of which the Government has been guilty, we cannot believe that such men as Mr. Bright would endure to remain in a Cabinet which sanctioned the annexation of Kandahar. They are too deeply pledged to an opposite policy.

The annexation of Kandahar means nothing less than the collapse and ruin of the Indian Empire within an appreciable time. Merely to keep a British force there during the winter is a policy full of danger and useless costliness. It is quite certain that as soon, as the snow has choked up the Bolan Pass, the Kandahar garrison will be attacked by a combination of Ghilzyes and Douranis; and though in the field we might have no difficulty in repelling the attacks of such a combination, if the leaders had the sagacity to concentrate their endeavours on cutting off supplies, we should, easily enough, be reduced to sore straits. And all the consequent waste of life and treasure would be—for what? For nothing at all, if on the coming of spring we are to withdraw from Afghanistan altogether. It is satisfactory to note that on the policy to be adopted in Afghanistan, the Liberal Press speaks with no uncertain sound. All the Liberal organs are unanimous in demanding a prompt and absolute withdrawal; all are unanimous in condemning the weakness and procrastination of the Government; and if they do not condemn the Cabinet quite so emphatically as we have thought it right to do, the reason is clear enough. They have

not been, as we have been, eye-witnesses of the misery and ruin occasioned by this war. They do not understand, as we do, from personal knowledge, the incalculable dangers of delay. When the war is over, the Government will have still a duty to discharge towards the nation, and we trust that the Liberal Party and the Liberal Press will allow them no rest until that duty has been discharged. It is to ascertain the true history of this war. What the nation has a right to know is the names of those secret advisers who led the late Government into the belief that a campaign in Afghanistan would be no more than an inexpensive military promenade. What the nation has a right to know is the names of those secret advisers who suggested that ridiculous imposition—the “scientific frontier,” which we are now abandoning. In demanding the disclosure of this secret history, we are actuated by no feeling of personal hostility against any of the offenders, but by a strong conviction of what is imperatively demanded for the good of the nation at large. At this very moment, a war is being, we greatly fear, manufactured in Calcutta and Rangoon, having for its objects the deposition of the King of Burmah and the extension of British rule over his territories. Those who are sufficiently familiar with British India to see below the surface of things, have been well aware that the process was begun immediately after the accession of King Theebaw, and that those who entered into the venture, were prompted by the seeming success which had attended the enterprising spirits who had manufactured the war in Afghanistan. The fact is, that however disastrous a war may prove to the nation in general, it is, nearly always, a highly profitable affair to its immediate projectors. In regard to this war in Afghanistan, we believe that the chief military adviser of the Government was Colonel Colley, Lord Lytton's private secretary. As the issue has showed, his forecasts were utterly mistaken. But what does that matter to him? He is none the less rewarded by a knighthood and a governorship, as if he had been a marvel of prescience and accuracy. His advice is found to have been, all through, mischievous and utterly mistaken. None the less has he been honoured and rewarded, as if the nation were profoundly indebted to him and his sagacity. On the remote frontiers of this vast empire of ours, the British people are not aware of how completely they lie at the mercy of a few clever and ambitious officers, who see their way to distinction and emoluments in a pushing and aggressive policy, laden with heavy charges and sore affliction to the nation as a whole. The only way to check this manufacture of distant wars is pitilessly to expose the processes by which they have been got up. If the Government is anxious to remain at peace with independent Burmah, a very effectual means for securing that end would be to disclose the part played in getting up the war in Afghanistan by the officers who advised it. (So called) irresponsible advisers would be much more chary of their advice if they knew that, in case of failure, they could not escape under the cloak of secrecy.

The war that has broken out in Basutoland is, as we have already said, the natural fruit of the indulgence shown by the present Government to the unscrupulous and incapable Sir Bartle Frere. Had they but recalled this official immediately upon their coming into power, it is highly probable that the disarmament policy which has goaded the Basutos into revolt, would never have been pushed to extremes. But they allowed Sir Bartle Frere to remain just long enough for the consummation of this crowning act of tyranny and folly. In the incidents immediately preceding the outbreak of war, we see everywhere indications of the same blindness, the same incapacity which, with most inadequate preparations, plunged us into the Zulu War. At first, Mr. Sprigg and

his satellites were assured that the Basutos would not dare to rebel; then they were equally confident that if they did rebel, the Cape Government was in possession of military means more than sufficient promptly to quell all opposition. Both forecasts have proved equally and signally untrue. The Basutos have rebelled, and the Cape forces immediately disposable, so far from being able to get the better of the outbreak, are themselves beleaguered, and in considerable danger of destruction. The detachment shut up in Mafeteng are eking out a precarious living by eating their horses; while at Maseru, the whole town having been destroyed, Colonel Bayley and 500 men are shut up in the fort. Should either of these detachments be cut off, the event will be the signal for the Pondos, the Tambookies, and other tribes to ally themselves with the Basutos. Even assuming that the worst does not happen, this war against the Basutos is a grievous calamity, because of the great progress in civilization and industry, which this tribe had made. The destruction of the Basutos involves the uprooting of the beginnings of a healthy civilization among the native races of Southern Africa. All we can hope now is that the Government will not lack the courage to adhere to its resolution of taking no active part in this war. Cruel on the surface as such a policy may appear, it is, in truth, a policy fraught with as much humanity to the colonists as to the Kaffirs. Nothing can be more debasing to the character of a people than the privilege of having its wars carried on by deputy. It is a state of things which encourages vindictive and despotic tendencies, while it destroys the manly virtues of independence and self-reliance, as well as the love of justice.

Turning to Home affairs, we must not omit to record the fact that Jingoism uttered its last dying maledictions about a fortnight ago, in the Knightsbridge Barracks. It had been advertised in the newspapers, that these maledictions would be repeated, on the following evening, at the Cannon Street Hotel; but the effort was more than Jingoism, in its present reduced and attenuated condition, was capable of; and when the reporters reached the Hotel, they learned that Jingoism had become speechless, and that in consequence, the meeting was "postponed."

"So fades, so languishes, grows dim and dies,  
All that this world is proud of."

It was a singular stroke of retributive justice which caused Jingoism to select the Knightsbridge Riding School as the scene of its unhonoured exit from the world. There, as our readers will remember, Jingoism attained its culminating height of glory, and amid the plaudits of a host of Jingos, "intoxicated," if ever men were, "by the exuberance of their own verbosity," a certain "sophistical rhetorician" was held up to ridicule, as a discredited and played-out politician. There they met to lavish eulogies on the men who had framed the Treaty of Berlin. Now they assembled to utter maledictions upon the "sophistical rhetorician" for attempting to execute their own much-belauded Treaty. It is seldom that a political party thus spontaneously adopts the humour of the excellent Dogberry and insists upon writing itself down an ass.

In Ireland, the rejection of the Compensation for Disturbance Bill has produced the results which every man of common sense predicted that it would. The agitators have seized upon the fact as an unquestionable proof that the Irish people can expect no concessions from a Parliament sitting in London, which are not extracted from it under the influence of fear. The removal of the Catholic disabilities was carried by Sir Robert Peel and the Duke of Wellington because the alternative was civil war; it was Fenianism which

rendered the disestablishment of the Irish Church possible, and the other reforms carried by Mr. Gladstone during [his preceding tenure of office. It is all well enough for people not suffering from the grievances which require to be redressed, to denounce the violence of those who do suffer from them, to treat them to mitigate their clamour, to have confidence in the good wishes of the Government, and so forth; but such exhortations will not be listened to and rightly so. The instant that the urgency of the demand ceases, or is mitigated, the class whose exclusive privileges are threatened, point to this quietude as a proof that no reform is either called for, or is expedient. The present troubled state of Ireland is, without doubt, greatly facilitating the way to a large and radical change in the conditions under which land is held in that unhappy country. It is useless that we English people should exclaim against the lawlessness of the Irish people, and the occasional acts of savagery into which individuals among them are betrayed. This lawlessness and these acts are the consequences, not of Irish, but of English lawlessness and English severity. The Irish people do not respect what we are pleased to call "the law of the land," because for hundreds of years that law has been framed in the interests of a class, and not of the Irish people. If an Irishman here and there is to be found who shoots an unpopular landlord, before we condemn the entire people for the crime of the individual it would be well to look back upon the dreary record of evictions. A landlord who, by an arbitrary eviction, turns a whole family out on the road-side to starve, though his action may be styled legal, is guilty of as great a crime, in the eye of conscience, as that of landlord-shooting itself. There is no charm in the term "legal," which can change the nature of an action. We earnestly hope that the Government will not be betrayed, by the existing clamour and excitement, into the adoption of any one-sided measures. If they feel it necessary to demand additional powers from Parliament for the preservation of peace in Ireland, we trust that such restraining measures will be made to operate equally all round. If the right of public meeting be prohibited, if the Habeas Corpus Act be suspended, it will be the duty of the Government to place executive checks upon the landlords' summary power of eviction. Unless they have the courage to do this, they will, assuredly, find that Irish discontent will only become more intense and more embittered, because deprived of the safety-valve of free expression. To proclaim a state of siege in Ireland, while preserving to the landlords the fulness of their powers, would be to imitate the practice of those humane vivisectioners who administer to the animals they are cutting to pieces, drugs which stifle their cries without mitigating their sufferings.

The secession of Mr. Stopford Brooke from the Established Church, is a domestic incident of sufficient importance to merit a reference in even so brief a summary of current events as this. It may be the first decided indication of a movement that shall revolutionize the religious life of the nation. For ourselves, we heartily applaud his determination to leave the Church, and, not less so, that of not entering any other religious denomination. We should not be sorry if all the Liberal clergy of the Establishment saw their way to doing what he has done. We have no fear that either Christianity, or the religious life, is about to become extinct; but it cannot be denied that the form in which Christianity shall be presented to the present age stands in imperative need of recasting. And this can never be done satisfactorily by men speaking as members of any of the existing religious sects, for the simple reason that they are hampered and encumbered by the past history of those sects. All existing Churches and sects have built themselves up on a false

foundation. Christianity, if it be anything more than articulated air, is the discovery of a spiritual power to elevate both the individual and society to higher and higher levels of moral and intellectual life. But the manner in which this spiritual power works, the Churches have tried to express in a series of verbal propositions, and then, instead of paying homage to the power, they have fallen down and worshipped the propositions. As the ages go by, and knowledge increases, it becomes altogether impossible to reconcile these propositions with the new lights which are continually rising above man's spiritual horizon. And yet they continue to be held as representative of the existing convictions of the Church or sect, to which they appertain. It is this circumstance which paralyzes the efforts of the Liberal clergy to reconcile the new with the old. An incredulous world replies, scoffingly, "Rome I know, and Anglicanism I know; but who are ye? Is this faith which you are talking about the same that I find written in the Thirty-nine Articles? Because if it is, there is no use in your trying to juggle me into accepting it. And if it be not, what right have you to stand up in the pulpits of the Establishment?" The Liberal clergy, however much they may protest the opposite, cannot but feel the difficulties of their position. Theirs is a divided duty—the duty which they owe to truth, as truth presents itself to their reason and conscience; and the duty they owe to the religious body to which they happen to belong. A great deal of intellectual energy is wasted in the endeavour to reconcile these two duties; while in the conclusions they desire to enforce there is, too often, a vagueness of statement which betrays a mind divided against itself.

If Christianity is destined again to assume an ascendancy over the reason and conscience of the West, it must go forth divested of that dogmatic panoply in which Ecclesiasticism has encased it. But this cannot be unless those Christian teachers who have ceased to believe in the utility of the panoply, have the courage also to cease from encasing themselves in it, as though it were a veritable armour of Achilles. At the present moment, it seems to us that in the regions of scepticism nothing is more powerful to check the progress of Christianity, than the existence of the various Christian bodies. Modern scepticism is a rejection of the religious tenets officially professed by these religious bodies; and until Christianity is presented to it in some new and independent form, modern scepticism will, like the Levite of old, pass by on the other side. It does not believe that men can serve Christ for naught, but only for livings, stalls, deaneries, bishoprics, and similar rewards.

### *Postscript.*

#### THE LATEST NEWS FROM AFGHANISTAN.

CHAOS is once more dominant in Northern Afghanistan. The "institution" which the Government of India set up there at the cost of the slaughter of Maiwand and the ignominy of the events which succeeded, has been toppled over as soon as our supporting hand was withdrawn. Abd-al-Rahman Khan—if he still possesses his life when these lines are published—has nothing else which he can call his own in Kabul and the territory around it. The readers of this journal are aware that we have never ceased to protest against the deplorable mistake committed by the present Government in recognizing Abd-al-Rahman Khan as Ameer; that we have, even to weariness, insisted upon the speedy and utter failure of their policy.



We take to ourselves no credit for this seeming prescience. Prescience, indeed, is too grand a name to give to our anticipations, for they were written, sun-clear, upon the existing facts of the situation in Afghanistan. Forty years of assiduous and increasing labour have Shere Ali and his father devoted to the building up of such law and order as prevailed in Afghanistan. This labour of forty years we wantonly destroyed, and then with the most ridiculous arrogance imagined that from the anarchy we had occasioned, we could evolve a new and better order by the simple expedient of issuing proclamations declaring that we actually had done so. Assuredly the ways of professional and practical politicians are past finding out. They stumble at noon-day. They appear to have a positive predilection for falling into open ditches. They delight in hoisting themselves with their own petards. The one thing they sedulously avoid to do, is to walk out of an untenable position by the simplest and straightest way.

Northern Afghanistan having relapsed into chaos and hostility, the question of what we are to do with Kandahar becomes more pressing than ever. Having accurately foreseen every new development in this disastrous war, there is, of course, not the smallest chance of the Government paying any heed to counsels of ours. Nevertheless, we shall thrust them upon them. The right thing to do is to immediately withdraw our troops from all Afghanistan, and leave the Afghans in entire liberty to arrange matters for themselves. If this be done, there will be no civil war in Afghanistan. Abd-al-Rahman Khan, supposing him not to be killed, will withdraw to Turkestan, where probably he will be able to maintain himself.

In Afghanistan proper, there is now but a single party—the Yakoub Faction, headed and represented by his brother, Eyoub Khan. If only our troops were out of the country, Eyoub Khan would be recognized without resistance throughout the country, as lieutenant for his brother, until the British Government had liberated him. And there is no reason why we should hesitate to do this. Yakoub, it is now universally admitted, was free from all complicity in the attack upon the English Residency, and his restoration to the Ameer'ship would do more than anything else to mollify the hostility with which the Afghans will, of necessity, regard us for many a long year.

If, however, as is most probable, the Government lack the courage to get out of an untenable position in the simplest and straightest way; if they insist, for the sake of *prestige* or similar nonsense, upon holding Kandahar during the winter, it will be well that they clearly understand what is needed for the carrying out of such a policy. It cannot be questioned that the fall of Abd-al-Rahman Khan renders an attack upon the Kandahar garrison an event all but certain. We have no garrison in Khelat-i-Ghilzai. Consequently, there is nothing to prevent Mahommed Jan, at the head of twenty or thirty thousand men, coming down into the Kandahar districts, and cutting off all supplies. Simultaneously with such a movement, it is highly probable that Eyoub Khan will march across the desert, and throw himself across our communications by way of Khelat and the Bolan Pass. To guard against this danger, it is imperative that a reserve force of no less than ten thousand men, supplied with transport sufficient to enable them to move anywhere at a moment's notice, should be at once concentrated at Quetta. At Quetta, we say, for if the winter be a severe one, the Bolan Pass will be rendered impassable. All this will add another five or ten millions to the cost of the war. The mistake of Mr. Gladstone's Cabinet all through, has been its failure to reverse the policy of its predecessors, with the emphasis begotten of the conviction that it was immoral throughout.



# The Statesman.

No. V.—OCTOBER, 1880.

## Correspondence.

### IMPEACHMENT OF THE EX-MINISTRY.

TO THE EDITOR OF "THE STATESMAN."

SIR,—I can scarcely express the satisfaction with which I read in the August and September numbers of *THE STATESMAN* your urgent and powerful appeal for the impeachment of the ex-Premier and Foreign Minister; and I earnestly hope that the appeal will be responded to by the independent press and the people.

It is obvious that until the crimes involved in the Afghan and Zulu Wars have brought on their perpetrators a reasonable amount of punishment, and the criminals are degraded instead of being rewarded with honours, the country will not be safe against disasters and disgrace such as those which have marked the history of the last three years.

To speak of continuity with regard to a policy which has been so strongly condemned by the Liberal opposition and by the country, is a sign of pusillanimity which augurs ill for the immediate future, and for the Cabinet which holds such language.

The *Dundee Advertiser*, about the 20th August, called for Lord Lytton being put on his trial. To begin with such a measure would defeat the end in view, as the Viceroy was but a tool in the hands of the chief criminals, and these would stick at nothing to defend him, knowing that they were really defending themselves.

D. C.

### THE LATE SESSIONS.

TO THE EDITOR OF "THE STATESMAN."

SIR,—The opposition which Mr. Gladstone and his colleagues sustained throughout the Session just closed, was, I think, largely attributable to their ignorance of the strength and direction of the popular feeling which placed them

in power. They seemed throughout to be trying to act as if the last General Election were merely an ordinary General Election which transferred political power from one party to another. What they call the "principle of continuity" in English politics was, according to them, to remain unaffected by the verdict of the constituencies; in other words, the crimes committed by the former Ministry in the name of the British nation were not to be acknowledged as crimes; the victims of our wrong-doing were to obtain no redress for the injuries we had done them; there was to be no reversal of policy whatever: only the old policy was to be carried out by a different set of men. The "principle of continuity" in politics either means this, or nothing at all. Neither Mr. Gladstone nor his colleagues ventured to defend the proposal to place a statue of the Prince Imperial in Westminster Abbey. Their argument was that the desecration having been sanctioned so many months before, it would be a "breach of continuity" to reverse that sanction now. So it always is with professional politicians. They erect around themselves a wall of verbal fictions, behind which the facts of existence become almost absolutely lost to them. What torrents of blood have been shed, what immeasurable suffering has been inflicted upon humanity in order to preserve what was known as "the balance of power!" The political sagacity of Lord Beaconsfield's "sovereigns and statesmen" went on for centuries, reasoning in this sagacious fashion: "Without a 'balance of power' war would be perpetual; we must, therefore, war perpetually in order to preserve the 'balance of power.'" In place of the "balance of power" we have now the "principle of continuity" as our rock of salvation. As soon as the Ministry were in office it was, as Lord Hartington with frank cynicism informed the diners at the Devonshire Club, "no longer necessary or expedient to raise popular enthusiasm, or to encourage popular excitement." The purport of such enthusiasm was not, it seems, to impress a nobler and more elevated morality upon the politics of the Empire, but merely to thrust Lord Beaconsfield from office, and put Mr. Gladstone or Lord Hartington in his place. So much having been done, everything had been done, and all that remained to be accomplished was to quench the popular enthusiasm. This unwise course has discredited them both with friends and enemies, and has not been attended with much success otherwise. Despite its manifest reluctance, the Government was dragged out of the old political ruts; and where it declined to follow its supporters, its supporters went on their way without it. Witness the triumph of Sir Wilfrid Lawson's Local Option Resolution, and again that of the Resolution of Mr. Briggs. Both victories were popular protests against the official theory that a nation's affairs are to be regulated, not by the people themselves, but by a certain select caste—Lord Beaconsfield's "sovereigns and statesmen." And in the Bradlaugh incident, the introduction of the Hares and Rabbits Bill, and the Compensation for Disturbance Bill, we may discern the beginnings of a movement which will revolutionize the constitution of society in Great Britain. The first forebodes the annulling, at no very distant date, of the connection between Church and State; the others the emancipation of the rural population from the chains of feudalism.

Nor has the Government distinguished itself by its skilful conduct of business in the House of Commons. The opposition through which the Compensation Bill had to fight its way was the Government's own doing, and grew mainly out of Mr. Forster's inveterate love of trimming. The retention of Sir Bartle Frere, as we learned on the authority of Mr. Grant Duff, was due to no worthier cause than a fear of what the Conservatives would have said had he been summarily degraded. No clearer evidence can be imagined than such an explanation as

this, to show how utterly the Cabinet failed to appreciate the significance of the General Election. In Afghanistan, the policy dictated alike by morality and expediency was as clear and unmistakable as the sun at midday. You have set forth that policy more than once in your pages, but I do not hesitate to recur to it. Not a week passes without furnishing facts in abundance to testify to its soundness, and the incalculable dangers of any other (so-called) "settlement." There is no boast more common amongst us, than that which ascribes our possession of India to the excellence of our moral character. Like most of our Indian boasts, no man acquainted with the facts can listen to this without a blush at the invincible self-righteousness of the British Pharisees. There is, however, a kernel of truth in this false and vainglorious vaunting, and that is that nothing would do so much to strengthen our rule in India as an act of disinterested and generous righteousness. It is because our rule has been sordid, selfish, and false, that it is at this moment in actual danger of subversion; subversion, I repeat, not from external aggression, but from internal weakness and corruption. The thinking Natives of India have lost all faith in our integrity and honour, and the bazaars are full of stories, the belief in which is a danger to the stability of the Empire. The desire of the Ministry almost seemed to be to impress upon the minds of both friends and enemies, that there is no resemblance between Ministers when in office and the same men when in opposition. In saying so much I do not mean that men like Mr. Gladstone and Mr. Bright are capable of breaking pledges into which they have formally entered: but that they failed to discern the meaning of the last General Election. The discerning historian of the future will regard it as among the most memorable periods of our island's history. For three long years the nation had tasted the bitterness of degradation; and in the reaction from this humiliated state, they rose, as it were, at a single bound from the low-lying levels of diplomatic finesse and "British interests" to "the shining table-lands where God himself is moon and sun." The nation rose to this height. The Ministers alone could not.

O.

### THE OPIUM QUESTION.

TO THE EDITOR OF "THE STATESMAN."

SIR,—Reading over the extract from my article which you reprint on page 303 of THE STATESMAN, I regret the use of the words "blind and wicked fanaticism." They were not given as a quotation, but as the impression produced on my mind by your somewhat severe censures. I am glad to hear you do not think so badly of the other agitators against the opium trade, whatever be your opinion of myself, and frankly withdraw the objectionable phrase. I cannot, however, refrain from reminding you that you use strong language at times, instances of which I see in the scathing expressions, "British Pharisees," and the "ignorance of this phenomenal Pharisee," applied, in this very connection, to somebody who does not know as much as you do, or does not altogether agree with your views. These condemnatory epithets are more recent than my use of the phrase to which you demur; but if you will turn to your letter in the July STATESMAN, you will find there the lines, "The danger is that India will be defrauded to appease the conscience of you sinners;" and again, "You will only commit a gigantic fraud upon the people of India." This was to be the upshot of our agitation. Never-

theless, you did not mean that the agitators are "blind and wicked fanatics." Therefore, I should not have said so. I apologize, and will be more careful in future.

But a truce to these personalities. Let it be understood on both sides that "Brutus is an honourable man," and that we discuss not motives nor temper, but facts. I should not, indeed, trouble you with these few words of explanation but that I have to point out that you have fallen into an error of fact, of some considerable importance. You have attributed to me a purpose which I abhor, and that in extracting from, and commenting on, an article written to advocate the very opposite of that purpose, you say : —

We could respect an agitation willing to pay 3d. in the £ for conscience' sake ; but we have no respect for the cheap morality that stipulates that the 3d. shall be laid upon the Hindus. It was not so that the nation redeemed itself from the stain of slavery, and if this anti-opium agitation is to command respect, it must fight shy of such advocates as the *Friend of China*.

This is a very strange blunder. Lord Hartington accused the assailants of the opium revenue of "cheap morality." I write, in reply, that we are not open to the charge, because we advocate that Great Britain, not India, shall pay the cost of the suppression of the opium trade. You represent me as saying the precise contrary ! Let me once more set before you the fundamental principle of the Society for the Suppression of the Opium Trade, embodied in our prospectuses five years ago. Here it is, cut out from the very article you were commenting upon :—

*It is for the British nation to determine whether it will consent to reign in India by the ruin of China. The people who willingly paid £20,000,000 sterling to liberate the slaves can free themselves from the opium disgrace if they will. The poor ryots of India must not suffer for the faults of the British Government and people. We must do justice to China, and, if money is required, pay the bill of costs ourselves.*

Never for one moment has the *Friend of China* swerved from this principle, and if it were possible that the principles of the Society should change, the present Editor would at once resign his office.

You may, perhaps, think that the words, "Who ought to pay the cost, Great Britain or India?" India, undoubtedly, *if she could*," are, at least, an excuse for your grave misrepresentation. I can hardly admit it; and if you turn to the article and read it over, I hope you will make the excuse. Those words were used to shut out the, as I believe, absurd notion that India has a natural and inherent right either to the opium revenue, or to be a burden on the British taxpayer. My ground for making Great Britain pay is plainly stated. "The one simple reason is this—India cannot bear any additional burden of taxation." I point out that "Indian financial reform will require years of peace, and a tremendous struggle with its bureaucracy, before expenditure can be cut down to the limits of India's ability." And I go on to say: "Meantime, we have in the opium trade a present wrong done to a foreign country, to extinguish which, since India cannot, we must pay. And there is a retributive justice in the cost falling on us. Great Britain, not India, waged the opium war, and that not in the interests of India, but in those of British commerce. Great Britain, not India, now forces China to receive opium. Ours is the sin, be ours the repentance and the reparation." With these sentences before your eyes, you ought not to have attributed

to me an intention to tax India for the abolition of the opium trade. I rely on your sense of fairness for the appearance of this letter in your pages.

You and I ought to be allies, not opponents. Why are we not? There is not a measure of justice to India which I am not prepared to support—which I do not support as I have opportunity; and the alliance has no obstacle except your own unhappy alienation from our cause—an alienation which, I am persuaded, cannot endure, because I believe you to be too honest a man long to continue under the influence of the prejudice which now, excuse me for saying so, seems to me to obscure your judgment.

Yours faithfully,

THE EDITOR OF THE "FRIEND OF CHINA."

*Note.*—We are glad to receive this letter, and accept it without further comment, upon the statement that "India ought to find the means of filling up the gulf which the abandonment of the revenue would open," as the writer practically accepts our contention that it is a question of English ways and means, and not Indian. We are obliged to say once more, however, that the opium revenue seems to us to differ in no essential respect whatever from the revenue which England derives from spirits or tobacco; and that while the Chinese Government, whether through insincerity or weakness, permits opium to be openly grown and manufactured in its own provinces, and upon such a scale as to threaten the eventual extinction of the imported drug, the demand that we should forcibly suppress the impost, as an act of good neighbourhood, cannot be sustained. Until the Chinese Government shows that it is in earnest, by prohibiting the home growth and manufacture of the drug, its appeal to other nations to forbear producing it is, we think, absurd.—ED.

## EDITORIAL NOTES.

THE Indian Civil Service never produced a purer or more noble character than James Cruickshank Geddes, whose untimely death a few months ago, was reported in the Calcutta newspapers. An enthusiastic disciple of the Positivist philosophy, Mr. Geddes was an earnest exponent of what have ever been our own views upon the true character of our relations with India. Dr. Congreve, with whom Mr. Geddes was, we believe, connected by marriage, pays a graceful tribute to his memory, in his serial of 23rd June last. In common with the late Sir George Wingate and ourselves, Mr. Geddes held our exaction of the Home charges from India, to a large extent, to be distinctly immoral. Dr. Congreve writes :—

In a letter to me, dated January 8, 1879, he says : "The Famine Commission drifts. I boldly advocated the transfer of the Home charges to English shoulders. At first Cunningham, the President, was impatient. Both he and Elliott, the Secretary, alluded to my invectives against the Government. I said, the use of phrases of that kind, and the attitude of mind which led to such phrases, put discussion out of the question. I had prudently written beforehand, that I had no wish to be questioned or not to be questioned, and so at the interviews I had some advantage. Then they said they had no wish—far from it—to brush aside my views with a phrase."

In a later letter (June 9 and 10, 1879) Mr. Geddes says : "I am very pleased to hear that you are considering whether it would not be well to advocate England's assumption of the 'Home' charges for which at present she draws on India. The subject should not be urged on your consideration unless it were sufficiently remote from the temporary questions and from mere politics. The question for you is whether this measure, as a concrete *example* of what you enjoin as righteousness, is fair enough and reasonable enough to be advocated by the priesthood and quasi-priesthood, supposing the clergy, theologic and other, were equal to their mission. I think this is one of the large and complex questions which, in virtue of their very complexity, call for an indication of the general principles, subordinate details being left to the men of action."

The Famine Commission, if we may judge from ourselves, deliberately evaded where they decently could, the examination of witnesses who would have urged unpleasant truths upon them. Their business was to persuade the nation that no one was to blame for the mortality that attended the famine in Southern India and in the North-west Provinces in 1877 and 1878.

As to the Opium revenue, Dr. Congreve holds, with ourselves, that it is not an Indian, but an English question :—

The feeling of this country becomes constantly more hostile to the opium trade. That trade yields for the purposes of the Indian Government from £7,000,000 to £8,000,000 a year. India herself is too poor to supply the loss which the suppression of the trade occasions. For its own purposes England holds and insists on holding India. It is but reasonable that England should pay for that privilege or burden, to the complete abandonment of the indirect method of extorting the money from China at the expense of that country's best interests, or

of the more direct method of wringing it from the poverty-stricken populations of her great dependency.

The italics are ours, and we use them to give point to the truth which they convey. Writers about India are constantly parading the fiction that we hold and administer India for the sake of its people. We hold it, and ever have held it, for our own purposes; while we hide the fact from ourselves with an ingenuity which all the resources of a self-love that is infinite can devise to keep the pretence in countenance.

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How is it that the Positivists show so much deeper a sense of what international morality requires of us, as a people, than multitudes of so-called Christian men, and even our Anglican clergymen? It will be a lasting reproach to many of the English clergy in particular, that they evinced the strongest sympathy throughout, with the conduct of the late Government towards other nations. To this hour we find large numbers of the Anglican clergy completely insensible to the guilt of the Afghan and Zulu Wars. Their influence at the elections was strenuously exerted to maintain in power, the men by whom the nation was betrayed into the committal of these crimes. The Dissenting and Presbyterian clergymen, Evangelicals to a man, saw and felt the national shame keenly; while the Evangelical clergy of the English Church, as a class, were ready to condone any conduct whatever in a Minister who had bribed them with a Public Worship Regulation Act, as an instrument of persecution, and flattered their sense of importance by his use of the patronage in the hands of the Crown. Of the whole bench of Bishops there were but three, if we remember rightly, and let us name them to their honour,—the Bishops of Manchester, Oxford, and Exeter,—who found one word to say in condemnation of the Ministerial course; the Archbishop of Canterbury and his colleagues never opening their lips to remind the nation of those sanctions by which the Divine law bids us “do unto others as we would they should do unto us.” They left it to the Positivists, and to a minority of the High Church clergy, to the Dissenting and Presbyterian ministers, to awaken the nation to a sense of the wrong-doing to which it was committed; and but yesterday tacitly gave their whole moral support in the Lords to the defeat of the Ministerial effort to check the oppressions of the landlords in Ireland. It is conduct of this order, steadily noted by observant and reflecting men, that fills them with abhorrence of a State clergy, and gives its real strength to the agitation for the Disestablishment of the Church. There must be something fatally wrong in an arrangement which results in this debauching of the clergy, and in making them active instruments in guiding the nation in wrong paths.

ONE of the morning papers (*Daily News*) calls attention to the fact that unlike the Commons, the Peers have never been reformed. The composition of the House has undergone great changes since Henry VII.'s first Parliament, when the Wars of the Roses had so reduced the number of the Barons that the Lords Spiritual were about equal in number to the Lords Temporal.

By an Act of the Long Parliament, passed in 1641, the Bishops were deprived of their seats in the Upper House, which they regained, however [under the Nell Gwynne Defender of the Faith.—Ed. S.] in 1660. Frequent motions for relieving the Bishops of their Parliamentary duties have been made during the last half-century in the House of Commons, but invariably defeated. In no other country is the ecclesiastical element so strongly represented in the Legislature as in England.



There can be no doubt whatever, it seems to ourselves, that the practical programme for advanced Liberals, at this moment, is a united demand for the exclusion of the Bishops from the House of Lords. Attribute it to what we may, their influence upon the legislation of the country is a distinctly evil one, and has ever been so. They are always generations behind their time, building the sepulchres of the prophets whom their predecessors slew. You find the entire Bench right to-day, upon the burning questions of *last* century. And if they are allowed to remain where they are, it will not be till next century, that they discern what "right and wrong" mean in the great issues of to-day. They occupy a false and unwholesome position altogether, and the Liberal party should fashion their programme, both of State and Church reform, to this one practical issue.

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A CORRESPONDENT of the *Times of India* writes to that journal from Cabul:—

No one who is intimately acquainted with Afghan politics can doubt that had Shêre Ali been treated with more judgment, frankness, and consideration, he would have acceded to the requests of the Government, and that the Afghan War would have been unnecessary. But when to the most wavering uncertainty and disingenuous diplomacy, was added a Political Agent whose want of tact and hasty temper were so notorious as that of Sir Lewis Pelly, how could arrangements do otherwise than break down? The whole question of Afghan politics depends in an unusual degree upon individual management, and there is no reason why the Ameer of the time should not by proper influence be brought to be a valuable ally of the British Government. Only a short time before Sir Louis Cavagnari left for Cabul on his last and fatal expedition, it is understood that he declared the war was absolutely unnecessary and unjustified, that it was possible for any man of intelligence and real tact, and who understood the Afghan character, to have won from Sirdar Nur Mahomed Khan at Peshawur the concessions which the Government wanted.

But the writer forgets that Sir Lewis Pelly was precisely the officer that was wanted to address the Envoy in the terms in which Lord Lytton's instructions were couched. Those instructions were drafted for the purpose of being read to the Envoy, and in them Sir Lewis Pelly was ordered to tell him that Russia was anxious to come to terms with us for appropriating Shere Ali's territory, and that his master could not understand too soon, that he was only "an earthen pipkin between two iron pots" and would be shivered to pieces if he dared to resist the Viceregal will. Sir Lewis Pelly was the very instrument to select for this false and disgraceful communication, as it would certainly lose nothing in passing through his hands.

Is there to be no Parliamentary inquiry into these proceedings? The authors and their instruments are all well enough known. Sir Louis Cavagnari, we have been assured, was innocent of all complicity therein, and so certainly was Mr. Lepel Griffin. Sir Lewis Pelly, Sir Pomeroy Colley—who has been rewarded with the Governorship of Natal for the leading part he played therein—Sir John Strachey, and Mr. A. C. Lyall, the Foreign Secretary, were, we believe, Lord Lytton's main instruments in a crime that will cost the nation £40,000,000 sterling before its history is closed, and that has shaken our rule of India to its very foundations. Mr. Aitchison was removed from the Foreign Secretaryship because he would not participate in the crime, Mr. A. C. Lyall being ready to do what Mr. Aitchison would not. Our Agent at Khelat, Sir Hugh Sandeman, stigmatized the proceedings throughout as they deserved to be. If this new

Parliament should finally condone what has been done, and make no inquiry into the facts, it will grossly betray the interests in its keeping. We believe that it will not condone what has been done, but expose and punish its authors for a crime the wantonness of which was perfectly well known to them, and the issues of which have been so fatal.

At the meeting of the executive of the National Reform Union, of 14th ultimo, the following resolution was unanimously passed :—

That this executive, remembering the emphatic verdict of the constituencies last April, whereby a Tory Ministry, distinguished as much for its neglect of domestic legislation as for its mischievous interference in foreign politics, was compelled to make way for a Liberal Government pledged to carry out reforms long demanded and imperatively needed for the welfare of the country, offers its heartiest congratulations to Mr. Gladstone and his colleagues on the important legislative successes which have already distinguished their career in office, and at the same time tenders to them, and to those earnest members of the Liberal party who have supported them, their sincerest thanks for the courage, energy, and perseverance which they displayed in the face of factious and unprincipled opposition in the House of Commons; and this executive further thanks the Government for having stood so firmly by their measures, and for having refused to allow them to be mutilated and rendered abortive by the "amendments" of the Upper House; and this meeting hereby declares that the Government has rightly understood the wishes of the people in regard to the legislation they desired, and that the sympathies of the people are entirely in accord with the Government.

The error which the Ministry made from the beginning was one that is begotten of the inextricable blending together of our political and social life. The interests of the nation demanded that the new Ministry should take up an attitude of stern reprobation towards the whole course of their predecessors. If ever men deserved impeachment, the leaders of the ex-Ministry did. The temper of the nation called for an attitude towards them, under which the Opposition in both Houses would have cowered. But such an attitude was impossible under the present conditions of social and political life, and it is useless to shut our eyes to the fact. How could Earl Granville, for instance, in the House of Lords, avow sternly that the conduct of the Marquis of Salisbury and the Earl of Beaconsfield had been of an order that would necessitate his colleagues advising Her Majesty to remove their names from the Privy Council? That they ought to be so removed is certain, but the intimacies of social life have long since reduced politics amongst us, to the level of an amusement. The thought that by condescending to engage therein, any responsibility of such an order as "impeachment," might attend the game, however recklessly played, would be regarded in these days as a social outrage. Impeachment belongs to an era of political earnestness, leading to divisions in society of the sharpest order, and is wholly alien to the euphuistic *dilettanti* officialism of the nineteenth century, in which earnestness is bad form, and responsibility to the nation means less than the responsibility of one's partner at the Whist-table. Whether it is destined to last or to pass away, we cannot say.

It is a very nice disclosure certainly, with which the Report of the Select Committee surprises the country as to the true character of the Metropolitan Water Bill that the late Government tried to rush through the Commons. No one will suppose Sir Richard Cross to be corrupt, but short of that charge it is impossible

to speak in terms too severe of his Bill. We reproduce a passage or two from the Report. First, as to the millions that were to be paid to the Water companies as compensation for their loss of increased profits in the future, the committee say :—

The calculation of increments on which the agreements proceeded was founded on the assumption that all the items of receipt would grow at a greater rate in the future than in the past; that the number and the value of the houses and the rate of the rentals would perpetually augment; but that, on the other hand, the growth of capital expenditure which has hitherto been required in order to earn an increased income would sink almost to nothing and might be discarded from the calculation. This does not appear to be a sound basis of a financial estimate for the future.

That is the euphuistic official way of telling us that the arrangement was monstrous. The Report proceeds :—

As a general rule, the market value of stocks of this description affords the best estimate, not only of their present, but of their prospective value. The expectation of future improvement is an element which always enters into the consideration of the market value. It was, indeed, suggested that, in the case of the water companies, their affairs were not sufficiently well known to the public to enable a complete judgment of their value to be formed, and that their future expectations were not sufficiently estimated. But during the past six months every possible light has been cast upon their affairs, and yet their market value is at the present time, with a complete knowledge of their condition, still some millions below the price which was payable under these agreements. The value of the shares rose immensely on the disclosure of the terms of the agreements; they fell as soon as it was considered doubtful whether the agreements would be sanctioned; but at no time did they ever rise to the full value which would have been due to them if the agreements had been carried into effect. It is obvious, therefore, that the judgment of the public, as evidenced by the market price, coincides with the opinion of the Corporation of London and the Metropolitan Board, viz., that the price offered in the agreements is greatly beyond the estimated value of the property.

We do Sir Richard Cross, and some other of the ex-Ministers, the justice to believe that this exposure will honestly distress and surprise them. They belong to what emphatically is the stupid party; and we charitably believe that it was stupidity and not jobbery that led them to submit such proposals to the House. The Report is a very scathing document. The committee observe that the total cost of the existing water supply to the metropolis has not much exceeded £12,000,000, a considerable portion of which may be attributed to works which have become useless or have been reduplicated. And they point out that it would become the duty of the Metropolitan water authority when constituted carefully to consider, with the professional assistance which will be at their disposal, whether a new and better supply could not be obtained at a cost greatly less than the sum which would have had to be paid, under the agreements, for the existing supply. Now the Bill which the ex-Ministry would fain have rushed through the House, proposed to pay the companies the very moderate sum of £33,000,000 only. But then these admirable custodians of the national purse held that the Companies had a right to "back dividends," whatever that may mean, from their origin :—

The companies claim the right still further to increase their rates in proportion to the growth in the value of houses, and this right would have no legal relation to the augmentation in the quantity or improvement in quality of the water supplied. If the companies were limited in the amount of dividend they could earn, as was contemplated by the Water Works Act, 1847, there might be some reasonable restraint on their power to enhance their charges

against the consumer. But the companies assert their right under the title of back dividends to escape from any such limit. Indeed, their right to do so is made one of the grounds for demanding so large a price from the public for the purchase of their undertakings. The calculations on which the agreements were founded, proceeded, to a considerable extent, on the assumption that the claim of the companies to back dividends was established. In the evidence of Mr. Smith, the possible amount of such dividends is estimated at nearly £20,000,000. The counsel for the companies contended before the committee that the right to such dividends might be carried back to the origin of the company, which accounts for the astounding figures given in the case of the New River Company of £15,000,000 as the amount of back dividend. The counsel for the Corporation and the Metropolitan Board of Works maintained, on the other hand, that no question of back dividend could arise till the Act which introduced a limit came into force. Without pronouncing an opinion on the legal point, your committee must observe that if the contention of the companies is well founded the population of the metropolis and its suburbs, amounting to 4,000,000 people, would be left at the mercy of certain trading companies, armed with the power of raising the price of one of the first necessities of life to an extent, practically, without any limit; a situation from which the companies seem to consider there is no escape, except in the purchase of their undertakings, at such a price as they may be willing to accept. If that were the only remedy, the consequences to the consumer of the improvident legislation of the past would be indeed intolerable. But Parliament is not unequal to redress such mischiefs to the public interests.

We have a very fair illustration in this Water Bill, of the sort of Government from which the nation has at last been delivered. If not "jobbers" they were "idiots;" and we prefer, for the national character, to believe them to have been too stupid to understand the true nature of the Bill brought in by them.

WE sometimes wonder how long it will be before we awake as a people to the fact that in our dealings with other nations the principle that we should "do unto others as we would that they should do unto us," is not merely an embodiment of the counsels of expediency, but the only statesmanship that is worth the name. Suppose some other nation, at the instigation of a Disraeli, had invaded this country in overwhelming force, and, without provocation of any kind, carried fire and sword throughout the land, perpetrating, in fact, the same cruel and bloody outrages upon us, that we have now twice over perpetrated upon the Afghans; and suppose that the conduct of the man who had wantonly and deliberately made this war upon us, had so offended the consciences of his own countrymen that they had driven him from power, and placed at their head, for the guidance of the nation, men who abhorred the conduct into which it had been betrayed under his temporary and almost accidental ascendancy,—what should we reasonably have expected that the new leaders of the nation, men with a deep sense of honour and religion, would do in such circumstances? Should we have thought it possible that while professing with their lips their abhorrence of the crime committed by their predecessors, they would gravely set up a fiction which they called "the principle of continuity," and assure us that we must really submit to the violence and cruelty heaped upon us, because their own *prestige* as a people would suffer, if they attempted to make reparation or atonement for the crime? We must, they told us, submit, whether we liked it or not, to the exclusion of our royal family from the throne, acquiesce in the loss of the territory that had been wrested from us by our aggressors as "a scientific frontier," and agree that the Scotch nation, and perhaps the Irish and Welsh, should be made independent of us, and placed under new dynasties, to prevent our ever gathering strength again as a people. And there are those who really think that the right way out of

Afghanistan is to consolidate the wrong we have done its miserable people, and hold them down with the point of the bayonet until they acquiesce in it! Can we persuade ourselves that there is innocence in persevering in a crime where every principle of right-dealing demands that we should undo the crime with all the emphasis we can? England longs for a rule that would show the world what the just guidance of a people means—a rule impregnated with the belief that it is righteousness that exalteth a nation.

We have administered Mysore in trust for its Princes for the last fifty years, filled it with highly-paid Englishmen, and excluded the people, as we do everywhere, from all positions of influence therein, though it is a purely Native State. And now that our Civilian officials are about to have its administration forced out of their hands, they will hand it over to the young Prince with a million of debt upon his shoulders, after starving one and a quarter millions of his people out of five millions, to death. The blight is clear enough here, we should imagine. Had the province been under Native rule, and shown these results, the Simlah Foreign Office would have declared the only remedy to be "annexation" and Civilian rule. If India is to be redeemed from its present dreadful condition, it will be by circumscribing our direct rule wherever it is possible, and substituting Native rule in its place. The account we have to give as "trustees" of this little province, is—that there is a million of debt upon it, and a fourth of the people dead from hunger.

A NATIVE gentleman writes to us from Madras: "The subject that engages the attention of the people is the Afghan War. You have earned the gratitude of India for your endeavours to show the English public that this unjust war was undertaken only to satisfy warlike propensities. Even had a scientific frontier been secured thereby, and Russian influence in Central Asia greatly checked, the advantages would be nothing compared with the waste of human life, the enormous expenditure which will be thrown on this poor country, the disorder and confusion among the tribes of Afghanistan, who were ruled as one nation by Shere Ali, the hastening on of a collision between Russia and England, and the estrangement of the people of India from English rule by their being burdened with a war undertaken for such purposes. The late Ministry committed a series of blunders, and, in the space of six years, managed to undo what Bentinck, Canning, and Northbrook did for this great empire. While famine unprecedented in our annals was raging in Southern India, the Empress of India was proclaimed with foolish pomp at Delhi; the Vernacular Press Act was imposed upon us; Manchester merchants were benefited at our expense; and the Arms Act passed to show that the Government had no faith in our good will. The License Tax imposed for preventing famines, was used for an unjust war declared against a neighbouring country."

THE exigencies of space do not permit us this month to do full justice to the persecution of the most eminent of Indian statesmen, the Nawab Salar Jung. We have not, for example, as yet touched upon that singular episode, the expulsion from Hyderabad, in 1877, of the Minister's Private Secretary, Mr. Oliphant. We are anxious to explain that we have not taken up this deplorable case merely

with a view to revive the Nizam's claim to the restoration of his Berar provinces, but with the more urgent object of calling public attention to the retrogressive and deteriorating influence over the administration of the Nizam's dominions that is now exercised by means of British domination, applied with the sole object of suppressing that claim, which cannot be justly refused, and cannot be truthfully disputed.

MR. BROUGH SMYTH, who has returned from India within the last month, is understood to have brought with him reports concerning the gold fields of Southern India of a somewhat sensational character. Remembering how important it is to the people of India that we should lighten the burden of our Home charges upon their industry, and that the State is the great owner of the soil, we might have hoped that the Government would long ere this have ascertained for itself beyond cavil what the true value of these ancient gold fields has become, under modern processes for extracting the metal from the soils in which it is imbedded. Mr. Smyth's "prospecting" has been confined, we believe, to the Wynaad district, an elevated plateau of land lying midway between the Neilgherry hills and the Malabar coast. The gold fields of Mysore are declared greatly to exceed those of the Wynaad in richness of yield, and it is in the Colar, district of Mysore, we believe, that the Madras Gold Mining Company (Arbuthnot and Co.) and the Mysore Gold Company have opened their "workings." The mining rights in the whole of this Colar district have been leased, with doubtful propriety, we should think, to a body of private *concessionaires*, under whose "grants" these Companies are "working." A recent prospectus of the Colar Gold Mining Company tells us that "from accounts and reports submitted to the *concessionaires* 17 tons of stone raised (on the Ooregum block) from a depth of about 80 feet, and treated (with machinery not of the best), yielded 40½ ounces of gold, and again from a different though adjacent lode 9 tons gave 27½ ounces." If these reports are reliable, and gold is really to be obtained from the quartz in these quantities by the modern processes of crushing, the value of these fields must be enormous. It is a proof, we think, of the apathy with which we administer India, that the Government shows no adequate sign of being conscious of what these reports mean. If these reports are reliable, instead of conceding "mining rights" at nominal rates to private parties, the State itself should work the mines in the interest of the people, and realize its Home charges, or a part of them, if possible, in this way. The attention of the Government cannot be too soon directed to this subject. Under the ascendancy of Sir Bartle Frere, the Government of Lord Canning, twenty years ago, alienated in perpetuity to a body of mere land-jobbers, the finest tea lands in Assam at nominal prices, with a pledge never to impose a land-tax upon them! The same folly will be repeated with these gold fields, apparently, from sheer want of insight into what their discovery means. The facts should be ascertained beyond dispute, and private concessions stopped instantly, if the workings are found to be as valuable as they are now declared to be, as the State should work them.

## PARLIAMENTARY REFORM.—IV.

### REDISTRIBUTION OF SEATS IN SCOTLAND AND IRELAND.

LET it once be conceded that the very essence of Representative Government, whether elected by a universal suffrage or by a class suffrage or selected, as the real governing body is in England, by one great leader, is its representation of the life and needs of the whole people, then it follows without question that no reform is more urgently needed for the attainment of mere consistency in our much-boasted British Constitution than a measure for the Redistribution of Seats. It is perhaps indeed a melancholy fact that the aforesaid premiss, which is the very basis of a good government of any kind whatsoever, is by no means commonly conceded. If it were, we should not hear so many people laying claims to larger representation for various grades of the governed according to scales of property, taxation, education, and what not. It is true that the controversy usually rages, and has for well nigh a century raged, on a false issue, not on the question what representation means and who are to be represented, but on the question who is to choose the representatives. And so widespread is this fallacy, that few seem ever to stop and think that a proper division of the representation among the population might effect more for the due influence of the whole people in the Legislature than any mere extension of the suffrage. Meantime the tyranny of cunning oligarchs, of whom not a few still exist even in these latter days, works its will silently, and, throwing a sop here and there to the blind hungry masses, as it did in 1867, nay even in 1832, laughs in its sleeve at the poor mistaken attempts to depose it and set a more nationally beneficial body of rulers in its place. But the fallacy will be exposed, and huge crying masses of the population, with pressing needs never reflected in the House by their one or two overworked representatives, will raise their voices and demand a remedy. And from that remedy we venture to predict that eventually all class-prejudices, all selfish considerations of property or taxation will have to be rejected, and a revised

constitution framed, which will be the true, equal, and complete mirror of the progressive needs of the whole nation or nations.

It was necessary to recapitulate this premiss, in which all can equally agree, whether of a monarchic, aristocratic, or republican faith, provided they but admit the elementary principle, as old as Aristotle, that the welfare of the whole people and not only of a class is the object of good government. How intimately this principle affects the question under present consideration, will be clear to all who have observed the common arguments used by controversialists in favour of the existing unequal division of representation. Our space is too limited to review these at any length; but, to take an instance, very much stress has in recent years been laid on a small table of figures, best, if not first, summarized in a Return made at request of Mr. Maclaren on March 26, 1872. And as one of the countries now under discussion is largely affected by the view taken of the matter, it may be as well to reproduce the tabulation of facts in an abbreviated form sufficient to carry their meaning. The return was made before the actual results of the census of 1871 were known, but the estimates made of populations were very nearly exact. Assuming 658 as the number of members for all three divisions of the United Kingdom, the proportions were found to be as follows:—

Due :	On Population.	On Revenue.	On Mean of both.	Actual.
England .....	476	514	494	493
Scotland .....	70	79	75	60
Ireland .....	112	65	80	105
	<u>658</u>	<u>658</u>	<u>658</u>	<u>658</u>

\* It will be observed that England has not much defence for the present proportions of representation, unless Revenue be made a distinct plea; that if that plea be allowed, Scotland is much wronged and Ireland vastly favoured. This will explain to many minds why there is a special desire on the part of England to prevent the question assuming the simple and just basis which it must eventually assume. Nothing can be more monstrous than to make poverty a bar to the claims of a people to a fair political hearing; and for England to do so in the case of Ireland is to heap bitter insult upon past injury, since Ireland was, without question, driven into poverty by tyrannical and selfish commercial restrictions, which actually helped to make England more rich in her monopoly. We do not wish to stir up this bitter question here, as it can only tend to obscure the general principle on which, apart from particular case, we stand. It is well, however, now while the misery



and discontent of the sister-country are her chief trouble in administration, that England should remember the past, and no more be tempted to commit any similar injustice, to which, as a summary means of avoiding Irish disturbance in Parliament, a few unscrupulous politicians have already pointed.

Apart, however, from this grievous particular case, we contend that the pure essence of representative Government forbids all reference to the Revenue contributed by various portions of the governed. The poor portion requires to be seen and heard as fully as the rich. Once admit the opposite, and you at once render all measures mere class measures, and legislation is only applied to the unrepresented classes when they cause inconvenience or danger to those represented. Without members to reflect the lives and needs of the classes in question, not only would such measures as the new Employer's Liability Bill, and Hares and Rabbits Bill be impossible, but even such important and radical measures as the Factory Acts would be framed with so little knowledge of facts as to render them worse than useless. Now, we have as yet only begun of late years to legislate about social and industrial matters affecting the poorer classes (the Poor Laws always excepted), in a serious and unprejudiced manner, and anyone who knows but a little of the Legislature and its members, knows that the most earnest and honest of them much desire some means of seeing and hearing those classes more truly in both Houses. As this spirit grows, and we trust we are right in assuming its growth, it will crush the false notion that Taxation or Property should form limits to due representation, and no more will be heard of iniquitous desires to stifle the cries of a people by refusing her a fair number of mouth-pieces.

What we have said is sufficient protest against any attempt in the coming Redistribution Bill to reduce the number of the Irish members, and we can now proceed to the detailed discussion of the proper division of seats in Ireland and Scotland.

On the return above quoted, it will be observed that on population Scotland has a claim to ten additional seats. The population due to each member of the present House of 652, if the whole United Kingdom be comprised in the consideration, is 48,288. With the existing division of seats, each Scotch member represents on the average 56,000, each Irish 52,538, and each English or Welsh 46,466. The difference is so considerable as to require at least some improvement, and though it seems impossible to rob England and Wales of any members, and undesirable to increase the House by any considerable increase of seats, the latter

alternative should be adopted in preference to the continuation of a state which looks very unfair, and often results very unfairly to the sister countries we have drawn into Union. This relative rectification between the three countries is not, however, the most important point; it is surpassed in gravity by the internal re-arrangement of seats, and if this latter point can be attained in the measure soon to be brought before the country, the former point should be postponed rather than allowed to impede the progress of the necessary measure.

With regard to the internal division of the Scotch seats, it is probable that on a first glance at a Parliamentary map most men would be astounded at the vague masses of straggling and utterly disconnected District boroughs. What reasons can have influenced the minds which planned these districts it is difficult, in most of the cases, for any rational man to conceive. The only excuse for their existence is the undoubted difficulty of giving representation to the few towns of importance so wide apart, in barren, thinly-populated counties; but it ought to be a first axiom of division of seats, that the places allotted to one member should have, if possible, some topographical and industrial connection, for he will otherwise be much disabled in reflecting them duly; and to this axiom even the separate political individuality of small towns should be, without hesitation, sacrificed, if no other course be possible.

This dispersion of the District boroughs in many counties has made the fair tabulation of each county separately, which could be so lucidly effected in the case of England and Wales, impossible for Scotland. Hence the annexed table—though it gives the figures for each county separately, by including the whole of a district of boroughs in that county in which its nominal chief is situate—is divided into groups as small as the complex connection of the counties by their boroughs would allow. This table of itself should form ocular demonstration of the necessity for a proper simplification of the system, since, it shows, by the size of the groups, how intricately the District boroughs are mixed with various counties. The order we shall follow in revising the Scotch seats in detail, is (with the exception of Bute, displaced by the necessary grouping) that taken in the Census return for 1871, made to Parliament in 1872, from which all the figures have been carefully collated into the best harmony possible in a mere abstract of so vast a system. In suggesting the changes necessary in a redistribution, the law that “interests” and “needs” and “intelligence” vary directly as the density of population, with the modification imported by the special monotony of agricultural interests, has been carefully kept in view,

though it has not seemed practicable to pursue the principle to its full limits in all cases. The order followed in the Census, as here, is such that a zigzag line, starting from the north will pass through every county southward. Populations are put in brackets in thousands. It seems clearly equitable to assume the same standard for both Scotland and Ireland, of population requisite to form a seat; this is in exact figures, 48,288. As in the case of England and Wales, it has been assumed that, some arbitrary sub-division of the country being necessary, the old historical division into counties is best preserved. There is no doubt that equalization of electoral districts might be much more perfectly carried out by an entirely new sub-division; but there are many weighty reasons against such an innovation, and any attempt to introduce it would be sure to wreck a Bill among members not enough impressed with its advantages to overcome their attachment to boundaries which have existed for centuries. It has also been assumed, as before, that the distinction between county and borough representation cannot be subverted, and that their merger is, for the present at least, however much it would facilitate a good redistribution, not feasible. With these few simple premises in view, let us proceed.

Orkney (31) and Shetland (32), though their combined population is beyond the standard, are adequately represented in their quiet life by one member. Of the rest of the group in which the Wick boroughs are situated, Caithness (40) and Sutherland (24) are excessively represented; while Ross and Cromarty (81) almost requires two (instead of one) members. Either the boroughs should be merged in their various counties (and this course, considering their very small size and slight importance, is not so objectionable as might be supposed), and an additional member given to Ross and Cromarty; or Caithness and Sutherland (which, in view of the recent development of the latter, seems undesirable) should be merged under one member, or (Caithness being preserved sole) Sutherland and Ross and Cromarty under two, and the District of boroughs maintained, Wick (8) remaining the leader, and Thurso (3.6) and Stornoway (2.5) being added to enlarge it, and put the last two places on the same level of importance as the lesser Dornoch (0.6) and Tain (1.7). Fortrose (0.9) should also be removed from Inverness to Wick district. In the next group, Aberdeen (245) requires an addition of three seats on its total population. Aberdeen (88) should have two members; the two divisions of the county remain as now, and a new district under one member be formed, comprising Peterhead (8.5), Kintore (0.6), Inverury (2.8), Fraserburgh (4.2), Huntly (3.5), Turriff (2.2), and Pitsligo, (2.2), of which the first three

are now in Elgin district, and the remainder wholly unrepresented. Then Inverness and Elgin districts, comprising Inverness (14.4), Forres (3.9), Nairn (3.7), Elgin (7.3), Cullen (2), and Banff (7.4), with Lossiemouth (2.6), Buckie (3.8), and Keith (3.5) added, should be amalgamated under one member. The representation of the three counties of Inverness, Nairn and Elgin, and Banff might then rest unaltered.

The next group, consisting of only Kincardine (35) and Forfar, is fairly represented. Dundee (119) is rather in excess of standard for two seats, and is a growing place of vast activity, but it is perhaps within the grasp of two members as yet, unless the 1881 census show a great increase. The Montrose district may remain as it is, though perhaps Broughty Ferry (6), Kirriemuir (4), Carnoustie (3), and Coupar Angus (2) have a fair claim to admission, the second-named especially being an active little linen district.

Perth (128) comes next, and is also rather large for two seats, but being of no special activity, need not be changed. The county should be relieved by the combination of Auchterarder (3), Crieff (4), and Alyth (2) with Perth (26), which now stands sole.

Our next group is the most important, as well as the most intricate in the country. We will take each county and try to simplify the districts within their limits. *Fife* (161) is adequately represented by three members, but the county seat numbers 98,000 under one member, while the two districts of St. Andrews (18) and Kirkcaldy (26) each have a member, two of the towns in the county, Dumfermline (15) and Inverkeithing (2), being excluded from it and put in Stirling district. These two districts ought to be combined under one member, Leslie (4) a spinning and bleaching centre being added, and the member so gained given to the county. There are several other little places over 2,000, but they have scarcely any important claim to be added to the district. *Kinross and Clackmannan* (31) are scarcely deserving of a whole member to themselves, but they could not well be merged in any of the surrounding counties. They and Kincardine show that perfect equalization could only be attained by an altogether new arrangement of boundaries for the purpose. *Stirling* (98) now has one county seat and the chiefs of two district seats, Stirling and Falkirk. These should be cut off from their external connections and combined with the other active little manufacturing centres to form a district consisting of Stirling (14), Falkirk (12), Kilsyth (5), Grangemouth (3), Bannockburn (3), Denny (4), and Lennoxton (4). This could be well served by one member; the county would retain its one, and the third go to help outside. *Dumbartonshire* (53) must be left

without change, and the town of Dumbarton (11), which is now most absurdly placed in the Kilmarnock district, treated as a twin sister of Greenock or Portglasgow as shown below. *Argyllshire* is more difficult to dispose; and we must either acquiesce in the annexation of Oban (2), Inverary (1), and Campbeltown (6), to some distant district, or destroy their political individuality. There certainly seems not the least reason why the two former should resist merger in the county; the last of the three is rather important with its collieries, and distilleries, and fisheries, and, if necessary, may be left in union with Ayr as at present. *Renfrewshire* (217) has three members, as it contains Paisley and Greenock, the heads of districts. The arrangement might be improved, and Renfrew preserved to its own county instead of being exiled to Kilmarnock. Greenock (58), Dumbarton (11), Portglasgow (11), Pollokshaws (9), and Johnston (7), should be combined and have two members, taking the fourth due to Renfrewshire; and Paisley (48), with Renfrew (4) and Barrhead (6), should be under one. Or, if preferred, three districts might be formed, the large towns being held sole, and the little ones combined. *Ayrshire* (201), with two District boroughs and two county divisions, is fairly represented, but the divisions (71 and 81) need relief, and the districts rearrangement. The external elements of them have been dealt with above. A Kilmarnock district should be formed in the Northern division of Kilmarnock (24), Ardrossan (4), Erith (4), Irvine (7), Saltcoats (4), and Stewarton (3); and an Ayr district in the Southern of Ayr (18), Galston (5), Cunnoek (3), Girvan (5), Maybole (4), Muirkirk (3), Newmills (3), Troon (3), and Dalmellington (3), with, if necessary, Argyllshire, Campbeltown (6) added. All these small places are important with collieries, iron works, weaving or shipping, and will grow rapidly. *Lanarkshire* (765) requires an addition of ten members to its miserably inadequate representation, which should consist of fifteen instead of five members. Of these, Glasgow (547), claims eleven, and, as in the case of all vast towns, should be divided into proper electoral districts, each with its member or members. South Lanarkshire would retain one member; North Lanarkshire should have two even after its large population of 181,000 has been reduced by making a district of Airdrie (16), Rutherglen (9), Coatbridge (16), Hamilton (11), Motherwell (7), and Lanark (5), thereby redeeming several exiled towns from alliance with distant Falkirk and Kilmarnock. *Linlithgowshire* (4) needs no change. The town of Linlithgow (3) and Queensferry (1.5) might well be merged in the county, but if they gave any difficulty, could be attached, the former to Falkirk, the latter to Leith or its

present ally Kirkcaldy. This concludes the most complicated group in Scotland, and we venture to think the redistribution can be easily effected in some such manner, and the present unreasonable and ludicrous dispersion of places corrected. Districts of boroughs are in many ways an evil, and the strongest efforts ought most unquestionably to be made in all cases to give them as much and as near connection as possible, to preserve their political coherence and unity.

Buteshire (17) is so small that the right course would be to combine it with Argyllshire (76), which is rather under represented, and give them two members.

Edinburgh (328) requires at least six members—*i.e.*, two additional. Edinburgh itself (197) claims four. The county needs one. Leith District (57) should attach Dalkeith (6).

The next group is far too largely represented, and has, without question, the least claim of any. Haddington (38) and Berwick (36) might well be combined, and allowing for reduction by deduction of district boroughs, not be at all too heavy a burden for one member. Peebles (12), Selkirk (14), Roxburghshire (54), should be combined under two members, as the former are too small and the latter rather large for one. The Haddington district (18) should be amalgamated with the Hawick district (25) under one member, as it forms even then a light burden (39).

The same course should be taken with regard to the last group on our list, the Wigtown District (10) being attached to the Dumfries district (23), and the counties left as they are.

We have now completed our scheme of Redistribution for Scotland. The changes are not nearly so considerable, nor would they be so difficult to make as those suggested in England. Indeed, it will be seen that in Scotland the question is almost solely one of re-arrangement, and not of rival claims as in England, where there are more large towns. The above plan does not disfranchise necessarily a single place, nor does it affect the separate individuality of constituencies in such a new manner as in England, since nearly all the Scotch boroughs are accustomed to vote in districts. It can plead, moreover, the special advantage of bringing into the political life of the boroughs a large number of new places, which, both from their size and their activity, ought to have been long ago set on the same level with other petty and insignificant villages. Of course, the one radical objection which will be raised against the re-arrangement suggested, is that it gives a very large amount of additional power to the populous counties of the two great cities. We have already urged our

reply to this objection, which will certainly have to be fought in England ere long if the representation of the great towns is not to degenerate into a mere mockery of the true principle.

We will now pass on to Ireland. The singleness of the Irish boroughs, and the consequent complete independence of the counties individually, makes the revision of the representation a matter of far greater simplicity than it is in England and Scotland. Indeed, it will not be so much the internal arrangement of Ireland, which will affect her chances in any Redistribution Bill which may be brought in, as the proportion of her seats to those of the sister countries. Still, as everyone already admits, there is every reason for revising the internal distribution, so as to prevent a number of minute Irish boroughs from continuing to be the loopholes by which any ambitious and unscrupulous upstart may creep into Parliament.

Let us proceed in detail in the order of the annexed table—i.e., Connaught, Ulster, Leinster, and Munster. In Connaught the representation is but two-thirds of what it ought to be, that is, eighteen members are due, instead of twelve. *Galway* (248) has one borough with two members, and, like all the Irish counties without exception, has two county members. The county should be divided, and each division should have two members. The borough of *Galway* (20) should attach *Ballinasloe* (4), *Loughrea* (3), and *Tuam* (4), and after that increase is adequately served by one member instead of two. *Leitrim* needs no change. *Mayo* should be divided into two unequal portions, to be represented respectively by two and three members. *Roscommon* claims three members instead of two. *Sligo*, with its disfranchised borough, requires three members, and as there are no towns besides the disgraced one, it is impossible to attempt any Borough District. In leaving Connaught one cannot but feel the melancholy want of enterprise and activity, and the entire lack of industry in the great province, which might under good circumstances have developed as largely as Ulster. To the last-named we now pass on.

*Antrim* (420) needs eight, in lieu of six members. *Lisburn* (9) should be combined with *Belfast* (174), and perhaps *Antrim* (2) added, and the District so formed have four members. *Carrickfergus* (9) should be enlarged by attaching *Ballymoney* (3), *Ballymena* (8), *Larne* (3), all these places being active commercial places, and still return one member. The county itself needs the remaining three. *Armagh* (179) has three, and needs four members. The borough of *Armagh* (9) should be combined with the linen-towns *Lurgan* (11), *Portadown* (7), and return one, the county taking

three. *Cavan* (141) should have three county members, there being no towns of any size as boroughs. *Donegal* (218) is in the same condition, but being a large county should be divided, each half having two members, double the present number. *County Down* (277) requires five instead of four, and should also consist of two divisions with two members each. The present small boroughs of *Newry* (14) and *Downpatrick* (4) should be merged, and after addition of *Banbridge* (5), *Dromore* (3), *Newtownards* (9), and *Holywood* (4), return one member. *Fermanagh* (93) with its petty borough *Euniskillen* (6), must lose one member, and as there are no other towns to join to the latter to form a district, the County should have both members, and the borough suffer merger rather than the evil of such a small constituency be continued. *Londonderry* (174) has its due number, but the petty borough *Coleraine* (6), should be merged in *Londonderry* (25) under one member, the seat so gained being given up to the county, as there are no more towns. *Monaghan* (115) should have three members, there being no towns to form a District. *Tyrone* requires an additional member. *Dungannon* (4) should be increased by the addition of the active *Strabane* (4), *Omagh* (4), *Cookstown* (4), *Stewartstown* (2), and *Newtonstewart* (2), and the county receive a third member; or the petty borough should be sacrificed, and two divisions made of the county, with two members each. This concludes the review of the large province of Ulster.

Leinster, as a whole, is too fully represented, and has to lose five members. In order to effect this, it is necessary to destroy a few boroughs, unless the alternative of leaving them alive, and maintaining an adequate representation for their counties be accepted. It is also necessary to combine certain counties, as is done in Scotland already. *Carlow* (51) and *Wicklow* (78) might be advantageously joined under three members, unless it be held preferable to maintain them separate under one and two members respectively. The petty borough of *Carlow* must be merged in its county. *Dublin* (405) has four, and needs eight members. Of these, the city (268) should have five and the county two, and the third should be given to a district formed of *Kingstown* (16), *Pembroke* (21), and *Blackrock* (8). *Kildare* (89) remains unchanged. *Kilkenny* (109) is really rather small for three members, but the town of *Kilkenny* (16) is too large to be wholly merged; and the county needs two. The only other place over 2,000 is *Callan* (3), which might be joined to the borough. *King's* (76) and *Queen's* (80) would be best amalgamated under three members, the proverbial borough of *Pontarlington* at last meeting with a long-deserved extinction. *Longford*



(64) and *Westmeath* (78) should undergo the same process. The borough of *Athlone* (6), which is contiguous to *West Meath*, should be merged in it. *Louth* (84) would be amply attended by two instead of four members. Of the two, the county claims one, and the present two boroughs of *Dundalk* (11) and *Drogheda* (16), with *Heder* (3), would have a right to the other. *Meath* (95), with two members, needs no change. *Wexford* (132) has to lose one member, which is very justly and advantageously effected by attaching the small borough of *New Ross* (6) to *Wexford* (12) under one member, two being left for the county. In this manner, *Leinster* has been reduced from thirty-four seats to twenty-nine, which are even then a little beyond its due.

*Munster* has a claim to two new members. *Clare* (147) has its right number; but the petty borough of *Ennis* (6) should be merged in the county, as there are no large places to associate with it, and the three members should represent the county. *Cork* (517) has eight, and needs ten. The large county should be divided in three with two, or two with three members each. *Cork* (100) should retain two. The small boroughs of *Mallow* (4) and *Youghal* (6) should be combined, and attach *Macroon* (3), *Fermoy* (8), and *Middleton* (4) under one member; the tenth would be given to the present boroughs of *Kinsale* (7) and *Bandon* (6), combined with *Queenstown* (10), *Dunmanway* (2), *Skibbereen* (4), *Clonakilly* (4), and *Bantry* (3). *Kerry* (196) needs four, instead of three members; the new one should be given to the county, and the borough of *Tralee* (9) should be enlarged by addition of *Killarney* (5), *Dingle* (3), and *Listowel* (2). *Limerick* (92) requires no change, unless as the borough (50) cannot have any towns to enlarge it, it be deprived of one member to lighten the representation of the county. *Tipperary* (216) has only three, and so claims a new one. The borough of *Clonmel* (10) should be enlarged by addition of *Cashel* (5), *Carriek-on-Suir* (8), *Nenagh* (6), *Thurles* (5), *Tipperary* (5), *Roscrea* (3), and *Templemore* (3). *Waterford* (123) has to resign two of its five seats; this can justly be effected by merging *Dungarvan* (7) and *Waterford* (30), and giving them one member instead of three between them.

We are now at the end of the Irish Redistribution. It will be observed throughout that the main changes have been in the substitution of a broader representation for a petty narrow one. It would require argument at some length on the present and past history of the small Irish boroughs, and a considerable amount of personal criticism to prove that these miserable constituencies have been the roots of many most serious evils, not only to the Irish

people, but to the Legislature of the Union. But it may be assumed that most people are conscious of this fact without a detailed proof, and that politicians of all parties would hail the destruction of the chances which those petty seats have offered to all kinds of political adventurers. If some such course as that suggested above were adopted, the evil would be struck at the root. Large constituencies would render the recurrence of the same melancholy, if not ridiculous, phases in Irish politics from year to year impossible; members of higher calibre, and more general reputation and honour, would be chosen; the hindrance offered to ambitious, selfish, and unscrupulous candidates, would be complete in the wider public character of the constituencies, and the result for the people of Ireland would probably be a more rational, steady, and practical representation.

Before leaving our subject, it is necessary to make a brief reference to the history of the Scotch and Irish representation, and, if our space allowed, it would also be desirable to summarize some of the most striking opinions which have been delivered at different times by important authorities.

Scotland, at the Union, received forty-five members, of whom one-third were allotted to the boroughs and two-thirds to the counties. In 1832, eight additional members were given to the boroughs. In 1868 the representation was again increased—to its present limits—seven more seats being conferred by the disfranchisement of English boroughs, on the motion of Mr. Baxter, objecting to an increase of members in the House, and carried against Mr. Disraeli's Government. It will thus be seen that by degrees Scotland has attained a more adequate representation, and it is to be hoped that the consummation of justice to her is not far off, the more, as the charge that her contribution to the united revenue is too small, cannot be brought against her, the fact being that it is, in proportion to representatives, larger than England's.

Ireland received one hundred seats at the Union, which were increased to 105 in 1882 (Cashel and Sligo disfranchised make present 103). In 1868 a partial Redistribution was attempted, but nothing came of it, and the Borough Franchise Bill was passed without any clause affecting the division of seats. The one cardinal fact to be borne in mind in looking at the state of the Irish Representation is, that from the days when Pitt first struggled to produce a change in them, the small boroughs have been the radical evil of the system. In the old days they were at the command of the patron landowners, who subdivided their lands in the way most suitable for influencing boroughs for their nominees; now they are in the hands of adventurers, who diffuse their opinions in any

way most suitable for exciting the populace in their favour. Perhaps the last state of the poor country is even worse than the first; at least, more order was possible under the old system than under the present.

We would now close with a reference to that very remarkable speech of Mr. Pitt's, of April 21, 1800, on the Irish Union, in which occur a few statements, which are of great import to the whole question of Redistribution, and which still apply to present condition of Irish representation. On touching the question of the number of members claimed by Ireland, Mr. Pitt declares it "extremely difficult to find any precise ground upon which to form a correct calculation, or to entertain a positive preference for any specific number of members." Further on, he continues: "*If there be enough to make known the local wants, to state the interests, and convey the sentiments of the part of the Empire they represent, it will produce a degree of security greater than any attempts at theoretical perfection.*" Again, he says: "At the same time, when it is necessary that the number should be fixed, it is necessary to have recourse to some principle, . . . and I am not aware of any more proper than a reference to the *supposed population of the two countries, and to the proposed rate of contribution.*" In this sentence we have a clear admission of the law of needs, and interests, and sentiments, varying with population, especially as following on the previous sentence, and though it is tainted by the mixture of the condition of revenue contribution, against which we have amply protested above, it is a valuable expression of opinion. Yet again, he states: "The plan proposed is, that the members of the counties and of the principal commercial cities, should remain entire. . . . The remaining members are to be selected from those places, which are the most considerable in point of population and wealth."

In the first year of the century these sentences were spoken; shall we see the century set on the inequalities they were aimed at, modified, but in a poor compromising manner, by even the great convulsions of 1832 and 1867? When will the principle of population as stated above be fully admitted in practice by statesmen? Even, if it must be modified by that of contribution, let the mean principle be adopted. Or will the rulers again stand still and defy the waves? If so, let the masses of human life roll on with their roaring voice, on and on till the deaf men hear; and let the unknown and unattended needs of the peoples be driven, in all their naked horrors, from the dark alleys of our mighty cities and the wilderness of our untilled wastes before the unseeing eyes of our careless or

ignorant rulers, and then at last, ere perhaps the floodgates of unremedied evils have been loosened, shall we have the sheep duly numbered for the care of the shepherds, and the shepherds, none overburdened by impossible cares, but all intrusted with definite, unmistakable, and manageable charges in a new order for better progress, for the true welfare of all their people.

## PARLIAMENTARY REFORM STATISTICS.

*N.B.—Populations and Assessments in Thousands. Electors in Hundreds.*

### IRELAND.

County.	BOROUGHES.					COUNTIES AND BOROUGHES IN EACH.								
	No.	Population.	Present M's.	Av. Pop. per M.	Assessments.	M's. due on Assessments.	Electors.	M's. due on Electors.	Total Population.	Present M's.	Av. Population per M.	M's. due on Population.	Add or Deduct.	
CONNAUGHT:—														
Galway .....	1	20	2	10	983	1	62	2	248	4	62	5	+	
Leitrim .....	..	..	..	..	276	..	24	..	95	2	47	2	..	
Mayo .....	..	..	..	..	659	1	32	1	246	2	123	5	+3	
Roscommon .....	..	..	..	..	560	1	37	1	137	2	68	3	+1	
Sligo .....	..	..	..	..	115	..	34	1	115	2	57	3	+1	
Totals.....	1	20	2	10	2,602	3	190	5	841	12	70	18	+6	
ULSTER:—														
Antrim .....	3	192	4	48	3,816	5	337	8	420	6	70	8	+2	
Armagh .....	1	9	1	9	827	1	76	2	179	3	59	4	+1	
Cavan .....	..	..	..	..	543	1	62	2	141	2	70	3	+1	
Donegal .....	..	..	..	..	597	1	47	1	218	2	109	4	+2	
Down .....	2	18	2	9	1,559	2	145	4	277	4	60	5	+1	
Fermanagh .....	1	6	1	6	458	1	52	1	93	3	31	2	..	
Londonderry .....	2	31	2	15	846	1	80	2	174	4	43	4	..	
Monaghan .....	..	..	..	..	545	1	54	1	115	2	57	3	+1	
Tyrone .....	1	4	1	4	698	1	91	2	216	3	72	4	+1	
Totals.....	10	260	11	91	10,089	14	944	23	1,833	20	63	37	+8	
LEINSTER:—														
Carlow .....	1	8	1	8	354	..	25	1	51	3	17	1	-1	
Dublin .....	1	268	2	134	5,828	8	173	5	405	4	101	8	+4	
Kildare .....	..	..	..	..	706	1	28	1	83	2	41	2	..	
Kilkenny .....	1	16	1	16	662	1	55	1	109	3	36	3	..	
King's .....	1	2	1	2	526	1	33	1	76	3	25	1	-1	
Longford .....	..	..	..	..	506	..	26	1	64	2	32	1	-1	
Louth .....	2	27	2	13	626	1	35	1	84	4	21	2	-2	
Meath .....	..	..	..	..	1,066	1	40	1	95	2	47	2	..	
Queen's .....	..	..	..	..	456	1	32	1	80	2	40	1	-1	
Westmeath (including Athlone) .....	1	6	1	6	609	1	38	1	78	3	26	1	-1	
Wexford .....	2	19	2	9	895	1	65	2	132	4	33	3	-1	
Wicklow .....	..	..	..	..	508	1	34	1	78	2	39	1	-1	
Totals.....	9	346	10	34	12,540	17	584	17	1,335	34	39	29	-5	
MUNSTER:—														
Clare .....	1	6	1	6	623	1	56	2	147	3	49	3	..	
Cork .....	5	123	6	20	3,233	5	210	6	517	8	64	10	+2	
Kerry .....	1	9	1	9	597	1	55	1	196	3	65	4	+1	
Limerick .....	1	50	2	25	1,208	2	82	2	192	4	48	4	..	
Tipperary .....	2	10	1	10	1,455	2	97	2	216	3	72	4	+1	
Waterford .....	2	37	3	12	960	1	47	1	123	5	24	3	-2	
Totals.....	11	235	14	17	7,081	12	547	14	1,391	26	53	28	+2	

# PARLIAMENTARY REFORM STATISTICS.

*N.B.—Populations and Assessments in Thousands. Electors in Hundreds.*

## SCOTLAND.

County.	BOROUGH.				BOROUGH AND COUNTIES IN EACH.								
	No.	Population.	Present M's.	Av. Population per M.	Assessments.	M's. due on Assessments.	Electors.	M's. due on Electors.	Total Population.	Present M's.	Av. Population per M.	M's. due on Population.	Add or Deduct.
Shetland .....	..	..	..	..	201	..	16	..	32	1	63	1	..
Orkneya .....	..	..	..	..	327	..	20	..	31	2	20	1	-1
Caithness .....	..	..	..	..	146	..	3	..	24	1	24	1	..
Sutherland .....	..	..	..	..	498	1	15	..	81	1	81	2	+1
Ross, Cromarty, & Lewis .....	1	17½	1	17½	1,172	1	63	..	208	5	41	5	..
Totals.....	1	17½	1	17½	1,172	1	63	..	208	5	41	5	..
Inverness and Skye .....	1	23	1	23	905	1	48	1	88	2	44	2	..
Nairn .....	..	..	..	..	602	1	59	2	10	2	27	1	-1
Elgin .....	1	29	1	29	..	..	..	..	44	1	62	1	..
Banff .....	..	..	..	..	418	1	25	1	62	1	62	1	..
Aberdeen, E. and W. ....	1	88	1	88	2,860	4	226	5	245	3	82	5	+2
Totals.....	3	140	3	47	4,795	..	358	..	449	8	56	9	+1
Kincardine .....	..	..	..	..	436	1	18	..	35	1	35	1	..
Forfar .....	2	173	3	58	3,316	4	275	6	237	4	59	4	..
Totals.....	2	173	3	58	3,762	..	293	..	272	5	54	5	..
Perth .....	1	25	1	25	1,954	2	100	2	128	2	64	2	..
Fife .....	2	45	2	22	1,909	2	116	6	161	3	54	3	..
Kinross .....	..	..	..	..	431	1	20	..	7	1	31	1	..
Clackmannan .....	..	..	..	..	1,550	2	137	3	90	3	33	2	-1
Stirling .....	2	76	2	38	659	1	29	1	59	1	59	1	..
Dumbarton .....	..	..	..	..	872	1	31	1	76	1	76	..	..
Argyll .....	2	105	2	52	2,602	3	187	4	217	3	72	4	+1
Penfrew .....	2	95	2	47	3,136	4	108	4	201	4	50	4	..
Ayr, N. and S. ....	1	477	1	159	1,654	29	749	1	765	5	153	15	+10
Lanark, N. and S. ....	..	..	..	..	381	..	12	..	41	1	41	1	..
Linlithgow .....	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
Totals.....	9	798	11	72	28,083	..	1,479	..	1,649	22	75	..	+10
Bute .....	..	..	..	..	184	..	13	..	17	1	17	1	..
Edinburgh .....	2	254	3	85	2,731	3	413	10	328	4	82	6	+2
Haddington .....	1	13	1	13	744	1	68	1	38	2	17	1	-1
Berwick .....	..	..	..	..	784	1	17	..	36	1	36	1	..
Peebles .....	..	..	..	..	402	..	11	..	12	1	26	1	..
Selkirk .....	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	14	..	..	..	..
Roxburgh .....	1	26	1	26	1,122	1	65	1	54	2	27	2	-1
Totals.....	2	39	2	19	3,052	..	121	..	154	6	26	4	-2
Dumfries .....	1	24	1	24	1,294	2	64	2	75	2	37	2	..
Kirkcudbright .....	..	..	..	..	676	1	21	1	41	1	41	1	..
Wigtown .....	1	10	1	10	523	1	30	1	39	2	19	1	-1
Totals.....	2	34	2	17	2,487	..	115	..	155	5	31	4	-1

NOTE TO SCOTCH TABLE.—To simplify analysis, each whole District of Boroughs has, with its Assessments of Electorate, been assigned to the County in which its nominal chief factor is situated.

## JOCKEYING THE NATIVE PRINCES.

IN our memorandum on the Condition of India, published in our August number, we said that the Parliament and people of England seldom or never hear a true report of matters from the Imperial departments in India, the only channels through which information is communicated to this country at all. A few months ago, we were called upon to admire the administrative skill with which the "Salt Line" of Central India had been abolished by Sir John Strachey, *with the consent of the Native Princes*. Now, the measure was carried by placing heavy pressure upon those Princes to compel them to acquiesce in a scheme that raised the price of salt upon the millions of their own subjects, to the same rates that prevail in our own territory. It was a most desirable arrangement for ourselves, but a very objectionable one to the Native States, whose Princes felt an honourable repugnance to a measure that raised the price of this necessary of life in their territories to our own rates. We must not be understood to blame Sir John Strachey for desiring to see the Salt Line abolished. It was a desirable reform in itself, and one that might with propriety have been kept in view in every modification of our engagements with the Native States affected thereby. What has been concealed is the fact that the measure was forced upon the Princes, and has been the occasion of the deepest heartburnings amongst them. Our Indian officials are simply "trustees" of the English nation, which has a just expectation and a right to be told the true history of their proceedings. But this is what Indian officials never dream of doing. They are never held back from courses they are bent upon, by any notion of accountability to the nation for their conduct. A certain policy seems to them desirable or necessary, and they follow it without scruple as to the means; but they take precautions that the English people are kept in ignorance of those means. Thus the nation is made to believe that the Native States co-operated cordially with us, in carrying a measure that was obnoxious to them to the last degree. Their consent was wrung from them by a course of procedure that the nation

would never have sanctioned had the facts been disclosed to it. Pressure of the most improper order was used to compel the assent of the Princes to a measure that they abhorred. Now the nation never hears of these facts. A despatch that conceals the true story is addressed to the India Office, and in routine order, finds its way into a Blue-book. Instead of the true story, an essentially untrue one is laid before the country, and the matter then passes into oblivion. Hearing how deeply the Princes resented the pressure put upon them by Sir John Strachey and his lieutenants (Mr. Allan Hume and Mr. A. C. Lyall), we asked the Government of India, through the Press Commissioner, to permit us to see the official record of the negotiations that had taken place on the subject. The Press Commissioner was appointed for the purpose of communicating such information to the Press. If the proceedings had been of a nature to bear publicity, they would have been sent to us forthwith; but as they would not bear publication, we have been unable to get them to this day. But we know generally what was done, and that the Government of India has falsified the facts in the Blue-book upon the subject; and unless Parliament puts an end to rule of this order, we shall ever be sleeping upon a volcano in that country. If we misrepresent anything in this article, it will not be our fault, as we have tried over and over again in the last three years to obtain from the Government the true history of a transaction that has left smouldering in the hearts of the Princes a very deep sense of our injustice. It is this deception practised upon the Parliament and nation that deserves such severe handling. The Press of England is plied with paragraphs and leading articles complimenting the Indian Executive upon the achievement they have accomplished, and the conductors of the Press, having no knowledge of the facts whatever, are made to propagate the false story that emanates from the Indian bureaux, to the despair of the Native Princes. The Maharajah of Jaipur has, probably, been treated worse in these proceedings than any other of the Princes, but the disaffection and sense of wrong that have been awakened amongst them is, we believe, universal. Sindhia, Holkar, and Bhurtpore have a common grievance with Jaipur and the Rajpootana Princes generally, while the Parliament and the nation are betrayed by the representations of the Indian Government into the belief that all these Princes cordially co-operated with Sir John Strachey to increase the salt revenue of British India. The Government of India refusing to let the negotiations be made public, the Native Princes are too timid to communicate them to the Press. They fear the resentment of the Simlah

Foreign Office, and with but too good reason. It happens, however, that we have, by accident, got at the official record in Holkar's case; and that the nation may see with what meanness and dishonour we treat the Native Princes of India, we ask its attention to the following story, for until proceedings of this order are brought to an end there will be no loyal acquiescence in our supremacy, let the lip-professions of the Princes be what they may.

Every one knows, we suppose, that the Government of India raises a large part of its revenue from a very heavy Customs' duty upon imported salt, and a proportionately heavy excise upon salt manufactured within the country itself. Now the great source from which the Native States of Rajpootana and the Mahratta States of Central India have hitherto drawn their supplies, have been the great Sambhur Salt Lake, in the territory of the Maharajah of Jaipur and other saline lands in Marwar and elsewhere. The cost of this salt was very small, as there was little or no duty upon its manufacture. It became necessary, therefore, to prevent this cheap salt being smuggled into British territory, to draw a vast cordon, or Customs' line, round the Native States, across which no salt was permitted to pass into our territory. The line was a barbarous device of our own to protect our revenue from salt disappearing in the neighbourhood of these States, from the excessive cheapness of the Sambhur and other salt, that would otherwise have driven it out of the market. The Native States were in no way answerable for the Line.

Permitting no transit duties in any part of India where by pressure upon the Native States, we could enforce their abandonment, we were ourselves transgressors of the greatest magnitude against our own principle. We maintained a great Customs' Line in Southern India for the same purpose, in addition to the Rajpootana and Central India Line, while we had established also a gigantic transit duty upon the opium manufactured in Malwa, that simply sought right of way through British territory to the port of Bombay on its way to China. It is necessary to understand these facts clearly at the outset, as no honest action could be taken in the matter towards the Native States while ignoring them. We were the transgressors. It was for our profit that the Lines existed. Vexatious and intolerable as was the evil, and productive of widespread demoralization, the Native States were not answerable for it in the least. Permitted by us to levy no transit duties on their own frontiers, we subjected them to an almost fabulous transit duty upon any salt they might attempt to import into British India, or to obtain from our own salt-pans in Bombay; while, in



the other direction, we levied a transit duty of Rs.600 per chest on any opium they attempted to pass through British territory for shipment to China. We approached, therefore, the question of abolishing these Salt Lines with hands as dirty as they well could be, and it was the suggestion of simple fairness, the requirement of plain morality, that if sacrifices had to be made to carry their abolition, it was *we*, and not the Native Princes, who should make them. We had ever done them a wrong that we should have regarded as intolerable if it had been offered to ourselves; we should not, indeed, have suffered it for a moment. We imposed an enormous transit duty upon their opium, seeking a right of way to China through our territory, and if we justified it on the ground that it was a poisonous drug, the instant reply was that we imposed an equally onerous duty upon the necessities of life in salt and sugar. No position could be more false, more unfortunate altogether, than that in which we stood. On the one hand, we were constantly denouncing the imposition of transit duties by the Native States however moderate, as intolerable, and as a violation of good neighbourhood. By incessant pressure upon the Princes, we had suppressed such duties altogether wherever we had the power, while maintaining transit duties of our own of a weight never before heard of in the civilized world. The Native States did not dare to remonstrate, and in this country the facts were unknown. I have frequently called attention upon the spot to the disagreeable fact upon which I am commenting, but I never remember to have seen it noticed either in India or in this country outside my own columns. I instance it now to show how profoundly ignorant are Parliament, Press, and nation alike of the facts of our Indian rule. The Salt Line in Southern India was got rid of some years ago, without very much difficulty. The opium transit duty still exists, and without a thought of abolishing it anywhere, the evils incident thereto being perhaps reduced to a minimum by the system of "passes," which has long been established for the exaction of the duty. The great Salt Line of Northern and Central India was *the* difficulty to be surmounted, and it is upon the recent abolition of this Line that Parliament and the nation are challenged to approve and admire the administrative skill of Sir John Strachey and the instruments by whom the measure was carried, under Lord Lytton's reign. We have repeatedly complained in these columns that the departments at Simlah, where most of our administrative crimes are hatched, systematically conceal from Parliament the true character of their proceedings. It has been so in the case of this Salt Line. I doubt if even the India Office knows the exact history of what was done,

to an imperfect disclosure of which I now come, and of the resentment and disaffection to which the measure has given rise throughout Rajpootana, Malwa, and Central India.

There was but one way, I believe, in which it was possible to abolish the Line at all, if we were to be guided by the maxims of morality or sound statesmanship. We could not afford to abandon our own revenue from salt, for no one could suggest a substitutory tax in its room, and the alternative was to induce the Native States to *tax the commodity at the same rate as ourselves, simultaneously granting their subjects an equivalent remission of other duties*. In other words, we should have invited them to recast their fiscal system somewhat upon the model of our own, taxing salt to the same limit as ourselves, and remitting other taxes to an equivalent amount. Now this suggestion was *actually made to Lord Northbrook* by the Maharajah Holkar of Indore, in a memorandum dated 10th November, 1874, laid before Lord Northbrook by the Native Minister of the State, Sir 'T. Madava Row. Here was the solution of the difficulty. Holkar's Minister was bent upon reforming the Customs' and Excise duties of Holkar's administration. In the memorandum laid by him before Lord Northbrook, he pointed out that the existing duties impeded "the growth of trade, and were little in advance of the old Mahratta system of taxation," which ignored "scientific principles of taxation." He proceeded to point out the special reforms which he desired to make, and the sacrifice they would entail upon the revenues of the State. "Anxious as I am," he said, "to carry out these reforms, and thereby bring about the development of trade, I am not in a position to ask his Highness to sacrifice much revenue for the sake of them." And then he added:—

I am in need of some external help, [and] I think I may venture to suggest how the British Government may, if it feels disposed, grant us some help.

He then proceeded to detail his views, and his plans were those of a statesman. We beg the reader's close attention to his proposals:—

As part of the system to be substituted for the existing one, I would propose to derive a special revenue from salt. To enable us to derive a special revenue from salt, we must have salt at prime cost. The assistance I seek at the hands of the British Government is in reference to our obtaining salt from the Bombay pans at prime cost, at the cost at which Bombay salt is permitted by the British Government to be exported beyond the limits of British India. In other words, the British Government should permit us to purchase salt at the Bombay pans at prime cost, and to bring it into our territories free of British duty. Would the British Government be a loser by this cause? I think not; on the contrary, it would gain. The salt now consumed in these territories does not come from

British India, but comes from native territories, such as Marwar, Jeypore, &c. Hence, it cannot be said that, by the course proposed, the British Government would lose any of its present revenue. As the salt from Bombay would come entirely by rail, there would be no chance of abuses during transit from Bombay to these territories, such as might injure British revenue. We might bind ourselves to sell the salt at a profit not less than that of the British Indian Monopoly. This condition would effectually prevent the return of the salt into British territory, and it might be understood that the railway should not carry back the salt once brought into our territory. While the British Government would thus not be a loser, I hold it would gain. The manufacturers of salt at Bombay would feel it an advantage to have a new market thus opened in these territories. The railway would gain by the amount of additional work thus given it. The salt revenue of the adjacent British territories would be effectually protected against the encroachment of the cheap salt now in use in these territories which comes from Jeypore, &c. Such advantage would be the result of our engaging to equalize our rates of profit on salt with those of British India. It thus strikes me that the assistance I seek might be given by the British Government without difficulty of any kind, and even with positive advantage. The measure seems to promise benefit to all parties.

The proposal was so just, so natural, so statesmanlike, that it should have been accepted instantly. It was a way of getting rid of the obnoxious Customs' Line, without loss to any one, and with direct, positive gain to every one. The British Government and its subjects gained by a largely extended demand for the salt manufactured within its territories; while Holkar and his subjects gained by the substitution of a single tax upon Salt for a multitude of small imposts that embarrassed and impoverished State and subjects alike. The Minister went on as follows:—

I am at a loss to find the means of compensation in other directions. I mean compensation for the losses which the proposed reforms in our Sayer (Customs) involves. The British Government already taxes our opium very high, and realizes a revenue of millions per annum therefrom. In these circumstances, the aid sought seems comparatively trifling. If, on consideration, the plan generally meets with favour, I should be prepared to discuss it more thoroughly and more in detail with any authorities the British Government may be pleased to refer me to. If the plan in its matured shape prove acceptable to the British Government and to his Highness the Maharejah, considerable advantage may accrue from the same.

Had Lord Northbrook remained in India, we have little doubt that this most valuable, most statesmanlike suggestion of the Native Minister would have been adopted as the right way of solving the difficulty everywhere. The Native States would all have been invited to remit the old and unwise methods of taxation that vexed their subjects, and to levy a salt tax like our own instead thereof. The Salt Line would then have fallen to the

ground of itself, and the measure have been made the occasion of a great and wide-spread fiscal reform throughout the States.

Lord Northbrook, we know, regarded the suggestion as very valuable, for he announced in Council shortly afterwards, his belief that he would be "able to make a satisfactory arrangement on the subject, so far as the State of Indore was concerned" (*Gazette of India*, March, 1875). But Sir John Strachey, a hard and as events have shown, an unscrupulous official, came upon the scene, with a Viceroy who is declared to be a master of statesmanship, "in its more occult branches." And now, what does the reader suppose has finally been done; the achievement upon the strength of which the *Pall Mall Gazette* told us, some weeks ago, that the fiscal policy of Lord Lytton and his lieutenant must be declared to have been a success? They have "jockeyed" Holkar and the Native Princes—that is all. "BY ALL MEANS," we have said, "REFORM YOUR SAYER, OR CUSTOMS' DUTIES, AND TAKE YOUR SALT FROM US: BUT YOU MUST MAKE NO REVENUE FROM IT. THAT MUST BE ALL OURS. WE SHALL BE HAPPY TO SUPPLY YOU AT PRIME COST, PLUS OUR DUTY. AND TAKE IT YOU SHALL NOW, FOR SINCE THIS SUGGESTION OF HOLKAR'S, WE POSITIVELY WILL NOT TOLERATE THE CUSTOMS' LINE [*our own line, gentle reader,*] ANY LONGER." The dishonour is too deep for words. Oh, that we held the pen of a Macaulay, to hold it up to adequate scorn. This is what Civilian administration has come to in India; and as it will not bear to be published, it is concealed, and the impudent falsehood foisted upon Parliament that the measure has been carried with the willing consent and co-operation of the Native Princes! The Native Princes are brimful of indignation and hatred of us and our courses, of our Stracheys, and their facile instruments of wrong-doing, the Lyalls and the Humes, who, as Secretaries, seem to be without a spark of honour in their official creed, and are equally enthusiastic for the crime of an Afghan War, or the meanness and dishonour of a fiscal fraud upon our own Princes. And now Holkar, a Prince whom we have already most unjustly used in the past, is in a tumult of bitter rage against us. Listen to the scornful terms in which he addresses us, through that kindred spirit of the Simlah Secretaries, General Daly, whom we keep as Governor-General's Agent in Central India to terrify the Native Princes into acquiescence in all we do:—

We [Holkar] have introduced reforms in the Sayer Department on the faith of the revenue to be derived from salt, and it would be very hard indeed if the arrangement is allowed to fall through upon considerations quite foreign to the intention of the agreement.

Government have derived considerable profit by the scheme which I was the

first to propose; and compared to it, the profit I shall obtain by the reduction I seek will not even cover the brokerage.

I had said at Delhi that you were the broker between me and the Government of India, in the negotiations about the railway. Similarly, I claim to be the broker in the matter of the general salt scheme which has now been introduced. You have done your business. You will, therefore, oblige me by obtaining my brokerage for me. The Finance Minister having taken advantage of my general scheme, will, I hope, be gracious enough not to grudge my brokerage or ignore my services after his business was done.

Sir Madava Row had asked for salt *at prime cost*. They have got heaps upon heaps of salt, out of which they can easily afford to supply me at the rate I ask.

Lord Northbrook called me his personal friend, and, as a proof of it, he was kind enough to keep my conversation at Calcutta in mind when he visited Bombay and made arrangements with the Government of Bombay for the supply of salt to me for my profit. I have thanked his lordship, yourself [Daly], and Mr. Aitchison for it; and I might remind you that it was not intended that I should reap that profit only for a year.

It would not be out of place to remind you of the remark I made on the Empress's birthday, when you gave me the glad news that the salt arrangement was made with Maharajah Scindia. I then remarked that we were brothers of whom two, yourself and Maharajah Scindia, were provided with salt, and I had to do without it. You then replied, that we were all in the same boat, and that I should write to you on the subject; and that I shall not remain without it. It would be very awkward indeed that the British Government and other Native Princes should benefit by the scheme which I was the first to suggest, and that notwithstanding the agreement with me was made when the other Princes did not even dream of it, and that by the highest authorities in India [his Excellency Lord Northbrook, yourself, and Mr. Aitchison], I should alone be left in the lurch.

Here is "the willing consent and co-operation of the Native Princes," with which Parliament and the nation are amused. The man positively insults us, as far as he dare, for the trickery we have played off upon him, in our rapacity and greed. He demands his "brokerage" upon the transaction in which we have jockeyed him, scornfully putting himself upon the level to which we have chosen, in our indecent huckstering, to descend. And Holkar's is not the worst case, gentle reader. We warn the nation that government by picnic at Simlah has become a dishonour to us as a people, and that it is time to get rid of it for good. Holkar's, we say, is not the worst case. The Maharajah of Jaipur chafes bitterly under our conduct towards him in the matter, but it is all concealed from the nation.

## POSTSCRIPT.

SINCE the above article was in type, our attention has been drawn to the following statement in the *Bombay Gazette* as to proceedings that are being taken in Kattiawar to compel its Native Chiefs to surrender their salt works to the control of British officers :—

It is stated that in October last the head of the Salt Department in this Presidency proceeded to Rajkot and held a conference with the representatives of the principal Native States of Kattiawar, to whom he *orally* explained the objects of his mission. The representatives asked for a written statement of his demands, and for copies of any orders from Government authorizing them. Both the Salt Collector and the Political Agent, however, refused to comply with this simple and reasonable request, while yet they both insisted upon the cordial co-operation of the Chiefs in carrying out what was represented to be the intentions of Government. The shape in which the demands of the salt officer were made was enough to arouse the worst fears of the Chiefs. They were called upon to close a number of their salt works, to destroy the salt spontaneously produced on some of their lands, and to hand over the rest of the works to the direct control of the Government Salt Department, which would henceforth appoint its own agents to manage the works, and at the end of every year make over to the Chiefs any excess of revenue over expenditure incurred in the maintenance of this establishment. How these demands have been met by the Native States principally concerned we have not the means of knowing, but there can be no doubt that they amount to a call on the Chiefs to surrender their vested rights in the sources of salt produce in their territories. Such a measure is scarcely consistent with the guarantee given to the Chiefs by Colonel Walker in 1807-8, when they were expressly assured that "no encroachment on their landed rights or their independence was contemplated, and that the *state of possession and power as it then existed was to be guaranteed.*" Some of these salt works lie within the capital cities and in the heart of the territory of these States. The making over of the works to the officers of the Salt Department creates a divided authority, which cannot fail to be a source of endless disputes between the British employes and the subjects of the Native Chiefs. In the natural course of things the former would be invested with the right of search for smuggled salt, and nothing could prevent this power being sometimes exercised in an arbitrary and offensive manner. The arrangement would, moreover, probably affect injuriously the trade of these States; since any packages containing goods would be liable to be opened and searched on the suspicion of their containing smuggled salt.

There is the deepest need of a Parliamentary inquiry into these proceedings. If India is not to be filled with disaffection from one end of it to the other, Parliament must take cognizance of the matter, and insist upon having its true history laid bare. Every effort will be made to prevent such an inquiry, and to keep from the knowledge of the nation what has been done. Instead of

recognizing that this great reform could be carried but in one way, with due regard to the rights of others, we use our military supremacy to force the Native Princes into any arrangements that we find profitable to ourselves. Thus, what we have really done in abolishing this Salt Line is to force the Native Princes to abandon their own manufacture of salt altogether, and compel them to take our heavily taxed commodity in its room. In other words, we have imposed by force our salt duty upon the Native States; and, as in the case of Holkar, instead of accounting to the Native Princes for the revenue arising therefrom, we boldly divert it into our own treasury. We amuse the Princes, and allure them into negotiations with us, upon the pretence that if they assimilate their fiscal system to our own, they will then be able, through the revenue they obtain from salt, to abolish other and perhaps more objectionable imposts which they now levy. At the last moment they find that they have been deceived. They have abandoned their own salt works, or made them over to our control, only to find that we have "jockeyed" them into an arrangement, under which *we tax their* subjects for the commodity as heavily as our own; and, instead of paying the revenue so derived to *them*, we take it ourselves, and then tell them to admire the great reform accomplished by us in the abolition of the Salt Line. There is such dishonour in our course, that Parliament should determine to sift it to the bottom. An adequate inquiry would show how shamelessly we have behaved towards the Maharajah of Jaipur, filling his soul with bitterness against us for our rapacity and unscrupulousness. What the end of it will be no man can foretell. We are sowing the wind, if ever a nation sowed it, and we *ought* to reap the whirlwind.

## THE PEASANTRY OF INDIA.—II.

My last article bearing this title was intended to throw some light on the condition of the agricultural classes in Bengal, Behar, and Orissa. In the present paper I propose to deal, in the same manner, with the agricultural classes in the North-west Provinces. As in my former paper, so in this, the reader will find that every statement rests upon the unimpeachable authority of British Civilians reporting to Government concerning facts immediately before them.

The system on which land is assessed and the revenue collected in the North-west Provinces is due to the labours and study of a very distinguished Civilian, Mr. Robert Mertins Bird. For thirty years—from 1812 to 1842—Mr. Bird was employed first as a judicial and subsequently as a revenue officer in the province of Benares. Noting the steady falling away of the revenue from the land, and the constant sales of property for arrears, he determined to investigate the causes of this untoward state of things. He speedily satisfied himself that it was not the result of any excessive charges being imposed upon the land; the Government demand was moderate and equitable. But, as he proceeded in his inquiries, he gradually discovered that the distressed condition of the province was due to the circumstance that the Indian Government was in entire ignorance of the conditions under which the land was owned and cultivated. The revenue was assessed upon a person who was, officially, assumed to be the landlord of a certain extent of land, but who, in point of fact, had nothing of the landlord about him. The consequence was that when this man was tried as a defaulter, and a decree obtained for the sale of his property for the purpose of making good the arrears of revenue, it was found impossible to put the decree into execution. The man had no property such as our courts of justice credited him with. He was merely head man or agent for a village community to transact business between it and the Government. The existence of such a corporate body being unknown to the Government, they, of course, knew nothing of the manner in



which land was owned by it; and the consequence was that when an arrear of revenue took place, or when there was a question of sale or transfer of property, it was impossible to discover either where the loss of revenue had occurred, or whose the land was which had been sold or transferred. All, in short, was in a state of confusion continually becoming worse confounded. Feuds and quarrels were excited among an armed and high-spirited people, destructive of order and security—a disgrace to the Government, and highly disastrous to the well-being of its subjects.

Mr. Bird's inquiries enabled him, in the course of years, to obtain a clear understanding of the Indian village system, and, ultimately, he was entrusted by the Government of India with the onerous duty of resettling the Government demand on the land in accordance with the nature of the tenure under which the soil was held and cultivated. The term "village" includes, in India, not merely the dwellings of the village community, but all the land which the community owns and cultivates. Mr. Bird's first care, upon entering on his new duties, was to make a survey of the land, and definitely establish the boundaries which marked off the land of one village from that of another. In the antecedent period of confusion, these boundaries, like everything else, had become unsettled, and the claims of conflicting village to this or that field had been a fruitful cause of riot and blood-shedding. The boundaries of a village having been accurately ascertained, a map of the village was then made, including every field which it contained. These fields were numbered, and a ledger was drawn out, in which every man's name was set down in alphabetical order, and against his name were set the numbers of the fields of all kinds of which he was in possession. When the extent and boundaries of a considerable number of villages had thus been ascertained, the revenue for the entire tract was fixed, and this again was subdivided into the portions to be demanded from each separate community. The demand was made upon the village community as a whole; but in order to avert confusion in case of arrears of revenue, and to allow of the discovery of individual defaulters, a statement was drawn up of a very elaborate kind. There was one such statement for each village; and it purported to set forth the property possessed by each person within the boundaries of that village, what were his rights with respect to sale or mortgage, or transfer of any kind, and, in a word, almost everything about him. Then a system of accounts was adopted. Each Native collector, of whom numbers are stationed in different parts of a district, had his own set of accounts; and

the principle was that every one of the revenue payers should have his separate entry in this account book of the Native collector.

Such, very briefly stated, were the general principles on which the land in the North-west Provinces was resettled by Mr. Bird. The object, as the reader will have perceived, was to restore to its proper place the ancient village system of India. This system had been disorganized and well-nigh destroyed by our invincible British prejudice that land could not be owned in any country under the sun except as it chanced to be owned in the United Kingdom. There *must* be a single landlord, and a number of tenants renting their farms from him. Mr. Mertins Bird succeeded in destroying this prejudice, and the early consequences of the revolution he effected were beneficial in the extreme. The ascertaining of the village boundaries put a stop to rioting. The imposition of the land-tax on the veritable owners of the soil immensely facilitated the collection of the revenue. The official recognition of all individual rights of property gave a marvellous impulse to the cultivation of fallow lands. "To illustrate," says Mr. Bird in his evidence before the Select Committee of 1852, "the progress of cultivation, I may mention that, after having settled the district of Goruckpore, I was away for three or four years before I visited it again. When I went to see it again, the resident collector requested me to go with him a tour through the northern parts of the district, towards the mountains, and in doing so I came upon some territory that I was utterly unacquainted with. We drove about twenty miles through one of the richest countries I ever saw, full of valuable products. . . . Upon asking him where it was, he said, 'You left this forest; it has since been brought into the state you now see it.'"

There was a weakness, however, in this stupendous achievement which was not long in disclosing itself, and which has now assumed gigantic proportions. The system attempted too much; it depended for its successful working upon conditions incapable of being fulfilled. For example, if the records of the various rights possessed by each individual in a village community were tampered with—if they fell into confusion or into arrears,—the most terrible injustice would be inflicted. In the same way, the equitable adjustment of the land-tax depended upon the account-books of the Native collectors being preserved absolutely free from false or incorrect entries. The villagers themselves could have no control over these, even if they had the knowledge (which they had not) to exercise such supervision. What, with the lapse of time, actually happened was, that both records and accounts "became a mass of falsehood,

inaccuracy, and confusion." Such, at any rate, is the statement of Mr. William Edwards, a Bengal Civilian, and one of the Judges in the High Court of Agra. In the course of some very interesting "Reflections on the Rebellion" of 1857, he thus describes the effects of our land revenue system in the North-west:—

It has been generally supposed that this system was one of unmixed good, admirable in its working, and complete in its details, and so highly appreciated by the people, that it had sincerely attached them to our rule and led them to desire its continuance. My acquaintance with the system . . . . . has led me to form a different opinion. . . . . The basis of the system is, it must be borne in mind, a survey of all lands held under the Government, and a record of the Government claim accruing thereon, and of all rights and interests connected therewith. But a record of this description, to be of any value, must be *accurate in all its details, completely trustworthy, and beyond suspicion*. If it falls short of this, it becomes one of the most powerful engines of evil and misgovernment which it is possible to devise. I fear that the revenue records of the North-west Provinces, however correct they may originally have been, have, from constant mutations in occupancy, and the corruption of Native officials, become *a mass of falsehood, inaccuracy, and confusion*. . . . . A record of the rights and interests in the soil, and those of the most minute and intricate character, subject to continued mutations of millions of men, can never be maintained by the direct agency of the servants of a Government of foreigners with that accuracy and completeness requisite to make it fit to be received as final and complete evidence of right, so long as the people themselves from their inability to read or write, are incapable of watching over their own interests. *In the North-west Provinces not one man in a thousand of the agricultural body is acquainted with reading or writing, or able to test the accuracy of the record on which all his earthly interests and those of his family depend. They are consequently left entirely dependent on our Native revenue officers, who are, as a class, very corrupt and untrustworthy.* . . . . . But, besides the impossibility of working the system, on account of its intricacy and minuteness of detail, it contained in itself the elements of its own destruction. The principle on which the whole scheme is based is *individual and joint responsibility*. Each member of the village community, is held severally and jointly responsible for the Government demand assessed on the village. If this principle be departed from, which is the keystone, the whole breaks down. But under a system of law . . . which is now in force, each co-partner in an estate or village is entitled to claim the separation of his own interest from that of the rest of the community, and its erection into a separate and distinct estate. Under the action of these laws, the village system was more or less broken up, . . . and when the rebellion broke out, the vaunted village system of the North-west Provinces was fast degenerating into pure ryotwar (*i.e.*, each cultivator singly and directly responsible to the Government for his share of the land revenue). As estates became divided and subdivided, a man's holding was too small to enable him to pay the Government demand and support his family. . . . Hence the agricultural body fell into the hands of the money-lenders, who ended by suing their debtors in the civil courts, and obtaining decrees, realizable any time within

twelve years from date of issue. These decrees were carefully kept until the fitting opportunity presented itself, when their holders sold up, in satisfaction of them, their debtors' lands, of which they became themselves the purchasers. Society in the North-west Provinces thus had become in late years thoroughly disorganized. The ancient proprietary body remained, it is true, but in the position of tenants on their hereditary estates, smarting under a sense of degradation, and holding intact their ancient power over their old retainers, who were willing and ready to co-operate with them in any attempt to recover their lost position. Again, the tendency of our land revenue system was, in other respects, depressing in the extreme. *The assessments were far too heavy in nearly every district under settlement. . . . The result was that the gentry had disappeared, or were in very reduced circumstances, and the mass of the agricultural body were in the most extreme and hopeless poverty.* Long before the rebellion, their state of increasing destitution had attracted my notice, and so deeply impressed me, that I always regarded some great convulsion of society as extremely improbable. . . . The bitter antipathy to our revenue system which existed in their minds was clearly manifested by their systematic destruction of all the Government revenue and other records, not only in the chief, but also in the subordinate offices in each district. We may put down armed rebellion, but we shall never, in my opinion, have real peace, or a secure hold on the country, unless we make some attempt to redress the grievances of our rural population.

It is hard to imagine a failure in administration more complete and overwhelming than that which is sketched for us in the foregoing passage. Mr. Bird's settlement was, I believe, completed in 1842. The passage from Mr. Edwards' book describes the condition of the country in 1857. It had required but fifteen years of our disintegrating system to bring about these direful results. Mr. Edwards was Chief Magistrate of Badaon, in Rohilkund, when the Mutiny of 1857 broke out, and he thus describes the state of society in that part of India:—

By fraud or chicanery, a vast number of the estates of families of rank and influence have been alienated either wholly or in part, and have been purchased by new men—chiefly traders or Government officials—without character or influence over their tenantry. These men, in a vast majority of instances, were also absentees, fearing or disliking to reside on their purchases, where they were looked upon as interlopers and unwelcome intruders. The ancient proprietary of these alienated estates were again living as tenantry on the lands once theirs; by no means reconciled to their change of position, but maintaining their hereditary hold as strong as ever over the sympathies and affections of the agricultural body, who were ready and willing to join their feudal superiors in any attempt to recover their lost position, and regain possession of their estates. . . . None of the men who had succeeded them as landowners were possessed of sufficient influence or power to give me any aid in maintaining the public tranquillity. On the contrary, the very first people who came in to me imploring aid were this new proprietary body, to whom I had a right to look for vigorous and efficient efforts in the maintenance of order. On the other hand,

*those who really could control the vast masses of the rural population were interested in bringing about a state of disturbance and general anarchy.*

If this evil had been stayed or even abated since the experiences of 1857, I should not have quoted Mr. Edwards' description of the state of his district at that critical period. But every one knows that the evil has been growing in extent and intensity ever since. In Cawnpore, for instance, I find, from a report drawn up so late as 1872, that out of 2,311 villages, 69 per cent. had been transferred from the old landowning classes to traders and money-lenders. In one subdivision—that of Etawah—a money-lender who, thirty years previously, had had only a small share of one village, was then master of forty entire villages, and had shares in as many more. In 1873, the Board of Revenue for the North-west Provinces published some Settlement Reports to show to what extent the transfer of land was going on at that period. I select from these reports—that on the district of Hattaras—merely for the sake of illustration. The Rajpoots of Hattaras had formerly owned ninety-seven villages. They then only possessed seven. The area in their possession was only 16 per cent. of what they had held thirty-five years before. Next to the Rajpoots, the Jhats had formerly held the largest area. The Jhats are the most thrifty and industrious agriculturists in India. None the less, 54½ per cent. of their land had permanently passed away from them; 11½ per cent. was mortgaged; and only 34 per cent. still remained in the hands of the original owners. The new proprietors were mainly traders and money-lenders. "In place," reported the Settlement officer, "of cultivating zemindars, lenient with their tenants, and contented mainly with the profits of their *seer* land, we have a body of keen speculators, determined to exact the fullest possible return for their investments."

More remarkable still is the case of the Jhansi territory. This tract was most unjustifiably annexed by us a short time before the Mutiny, and British administration cannot be said to have been fairly established there until after the suppression of the revolt. Yet, at the close of ten years, what had occurred? Out of 637 villages, fifty had been lost to their original owners. Besides these, eighty-three portions of villages had been transferred; and altogether it was found that 13 per cent. had changed hands. But not content with the havoc they had already caused, in 1871 the Government of the North-west Provinces decreed that throughout Jhansi debts contracted under Native rule might be sued for in our courts. The Commissioner of the division wrote, protesting urgently against this pitiless and unwise proceeding. He said:—

If it had been possible to have prevented these Acts having retrospective

effect, and limited their action to engagements made subsequent to their introduction into the division, the evil would have been comparatively slight, and the people would, at all events, have accepted liabilities with their eyes open; but the fact has been very different. Debts incurred under a different system, mortgages entered into with a looseness and ignorance of the consequences which will now only too surely ensue, are being brought into court, and will be carried through to the bitter end. The Marwaree knows no mercy. These bankers, who originally settled in the villages under the protection and patronage of the zemindars, at a time when such protection was worth paying highly for, and in return assisted their patrons with funds on the occurrence of marriages or other high festivals, now find their former patrons at their feet. The old Thakoors (i.e., squires) will be sold up. *The running accounts of many years will be brought forward, instalments ignored, and whether true or false, they cannot be disproved by the zemindars, who never kept any accounts. District officers will rarely be able . . . to save the ancestral property from passing into other hands, and seven or eight years hence, perhaps earlier, the land will be in the hands of these money-lenders, who will prove a source of weakness to the State, who are proverbially the worst landlords, and who will carry rack-renting to its utmost limit.*

These gloomy forebodings have been verified to the uttermost. The agricultural classes in Jhansi—both the old proprietors and the cultivators—are at this moment steeped in an indebtedness, misery, and destitution which are exceptional even in British India. Twenty years of our beneficent supervision have brought them to this pass. There would be some comfort to be obtained even from the ruin of the ancient proprietors if a better class of men had been substituted in their stead. But this is the manner in which they are described by Mr. C. H. Crosthwaite, a Revenue officer, second to none in India for knowledge and ability:—

But the greatest political evil arising from the present state of things is the character of the men to whom the great majority of transferred estates are passing. *Nothing can be conceived in the shape of a landlord worse than the money-lender or trader who has purchased an estate.* He has no sympathy or fellow-feeling of any sort with his people; he seldom resides on his estate; he regards his tenants much as the worst class of Southern slaveholders regarded their slaves; he looks upon them as things given over to him by Providence for the production of rupees; and if he does not kill them outright, it is only because he has learned wisdom from the fable of the goose that laid the golden eggs. I have done all I can to oppose the attacks that have been made on the rights that we have conceded and confirmed to the landowners. But if this is the class of men who are to become our landowners—and unless a speedy alteration in the law is made, very few of any other class will be left—we shall be compelled sooner or later to sweep them away.

When I began to write these papers on the "Peasantry of India," the thesis I undertook to prove was that British rule, so far from giving security to landed property, had been the most potent

destroyer of ancient rights, and all sense of security ever known in that or in any other country. That position, I think, I may claim to have established beyond reach of question. British rule in the North-west Provinces has sunk the whole agricultural body into a state of the direst misery; and it has done so in the interests of a single small class, which, while they cause us to be hated throughout the length and breadth of the land, neither could nor would afford us the smallest assistance if that hatred expressed itself in corresponding action. That eventually the combined wretchedness and rage of the people will drive them to an insurrection against our "beneficent British rule," no student of history or human nature can doubt for a moment. The issue is as certain as that the sun will rise in the morning, and the sole element of uncertainty has reference to the time when it will occur. No one, so far as I know, either denies the danger or the consequences that must eventually proceed from it. But the argument of the *laissez faire* school is that, happen what may, we must, as guardians of law and order, see that debtors are compelled to execute their contracts. This is the only argument I have ever heard used in defence of our present practice, and it is one which begs the whole question that is in dispute. Allowing, for the sake of argument, that the sole function we have to discharge in India is to see that men fulfil their contracts, is it in consequence of any duly proved "contract" that our courts of law are so incessantly transferring the possessions of the ancient landowners of India to a horde of greedy money-lenders? Every one knows that it is not. Great as, under any circumstances, would be the political danger caused by the ruin which, under our administration, has overtaken the most influential and manliest class of our Indian subjects, that danger is infinitely aggravated by the cruel wrong and injustice whereby that ruin has been effected. With blind perversity and reckless disregard of consequences, we have fashioned our administration of justice as if we had but one object in view, and that the advantage of the money-lender. Let the reader mark the special privileges that have been reserved for this favoured creature, as they have been enumerated by one of our own Civil officers:—

His books . . . . . if kept in due form, are accepted as conclusive evidence in a suit; though not a judge who has so to accept them but knows their utter unreliability, or rather the moral certainty that they are either duplicates or have been cooked for the occasion. Provision is made by regulation that these books should be examined by assessors; and as both the character and dialect used on such occasions is utterly unintelligible to all but the money-lenders themselves, and the character generally to all money-

lenders but those of the plaintiff's particular neighbourhood, it may be understood that this provision is one that effectually guards the plaintiff from too close or vexatious a scrutiny of his ground of action. . . . . A fancy description of mortgage has also been introduced into India, practically for the money-lender's especial behoof, called the usufructuary mortgage, whereby he enjoys his debtor's estate, not in liquidation of the debt and interest, but merely in payment of the interest; the debtor, thus deprived of the means of liquidation, being in consequence effectually debarred from redemption. Again, compound interest, though illegal, is specially admitted in the money-lender's favour by recognition of the arrangement whereby he strikes balances in his books periodically, and takes the debtor's signature thereto, as a new initial sum bearing interest from that date. . . . . In short, the whole machinery of an intricate and refined system of law—elaborated by men in an utterly different stage of moral and intellectual progress from those for whom it is framed, and consequently entirely unsuited to the feelings, instincts, and traditions of the latter—is placed at the disposal of a class so keen, shrewd, and guileful, that even in fanatical countries where they are treated as dogs, and labour under every possible disability, they trade and lend money, and prosper, and cheat with impunity the Mohammedan masters who oppress them.

This picture of the Indian money-lender and his special privileges would not be complete without a description of the Courts of first instance, in which these privileges are enforced. I rely, as always, on the testimony of our own Civilians :—

Perhaps no greater curse has ever been inflicted by rulers upon ruled than the [old] Moonsif's Courts of Bengal. Of all the blots on our system, this is the worst and most serious. Buried far down in the depths of the rural districts, often situated in places inaccessible to Europeans for many months in the year, the little square hut, with its walls of peat and thatched roof, which enshrines the local "incarnation of justice," is the nucleus round which centres all the villainy of the neighbourhood. 'If perjury could coagulate like smoke, the roof of that paltry hut would be hung with festoons of lies blacker and more noxious than soot; and if forgery lay like dust, the pleaders would wade knee-deep before the Bench. . . . . *It is in these paltry rural tribunals that the village usurer, who has lent five rupees to the peasant, institutes his suit, and obtains a decree for a sum infinitely greater than the modest amount of the original sum—a sum in which, so to speak, the principal is as a mere speck of dust floating on the surface of a vast lake of interest. Here, too, it is that any man who chooses may, with a forged bond and a couple of bought witnesses, gain possession of land to which he has no more right than the man in the moon.* The abuses of these Courts, too, are not confined to indiscriminate granting of decrees; the wearisome length and intricacy of the pleadings, the thoughtless, machine-like procedure, the heavy costs, all combine to render them the terror of the ignorant and the simple.

Simply as a practical illustration of the working of our British institutions at the point where they directly come in contact with our Native subjects, I quote the following passage from Mr. Edwards' "Personal Adventures during the Rebellion":—

In the conversations I have had with Hurdeo Buksh, who is a very superior, intelligent man, he has given me to understand that the Omlaho



(revenue collectors) who were introduced in such shoals into Oude immediately after the annexation, were the curse of the country, and, in his plain-spoken phrase, 'made our rule to stink in the nostrils of the people.' . . . . . The Native officials they describe as regular harpies, and a Native deputy-collector who had been stationed at Saudee they frequently mention to me with expressions of deepest hatred. *This fellow, they assert, had a pair of slippers of extra size made, on purpose for 'shoe-beating' (the most disgraceful punishment that can be inflicted on a Native) in open kutcherry any one who refused to pay him what he demanded in the shape of bribes, or to sign any agreements respecting the disposal of their villages or land that he chose to fix upon, however unjust and ruinous to their interests these might be. Old Kussuree told me that he had paid 1,000 rupees in petitions alone, not one of which ever reached the Commissioner, and more than 6,000 rupees in bribes; notwithstanding which, he had lost the village farmed by him and his ancestors for many generations, and had been assessed so highly for those he had left, that he had only been able to pay his rent the preceding year by the sale of some of his family jewels, and a mare he highly valued; and this year, he said, he would no doubt have been a defaulter, and been sold up, had not the rebellion fortunately occurred.'*

There is yet another touch to be added before the picture is complete. Having invested the Indian money-lender with the special privileges enumerated above, having instituted Courts where forgery and perjury could be practised with almost perfect impunity, all that remained for a beneficent Government to do was to collect the revenue from its agricultural subjects in such a manner as to force them into the clutches of the money-lender. This, accordingly, by means of an ingenious process, the Government decided should be done. For a description of this process I shall have recourse once more to the experience and knowledge of Mr. C. Crosthwaite. He writes as follows. The extracts are long, but they will amply repay the labour of perusal.

Any one who has gone, about the middle of April, from Calcutta to Meerut must have noticed the various stages of progress of the harvest as he passed upwards. Below Benares the fields are all bare and brown. The corn is in the threshing floors; most of it is already trodden out. As the traveller goes northward more and more, fields of standing wheat and barley meet his eye; the stocks of gathered grain become smaller and fewer. When he reaches Allyghur, it will seem to him that the sun must have gone back, and the season changed. The crops that were rich and golden yesterday are lighter and less ripe to-day. Hardly a field is cut. If, when he reaches Meerut, he leaves the train and passes into Rohilkund, he will find the wheat still green, and the harvest-time two or three weeks to come. If the traveller is a stranger . . . . . will he not wonder to learn that the Government of these countries collects its rents from one and all at the same time; that the peasant whose wheat is still standing and green, and the man whose corn is already trodden out and dressed, have both to pay their rent on the same day? . . . . . Yes, we think a man would have to search long and far before he found a more apt illustration of "How not to do it" than is to be seen in our system of collecting the land revenue. If it was our object to make

the pressure of the revenue as severely felt as it could be, how better could we proceed? . . . . . We find that the harvest-time varies from the end of March to the end of April. We select a day that barely gives time to the peasantry to reap and sell their crops in the most forward districts, and make it rent-day for all. *Where the harvest is earliest, we drive the farmers to throw their produce into the market, and make the fortunes of the dealers; where the harvest is latest, we forestal it altogether, and compel the peasant to borrow his rent from the usurer. . . . . The result is that the people are enslaved to the usurer.* And to make the matter worse, the exorbitant interest which he got when there were no courts, and when his chance of getting the principal back was very small, is secured to the money-lenders by all the power of the British Government.

It is worth while, before closing this article, to follow in some detail the process whereby our agriculturists are enslaved to the usurer. Under Mr. Crosthwaite's competent guidance, we can trace it step by step. He takes an ordinary peasant, and goes through a year with him to see how he gets on:—

It is the beginning of October. He has six acres of land. Three of them are under autumn crops, and three are ploughed and ready for wheat and barley. The next thing is to get the seed. . . . In a big village hard by lives a fat Marwaree, who has the custom of all the country-side. Off to him hies our cultivator, with a dozen others on the same errand. For his three acres, he requires, in round numbers, three maunds of seed (a maund is eighty pounds). Wheat is selling now for thirty pounds and barley for forty pounds the rupee. The Marwaree, therefore, looks him as follows:—

	R.	A.	P.
Two maunds of wheat .....	5	5	4
One maund of barley .....	2	0	0
Total .....	7	5	4

Our friend then returns home with his three maunds of seed, and his debt of Rs.7-5-4. He is now busy, sowing his spring crops, and looking after his autumn harvest, none of which is yet ready to gather. October, however, has still a week to run when . . . rent-day has come round. The first instalment is due. The landlord has come for his rents. What is our cultivator to do? He has no cash, for, as we have seen, he has just been to borrow his seed. If he cannot pay, the landlord will distrain, and distraint means ruin. . . . The end, then, is that about fifteen days after he borrowed the seed, our friend is on his way again to the Marwaree. This time he wants cash. The whole country-side is then wanting cash; all at the same time; all for the same purpose; all because their crops are not ripe, and their rent is due. . . . He lies down that night with a heavy load of debt—Rs.7-5-4 for seed, and Rs.8-3-3 for rent. He and his wife talk it over before they go to sleep. Between them they make out that the debt comes to Rs.15-8-7. But the interest—they cannot count up that. Let us see what it will be. It is universally the custom to recover the advances made in April for seed at the harvest-time. The interest charged is at the rate of 50 per cent. per annum. . . . . Now, our friend borrowed in October for seed Rs.7-5-4. Let us see what he will have to pay in April. First, if he pays in money, he will have to return—

	R.	A.	P.
Principal.....	7	5	4
Interest .....	1	13	4
Total .....	9	2	8

But April is a long way off, and he has no time to think of it. He must, however, repay the money he borrowed for rent, and that soon. Such loans are given for a month only, and interest is charged at the rate of one anna per rupee. . . . . So about the 20th of November the cultivator has to find the sum of Rs.8-11-6 to repay the loan of Rs.8-3-3, that he took to pay his rent a month before. In a day or two he has also to pay his second instalment of Rs.8-3-3, to enable the zemindar to meet the revenue demand of December. But at this time he has not so much difficulty, if the season is good, in finding the money. Well, we need not visit our friend again until his harvest is ripening early in April. . . . . Down comes the zemindar again. There is another revenue instalment due on the 15th of May. He must get in his rents a month or fortnight before. The cultivator has to find Rs.8-3-3. again. Again he has to go to the Marwaree, and borrow the amount at the same moderate interest of 75 per cent. per annum.

In this detailed manner, Mr. Crosthwaite follows one of our Indian cultivators throughout the year, making out that, if all goes well, the man will have about twenty rupees wherewith to support himself and his family for more than six months. And he sums up as follows :—

Under the most favourable circumstances, the cultivator must borrow to pay half his rent, and pay interest for one month at the rate of 75 per cent. per annum. Out of every Rs.100 of rent, 50 are borrowed, and Rs.3-4 paid as interest to the money-lender. The revenue of the North-west Provinces is about four million pounds sterling; the rental cannot be less than seven millions. Therefore, in round numbers, about three millions are borrowed every year, and *one hundred thousand pounds paid as interest by the cultivators.* . . . . All this burden is simply thrown on the peasantry by the system of taking the rent before the crops are harvested. . . . . It appears, then, that by our system of collection, in the most favourable circumstances, at least one hundred thousand pounds sterling of the produce of the land are made over annually to the money-lenders. *This, however, only represents a portion of the loss actually caused to the peasantry; for it is seldom that things go so smoothly as we have supposed them, and the share of the money-lender in the produce is probably much more than the sum we have named.*

The reader who has perused the foregoing will not fail to understand how it is that the state of things has been brought about which is described in the following paragraph from the letter of a district officer addressed to the Government of the North-west Provinces, during the terrible famine of 1877-78 :—

*In the whole division, the difficulty which presents itself now is this. The poorer class of cultivators, the ploughmen and labourers, cannot get food*

*except with great difficulty.* The money-lenders close their advances to the cultivators, and the labourers have no work to do. The Banias (*i.e.*, money-lenders) are in the habit of feeding the poorer class of cultivators on the strength of, and on the security of, the crops on the ground; whenever there is little or no crop sown, or when the sown crop is endangered by drought, the Banias close their money-bags, and refuse food or its equivalent. *The people are then thrown on their own resources, which are nil.*

In other words, the North-west cultivator is the serf of the bania. The latter keeps him alive as long as it is profitable for him to do so; when the speculation ceases to be profitable, the bania closes his money-bags, and refuses food or its equivalent. The cultivator then perishes in the manner described in the following extract from an official report, dated 1878 :—

Whole families were carried off by one fatal meal. There is a weed called *batua*, which seems to be resorted to a great deal by people in distress, though it is a terribly dangerous food. . . . The general opinion was that so long as a man could get salt to mix with *batua*, and not less than four chitacs of grain to add to it, a long period could be tided over safely; but salt was said to be indispensable, and at widely distant points I heard the same expression—“Those who died were those who could not get salt to eat with their *batua*.” With or without salt, however, diet of nothing but *batua* for four or five days was so they said, more than the strongest could stand.

In the foregoing article I have purposely abstained from advancing anything as the results of my own observation. I have drawn my testimony entirely from official sources, and it certainly seems to me that a more terrible picture of hopeless, unrelieved maladministration the liveliest imagination would fail to conceive. I should only weaken its effect if I attempted to comment upon it.

ROBERT D. OSBORN.

## THE IRISH LAND QUESTION.

*(By a Colonial Landlord.)*

SINCE the conquest of Ireland by England, the land has been a fertile cause of contention ; and there has been good cause for this strife. Until that time the Irish soil was tribal property, and was merely subject to certain claims of, and duties exacted by, the chief of the sept or clan, which were not very burdensome. The Maories of New Zealand have held their land by a similar tenure from time immemorial. The British Government asserted its sovereignty in that country, and ignored the rights of the Maories. This policy, which cannot be justified, was the cause of much warfare and bloodshed. We had ultimately to withdraw the British troops, and counsel the colonists to deal with the rights of property in a more equitable manner. The colonists have now to buy out the tribal claims before attempting to occupy or alienate the land. Had this policy been pursued in Ireland, centuries of conflict and chronic warfare would have been avoided. The soil of Ireland has been repeatedly confiscated and handed over to Court favourites, without reference to the rights of the people, or those of their chiefs.

When the "plantation of Ulster" was effected, the remnant of Celtic population was driven to the bogs and mountains, or "sent to hell or Connaught," in other cases, to make room for the stronger party. The land was granted in fee to "undertakers," who were bound to introduce a given population in each case. These British settlers were secured in their position as tenants, and held their farms on very easy terms, but had at times to fight for their lives, and for the protection of their families and property. The massacre of 1641, and their share in the war of the Revolution Settlement, were the consequences of their position. An instance may be given of the rental value of an Ulster farm some 200 years since. A tenant was offered a lease in perpetuity at 2s. 6d. per acre. He declined the lease, saying that he did not object to the rent, but he would not agree that it should be paid for all time. The rent now paid

for that farm is 30s. per acre. It should be borne in mind that in this case, as in Ulster generally, the tenants have made, and still make, all improvements at their own cost. This practice, together with the concurrent custom of selling their tenant-right, has been the chief source of the exceptional prosperity of the province of Ulster. While the tenant's interest is worth, on the average, £15 per acre, or half that of the landlord, the property of the latter is of much greater value than that of landlords in the south and west. The Land Act of 1870 only protected the interest of the Ulster tenant to half its value, and he has to go into the law courts to recover that moiety. And landlords have the assurance to call the Land Act "spoliation and robbery," though we learn from the returns of the Irish Government, as published in the *Times*, that the selling value of Irish land has increased from sixteen and a half years' purchase in 1868 to twenty-two and a half in 1878. At a recent sale of land in Ulster many of the tenants were prepared to bid high for their farms, but as twenty-nine years' purchase was given by a noble landowner, the tenants have to remain in serfdom, and the purchaser may, as many buyers of Irish property have done, raise the rent so much as to pay 5 instead of  $3\frac{1}{4}$  per cent. A southern landlord, writing in the *Times* some months since, says that his estate affords a return of 5 per cent. on the cost, and that his neighbours are more severe upon their tenants. Mr. Bence Jones, writing in *Fraser's Magazine*, advocates the elimination of all thriftless people from estates. If they could be disposed of as breeders sell their "culls," his scheme might work; but we are told of the poor that they shall be "always with us." It would not be to the advantage of neighbouring estates if such deportation were practised.

Irish landlords do not deal fairly by their tenants, as will appear, when we compare the position of the Crown tenants in Australia with that of the former. In both cases, the tenants generally make all improvements at their own cost. In those colonies, as in Ulster, the tenant's interest is about equal in value to half the fee simple. But Crown tenants have the liberty of free sale; they also have fixity of tenure. If an increased rent is imposed, the tenant can have it referred to arbitrators mutually appointed. The rent may thus be fixed for from ten to twenty-five years. The writer has acted as the tenant's arbitrator in an area of 300,000 acres. The result of this liberal dealing is that the return to both parties is threefold more than under even the Ulster system. The writer could give many colonial examples, in which the stock-bearing capacity of the land has been trebled at the tenant's cost in thirty

years. The system is equally profitable to the tenants and to the State. It is worthy of mention that many of the largest holders of Crown lands are Irishmen, and that agrarian crime is quite unknown. "There is that scattereth, but yet increaseth; there is that withholdeth more than is meet; but it tendeth to poverty." Under the wretched system which prevails in Ireland, if the tenant is industrious, he is none the better off, and if idle none the worse. When an Ulster tenant was asked why he did not whitewash his dwelling and show more taste, he said, the result would be the demand of a higher rent. Another spent £10 per acre in reclaiming a waste portion of his farm. His landlord thereupon increased the rent by 10s. per acre, charging him 5 per cent. in perpetuity on his own outlay. Many cases could be given where Irish tenants have doubled, trebled, and even increased the rental value tenfold, but they had no legal security before the passing of the Land Act of 1870. It is affirmed by the best authorities, and well exemplified in Kay's "Free Trade in Land," that the produce of the Irish soil could be doubled in the hands of a peasant proprietary. Of course the majority of landlords are opposed to any such change. The present policy of most Ulster landlords appears to be the absorption of the tenants' interest by the maintenance of a rent which foreign competition has made too high by one-third. The tenants are quite willing to bear their proportion of the lessened value of produce, according to their interest in the soil. While British landlords have reduced their rents, in many cases which could be given, by 20, 40, and even 50 per cent.; Irish owners prefer a liberal use of military and police force to evict the tenants when they fail to pay an exorbitant rent. It is the landlords who opposed the repeal of the Corn Laws, and the Land Act of 1870, against which some 300 amendments were proposed.

Perhaps the only effective remedy for Ireland's misery is a land system similar to that of Prussia. In Seeley's "Life and Times of Stein," p. 189, it is said of the Prussian peasantry of his day that "the want of credit made enterprise impossible to them, kept the standard of cultivation and of comfort low, and forced them to apply to the State for assistance when misfortune fell on them. They now, when ruin falls on them, expect more from the State than the State is in a condition to give." The past condition of Prussia is the present condition of Ireland. In Prussia, the respective interests of landlord and tenant were ascertained and settled by a general rule. The combined interest was offered for sale to the highest bidder. The tenants were generally the purchasers, and the State advanced the cash for the purchase of the landlords' interest,

which advance has been repaid in a term of years by the tenants. Where the cultivators are the owners of the land, they will have something in reserve for bad seasons. They can also, as has been observed of the French peasantry, enable the State to meet such a demand as the German war indemnity. It is freely admitted that many Irish and British landlords are fair and equitable in their demands, but the course of the House of Lords may lead to a more sweeping measure of reform than would otherwise be needful.

It has been alleged that Irish misery is owing to the prevalence of Romanism; but the Belgians (of whom but one in thirty-five is Protestant) and also the French are highly prosperous, loyal, and contented. These, as well as the Prussian peasantry, are in a better condition than the Protestants of Ulster, as their land laws are more equitable. The demands of many Irish landlords and the agitation which is kept up by the Home Rulers are equally unreasonable. The landlords should get justice, and nothing more. In granting the fee to Court favourites, the State did not divest itself of the power of protecting the cultivators of the soil. If these are oppressed, they should be protected, as they would have been upon Crown lands. Crime is said to be specially prevalent in Ireland. This is true as regards agrarian crime, but such crime, as well as Lynch law in America, is owing to the want of legal protection to life and property. What is called agrarian crime is generally serving threatening notices. The operation of the Land Act reduced such crime to one-fourth in eight years. As to rural crime in Ireland, in proportion to a similar population in England, the number of cases is as six to seven. As the English crime is greater, it is also more brutal.

British statesmen have been, and are still, responsible for the disloyalty of the Celtic people in Ireland. Their land has been confiscated, their faith proscribed, their trade and manufactures suppressed, and their civil liberties abridged. While supporting religious ordinances for themselves, they were compelled to maintain an Established Church. Had Irish Romanists been treated as the French Canadians were, they would have been equally peaceable and loyal.

The peasantry of the French province of Picardy have a tenant-right custom which, being without legal protection, has been maintained for ages by agrarian outrages. "This custom, styled *mauvais gré*, or *droit de marché*, prevents landlords from raising their rents, or ousting their tenants. The traditional belief is that, centuries ago, the tenants and owners came to an agreement, orally, whereby, in consequence of a sum of money given by the former, the owners allowed the tenants to become hereditary tenants in



perpetuity at a fixed rent, then arranged. This copyhold is not recognized by the tribunals, but is upheld by public opinion. Farms from which tenants are ousted cannot be let, as the new tenants would find themselves sent to Coventry, all neighbourly assistance being refused them. In former times the landlords even ran the risk of murder or incendiarism, but judicial severities, the opening of roads, &c., have nearly, if not altogether, extirpated these reprisals." The tenants' interest in that region is from one-third to one-half the value of the landlords' interest.

The plantation of Ulster began in 1606. The land was let to the original tenants in those days at a rent of 1s. per acre, which was probably the rental value of land in the south and west also at that time. It should be borne in mind that (as has been mentioned) the tenants have not only made all the improvements which have increased so largely the rental value, but they have also paid the agents 6d. per £ for receiving the rent. We find that 370 acres of the recently sold land which is mentioned above, taken in consocutive lots, is let at 19s. per acre. The tenants who represent this increased rental value, which has been effected by their own and their predecessors' outlay, are certainly entitled to more consideration than so-called owners who have spent nothing on the land. The rent on the Hertford estate, 150 years since, was from 3s. to 5s. per acre; it is now 29s. nearly.

The Landed Estates' Court was brought into existence chiefly by landlords' legislation, which may account for the tenant-right being sold in such cases as part of the fee. The tenants on the land thus sold not only had their property confiscated, but in many cases were either ousted, or had their rent doubled. Lord Waveney tells us that such land was bought so as to pay 3½ per cent., and the rent raised so heavily as to afford 5 per cent. on the investment. This increase would just buy the fee in thirty-five years, under the Bright Clauses of the Land Act. In 1770 a number of "noble" proprietors in Ulster offered to let their land to the highest bidders, quite ignoring the tenants' interest in the soil. This gave rise to the associations in Ulster called Hearts of Oak and Hearts of Steel, and an agitation commenced which assumed almost the form of a civil war, when the rebels were able to treat with the Commandant at Carrickfergus and the Mayor of Belfast for the delivery of prisoners. The people maintained their rights, but the feeling of injustice drove many to America, where they afterwards fought successfully for independence. When Cornwallis surrendered in America, it was found that seven American generals were present whose fathers had been exiled from Ulster and their tenant-right

confiscated. The misconduct of the landlords, abetted by the wretched Government of the day, caused many of the Ulster tenants to join in the Rebellion of 1798. The state of the Irish land laws both then and at the present time can scarcely be matched, except in Turkey. We urge the necessity of reform in that empire, but we have still enough to do in that way nearer home.

We lend countless millions of our wealth to Greeks, Spaniards, Peruvians, Egyptians, and Turks, but neglect the development of Irish and Indian resources alike. If the State were to buy Irish property when offered in the market, so as to pay  $3\frac{1}{2}$  per cent., the cash could be raised most readily. There are £170,000,000 lying in the Savings and other Banks, which afford, say,  $2\frac{1}{2}$  per cent. on the average. Tenants could pay 5 per cent. as a rent, with the clear prospect of clearing the freehold in thirty-five years, while the increased productiveness of the land would lessen the burden from year to year. We find by the returns of the Commissioners, that even during last year the rents of Irish Church land so held are well paid, the arrears being only  $3\frac{1}{2}$  per cent., with the prospect of being fully paid. The rents of British farms are certainly not paid nearly so well. Cash could be raised by bonds, as in the case of the French war indemnity, in sums down to £5, and made easily transferable. The holders of such stock and the cultivators of the land would be both loyal subjects and good citizens. A divided ownership of the soil is most disadvantageous. Some Ulster landlords have bought the tenants' interest, like honest men, at £16 per acre, and the productiveness of such land has been vastly increased.

The Irish people have little to depend upon for subsistence but the produce of the soil. The land is a fixed quantity, a monopoly in the hands of a few; while the population is steadily increasing. The result is a competition which leads to the promise of rents which, in many thousands of cases during the last year, were in excess of the whole value of the produce. Beef, hams, pork, butter, cheese, and corn, which were formerly supplied by Ireland to Britain, are now sent largely to Ireland from America. The State loans to Irish landlords at 1 per cent. will probably cost the tenants 5 per cent. in their rents. Such loans, as well as the charity which is so frequently required to prevent famine, are rates in aid of rack-rents. It appears that two boys of ten and twelve years of age walked from Cork to Dublin, 200 miles, to get £2, which enabled their father to make up his rent of £8 from the Famine Relief Fund. While the rents on some Irish estates are below the Government valuation, the rents

upon others are double, treble, and even four and a half times greater. A moderate rent for the time does not ensure progress, as the death of the landlord or the sale of the property, may lead to the absorption of the tenant's interest.

The amendment which was introduced to the Land Act of 1870 by a Scotch member shows the ignorance or animus that existed in the House as to the Irish Land Question. This clause would have extinguished the tenant's claims where he had a lease for thirty-one years. The payment of a full rent for this term would swamp the outlay of nearly 300 years ! It would be equally just if the landlord's interest were dealt with in the same way. The Scotch land system is excellent, but it should not be introduced by a penalty upon the Ulster tenant and a bonus to the landlord of £15 per acre. The writer may be permitted to add that he owns 40,000 acres of colonial land, which is let at a fixed rent for a term of years, the owner making all needful improvements. The State is welcome to resume possession of the property at its market value, should the course be thought conducive to the public welfare. There is no landlord and tenant difficulty, nor is the rent ever in arrear.

It has been proposed to extend tenant-right as it exists in Ulster to all Ireland ; but the Ulster Custom does not afford adequate protection. In some cases it does not secure freedom of sale ; in others the price is restricted to £5 per acre. In all cases, the rent may be kept so high as to absorb the tenant's interest. Some tenants, even after gaining their suits for disturbance of occupation by exorbitant rents, have been compelled by circumstances to continue at the rack-rent. It would appear that in such circumstances there is no other course but selling the combined interest and paying the ousted party, or parties, the value of their interest in the property. The case between landlords and tenants in Ireland might be dealt with as in the compulsory winding up of an unworkable partnership. As the matter stands there, in many cases it is open warfare. The value of the respective interests of the parties could be ascertained by taking cases where there has been no infringement by either party. Neither should gain by his wrong-doing in the past. A more liberal policy on the part of landowners in the past (as has been shown above) would have been mutually advantageous. There are 10,000 landlords in Ireland, and some 600,000 tenants. The welfare of sixty tenants is as important as that of one landlord, especially as one-half the landlords are absentees. In very many cases, the tenants even in late years have doubled or trebled the rental value, as has been stated above, and in others which could be given have increased

the value from 2s. 6d. to 30s. per acre. Indeed, they have raised the letting value by their improvements nearly twentyfold in less than three centuries. We may ask, under these circumstances, whether the so-called owners, or the tenants, have the larger equitable interest in the soil. We have observed that the rental value of Irish land in 1606 was 1s. per acre. About ten years since, a vast area of Victorian pasture was forfeited by the tenants' non-observance of the land laws. When that land was opened to competition, it was let at a rent of 1s. per acre.

A word, in conclusion, as to the late purchase of Ulster land on behalf of a large proprietor. Though many of the tenants were prepared to buy their farms at the same price, this proprietor would have all or none. "Woe unto them . . . that lay field to field till there be no place, that they may be placed alone in the midst of the earth."

CHARLES WILSON.

*Cheltenham, Sept. 1880.*

## STATE GRANARIES IN INDIAN FAMINES.

IN the dissent recorded by Professor Caird and Mr. Sullivan from the Report of their colleagues, they insist that it "might not only be expedient, but absolutely necessary" for the State to provide granaries for the supply of food to the people, as a precaution against famine.

There are certain localities in Southern, Western, and Central India which are now, and may continue to be for some time, distant from the lines of railway communication, and which are in an especial degree liable to visitations of famine. For these comparatively inaccessible tracts, which we may reckon at one-fifth part of India, with a population of forty millions, we suggest a plan of storage to show that the measure is not the financial impossibility indicated in the Report; and if our views as to its necessity be accepted, we recommend its being adopted tentatively on a limited scale, leaving the extension of the operations to be decided by the success or otherwise of the experiment. . . . The food of the people is of the simplest kind, grain and salt, and a few condiments for a relish. The grain is easy to handle, bears storage in pits for many years, and the people themselves grind it as they require it. The pits are made in the ground, in a manner with which the Natives are familiar, and cost nothing beyond the encircling ring of baked clay, and labour, in construction. We propose no new practice, but recommend that, in outlying places, the Government should, through their resident officials, do for the safety of the poorer class what the wealthier now do for themselves. The people live on different varieties of dry grain grown in their several districts, which is the specific food they are accustomed to. As this common grain is rarely an article of export, its storage would in no way interfere with the operation of foreign trade, and as the storage would be subdivided in every village, it could be done without disturbance to the usual operations of husbandry. In seasons of abundance stores may very conveniently be made. A village of four hundred inhabitants, cultivating four hundred acres of grain, may be reckoned to have forty of the class for whom storage is here proposed. A store of seven tons would suffice for this number during a year of famine, and as severe famines, on an average, come as yet but once in eleven or twelve years, the quantity so required might be secured out of two years of good crops during that interval, at the rate of three and a half tons for each time, without any pressure on the rest of the people, while the storage of that quantity of grain would be a simple and inexpensive operation.

In reply to these suggestions, their official colleagues say :—

The dangers and difficulties consequent on the storage of grain by the Government would be very great, especially in respect to the manner in which the stores of grain should be utilized, and in which the Government should

regulate its action in opening or closing the stores. The result, upon the dealers in grain, of the Government suddenly opening the stores when prices rose beyond a certain fixed amount, and upon the people when the stores were closed, the local trade having meanwhile been destroyed or its action paralyzed, must, we think, be disastrous.

Thus the experience gained in Behar in 1874, when the Government of Lord Northbrook did actually form such stores, under every disadvantage that could attend the haste with which the measure had to be adopted, is entirely ignored. No practical difficulty whatever was experienced, as to deciding when to open the stores or when to close them. The only effect of the measure upon the grain-dealers, was to prevent their using the monopoly in their hands to starve the people, by sending up the price of grain out of all proportion to its scarcity. Efforts were repeatedly made by the dealers to run the price up to eight or ten pounds per rupee, when the opening of the Government stores at once dropped it to twenty pounds, the price at which the Government sold. The measure in no way discouraged the importations of the private trader, as the price at the Government stores left an enormous margin of profit to stimulate his exertions. With this experience fresh in every one's memory, the Commission nevertheless justify Lord Lytton's fatal refusal to adopt the same course. "The result of such stores," they say, "must, we think, be disastrous." But there is no room for speculating upon the results, when the measure has been already tried, and its effects seen. The formation of these Government stores by Lord Northbrook under every possible disadvantage, was attended by success. While they were in course of formation, the prophets of evil never ceased to affirm, just as this Commission does now, that private trade "would be paralyzed thereby." Their vaticinations were falsified throughout. But then the measure *ought* to have paralyzed trade, though it did not, and the result *ought* to have been "disastrous," though it was not. The bias under which they deal with the question, arises from the fact that the business of General Strachey and his Civilian colleagues was to find excuses for Sir John Strachey's reversal of Lord Northbrook's policy. It would never have done to let it go forth to the world that Lord Northbrook had discovered the way to encounter famine successfully, and that, by refusing to follow it, Lord Lytton had starved several millions of people to death. But the Commissioners are superior to the teachings of experience, and if the facts are against them, so much the worse for the facts. And so they fall back upon a system of philosophizing, and say:—

We greatly fear that any system of Government storing, if once brought

home to the people, would produce most fatal effects on their prudential habits ; and that the existence of a public granary in every village, ready to be thrown open whenever distress passed beyond a certain point, would be a standing encouragement to improvidence and recklessness, and to that most dangerous of popular vices, the disposition to force the Government to grant public charity. The plan would strike a death-blow at that healthy development of the internal trade of the country, now in an early stage, but steadily thriving under the encouragement given by the extension of railways and complete free trade, and it would raise a fatal barrier to the growth of those qualities of self-reliance in the community without which the country can never raise itself in the scale of civilization. Chronic famine is, we are satisfied, one of the diseases of the infancy of nations, and its remedy will never be found in prolonging the tutelage of the State, and least of all in measures which would render escape from such tutelage almost impossible.

We have here the old tradition once more in full blossom. The great, the overwhelming danger is the doing too much for the people ! How hard it is to write dispassionately about it all ! You have just starved five millions of people to death, by maundering in this idle way about the danger of doing too much at such periods ; and wherever and whenever the calamity has arisen, your moralizing has resulted in the same catastrophe. And the danger still is the same. "Take care ; for God's sake, take care that you do not demoralize the people." It is a calumny upon the peasantry of India to depict them as a race ready to take advantage of, and abuse the assistance of the State. We appeal to every one who knows the patient, frugal, and industrious character of that peasantry, whether it is not a slander to speak of them in this way, simply to justify the crime of having left them to perish, as they were left to perish by the Government of India in 1877 and 1878. "Chronic famine is, we are satisfied, one of the diseases of the infancy of nations." So the Hindus and Mohammedans of India are in the infancy of nations, poor barbarians of the Red Indian order, because, we suppose, they have never had a poor law amongst them ; every man maintaining his own poor while he has anything to maintain them with, and even insisting, as a matter of honour and religion, upon discharging his father's debts, though he have left nothing else behind him. The deadly insincerity of these moralizings, simply to "whitewash" the crime that has been committed, moves us very deeply. But we are further assured that—

No Government has ever succeeded in such a measure as that which is here proposed. The repeated and continued attempts to alleviate the difficulty of securing the food-supply of the people by direct State interference, which have been made in our own country and elsewhere, have always ended in failure, and the safety of the populations and their freedom from extreme fluctuation of the

price of bread were only assured from the time when all such efforts were finally abandoned.

Witness, we suppose, the Irish famine of 1847-8. Bishop Colenso having demolished the Pentateuch, the Commissioners are, no doubt, entitled to treat the story of the great Egyptian famine, which was successfully surmounted by the formation of State granaries under Divine direction, as a fable. And yet some of them would, we believe, be uneasy at such a challenge. We are ourselves old-fashioned enough to believe, and have long so believed, that this very story of a famine, without precedent for its duration, is written in this old Book of the Hebrews, for the enlightenment of all after times. Is it not odd that the one famine that has been successfully treated in modern times—the only one—was surmounted by Lord Northbrook's taking a leaf out of the old Hebrew book?

The great Hebrew statesman, under Divine enlightenment, prepared for the famine of which he was forewarned, by the formation of State granaries, and carried the people of Egypt through a seven years' famine with complete success, while making it the occasion of a great fiscal revolution, which the economists of our own day have only now discovered to be the model on which *all* fiscal systems should be cast. "He took up a fifth of the land of Egypt" for the State revenue. In other words, the Hebrew Minister divined, by enlightenment from on high, that a land-tax of 20 per cent. of the produce was the proper resource of the national revenue, and that State granaries of food were the right means of encountering famine. And, strange to tell, the economists and statesmen of the nineteenth century begin to discern that he was absolutely right in his fiscal policy, while Professor Caird declares him to have been right in his famine policy too. Our official Commissioners meanwhile assure us positively, that no "Government ever succeeded in such a measure" as that very measure which Joseph was divinely inspired to take, and took with complete success. The gentlemen who "sit in the seat of the scornful" may smile at our fanaticism if they like, but it is a fanaticism of a good many years' standing now, and we are not likely to be cured of it. Many years ago, we wrote upon this very subject as we write now, and we have seen no answer to it.



## RESTITUTION OF BERAR.—II.

## THE NAWAB SIR SALAR JUNG.

ON a previous occasion\* I explained how, in 1853, by dint of "objurgations and threats" of military coercion, some of the richest provinces of the Nizam's dominions were assigned to British management, in pledge for a debt which, by official admission, the Nizam did not owe, and on the plea of treaty obligations which were acknowledged in secret conclave not to exist. I explained also that, according to Colonel Low, the British Plenipotentiary, "the whole negotiation," though backed by the most alarming menaces, would have failed, unless he had consented to the exclusion from the Treaty of 1853 of every word involving or implying "permanence" in the territorial assignment. "Fearing that the whole negotiation might fail," Colonel Low "announced formally that, if his Highness wished it, the districts might be made over merely for a time, to maintain the Contingent as long as he might require it."†

The same terms and conditions were claimed and conceded in the correspondence regarding the Treaty of 1860. No circumstance up to that year had in the least degree modified the position of protest and remonstrance which the Nizam Nasir-ood-Dowla took up against the sequestration of 1853, and which was kept up by his son, Afzul-ood-Dowla, who succeeded in 1857. The Viceroy in Council had before him a series of appeals for restitution when the negotiations were set on foot for the Treaty of 1860, under which, two districts were restored to the Nizam's administration, while certain cessions and indemnities were gained for the Government of India. Notwithstanding continued importunity and pressure, no phrase or form indicating "permanence" found its way into the new treaty. To remove the last misgivings of the Nizam, the Government of India again declared "the alienation of this portion of the dominions of his Highness to be temporary only," so

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\* "Restitution of the Berar Provinces," STATESMAN, No. 2, July, 1880, pp. 102 to 185.

† Papers, "Nizam's Debts" (418 of 1854), p. 122.

that it "will still form an integral part of the Nizam's Dominions, and will be restored to his Highness entire whenever it shall seem fit to the two Governments to terminate the engagement under which the Contingent is maintained."\*

The continuous appeal of two successive Nizams was thus partially met by the restitution of two districts in 1860, with a renewal of the original understanding that the assignment of the Berar provinces, still left "in trust," was temporary and terminable.

The aim and end of the Treaty of 1860 was partly, as declared in the preamble, to "mark the high esteem in which his Highness the Nizam is held by Her Majesty the Queen, in recognition of the services rendered by his Highness personally, and by the Government of Hyderabad, during the revolt of 1857-8,"† and partly to afford reparation and obtain indemnity for the defective observance of the Treaty of 1853 by the stronger party, the British Government. Here are some official admissions on the subject. "The provisions of the Treaty of 1853," says Mr. Aitchison, Under Secretary in the Indian Foreign Office, "which required the submission of annual accounts of the Assigned Districts to the Nizam, were productive of much inconvenience and embarrassing discussions."‡

Under Article 8 of the Treaty of 1853, the British Resident was bound to "render true and faithful accounts to the Nizam every year of the receipts and disbursements, and to make over the surplus revenue to his Highness." No surplus revenue was paid, and no accounts were rendered for seven years—hence the "embarrassing discussions." "By the Treaty," wrote the Viceroy in Council on the 7th of July, 1860, "we are bound to render these accounts every year, and it is not creditable that this should not have been done."§ Under the Government of Lord Lawrence, in a despatch dated 13th February, 1867, "the omission to furnish annual accounts" was "confessed to have been a dereliction from the letter of Article 8 of the Treaty of 1853."||

The cause of no surplus revenue being paid, though veiled by the absence of accounts, was well known to the Nizam, and fully

\* Papers, "Hyderabad Assigned Districts" (338 of 1867), pp. 20, 21.

† "Hyderabad Administration Report" for 1861-2, paragraph 161.

‡ "Collection of Treaties," Calcutta, 1864 (London: Longmans and Co.). Vol. V., p. 10. Mr. C. U. Aitchison, who has been Foreign Secretary to the Government of India, is now one of the Viceroy's Councillors.

§ Papers, "Hyderabad Assigned Districts" (338 of 1867), p. 7.

|| Papers, "Cession of Berar" (29 of 1867), p. 21.

admitted by the British Resident. It arose, in the words of the latter, from "the extravagance of our management," contrary to verbal assurances, during the negotiation of the Treaty, the written provisions of which were actually broken by the annual accounts being withheld. "There is no doubt," wrote the Resident, Colonel Davidson, on the 6th of July, 1859, "that General Low allowed the former Minister, Suraj-ool-Moolk, and the present one, Salar Jung, to suppose that our management would cost about two annas in the rupee, or about 12½ per cent. on the revenue;" "and I distinctly remember," he continues, "its being made use of as an argument to induce compliance in signing the Treaty by General Low."\* After much discussion at Hyderabad and much correspondence with the Resident, the equity of the case advanced by the Nizam's Minister was in substance acknowledged. The Viceroy in Council, in a despatch dated 7th July, 1860, taking into consideration "the expectation of the Nizam, when the Treaty was signed, that the expense of managing the districts would not exceed two annas in the rupee, or 12½ per cent.," and also "the circumstances under which, and the objects for which, the Treaty was made," declared himself "not disposed to charge the Nizam, for administering a country which really belongs to him, more than he would himself have incurred, and more proportionally than he incurs in the rest of his dominions." The Government of India, therefore, agreed "to admit the excess civil expenditure "of past years as a set-off against the Nizam's debt of fifty lakhs of Hyderabad rupees."† "This debt, however," it must be remembered, in the subsequent words of Colonel Davidson, the Resident, "the present Nizam" (1862) "and his father equally refused to acknowledge. They brought counter-claims against the British Government, which, they justly complained, had been neither recognized nor refuted." "It is not to be wondered at," continues the Resident, "that his Highness the Nizam fails to regard the remission as a spontaneous and unequivocal gift."‡

It is not, consequently, to be wondered at that the imperfect restitution of 1860, accompanied as it was by valuable concessions to the British Government, was not regarded by the Nizam as a satisfactory or final settlement. The negotiations of 1860 had been opened, in the words of the letter from the Resident to the Nawab

\* Papers, "Hyderabad Assigned Districts" (338 of 1867), pp. 4, 5.

† Papers, "Hyderabad Assigned Districts" (338 of 1867), p. 9.

‡ Administration Report of the "Hyderabad Assigned Districts for 1861-62" (Despatch No. 26, dated 26th June, 1862), paragraph 150.

Salar Jung, "in consequence of your having repeatedly requested, on the part of his Highness the Nizam, that I would submit to the Governor-General that the whole of the Assigned Districts should be restored to his Highness." \* That request was from time to time renewed, as occasion offered, after the conclusion of the Treaty of 1860, until, in 1866, in a letter from the Minister, dated the 27th of October, when the Government of India was bent on the annexation of Mysore, the Nizam offered to give up his reversionary right to share in the lapse of that State with some minor claims, in return for the restoration of the Assigned Districts. This offer was rejected by the Governor-General in Council "*with censure.*" † The Nawab Salar Jung was personally rebuked, in a despatch dated the 13th of February, 1867, for what was called his "erroneous statement"—really one of perfect accuracy—"that the anticipated lapse of the Mysore State arises only and exclusively from the want of an heir, or the refusal of the British Government to permit the Rajah to adopt one. Sir Salar Jung," says the Governor-General in Council, "takes too much upon himself, when he attempts to instruct the Government of India in the interpretation of treaties to which the Hyderabad Durbar is not a party." ‡ The intended rebuke was equally unmannerly and unfair. Sir Salar Jung did not "take too much upon himself;" he took nothing upon himself; he represented the Nizam's Government, and spoke in the name of his Sovereign. Sir Salar Jung's letter was, moreover, pronounced to be "unworthy alike of his princely master's dignity, and of his own reputation for enlightened statesmanship," to be pervaded by "a spirit of extravagant assertion," and to leave the Governor-General in Council "no alternative but to require that the future communications of the Hyderabad Durbar shall be framed in a tone more serious and circumspect." §

The style of this ineffectual scolding is, it will be observed, rather departmental than diplomatic. The words are more suitable for a refractory subordinate than for the duly authorized Minister of an allied and protected State. It is a standing device of Anglo-Indian "Political Agency" to evade the merits of a troublesome appeal by a personal challenge, to meet importunity by intimidation. But in this instance the extreme irritation is intelligible, and was unquestionably genuine. The Nawab Salar Jung, quite uncon-

\* Papers, "Hyderabad Assigned Districts" (338 of 1867), p. 17.

† Papers, "Cession of Berar" (20 of 1867), p. 23.

‡ Papers, "Cession of Berar" (20 of 1867), p. 19.

§ Papers, "Cession of Berar" (20 of 1867), p. 11.

sciously, had touched the very heart of the matter. His real offence was, not that he had presumed to interpret the Subsidiary Treaty between the East India Company and the Rajah of Mysore, "to which the Nizam was not a party," but that in a solitary allusion to that treaty he had impugned the main argument by which the Calcutta Secretariat was attempting to justify the annexation of Mysore. The authorities at Calcutta were arguing that by that misgovernment of his territories which led to their sequestration, the Rajah had "infringed," or failed to fulfil, the "conditions" of his treaty. They were arguing, also, that the Rajah's rights were "personal," not "heritable." \*

Both these positions were most innocently assailed, at a momentous crisis of the controversy, by the Nawab Salar Jung. In his despatch of the 27th of October, 1866, he stated, quite correctly, that the British Government had resolved "to annex the Mysore territory on the death of the aged Rajah."† He could not have anticipated that this resolution of Lord Palmerston's Cabinet would be reversed by that of Lord Derby which had just succeeded to power. He could not have known that his despatch would come up for consideration just as the fate of Mysore was trembling in the balance. "Soon after Lord Cranborne" (now Marquis of Salisbury) "took office, he wrote a despatch in the Secret Department ordering that, on the death of the Maharajah, no steps should be taken towards the annexation of Mysore without communication with the Home Government."‡ Then commenced the last struggle for annexation, and the interference of the Nizam was peculiarly inopportune. It might just turn the scale. Salar Jung must be silenced or put down. Not being a Deputy Collector, or an Assistant Commissioner, he was not to be so easily silenced or put down; but even if the appeal of 1867 had not been dismissed "with censure," its basis and the offered consideration had alike disappeared when the project of annexing Mysore was finally renounced by Her Majesty's Ministers.

The two successive Nizams with whom the Treaties of 1853 and 1860 were concluded, never ceased to maintain a position of dissent and remonstrance against the sequestration of their provinces, which they looked upon as a heavy loss and bitter humiliation unjustly forced upon them by threats of military coercion. The hope of complete restitution formed the guiding principle of their policy,

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\* "Mysore Papers" (112 of 1866), pp. 6, 48, 59, 60, &c.

† Papers, "Cession of Berar" (29 of 1867), p. 8.

‡ "Mysore Papers" (271 of 1867), p. 11.

and each of them, to his latest breath, made it a subject of reproach against the Nawab Salar Jung that his uncle had lost the Berars, and that he had not sufficient zeal or ability to regain them.

The Nizam Afzul-ood-Dowlah died, somewhat suddenly, on the 26th of February, 1869, and was succeeded by his infant son, the present Nizam. It was at once arranged, with the approval of the Government of India—the Minister, the Resident, and the chief nobles of Hyderabad concurring almost by acclamation—that while Salar Jung should remain at the head of the administration, the Nawab Shums-ool-Oomra should be associated with him as Co-Regent to represent the Hyderabad State, and to have charge of the Sovereign's person. [It was admitted by the Viceroy in Council that the absolute independence in all its internal affairs secured to the State of Hyderabad by treaty, had suffered no diminution in consequence of the Prince being a minor. This was officially notified in the despatch from the Government of India, No. 394A, dated the 22nd of March, 1869, written on the occasion of his Highness's accession, in which this passage occurs: "It is not the wish of his Excellency that the representative of, the British Government should, for the future, possess more direct control over the internal affairs of the State, than has lately been exercised." Furthermore, the Governor-General expresses himself anxious "to maintain the independence of the administration," and intimates his "great satisfaction that the future administration of affairs will be placed entirely in the hands of Sir Salar Jung and of the Ameer-i-Kabeer," and his desire that "care should be taken that no interference should be exercised on the part of any person whatever with the power of the two noblemen who are the chiefs of the administration." It was, in short, completely recognized by the British Government as consonant with the existing treaties and with the usages of all States, that the Regents were to have the fullest powers in every way to act for their youthful Sovereign.

The Nawab Shums-ool-Oomra, more usually designated by his higher title of Ameer-i-Kabeer, or "the Great Lord," was unquestionably the chief of all the Hyderabad nobles, the head of a family closely connected with that of the Nizam by many inter-marriages. As hereditary Commander of the Pagah, or household troops, he held a large *jaghire* on military tenure, besides a considerable estate for the maintenance of his personal dignity. He was not particularly enamoured of the reforms that had signalized the whole course of the Nawab Salar Jung's administration. He stood on the old ways, and was naturally inclined to sympathize with the Munsubdars, or chieftains, whose military fiefs and hereditary jurisdic-

tion were being gradually resumed and reduced, as occasion offered, under the Minister's process of judicial reform, administrative uniformity, and universal subjection to the law. Still, he was an honest, well-meaning man, open to conviction, and by no means inclined to perverse and vexatious opposition. An understanding, more or less definite, was established between the Regents, that executive details were to be left, as before, in the hands of the Nawab Salar Jung, who would consult his colleague in such matters of weight as had hitherto been submitted for the sanction or confirmation of the Nizam, and in all affairs affecting the relations of Hyderabad with the Imperial Government of India.

On one matter of great moment, the Regents were completely of one accord. They considered it a sacred duty not to relax during the Nizam's minority, those efforts to restore the territorial integrity of the State to which his Highness's father and grandfather had attached supreme importance, and which had formed the subject of their latest injunctions. The history of that "costly incubus," the Contingent, was always before their eyes, to prove that when once the screw had been put on, it became riveted and rusted into its place simply by being left alone. The Nizam, in the person of a corrupt Minister, had acquiesced in the Contingent until his finances were brought to ruin; and in 1853 that ruin was made the excuse for seizing the Berars. The claim for restitution had never been relinquished or closed in the two preceding reigns, and they must not allow a long interval of acquiescence during the Nizam's minority to give scope for a pretext, by which the seizure might be made permanent.

In a letter dated the 19th of September, 1872, in which, after many verbal and informal communications, the case was once more submitted by the Regents for the consideration of the Viceroy, the Nawab Salar Jung observed to the Resident, Colonel Lumsden,— "The assignment of the districts effected during the last hours of my uncle's life, has left a reproach on my family in the eyes of both the Sovereign and the people of this country. The late Nizam," he continued, "often urged me to strain every nerve to have the districts restored, and I told him I would do my best to have the stigma removed from our family. When I made an application with this object some time ago, in connection with the expected lapse of Mysore at that time, and failed, his Highness observed to me that the reproach on my family had not been removed."

Fully aware of the great value attached by the Government of India to the Contingent, that "*inexpensive* addition to our strength," the illicit nature of which was disguised by the coercive

Treaties of 1853 and 1860, the proposal of the Regents in 1872 was based on the maintenance of that force, and limited to the substitution for the territorial assignment of the Berars of a security in cash, to be deposited with the British Government. Just a year had expired, when the reply came in a letter, No. 2,271 P., dated Simla, 24th of September, 1873, from the Secretary to the Government of India to the Resident at Hyderabad, briefly declining the proposal, because the Governor-General in Council could not "admit that the maintenance" of the Treaties of 1853 and 1860 "depends, as the Ministers appear to contend, upon the pleasure of the Nizam," and "because the provision of a territorial guarantee was one of the fundamental principles of both Treaties."

The Regents, not satisfied with the treatment their carefully mitigated appeal had received, addressed the Government of India again in a letter to the Resident dated the 24th of November, 1873, the purport of which was that while it was their "desire to make every effort in their power to meet the wishes of the British Government," they considered their proposed cash deposit for securing the pay of the Contingent to be a most liberal offer, the Nizam's Government being under *no obligation to maintain the Contingent at all*, but only bound, under an extorted Treaty, to pay the British Government for maintaining it. This distinction they held to be of very great consequence. Lord Dalhousie, they said, intending to get a permanent cession of territory, originally suggested that such an obligation should be pressed on the Nizam, as appears from the wording of the draft article of the Treaty in his Minute of 30th March, 1853: "His Highness the Nawab Nizam-ool-Moolk, &c., &c., agrees for himself, his heirs and successors, to maintain an auxiliary force." \* But this wording was never proposed to the Nizam, because at every step of the discussion it was clear that no coercion would make him agree to it. All notion of the Nizam binding "himself, his heirs and successors," to maintain the Contingent, was excluded by his inflexible refusal to give more than a temporary assignment of territory for its support. They did not at all deny that the Nizam was bound by the Treaties of 1853 and 1860; they did not deny that the consent of the British Government was necessary for their modification; but they argued that their request for such a modification as included the restitution of the Berar provinces ought, in justice, to meet with compliance, by virtue of the fundamental principles of the Treaties themselves, and of the conditions under which they were framed.

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\* Papers, "Nizam" (418 of 1854), p. 110.



In June, 1874, the copy of a despatch from the Secretary of State, Lord Salisbury, dated London, 19th March, 1874, was given to the Regents, confirming the refusal of the Government of India to entertain their proposal of 1872, but written without knowledge of their last letter of 24th November, 1873, which, although transmitted seven months previously, had as yet extracted no sign from Calcutta. The Secretary of State, following the example of the Viceroy, left the real merits of the appeal unnoticed, rejected "the unsound assumption that the duration of the territorial assignment wholly depends on the pleasure of the Nizam," and declared that "a territorial guarantee was the main object of the Treaties of 1853 and 1860," and was "an object equally paramount at the present day." No attention, in short, was given either in London or Calcutta to the distinct claims to restoration preferred by the Nizam's Government. The Regents maintained that their case must by no means be considered as hinging upon the acceptability of the security in cash which they offered instead of the territorial guarantee. As their letter of the 24th of November, 1873, still before the Viceroy and not yet in the hands of the Secretary of State, closed, like that of 1872, with a proposal for furnishing funds for paying the Contingent, they deemed it incumbent on them to submit a supplementary letter asserting the full claims of the Hyderabad State to the restoration of its provinces, irrespective altogether of the provision for the Contingent. In this letter, dated 6th July, 1874, and extending to 124 paragraphs, they argued truthfully, though with every deference and courtesy, that the Treaty of 1853 was the coercive climax of a long course of unjust exaction. The territorial assignment under that Treaty was extorted by compulsion, on grounds and pretexts of acknowledged inaccuracy. They reiterated the recorded fact that at the crisis of the discussion in 1853 the British Plenipotentiary, Colonel Low, expressly invoking the authority of his Government, "announced formally that, if his Highness wished it, the districts might be made over merely for a time, to maintain the Contingent as long as he might require it."\* On this basis only, even under threats of the military occupation of his capital, was the territorial assignment conceded by the Nizam.

The Regents emphatically declared that the Hyderabad Contingent was not required for the defence of the Nizam's Dominions. Official documents, which they cited, proved that this force had never been anything but a relief to the British Government in per-

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\* STATESMAN, July, p. 180.

forming services already pledged and subsidized. The Administration Reports of the Resident certified that "it had not fired a shot except on its own parade grounds" since it aided the British Government in the suppression of the mutinies.

"Nevertheless," they said, "in the belief that the continued maintenance of this Force would be an object agreeable to the British Government, we have hitherto coupled our claims to the restoration of the provinces with a suggestion for a separate provision of some kind for its pay." They referred to the specific proposal made in their letter of the 24th of November, 1873, and still declared "the cordial desire of the" (Hyderabad) "State to offer the most liberal terms within its power." But, they continued, "if we cannot succeed in getting such a proposal received with favour, there will remain nothing for this State except to fall back on the letter of the British Government's pledge given through Colonel Low, which forms the very basis on which the Treaty of 1853 was negotiated, viz., that the assignment ceases whenever this State ceases to require the Contingent Force. We would in such an event be necessitated to embrace the single alternative of disbandment thus left available."\*

"In conclusion," they said, "we trust that by the full explanations that we have now submitted, the reason will have become apparent wherefore we have always viewed, and now beseech his Lordship in Council to view, the Treaty of 1853 as occupying a very different footing from the other treaties in force between the two Governments, and the assignment under it as simply a concession exacted from this State, of such a nature as could only last till such time as, the true nature of the case becoming recognized, the assignment would be gladly and spontaneously revoked by the sense of justice of the British Government."†

The case for the restitution of the Berars as preferred by the Nizam's Government being simply unanswerable, the magnanimous plan adopted by the stronger party was to persist in leaving it unanswered, to treat it as an irregular and unauthorized proceeding, and to try to intimidate the weaker party. We have already remarked on the very strong language applied to the Nawab Salar Jung personally in 1867, because, in simple obedience to his duty as Minister to the reigning Nizam, he had tried to make the threatened annexation of Mysore conducive to the object of regaining the

\* Paragraph 118 of letter, dated 6th July, 1874, from the Co-Regents of Hyderabad to the British Resident.

† Paragraph 123.

Berars. He was told that he "took too much upon himself," because, in truth, his argument was too much for the Calcutta Secretariat. His despatch was pronounced to be "unworthy of his princely master's dignity, and of his own reputation," and its "tone" was condemned as not sufficiently "serious and circumspect."\* In words more measured, the Resident, Mr. C. B. Saunders, in a letter dated the 9th of March, 1874, made the same supercilious objection to "the tone" of the appeal made by the Regents, complaining that it was "novel and unusual, and perhaps hardly consistent with the relative position occupied by the Ministers of his Highness the youthful Nizam and the Representative of Her Majesty the Queen in India." Unless it was intended to forbid the weaker party to employ argument at all, these strictures were entirely unmeaning. Nothing could have been more serious, nothing more circumspect, than the style to which the Nizam's Ministers adhered in preferring their appeal. The true and sole offence of "tone" and tenor in their despatches, was that they were unanswerable. The sternest remonstrances and the stiffest reasoning on the side of the Nizam, were now publicly recorded in quotations from British authorities. The most conclusive admissions now lay revealed in the Minutes of Council and of the Court of Directors. The whole of the Nizam's case was, in fact, now presented in English official statements. All these must be answered before a rejoinder could be given to the Nawab Salar Jung. The Calcutta Foreign Office could no longer contend that the Nizam had been in debt in 1853, after the denial by Colonel Davidson, the Resident, of there having been any debt at all; and after Lord Canning's tardy relinquishment of the usurped Excise revenues of Secunderabad and Jaulnah. After the deliberate and impartial statements of General Caulfield, Major Moore, Colonel Sykes, and Sir Frederick Currie, it was no longer possible to deny that the Contingent was a costly and oppressive incubus, imposed on the Nizam for the benefit of the British Government.† Unquestionably the Co-Regents felt their strength. Our own Blue-books proved that even in 1853 the balance was against the East India Company, and reparation due to the Nizam. In the light of subsequent disclosures and admissions,—to say nothing of subsequent services,—reparation was far more clearly due.

In this provoking situation, the plan adopted by the Resident at Hyderabad—of course in private communication with Calcutta—

\* *Ante*, p. 451.

† *STATESMAN*. July, pp. 170, 171, 172.

was that of refusing to receive for transmission to the Government of India the despatches from the Regents on the subject of the Berars that had been written after the reception of the letter from the Secretary of State, Lord Salisbury, dated the 19th of March, 1874.\* By that letter, so the Resident declared, "the discussion"—on which the stronger party had carefully avoided entering—was "finally closed." There had been really no discussion at all. It was very hard, the Regents urged on the Resident, in a letter dated 29th September, 1874, that this process of suppression should be applied to them, when "you know that the claims put forward have not yet been answered at all on their merits, or even discussed, by the British Government, the chief of them not having, in fact, been perused by the Right Honourable the Secretary of State."

At this crisis—for the date can be fixed very nearly with certainty—the negative method of declining to answer, and refusing to forward letters, was coupled by the Resident, Mr. C. B. Saunders,—not, we may be sure, without a confidential hint from headquarters,—with a positive plan for checking the Regents by encouraging local opposition. It was no easy matter—it was, indeed, impossible,—to find an honourable opponent for the Nawab Salar Jung. "We cannot suppose," the Regents wrote on the 29th of September, 1874, when the Resident's plan of attack had been unfolded, "that any loyal subject of this State, if as fully cognizant of the strength and justice of the claim as we are, and acting under the like responsibilities, could deem it consistent with the duties he owes to his Highness to advise that the claim should be foregone." But as no loyal or honourable opponent for the Nawab Salar Jung could be found in Hyderabad, it was necessary to secure for the purpose one that was disloyal and dishonourable. Such a person was found in the Nawab Wikar-ool-Oomra.

Before going more fully into particulars, let it be clearly premised that this is no piece of loose invective or partisan abuse. The words come very close to a brief paraphrase of an official report from the Residency at Hyderabad. In 1861, the Nawab Wikar-ool-Oomra was detected, described, and denounced by the British authorities as a disloyal and dishonourable person, the chief contriver and agent in a fraudulent and corrupt conspiracy, whereof the Nawab Salar Jung was to have been the principal victim, and the Nizam the principal dupe. The secondary victim—who would merely have been slandered behind his back, probably without its ever coming to his knowledge—was to have been the British Resi-

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\* *Ante*, p. 456.

dent. The British Government, also, would have been grossly deceived, and in the person of its representative, the Resident, insulted and maligned.

The Nawab Wikar-ool-Oomra was the younger brother of the Co-Regent, the Nawab Shums-ool-Oomra, Ameer-i-Kabeer. During the lifetime of his father—the first of the family who bore the title of Ameer-i-Kabeer—he was usually called Ikhtidar-ool-Moolk, under which designation he appears several times in the Blue-book as being present when the Resident, Colonel Low, was conferring with the Nizam regarding the Treaty of 1853. In one place Colonel Low speaks of him as “Ikhtidar-ool-Moolk, the youngest son, who is believed to be ambitious of being the Prime Minister.”\* On another occasion he is mentioned as “Ikhtidar-ool-Moolk, Shums-ool-Oomra’s youngest son, who is the keeper of the Nizam’s great seal.”† He was married to one of the Nizam’s daughters, and was very wealthy. He thus possessed two great qualifications as an opponent to the Nawab Salar Jung—high rank and access to the Palace. His rank was higher than that of the Minister, who, although belonging to a noble and ancient family, held his position at Court and in the State, chiefly by virtue of his office. Wikar-ool-Oomra had other qualifications that fitted him for the sinister purpose of our Foreign Office—his notorious enmity to Salar Jung, his restless ambition, and his personal disgrace. In 1874, though he had been leniently treated by the British Government, and generously by the Minister, he was still under a cloud; and the British Resident might have been considered to be the very last person who was likely to take any step to recall him to public life.

For several generations there had been something like a competition for political power and influence at Hyderabad between the orthodox house of Shums-ool-Oomra and the distinguished family at the head of the Shiah sectaries, now represented by the Nawab Salar Jung. A very fair understanding for all public objects had, however, been established and maintained for more than twenty years by the father and brother of Wikar-ool-Oomra, himself quite irreconcilable. The Residency diaries contain many references to his personal ambition and pretensions, and to intrigues and cabals at Court, traceable more or less to his disappointed rivalry.

On the 15th of March, 1859, as Colonel Davidson, the Resident, was leaving the Nizam’s Durbar, arm-in-arm with the Nawab Salar

\* Papers, “Nizam” (418 of 1854), p. 128.

† Papers, “Hyderabad Assigned Districts” (338 of 1867), p. 41.

Jung, a Rohilla, named Jehangeer Khan, discharged a carbine loaded with slugs at one of them—fortunately without effect on either the one or the other, though one of the Minister's retinue was wounded—and then rushed forward with a drawn sword. Captain (now Colonel) Hastings Fraser, one of the Resident's Assistants, drew his sword and threw himself in front of Colonel Davidson, but the assassin was almost immediately cut down by the Nizam's guards. As he was killed on the spot, his secret perished with him. All that was known about him was, that he was a retainer of the Nawab Wikar-ool-Oomra. In this case, nothing more can be said than was expressed by the Viceroy, Lord Canning, in the message of serious admonition which he conveyed to the Nizam in a letter to the Resident, dated the 2nd of April, 1859, No. 1,511: "The criminal is beyond the reach of justice. It may be that he was a single fanatic, without instigators or accomplices." It may be so.

The reforming measures of the Nawab Salar Jung have never been popular either with the Prince or with the nobles of Hyderabad, however much their benefits may have been appreciated by the trading and agricultural classes. His great support, and stay, during the most active and useful period of his administration, was undoubtedly the belief at Court, and throughout the city of Hyderabad, that he had the confidence and good-will of the British Government and its local representative. To shake or destroy that belief, was the first indispensable step towards displacing the Minister. In May, 1861, the Nizam Afzul-ood-Dowla requested that the Resident would pay him a visit, and at the interview expressed his intention of removing Salar Jung from office. The Resident was astonished at this intimation, but the Nizam's astonishment at finding the Resident apparently quite unprepared to acquiesce in the proposed change, was unfeigned and undisguised. Almost as if he imagined that Colonel Davidson was dissembling his real wishes, in order that he might not seem too eager in seizing a proffered opportunity, the Nizam turned to the officers in attendance on the Resident, and requested them to bear witness to his decided intention of dismissing Salar Jung. Colonel Davidson, still much surprised, and as much in the dark as the Nizam, positively refused to carry on business with any other Minister but Salar Jung, until he had reported the circumstances to his own Government, and was in full possession of its views on the subject. Both verbally and in writing, after his return to the Residency, Colonel Davidson exhorted his Highness to reconsider the question very seriously, and to explain more clearly the grounds on which he was proceeding.

On perusing the official note from the Resident, the Nizam

became so much alarmed that he at once entered on a partial explanation of the circumstances under which he had been led to propose the Nawab Salar Jung's dismissal, stating that he was under the impression that the Resident himself was anxious to nominate another person to the office—a member of the family of the Nawab Shums-ool-Oomra. In the meantime, Colonel Davidson had forwarded an account of the interview to the Viceroy, and on the arrival of his Excellency's expression of surprise and regret at the announcement, the Nizam was so annoyed and irritated at the utter failure of a movement which he had been told would be instantly successful, that he became still more communicative, and insisted on steps being taken to facilitate an inquiry. An investigation followed, which proved, beyond all doubt and question, that the Nizam had been misled by a base conspiracy concocted and conducted by the Nawab Wikar-ool-Oomra. Assisted by an accomplice, who was held almost equally in favour by the Nizam and the Resident, Yakoob Ali Khan, the jaghirodar of Tickapilly, the Nawab Wikar-ool-Oomra persuaded the Nizam, to whom as a near relative he had constant access, that the Resident, like others, had his price, and that if that were handed over with due and decent form, the Nizam could have his own way entirely as to the choice of a Minister. To give full satisfaction to the Nizam, and to save the Resident's dignity, the actual recipient was to be Mrs. Davidson, who would in person convey to his Highness the desired assurance that neither the Resident nor the Viceroy would give any support or countenance to Salar Jung, if his Highness desired his removal. The next scene of the drama consisted in the private introduction of a lady calling herself Mrs. Davidson, wife of the Resident, into the Nizam's presence at the Palace, where she gave the requisite pledge that Colonel Davidson would put no obstacle in the way of Salar Jung's dismissal, and whence the lady departed with a handsome parcel of gold mohurs in her carriage. But in the subsequent investigation it appeared that the supposed Mrs. Davidson was the wife of an apothecary, dressed up and tutored for the occasion, who soon afterwards disappeared from Hyderabad, not, however, without having been identified and examined.

The immediate result to the Nawab Wikar-ool-Oomra of having been detected as the prime mover in this disgraceful conspiracy, is briefly described in the Administration Report for 1869-70 by Mr. C. B. Saunders, C.B., then Resident at Hyderabad. He says that the Nawab Wikar-ool-Oomra, brother of the Ameer-i-Kabeer, "having been pronounced guilty, some eight years ago, of lending himself to an intrigue, the object of which, it was believed, was to

procure for himself the office of Minister, had been prohibited, under the orders of the Supreme Government, from appearing on any public occasion, the Nizam's own Durbar not excepted, when the British representative was present. This sentence amounted to one of complete political extinction."

But everything will come, it is said, to him who can wait. Wikar-ool-Oomra waited. The first measure for his relief from "complete political extinction," accorded, of necessity, by no hands but those of the British Resident, seems to have been open to little or no exception. At the installation of the present Nizam, in succession to his father, the Nizam Afzul-ood-Dowla, early in 1869, the Nawab Wikar-ool-Oomra was allowed to occupy his former place in the Durbar. This was, it may be admitted, a politic and considerate step, if it had stopped there. It might have been a subject of reproach against the Nawab Salar Jung, as an affair of evil omen, if the person second in rank after the Sovereign, and allied to him by blood, had been forbidden to pay his homage at the commencement of a new reign. At the instance of the Minister himself, the Resident consented that the Nawab Wikar-ool-Oomra, having suffered an eight years' exclusion, should be restored to his ordinary privileges, and his former offences covered with charitable oblivion. "But still," adds Mr. Saunders, the Resident, in his remarks on this act of grace, "he was not officially connected with the Government."

Wikar-ool-Oomra waited five years longer, and then at last he was wanted. It struck Mr. Saunders that this was the very man to be put forward as a counterpoise to the Co-Regents, when they could neither be answered nor silenced in their appeal for the restitution of the Berars. About a month after the Regents had submitted their comprehensive despatch of the 6th of July, 1874, the Resident addressed a note to the Nawab Salar Jung, inviting him and the principal nobles to breakfast on the 21st of August, 1874, to take leave of them, according to custom, on going for a visit during the hot season to the Resident's country house at Bolarum. Not a hint was given that this was to be anything more than an ordinary entertainment, or that any business would be transacted or discussed. After the breakfast, however, the Resident addressed the nobles of Hyderabad on the subject of the error of judgment committed by the Regents in asking for the Berar districts after it had been "finally" declared by Her Majesty's Government that "the application could not be favourably considered." A special allusion was made to the Nawab Wikar-ool-Oomra as one of a "noble family which had always evinced so great a desire to maintain the most



friendly relations between the British Government and that of his Highness the Nizam." This was putting the best construction certainly on the little affair of 1861. The object of this complimentary allusion was rather too obvious, and a somewhat ostentatious and quite unusual visit paid to the Nawab Wikar-ool-Oomra by the Resident at this time, was equally undignified and ineffective. The address to the Ameers fell perfectly flat, and produced no result whatever, because, as the Regents pointed out on the evening of the same day to the Resident, "those present could not fail to notice that the claims were neither declared by you to be invalid, nor any reason given why, if valid, they should be foregone." No loyal or honourable subject of the Nizam could be expected to exercise any influence he might possess to assist in the suppression of these claims; and even the Nawab Wikar-ool-Oomra, though singularly qualified, and particularly well disposed also, to take up a position of antagonism to the Nawab Salar Jung, was quite powerless and devoid of authority, so long as his elder brother, the Ameer-i-Kabeer, was there as the other Co-Regent. He had to wait a little longer before he became an available weapon of offence, fitted to the hand of the Resident for the restraint and chastisement of the Nawab Salar Jung.

The Ameer-i-Kabeer, Co-Regent of the Nizam's Dominions, died on the 5th of April, 1877. He had no son, and recorded his wishes in a last will and testament, that his estates should be divided between his two nephews, the sons of a deceased brother older than Wikar-ool-Oomra, and that the titles of Shums-ool-Oomra and Ameer-i-Kabeer should be conferred upon one of them. Such a document, however, was of questionable validity. It seems natural to us that a grandson, the child of a deceased elder son, should be his grandfather's heir, in preference to his uncle; but, by a rule of Mussulman law, known as *mahjub-ul-irs*, peculiarly applicable to regalities or indivisible estates, a surviving son succeeds as principal heir before a grandson. It is true that the titles of Ameer-i-Kabeer and Shums-ool-Oomra, the command of the Pagah, and the administration of the large estates charged with the pay of those troops, were not strictly hereditary, and might have been allotted by a Nizam exercising the functions of sovereignty to the most worthy member of the house. But the suppression of the legal head of the family would have been a great stretch of prerogative during a minority, and if the advice and influence of the British Resident were applied—though I have not heard that the Minister had any doubt on the point—in favour of the usual course of inheritance, they were properly so applied.

As to the Co-Regency, there could be no claim of inheritance. The late Ameer-i-Kabeer, though his position as premier noble and Commander of the household troops marked him out as the most eligible colleague for the Minister, was not selected merely by virtue of his high rank, but also on account of his high character, and more especially because it was known that he could co-operate harmoniously with the upright and enlightened statesman who had then conducted the government of Hyderabad for fifteen years—a period equally distinguished for the administrative reform of the protected State, and for the inestimable aid given to the Imperial Power. For eight years more the Nawab Salar Jung had continued in the same course; but that course was now to be interrupted. Administrative progress must go to the winds in 1877, in order that the Nawab Salar Jung, of whose fidelity to Imperial compacts there was no question, *should be humiliated and hampered*, checked, and, perhaps, checkmated, in his persistent appeal for the restitution of Berar. It was notorious that the Nawab Wikar-ool-Oomra, henceforth to be known as Shums-ool-Oomra Ameer-i-Kabeer, could not and would not co-operate harmoniously with the Minister. His character was bad. He had robbed and deceived his master; he had insulted the British Government, and slandered its representative. But he was now fully available for the *discomfiture of Salar Jung*, and the infamy of his antecedents only made him the more subservient. As he was now to be raised to the highest position in the State by the same influence, that of the British Resident, which eight years before had relieved him from “complete political extinction,” he well knew that nothing but that dominating influence could sustain him for a day, and that one word from the British Resident could consign him once more to “political extinction” at a moment’s notice.

When the pretensions of the present Ameer-i-Kabeer to succeed his brother as Co-Regent in 1877 were supported by the Resident, Sir Richard Meade, and by the Government of Lord Lytton, the Nawab Salar Jung protested against the appointment on grounds which it is needless now to recapitulate or enlarge upon. His remonstrances were disregarded, and in a grand Durbar appropriately held by the youthful Nizam in our military cantonment of Secunderabad, surrounded by British troops, on the 29th of September, 1877, the Resident read a letter from the Viceroy, nominating the present Nawab Shums-ool-Oomra Ameer-i-Kabeer, formerly called Wikar-ool-Oomra, as Co-Regent of the Hyderabad State.

The economical and administrative results to the Hyderabad State of this compulsory and scandalous union, have been as

disastrous as every one could have predicted. The Ameer-i-Kabeer has claimed a much more direct share in executive government than his brother, and has grasped at every occasion of opposing his colleague's policy, and obstructing his measures. Judicial reform is blocked by his maintenance of hereditary jurisdictions and privileged exemptions from the ordinary course of law.

The political results have been still more damaging to the honour, dignity, and reputation of the Imperial Government and its local representatives. Very bad rumours are current at Hyderabad. How could it be otherwise? When the Bayard of India, the late Colonel Outram, was carrying on, as Resident at Baroda, that contest against "Khutput" in Bombay, which he ultimately won, at great personal loss to himself, against all the efforts of the Bombay Government, he did not accuse English officers of corruption, but he proved that "not only the servants, but members of the Government were considered by the Natives of Baroda to be accessible to corrupt considerations;" and in advising certain precautions to be taken to avoid the grounds of such belief, he particularly warned the Government against the appointment, promotion, or favourable notice of "persons known or suspected to have been corrupt."\* He urged that "all, whether Princes or their subjects, who dared to contemplate bribing British officials, must be considered hostile to the Government."† What is thought at Hyderabad of the appointment, promotion, and ostentatious patronage of Wikar-ool-Oomra, a man found guilty of conspiracy, corruption, and calumny, to the discredit of British officials, may easily be conceived. If a notion is prevalent in Hyderabad that such proceedings are not now considered "hostile to the Government," and that the spirit of Outram does not animate the present generation of Political Agents, no one ought to be surprised. Moreover, if Wikar-ool-Oomra, having once at least compassed and imagined the bribing of a Resident's wife, should be generally suspected of having recently resorted to some analogous devices; and if aspersions against British officers are consequently current in the streets of Hyderabad—let indignation fall where it is due, not upon the miserable engine of all this mischief, but upon the unscrupulous workmen who drew it from its dark corner, when they could have had no reasonable hope of applying it to any good purpose. We charge Lord Lytton's Foreign Office with this crime, and demand an inquiry into the facts.

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\* "Guicowar Papers" (560 of 1852), p. 1290.

† *Ibid.*, p. 1301

## NATIVE THOUGHT AND OPINION CONCERNING OUR RULE IN INDIA.

[It is of great importance that our countrymen should know what the people of India in general, and the educated class in particular, think of our administration, and its effects upon their well-being. The subjoined letter has been sent us by a Native gentleman in Oudh. It is a reply to the eulogiums lavished on the British rule by Dr. Hunter in his recent lectures on India at Edinburgh. We print it verbatim.—*Ed. Statesman.*]

TO THE EDITOR OF "THE STATESMAN."

SIR,—Seeing that the whole administration of India, its welfare and condition, depend almost entirely upon the justice of the British Parliament, it will hardly be food for wonder that the utterances of the great statesmen who direct its counsels are carefully studied by all Natives who have the welfare of their country at heart. Recent speeches of Mr. Gladstone, Mr. Bright, and others, had impressed the Native mind with the idea that at length England had awakened to the wrongs of India, and to the responsibility which the relations between India and Britain impose on the latter. Nor were indications wanting that the great mass of the United Kingdom were beginning to realize the magnitude of the task of regenerating India which they had undertaken, and how that solemn duty had been neglected in the past. The Native mind was, therefore, hopeful of reform from these signs of the times, and looked forward to a time when, party feeling laid aside, all would join in stretching out a helping hand to raise an erst great nation and people. These perhaps too sanguine hopes have been shaken to some extent by the lectures recently delivered by Dr. Hunter, the official champion of the Anglo-Indian Government, whose utterances, to judge from the tone of the London Press, are not altogether unacceptable to at least some portion of the English people. The conscience of nations is difficult to prick and easy to lull; and little wonder if the efforts of Dr. Hunter succeed in soothing the qualms the national conscience lately betrayed. The prospect is, however, not entirely gloomy. The characteristic of the great mass of the British public is love of justice; and though its indignation may for a time be averted by plausible evasions, yet it is sure to find vent with additional fury when it awakens to the truth, and discovers that it has long been tricked by those whom it trusted and whose word was law.

The first exception that I take to Dr. Hunter's address is that it ignores entirely the sacrifices which India has to make, and the high price which it has

to pay for the advantages which English rule confers. The veriest tyro in accounting could have told the learned Doctor that no adjustment of profits is worth the least consideration, that does not take into calculation the losses; no settlement is worthy of its name when the credit side of the account is omitted. Though, perhaps, hardly flattering to the national vanity of Englishmen, the fact is incontrovertible that, in the relation which exists between England and India, the advantage is not entirely on the side of the latter, and if the account were made up on strict principles of equity, a large balance of pledges unredeemed, of obligations unfulfilled, and of services unpaid, would appear against the former. To enjoy the advantages which English rule affords, India has to undergo the greatest privations which any nation has ever experienced; and the real question is whether the advantages of English rule have been commensurate with the sacrifices which India has to make to ensure them, and whether the improvements effected are great enough to justify England in exacting so high a price from her dependency. What, then, are the sacrifices which India has to make—what the high price which she pays for the benefits of English rule? Nothing less than an entire and complete elimination of India, as a nation, from the political system of the world, in addition to the imposition of a foreign yoke in its most repulsive form. This is not a mere sentimental phrase, but a hard reality, which only those who have been in the country and witnessed the present condition of the Native population, and its miserable existence, can rightly estimate. The children of the soil have been reduced to the condition of hewers of wood and drawers of water, while all places of power and emolument are monopolized by the stranger. The national industry of the people has been crippled, their manufactures suppressed, and they have to look to foreign lands for even the barest necessities of life. Its trade has passed into other hands, and with it the means of accumulating wealth and riches. As if this was not sufficient to exhaust her resources, and to reduce a great bulk of the population to a chronic state of starvation and misery, it has been subjected to a yearly drain of £20,000,000 in the shape of home and other charges. The evil would have been slightly mitigated if these had been found sufficient to fill the cup of her misery to the brim, and had insult not been added to injury. But the feature of British administration which is most galling and revolting to the national spirit is the degradation which India's sons have to undergo in every walk in life. No foreigner is treated with more contempt, and subjected to greater indignities in the most exclusive country in Asia, than a native Indian in his own. And what are the advantages which England has conferred, and which may be set off against these losses that she inflicts? Protection from foreign aggression, domestic tranquillity, and railways, says Dr. Hunter. The first may be disposed of in a few words. The power which first checked the tide of invasion from the North-west was not that of England, but that of the Sikh, which curbed the restless spirit of the Afghans far more effectually than England, with all its immense strength, has ever succeeded in doing. Since the downfall of that power, the warlike tribes of Central Asia have been too much occupied with Russia, and engaged in measures of self-defence, to attempt aggression, while the Afghans have been distracted by domestic dissensions. So that since the conquest of the Punjab, there never has been any serious danger of foreign invasion. But even if the facts were as Dr. Hunter would have them, if we consider that the drain to which the country is subjected *annually* by the protectors does not much fall short of the utmost sum carried away by an invader once in a century, the gain to the protected is not very clear, nor the credit

to the protectors very great. As to the rest, our first objection is to the manner in which Dr. Hunter has dealt with the subject. Throughout his lectures he has treated the subject from the commercial point of view as opposed to the political, and this we cannot reprehend too strongly. Discussing the subject from the statesman's standpoint, I submit that nothing is of advantage to a nation which does not prepare it to take its position among the nations of the world, which does not inspire its people with self-respect, and prepare them for self-government, and which does not make the struggle for life less difficult. The real criterion, therefore, to which the success of English rule ought to be referred is, whether India is further advanced in the race of civilization, and whether the struggle for life is now less difficult than it was before England assumed its sovereignty. The first essential qualification of fitness for self-government is the power of self-protection, and India as a nation has never been more deficient in this qualification than since it submitted to the English yoke. Ninety-nine per cent. of the whole population have been deprived of the use of arms, even of the most inferior quality. It is the habit of bearing arms which alone accustoms a people to their use, and gives them skill and promptitude in danger. The mischievously selfish policy of the British Government, which has disarmed the whole population, and has refused admission into the Army to the sons of the nobility and the gentry, is fast leading to its natural result. The mass of the Native population, owing to this fatal policy, is enervated, and is losing all knowledge of the use of arms; the nobility and the gentry, debarred from taking any active part in the administration of the country, and having no scope for their talent and energy, have recourse to the gratification of their sensual appetites. If England should be compelled by any catastrophe similar to that which befell the Roman Empire, to withdraw her forces from the Indian continent, she would have the satisfaction of feeling that she has left her Indian subjects in a predicament like that in which the ancient Britons found themselves after the downfall of the Roman Empire. Domestic peace and tranquillity are no doubt blessings highly to be prized, but they are blessings only when secured by good administration, which fosters and not crushes the national spirit. It is quite possible to pay too high a price for peace, great as the blessing is; and this is what India is doing under the present *régime*. The prevailing anarchy, described so vividly by Dr. Hunter, which marked the period of transition after the downfall of the Mogul Empire in India, was not worse than that in England during the Wars of the Roses, or in the period of the great struggle between Charles I. and his Parliament; and yet would any patriotic Englishman express a wish that the strife and blood-shedding of that period should be exchanged for peace and tranquillity similar to that which India enjoys at present? Does the British rule prepare India for self-government by other means, by developing the administrative talent of the Natives, or by interesting the people in the administration of their country? Unfortunately, it is impossible to reply to these queries except by a most emphatic negative. Administrative talent, like every other faculty of the human mind, is only developed by use and cultivation. In a country, therefore, where the aborigines are debarred from all posts of responsibility and trust, it would be simply a miracle if in time all administrative talent does not cease to exist. The interest which the people of India take in the English government of their country is simply *nil*, and it has been the traditional policy of successive Councils to discourage all criticism and discussion of their measures on the part of the Natives. Powerless as the Native public is to influence for good or evil the legislative and administrative policy of the Government of their

country, is it astonishing that under these conditions it should evince apathy? The municipal institutions of which Dr. Hunter made mention in his lecture, are a huge sham, and all India knows it. The only section of the Native community which criticizes the measures of the Anglo-Indian Government is that of the educated Natives, and it does so in spite and in defiance of its European rulers. Of all the benefits which Dr. Hunter enumerated before his English audience, education is the only real advantage conferred by the English rule; but even that has not been conferred in the shape in which it would have proved a real blessing to the country. What India needs most is not the speculative philosophy of Europe, or the poetical literature of England, but the practical sciences and arts which have raised Europe to its present exalted position in the world; and this knowledge has been intentionally withheld. For all useful and practical purposes, India is as much dependent on England for scientific and practical men as if the Educational Department had not existed. In fact, throughout the whole course of British administration, there is one policy which has pervaded all its measures, which a keen observer can have no difficulty in detecting. The only object which the Anglo-Indian Government never loses sight of, be it in her administrative or educational policy, is so to frame its measures as to keep this country dependent on England for the supply of men and material, whereby it shrewdly hopes to perpetuate the present condition of helpless dependence. The natural result of the education imparted is the "Bengalee Babu," and whether it be in the columns of the press or on the boards of the theatres, he is held up to ridicule for being what the Government have made him.

The only point that remains to be discussed is whether the tendency of English rule has been to render the struggle for life less difficult. The answer is not far to seek. Never within the memory of man has there been such wide-spread poverty and misery in this country as that which the unfortunate Indian has had to suffer since the planting of the British flag. The aristocratic and wealthy families, who were the means of support to thousands of their countrymen, have disappeared. Their children have been reduced to a most abject condition of distress, and are the objects of painful commiseration on the part of their quondam dependants. The working classes are steeped in the greatest poverty, and cannot get employment sufficient to keep body and soul together. No one who has seen the life of starvation and misery which the great bulk of the Native population has to lead will hesitate in saying that if the Government of a country be judged by the condition of its subjects, the Anglo-Indian Government must stand condemned. The network of railways on which the learned Doctor dwelt so long in his address was chiefly constructed, as a matter of military organization, to facilitate the movement and concentration of troops; and the only light in which the iron horse presents itself to the Indian ryot is that of a monster, worked by a trading nation, to wrest the food from a famishing population in the times of utmost scarcity. How far this picture is overdrawn may be judged from the fact that the Oudh and Rohilkund Railway was exporting thousands of tons of grain at a time when a great majority of the Native population in Rohilkund were dying of sheer starvation. The import and export returns are no criterion of Indian prosperity, as a great portion of the trade they show, fills the coffers of foreigners. In fact, India presents the strange and anomalous spectacle of a country impoverished both by its exports and imports—where the prices of articles of daily consumption have doubled, while the means of income and wealth of the Native population have decreased in the same ratio. The real questions on which the verdict of an im-

partial jury could alone be secured are those which Dr. Hunter has studiously avoided. Has British rule brought comfort and prosperity to the people? Are they now better off than they were before? Is the manufacturing industry of the people more prosperous, and the wealth of the people increasing? Throughout the lectures of Dr. Hunter we have no satisfactory reply to these questions. Look, however, says he—as if it were a set-off—how it performs the functions of a prying policeman, a rack-renting landlord, and of a pedantic pedagogue! The improvements which this erudite gentleman has flourished with so much effect before the English public are such as any rack-renting landlord would make. Improvements in the physical features of the country, however, do not materially improve the condition of the people. There are hundreds of thousands of the unfortunate people of this country who cannot afford two meals a day, while there are as many who fare worse, and can only afford one every alternate day. Of those whose condition is better, 75 per cent. among the agricultural classes cannot afford to eat wheat grain and other corns which their industry produces; their ordinary food being a coarse corn, called *savun*, easy of growth and having no market value. The nutritive properties in this corn are trifling, and its consumption is not conducive to health.

I am sure that to obtain redress for these grievances, it is only necessary that they should be made known to the British public; and the whole of India is of one accord on this point. Throughout her past history England has always identified herself with the cause of human progress, and her reputation is founded on too sound and firm a basis, to be shaken by the vagaries and eccentricities of the late romantic Premier and subservient Parliament. Is it, then, too much to expect that the benevolence and justice which have characterized her dealings with other nations should influence her conduct towards one so nearly and closely connected with her as her English dependency in Asia? However, to secure this object, it is indispensable that the real aspirations of the Indian nation should be made known to the British public. What India wants is not separation from England; the interests of the two are too closely allied to admit of a divorce, and so far as the educated Natives are concerned, it is an axiom on which all their political discussions are based, that disjunction from England is an impossibility. The conflict which is going on between young India and the Government is one of principle, though not recognized in words at present by either side, and will soon resolve itself into a narrow issue. For the last twenty years India has been gradually and imperceptibly sliding towards the position of a Crown colony, and it is this position that young India strives to attain. The Government seems, however, determined to check her progress in this direction, and would keep her by force in the abject position of a helpless dependency. Before legislation is brought to bear on this point, the safety of the empire should be placed beyond question; and this, at present, is not the case. The greatest danger to the British rule is from sources which the Indian Government seem disposed to conceal—the discontent of the miserable and half-starved populace, whom they have subjected to a most extortionate taxation at a time when they have scarcely recovered from the effects of a great famine. The Indian population is the most submissive and law-abiding on the face of the earth, but there is a limit even to Job's patience, and the English public may be sure that the sufferings and distress which the Indian population has passed through during the viceroyalty of Lord Lytton, approached well-nigh to the limits of human endurance. During the months of November and December last, when the district of Agra, as well as



others adjoining, were being devastated by a virulent fever, almost the whole body of *hamals* (the bearer class) was impressed by a benevolent Government, and despatched to the seat of war, there to die from cold or by the Pathan dagger. The water-supply of the historical town of Agra entirely depends on the industry of these people, and yet a paternal Government left the weak and the dying to help themselves with water as best they could. This state of things is hardly likely to foster kindly feelings between governor and governed, and the idea is already beginning to dawn on the minds of many that they are paying too much for the whistle. Believe me, there is a great convulsion going on in the national mind, and the lull which at present exists is simply a precursor of the storm which the Deccan riots and Rumpa insurrection have presaged. Bulwnul Rao Phadke, the Mahratta dacoit, who was lately raised to the rank of an Indian patriot and martyr by the British Government prosecuting him on the charge of treason, was publicly cheered by the Poona populace when removed to prison; and a wise Government will take its warning even from this insignificant fact. The gagging of the Native Press cannot have the effect of stopping the ebullitions of the national mind which it faithfully represented. The present political condition of the country is critical and full of danger, which requires a master-mind to avert. The advanced portion of the Native community demands representation, and a fair share in the administration of their country; the populace clamour for their burdens to be lightened, and new fields to be opened up for the employment of their industry and energy. Any further opposition to these just demands may enrage both these parties, and bring about a coalition, the result of which I shudder to imagine. The Government would do well not to place too much reliance on the disarmed condition of the people, and on the large army which is expressly maintained to prevent any popular demonstration. On the 14th of July, 1789, the great arsenal of the Invalides supplied arms to a disarmed but infuriated mob of Paris, and the veterans of the monarchy remained awe-stricken and passive; and it would be no wonder if history repeats itself after a century. If the miserable condition of the Native population continues much longer, I would warn the Anglo-Indian Government against the next famine. The ancient monarchy of the Bourbons, linked in the mind of the people with numerous endearing associations, and supported by its hereditary adherents among the nobles, succumbed to the violence of a mob infuriated by hunger. It would not, therefore, be astonishing if the famishing population of this country, embittered by long years of suffering and driven by starvation, gives some trouble to the Anglo-Indian Government in the next famine. It is, however, within the power of the English public to avert from this country all the evils and miseries which such a social upheaval must entail. The whole population of India look to England for redress, and wait with anxious expectancy the results of the new Parliament. The Indian Empire is too poor to be able to pay the expenses of a war waged for the personal glorification of a Viceroy, and is ill-adapted for the experiments of an Administration whose sole and grandest object was to produce a theatrical and evanescent effect. For the purposes of its electioneering manœuvres, to catch the vote of Lancashire, the late Ministry was almost killing the bird that lays the golden eggs. What India wants at present is a Government strong in finance, which will attend to the amelioration of the condition of the people, and not allow its attention to be distracted by visionary schemes of an ideal frontier. Which of the two parties is most likely to inaugurate these reforms the English public has decided; but if England has any desire to retain her great Indian dependency, she must remember that a

policy regulated by an unbridled imagination, and actuated by a most inordinate ambition, is ill-adapted to secure her end. On behalf of the dumb millions of India, I appeal, therefore, to the conscience and sense of justice of the British nation, and if I appeal in vain, I can only tell it, in the words of the unfortunate Francesca—

Dark will thy doom be ;  
Darker still thine immortality of ill !

GURU GOVIND.

## HOME AND FOREIGN AFFAIRS.

THE Afghan army besieging Kandahar was sufficiently confident to await General Roberts' attack at the head of some 14,000 men. The consequence was that on the 1st September their position was carried, the main body of the Afghan army flying without, apparently, attempting to make any resistance. General Roberts telegraphs that "after careful inquiries" he is satisfied that the losses of the enemy were severe. But "severe losses" in a battle-field leave evidences behind them which do not need "careful inquiry" in order to be verified; and it is more than probable that the Afghans at Baba Wali Kotul suffered no heavier losses than we did ourselves. Our loss seems to have been about fifty men killed, and about two hundred and fifty wounded. In the former number are, unhappily, included the lives of some valuable officers. General Roberts, as was to be expected, is being at this moment compared favourably with Hannibal, Cæsar, Marlborough, Wellington, Napoleon, Moltke, and a host of other military worthies past and present. It is some years now since the British nation, in matters military, lost all sense of proportion, and took to exalting the most trivial campaigns into great military achievements; but we should not deem it worth while to protest against this undue glorification of General Roberts, if it were not likely to involve injustice to the unfortunate General Burrows. At Baba Wali Kotul, General Roberts had at his disposal (including the Kandahar garrison) not less than 14,000 men; and this force contained a larger proportion of European regiments than any English general fighting in India has ever had under his command. With this force he attacked and routed, say, double the number of Afghans. Had he failed, India would have been lost to us; for failure would have demonstrated that our ancient fighting superiority had passed away. But to infer, as many are doing, from the Battle of Baba Wali Kotul, that if General Roberts had commanded at Kuskh-i-Nakhud the issue of the latter battle would have been different, is certainly unjust and unwarrantable. The probabilities, in truth, are all the other way. At Kuskh-i-Nakhud, General Burrows had but 600 English soldiers, and 2,200 Sepoys. But in December of last year, General Roberts commanded 7,000 men against Mahommed Jan and his Afghans, and suffered a defeat which, in a military sense, was hardly less complete than that of Kuskh-i-Nakhud. Mahommed Jan as completely outgeneralled General Roberts as Ayoub Khan did General Burrows. The Afghan drove him out of the Bala Hissar and the city of Kabul, compelled him to sacrifice a vast quantity of ammunition and stores, and to abandon to the mercy of the enemy the whole of the Hindoo population. If General Roberts had been in a like predicament as General Burrows, without a fortified position

within which to withdraw his troops, a like catastrophe would, in all probability, have overwhelmed his troops. As it was, he remained for seven days with his forces cooped up behind the defences at Sherpore. There is, we are aware, a popular legend to the effect that Roberts emancipated himself from this position of ignominy by a brilliant victory, but the legend is fabulous. Mahommed Jan's gathering melted away by reason of the cold and the lack of food, and not from any counter-stroke on the part of the British General. General Roberts, throughout this war, has been attended with marvellous good fortune, for, on several occasions, he has been extraordinarily rash and unskilful, and escaped crushing disaster by "the skin of his teeth." The defeat at Kuskh-i-Nakhud was due to over-confidence, and assuredly had Roberts been in the place of General Burrows there would have been no lack of that particular failing. General Burrows fought and was defeated, but he did no more than every British officer would have done in his place, and what every Englishman in India expected him to do. He would have been reviled as a manifest poltroon, from one end of India to the other, had he obeyed the dictates of military prudence, and fallen back on Kandahar. Over-confidence such as his is inseparable from the nature of the tenure by which we hold India, and in five trials out of six the results justify the rashness. But it is inevitable that occasionally we should have to suffer for it.

For the present, opposition has been crushed in the country round Kandahar; and the advocates for its permanent incorporation in our Indian Empire have recommenced writing letters to the newspapers. The "Forward" school have never been lacking in audacity; but we do not remember to have seen before any argument quite so ridiculous as that which appears in a recent letter by Sir William Palliser. This gentleman desires Southern Afghanistan to be annexed in order to be made into a granary for the supply of the famine-stricken districts of India! We may, perhaps, regard this preposterous nonsense as the culminating expression of that combined stupidity and ignorance which are the distinctive "notes" of the "Forward" school. Even they have hitherto abstained from urging the fertility of Afghanistan as a reason for its appropriation, but a "school" in the agonies of drowning under a flood of irresistible facts, may perhaps be excused if it catches at any argumentative straw which gives promise of a prolonged existence. Sir William Palliser is haply a believer in his own notion, in which case he will be glad to have its fallaciousness demonstrated. Every one acquainted with Afghanistan knows that there is in that country no margin of supply over demand sufficiently large to create an export of cereals; while any extension of cultivation is impossible from the lack of irrigating streams, the uncertainty of the rain-fall, the want of labour, and every other condition of production upon a large scale.

The course which the Government ought now to adopt should, we undertake to say, be patent to an intelligent child of ten years old. But it is the misfortune of the Cabinet, that their very successes seem only to increase and intensify their perplexity. Before the prorogation of Parliament, Lord Hartington was

asked what the Government intended to do with Kandahar. Lord Hartington was utterly unable to say. All he was in a position to inform the honourable member was that the matter had been rendered more perplexing since the victory of Baba Wali Kotul. Meanwhile the Government was in earnest consultation with the "highest authorities." It would be interesting could we catch a "high authority," and subject him to examination for softening of the brain. If we are to accept Lord Hartington's statements as they are spoken, the Ministry, individually and collectively, have ceased to occupy their minds with Afghanistan at all. They have delegated the matter to certain "authorities" whom they are pleased to style "high," but no result seems to proceed from their deliberations; for it must not be forgotten that the recognition of Abd-al-Rahman Khan, and the evacuation of Northern Afghanistan, were a part of the policy of the preceding Government. Our present rulers, meditating intensely, although vicariously, through the intellectual apparatus of certain "highest authorities" have not succeeded as yet in bringing forth anything intelligible. We are convinced that there is not a member of the Cabinet who does not feel, as keenly as ourselves, the exceeding shame and futility of this war. We are convinced that every man of them is agreed that the only sound and moral policy is to withdraw from Afghanistan, and resume along its whole line the ancient Indian frontier. Yet there they stand, paralyzed, like so many demented metaphysicians who will not move because they cannot explain how motion is possible. Every day while they stand thus, sees the gigantic cost of the war becoming more and more gigantic, prolongs and enhances the burdens which it lays upon the wretched Indian peasantry. When is it all to end? It is in no spirit of unreasoning impatience that we reproach the Government for their dilatoriness. The fact is that from the hour they came into office, they adopted towards Afghanistan a policy radically erroneous. And no stronger proof of its faultiness could be given than the difficulty they have found in extricating themselves from the bewildering affairs of that country. Their radical error consisted in supposing that it was impossible to remain, even for a week, independent of political relations of some kind with the people of Afghanistan, whereas such a period of independence was indispensable as a foundation for our future relations. Political relations with Afghanistan mean political relations with some sort of Government existing in that country; and it is obvious that we ought not to enter into such relations except with a Government having the promise of permanence and stability. But that such a Government should have the possibility of coming into existence, it was indispensable that the dead weight of 60,000 British troops should be removed from the country. Until these were withdrawn, it was impossible that the veritable wishes of the people should find adequate expression. The Government either lacked the discernment to perceive this, or the courage to act in accordance with it if they did. They chose, *Micawber* fashion, to live in the hope of something turning up at a future day. The "something" turned up in the shape of the defeat of Kuskh-i-Nakhud, and the disgraceful spectacle of a British force, amid panic and confusion indescribable, hurrying behind the ramparts of the Kandahar citadel. It is necessary to insist upon this fact with urgency. The defeat of Kuskh-i-Nakhud was the consequence of the procrastinating policy of Government. In the futile ambition not to withdraw from the country until they had bestowed "institutions" upon it, they have merely extended the area of turmoil, and the province of Herat is (to quote the language of Mr. Gladstone) now added to the "anarchies" of the world. If the people of India are again to know quiet and peace—if the people of Afghanistan are to

be respite from slaughter by our Martini-Henry's—the Government must restrain their philanthropy within the limits of the possible. To bestow "institutions" upon Afghanistan is, doubtless, a benevolent aspiration: but unless we are prepared to annex the country we might as well try to confer "institutions" upon the planet Jupiter. The Government and the "highest authorities" ought to rest satisfied with what they have done in this line. Is not Abd-al-Rahman Khan himself an "institution" wholly of their own devising? Present him, then, to the whole of Afghanistan, or present the whole of Afghanistan to him. The form of words is indifferent, for we have precisely the same power to do one as the other—*i.e.*, no power at all. All we can do is to go through a certain form, and that being completed, let us get out of the country as swiftly as possible.

But though we shall eventually leave Afghanistan, the Government, it is evident, has no intention of doing so until it has played out to the end the solemn farce of consulting with this person and that person, and pretending to settle matters which are already settled as much as they can be. Mr. Lyall (!) we are told, is about to proceed to Kandahar, in order to confer with Colonel St. John on "the situation." Seeing that Colonel St. John was so utterly ignorant of the situation, that he did not know the strength of Ayoub's force when it was only six miles distant from his own camp, this conference cannot fail to be an exceedingly profitable affair. All these solemn, tedious, and costly processes impose upon the uninitiated, but, in truth, there is nothing in them. They are empty and frivolous farces. The question of Afghanistan is already threshed out. The events of the past three years have not added a single iota to the knowledge possessed by all who had studied the subject, except certain "highest authorities," not, we hope (though only very faintly) those whom the Government has been fruitlessly consulting for the past three months. We must either annex Afghanistan altogether, or leave it altogether. There is no third course possible. The Government have plainly enough indicated that both their conscience and their reason are in favour of the second course; and seeing the enormous suffering and misery which are occasioned by their hesitation in giving effect to this conviction, it is not strange that their most loyal supporters—among whom we reckon ourselves—should speak of their Afghan policy in language of regretful condemnation.

The long-threatened war in Basutoland appears at last to have broken out, and unless the Government is resolute, we shall find ourselves paying in British blood and treasure for the slaughter of a loyal, peaceable, industrious tribe of Kaffirs, whose lands our Christian countrymen at the Cape desire to appropriate. If people are desirous to ascertain the motives which lie at the bottom of this Cape Disarmament Act, they might study with advantage the letters which appear in the daily papers, on the propriety of depriving Southern Afghanistan of its independence. If the moral side of the matter is referred to, it is referred to only to be sneered at. That "British interests" demand the annexation, is considered a sufficient justification for this or any other act of robbery. British nature is very much the same all over the world—at home, in India, or in the Colonies. And these incessant Kafir wars have sprung uniformly from British greed for the possessions of other people. The wretched Basutos have already been deprived of the better half of their lands by colonial rapacity; and their refusal to deliver up their arms—in other words, to yield themselves naked and defenceless to the tender mercies of those who have been busy butchering their fellow Kaffirs for the last five or six years—will now be made

the pretext for depriving them of what still remains. The Liberal Party is powerless to hinder the war, but should war break out, they must not shrink from compelling the British Government to adhere to its resolution of allowing Mr. Sprigg and the other Brummagem Imperialists at the Cape to do their own fighting without assistance from us. Until the colonists of South Africa are fairly convinced that we are not to be moved from such a line of policy, there will be no respite from these wars. The fact of our support is a premium upon the extermination of the Kaffirs. A policy of rigid non-interference in colonial wars is urged upon us, even more emphatically by considerations of humanity than from a regard of our own interests. In it exists the only chance of the discovery of a peaceful *modus vivendi* between the European and African races. Already there are not wanting signs that Lord Kimberley's expressed determination has caused the truculent Mr. Sprigg to moderate the violence of his language and intentions. The fact is that this scheme for disarming the native races at the Cape was part and parcel of Sir Bartle Frere's plans for carrying Confederation into effect. The object of Confederation was that the colonists, instead of the British Government, should provide their own military defences. In order to make this palatable to them, the native races beyond British territory were to be put to the sword, and those within it were to be rendered innocuous by being deprived of their arms. The Zulu war was the carrying out of one part of this humane policy; the projected disarmament of the Basutos is the carrying out of another. Now, the hesitation of Mr. Sprigg, in face of the Basuto opposition, is occasioned by the knowledge that, should war ensue, there is not a Kaffir in South Africa but will feel that the Basutos are fighting his battle no less than their own. It may well be that the flame kindled in Basutoland will prove the beginning of a conflagration embracing the whole of South Africa—all the Kaffir races, moved by a common instinct of self-preservation, uniting against the European settlers. Unless assured of aid from Britain, Mr. Sprigg may well hesitate before he encounters such a danger as this. If assured that help will not reach him under any circumstances, he will not encounter it at all. He will allow the Basutos to retain their arms unmolested. But should this war be happily averted, it will be still the duty of the Liberal Party to insist that, so long as our connection with the Cape continues, some kind of political rights be secured to the native races dwelling in British territory. At present they are destitute of any. Throughout Cape Colony their lives and property are entirely at the mercy of the Cape Government; and the mercy and justice which inspire that Government may be estimated by the popularity enjoyed by Sir Bartle Frere.

It is interesting to contrast the vigour, decision, and consistency which have marked the policy of the Government in South-eastern Europe with their halting action in Afghanistan; and the reason which accounts for the contrast is not far to seek. In both countries, the Government had a perfectly definite policy which they desired to carry out, and which, in truth, they had no alternative but to carry out. This policy, in both instances, was one diametrically the opposite of that which had been pursued by Lord Beaconsfield and his colleagues, but there was, superficially, a notable difference. In South-eastern Europe the new policy could be verbally represented as merely a continuance and carrying out of the old. In Afghanistan this was impossible. And yet in both cases it was indispensable that no open and palpable outrage should be committed on that great fetish of British official personages—"the principle of political continuity." In Afghanistan, really to hinder an outrage on this sacred

principle, and to give effect to the policy that Ministers were pledged to carry out, was as impossible as to square the circle, or, to be in two places at once. All the subtlety of Ministers was therefore devoted, to accomplishing this revolution by such imperceptible gradations that no one should be able to arrest them at any particular moment with an outcry that they were going right-about-face. No breath of censure must be uttered on the acts of their predecessors. The agents who carried out the policy which had to be reversed must, whenever an opportunity offered, be plentifully larded with official "butter." The Government must put forth no declarations of its own—only make itself extremely affable and pleasant all round—admitting with lavish candour that a vast deal was to be said on both sides—but still all the while keep steadily and gradually revolving. The process was, in fact, a delicate and elaborate manœuvre, the execution of which was a spectacle by no means devoid of interest, if only those unintelligent Afghans of Herat could have been persuaded to enter into the spirit of the thing. There, unhappily, was the "little rift within the lute," the factor which had not been reckoned with, and which converted a genteel comedy into a great tragedy. But in South-eastern Europe, the Cabinet was under no compulsion to encumber their policy with this elaborate attitudinising. Here, let their policy be as vigorous and decisive as they pleased, there would be no verbal breach of the "principle of political continuity." And as is the way with all fetishes, this particular one exacts no more from its worshippers than a merely verbal homage. But the contrast between black and white is not more startling than the contrast between Great Britain's Turkish policy at the present hour and Great Britain's Turkish policy of the year that is past. Then the object of the British Government was to break up the European concert as soon as there was a prospect of its becoming a fact; now the European concert, in consequence of the action of the British Government, has become a palpable and aggressive force. Then the object of the British Government was to aid and abet the Sultan and his Pashas in their non-fulfilment of the pledges which they had given to Europe; now it is to insist upon a rigorous execution of the same. For this, it is almost impossible to be too thankful. As Mr. Freeman has pointed out in one of his many learned and eloquent discourses on this subject, there was in the Eastern policy of Lords Beaconsfield and Salisbury an unprofitable and senseless inhumanity, that caused it to appear like a doing of evil for its own sake. What British interest, Mr. Freeman asks (even in the perverted sense in which a Jingo understands the expression) was served by thrusting one-half of emancipated Bulgaria back into its old state of servitude? what in restoring the military supremacy of the Sultan in Epirus and Macedonia? The wanton inhumanity of acts like these, tortured the consciences of a vast number of the nation as if they had been guilty of some personal vileness. As an American poet sang of the slaveholder in the days before the War of Secession, so they might have said of the Turk—

And must we feel and share with him  
The danger and the growing shame,  
And see our freedom's light grow dim,  
Which might have filled the world with flame,  
And writhing, feel, where'er we turn,  
A world's reproach around us burn!

From all this, at last, we are delivered. We are now working for the freedom of races whom, from a mistaken understanding of our own selfish interests, we have striven for more than a quarter of a century to retain in bondage to as bad



a tyranny as they defaced the earth ; and it is with a sense of personal gratitude that we watch the development of the Ministerial policy. Nor do we doubt that Ministers understand full well that, having put their hands to the plough, there can be no drawing back until the work they have undertaken is fully accomplished. If, as regards their Christian subjects, the Sultan and his Pashas find that they can successfully resist and baffle the mandates of united Europe, the last state of those subjects will be worse than the first. With nothing further either to hope or to fear from the Christian Powers in the West, the Pashas and their Sultan will form an alliance with Moslem fanaticism in order to obtain the strength hitherto derived from the countenance of the great Powers and the gold of the Turkish bondholders. The Christian races, their property, their lives, and their persons, will be the prize dangled before the Moslems of the Ottoman Empire, in order to persuade them to enter into this alliance.

# The Statesman.

No. IV.—SEPTEMBER, 1880.

## Correspondence.

### THE AFGHAN WAR CHARGES.

TO THE EDITOR OF "THE STATESMAN."

SIR,—You are quite right in stating that the Afghan War charges will amount to over twenty millions sterling, instead of the eight millions which the official estimate puts them at; but there is generally a great underrating of the expenses till the bills come in of military operations. At the time of the Mutiny, I stated in an article written by me for a paper I was then connected with, that the cost would exceed thirty millions. The idea was ridiculed; but it proved in the end that the cost amounted to forty millions. In the same way, when Mr. Disraeli stated in Parliament that the Abyssinian War would not cost more than three millions, I wrote a letter to the *Morning Star*, saying that the cost would come to at least three times that amount, and it actually exceeded ten millions.

A rough but tolerably accurate estimate of the cost of the Afghan War may be arrived at by setting down the charge at a pound a day for each fighting man engaged in the operations, omitting non-combatants and camp followers. Thus, if there are fifty thousand soldiers of all arms engaged, then, as Lord Hartington says, at present, the sum the country is paying will be £50,000 a-day, or £1,500,000 a-month, including ammunition, provisions, and commissariat and transport charges.

R.

[NOTE.—Before the last traces of this war disappear from the accounts, the cost will be double our original estimate of £30,000,000.—ED.]

## ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE IN INDIA.

TO THE EDITOR OF "THE STATESMAN."

SIR,—Permit me to give your readers an illustration of what the administration of justice too often means in India. Mr. Robert Ward was a European Inspector of Police at Toomkoor, one of the Mysore districts. When preparations were being made for the tour of his Highness the Maharajah, in a four-in-hand drag, in the train of the Chief Commissioner, Mr. J. D. Gordon, C.S.I., in November and December, 1879, there was—as usual on such occasions, unless great precautions are taken—great "squeezing" of the people, which continued through the tour. Mr. Ward made great remonstrances regarding some of these proceedings, and was very zealous in trying to trace certain acts of oppression to the officials, and is said to have thus made himself obnoxious to official interests in high places, or near high places.

Some time after this tour, a criminal charge (said to be false, and, as will be seen, admitted by the hostile authorities to be venial) was preferred against him by Mr. Sheshadri Iyer, Deputy Commissioner of the Toomkoor District (one of Mr. C. Rungacharloo's lieutenants). The charge was heard by Captain Maltby, Town Magistrate of Bangalore, in his capacity as local magistrate, not as a Justice of the Peace, who committed Ward for trial in the Judicial Commissioners' Court. Ward being a European, he should have heard the case as a J.P., and committed Ward to the Madras High Court. The Judicial Commissioner, Mr. Sandford, however, tried the case, took the deposition of Mr. Sheshadri Iyer, the Deputy Commissioner of Toomkoor, and real accuser, *by commission*, so that he could not be cross-examined—against which the prisoner's advocate in vain protested; and on the 10th of March, Ward was convicted and sentenced to six months' imprisonment, with a fine of Rs.500, and in default six months more. He was sent to gaol. His advocate appealed to the Madras High Court, which called for the record, and quashed the proceedings as utterly illegal, the Mysore courts having no jurisdiction. "Ward should be taken to the Justice of the Peace who committed him, and who should deal with him according to law."

On the 18th of May, Ward having suffered ten weeks' imprisonment, was again brought before Captain Maltby, who, instead of acting as directed by the High Court in his capacity of Justice of the Peace, produced a letter, No. 1031, 17 J, dated Ootacamund, 14th of May, 1880, from Mr. Gordon, Chief Commissioner of Mysore, which was read, and a copy given to Ward, stating that the Mysore Government declined to prosecute him further, on the ground, not of the illegality of the sentence and trial, but that by his having already suffered a term of imprisonment, and been dismissed from the police, "*the ends of justice had already been sufficiently met.*" The prisoner was discharged, after vainly demanding to be committed for trial by the High Court. Ward's advocate is to move the High Court to take measures—by *mandamus*, I suppose—to compel the Justice of the Peace to act according to law, in order that the case may be tried at Madras, away from local influences, and where the chief witness could be cross-examined. Comment upon such proceedings is needless.

E. B.

## EDITORIAL NOTES.

It is our duty to call the attention of the Government once more, and as pointedly as we can, to the statement that the Mysore treasury has been plundered of about one-third of the State jewellery that was made over to the keeping of our officials upon the death of the late Maharajah, in trust for the young Prince who is shortly coming of age. We are not in circumstances to affirm whether the charge is true or not, but it has taken the following form of precise allegation in a private letter, from which we give the extracts, in translation :—

The late Mysore Maharajah's jewels and gold plate were valued in 1868 by Major Elliot, Mr. Runga Charlu, and a punchayet of the most respectable *sahukars* [bankers] in the city, at thirty-six lakhs of rupees. The general belief in Mysore now is that a punchayet of goldsmiths would declare the value [of the remaining jewels] to be less than twenty-five lakhs.

Many of the jewels were set with two layers of precious stones, the bottom layer being used to increase the lustre of the top layer, in the old native style of setting. The jewels were, one by one, sent to Madras, where the top layer was removed, and the bottom layer raised, and set off with polished silver leaves, to heighten the brilliancy, and so make up for the deficiency, after the modern or European fashion. The altered jewels were then returned to their former places. Other jewels were reset in Mysore itself by Madras workmen, with fewer stones, and less elaborate workmanship, but so as to present somewhat the same general appearance, if not closely inspected. . . . All the old [original] accounts of the jewels of every description have been made away with.

It is impossible for us to say whether these charges are true or not, but the Home Government will, no doubt, call for information upon the subject.

We are the more jealous of the national reputation in this matter, because of the intense unwillingness of our Simlah officials, after their wont, to take the steps that are necessary for the transfer of the Raj from our own administration to that of the young Prince now coming of age. The bureaucracy will no more willingly surrender Mysore to Native rule, than it will restore the Berars to the Nizam. It is a bitter reproach to our rule in Mysore that no less than 1,250,000 of its small population of 5,000,000 are allowed, by Lord Lytton himself, to have perished of hunger in the last three years, through, as he himself admits, the British Government not rightly appreciating facts that were understood perfectly by the outside public. It is government of this order that "the nation" must put an end to, if it would not see British rule disappear altogether from India.

For the first time in our Indian history, we are called to witness the humiliating and ominous spectacle of a British force of 5,000 men shutting itself up in a fortress, and permitting itself to be besieged by some 10,000 Afghans. The General in command is afraid to come into "the open," lest he should incur a disaster that would involve the destruction of his entire force. And we are in this miserable dilemma, that we are obliged to approve what General Primrose

is doing. Never before, be it well understood, was an English force seen in a position so fatal to the "prestige" which the authors of this most guilty war assured the nation they were promoting. We were to march to Herat, and to garrison it with 30,000 men to secure it against Russia; and at Candahar, 350 miles on this side of it, we are hiding ourselves in a fortress from a force of mere Afghans, and counting the hours when the advance of reinforcements from two directions, and 20,000 strong, shall deliver our beleaguered army. Now, there were men who foresaw all this, foresaw it clearly—men who never ceased to point out the wild impossibility of the projects of our Pomeroy Colleys and Macgregors, and Lyttons and Lyalls and Beaconsfields. For two years before these men consummated the crime which they were bent upon, the *Statesman* in Calcutta, with absolutely prophetic insight, warned them, without ceasing, of the nature of the enterprise they were rushing upon with equal guilt and madness. And they are all already decorated and rewarded by the Throne for having accomplished their crime. And we have a responsible Government, we are told!

We may be very sure that General Primrose is right in the course he is following. *There are no troops in the world, that could be relied upon to face the Ghazis of Afghanistan in their present mood, except, perhaps, our own English soldiers.* To send the Native Sepoy into the open against these fanatics, is only to court a repetition of General Burrows's disaster. There was a moment of extreme peril to Donald Stewart's force, as is well known, when the Ghazis came down, sword in hand, against our Martini-Henry rifles. Twice the strength and size, physically, of the Sepoy, the Ghazi is not simply reckless of death—he *courts* it, full of the fanatical assurance that death for him means instant translation to paradise and the arms of the Houris. No mere rifle fire, however deadly, can be counted upon to prevent these men closing with our rank and file; when the contest is over if the troops are Sepoys only. It is the Ghazi, the mountain fanatic, who is the real danger in the open, and with but 1,100 English troops in his 5,000, and 4,000 Ghazis in the Afghan ranks, General Primrose is, no doubt, acting wisely in waiting for reinforcements, ruinous and humiliating as the spectacle is. And we were to march to Herat! Our Rawlinsons and Freres have had their way. For twenty years did the *Times*, in common with ourselves, in India, denounce the insanity of their counsels; and in turning its back upon itself three years ago to please the populace, the great London journal made its last and most fatal tergiversation, without the shadow of an excuse for it. The only atonement it could make to-day would be to demand, with ourselves, the stripping of every prime mover in the guilty business, of the honours which have been conferred upon them by the prostitution of the Throne.

It is with reluctance that we ever criticize anything that Mr. Fawcett says concerning India, but he has given so much disinterested attention to the affairs of that unhappy empire that we feel sure he will listen patiently to the exceptions we are obliged to take to certain statements made by him in his speech upon the Indian Budget. The improvidence of attempting to borrow money on account of India in the Calcutta market, ought surely to be obvious to every one. The pretence is that it is very desirable to induce the people of India to invest their surplus capital in the Government loans; but there is no such capital in India, and even if there were, the interest it can command is so high that the Government

loans offer no attraction to it whatever. The only effect of opening these loans in India, is to lessen the competition for them amongst European capitalists, for it is European capitalists alone who tender for the stock, open the loans where you may. Thus the only *boni fide* tenderers for the last loan were the exchange banks, the Comptoir d'Escompte de Paris taking up the whole loan. Now, Mr. Fawcett's defence runs thus :—

He could conceive no country engaging in a rash enterprise than to receive her revenue in one metal, and constantly to increase the amount of payments she had to make in some other metal. That was the reason why he differed from that part of the able speech of the hon. member for Bolton in which he said it would be better to raise a loan in England than in India, because you could raise it cheaper.

But what is to prevent loans being negotiated in silver in London? With the price of silver depressed below its normal value of the last 200 years, from a cause that is now admitted to be casual and ephemeral, common prudence suggests that we should refrain from borrowing therein at a time when it is worth but fifty-two pence per ounce, with the prospect of having to repay it when it is fifty-nine or sixty pence. Putting this question aside altogether, however, what we complain of is the borrowing in India, not the borrowing in silver. If the Government cannot see the wastefulness of borrowing 1s. 8d. with the prospect of having to return 1s. 11½d. a few years hence, it might surely be expected to see the wastefulness of borrowing in a far-off market where there is no loanable capital but what is sent thereto from Europe. Now, obviously, is the time to pay off our liabilities in silver, not to incur fresh ones therein. Let that be as it may, however, what has it to do with our borrowing in Calcutta instead of in London, when indefinitely better terms could be got in London? The truth is, the Secretary of State borrows in India that he may avoid having to ask the sanction of Parliament for borrowing in London; and Mr. Fawcett cannot need any assurance from us that this is the real reason for opening these loans in India. As to the price of silver, the present depression has been so manifestly caused by the German Government throwing millions of the metal upon the market, out of the ordinary way of supply in the course of trade with the mining countries of the world, that there is no reason whatever to suppose the depression will be permanent.

AGAIN, as to the fatal step of breaking up the great Public Works Staff in India that it had taken twenty years to organize, only that the late Tory Government might find funds for the Afghan War, Mr. Fawcett says :—

The committee had recommended that no more than £2,500,000 should be annually borrowed in India for the construction of public works. Of course, that recommendation placed no restriction on the amount that might be spent if India obtained a surplus. In that case £3,000,000 or £10,000,000 might be expended, but the conclusion of the committee was that it was not safe, considering the uncertain returns yielded by many of the later public works, to borrow more than the annual sum of £2,500,000. The hon. gentleman said that on that point he had not changed his mind, and he might add that neither had he seen any reason for altering his opinion.

In the first place, we defy any one to say whether our Public Works expenditure in India has been profitable or not under a system of accounts that jumbles together, for twenty years on end, the outlay thereon and the receipts therefrom with the ordinary revenues of the country and the annual expenses of its administration. Even were it proved that a part of the expenditure on public works had not been *directly* remunerative, one must have lived in India

to know and understand their important *indirect* effects upon the people. If anything can redeem our rule from complete and scathing condemnation, it is our moderate expenditure of late years upon public works and upon education. Does Mr. Fawcett really think that we are likely to redeem the people of India from their present condition, by reducing our expenditure upon public works to £2,500,000 a year? You have only to suppose Great Britain, France, Spain, Portugal, Italy, the German Empire, Austria, Holland, Denmark, and Scandinavia shut up to an outlay of £2,500,000 a-year upon railways, roads, canals, &c., to understand what Mr. Fawcett's limit means in India. The area for which these £2,500,000 are to suffice would cover all the kingdoms we have named, while the population is probably three times as dense. Imagine the dozen sparsely populated kingdoms of Europe we have named, forbidden by their rulers to construct any public works out of borrowed capital, and to limit their annual outlay upon railways, roads, canals, wells, tanks, reservoirs, telegraphs, postal lines, by an allotment of £2,500,000 out of the taxes. Now this is what Mr. Fawcett thinks wise for India, because of the difficulty of getting our home charges therefrom! It is selfish insanity so to treat the great dependency we rule, and its 200,000,000 of people. Nothing but covering the country with a network of railway and other communications, can now save the people from perishing in millions by famine, owing to the exhaustion of their food stores under our rule, and the impossibility of importing food from abroad. Imperfectly grasping the position, Mr. Fawcett has lent his great influence to the most fatal step that even a Tory Government could take. In the most ruinous and wasteful manner, we have been made to give compensation annuities and immense *bonuses* to officers of the Public Works Staff in the very prime of their powers, to induce them to retire. Young men of eight and ten years' service, full of energy, and fraught with experience, have been seduced into retiring upon pensions of Rs.2,000 a-year, with a bonus of Rs.10,000 in addition. The wretched people of India are now saddled with these liabilities as long as the men live, and we have to-day to begin again and make a new staff! Ten times £2,500,000 a-year would hardly compass the public works needs of India, in its present condition; while judicial blindness seems to be upon us in our profound selfishness about the Home charges. We are sometimes ready to weep with passionate indignation at our conduct. If we mean to *save* India, we must be unselfish. We must identify ourselves with her and spend money boldly upon public works therein. It is our only wise, our only honourable, our only safe course, as Mr. Fawcett would see if he knew India as we know it. One of the most fatal steps of that guilty Government the nation has just upset, was its break-up of the Public Works Department in India for the sake of prosecuting the Afghan War.

Mr. FAWCETT pointed out in the debate that twenty-two years had elapsed since the transfer of the government of India from the East India Company to the Crown had been effected; that great events had happened since then; public works had been extended, the military system has been changed, a different race of men had grown up; and that he thought the time had come for a careful inquiry into the condition of India. Mr. Fawcett inclines apparently to the appointment of a Select Committee, and Alderman Fowler has given notice that he will move for such a committee next session. For ourselves, we despair of any good therefrom, and for a very simple reason. If we could confine the evidence to half a dozen really competent witnesses—men with true insight into the position in India—and get them beforehand into some concerted harmony of

views, a Select Committee might report upon their evidence to some purpose. The ordinary committee examines, as well as it can, forty or fifty witnesses, holding the most opposite views, full of crotchets, and all more or less entitled to express an opinion (from longer or shorter residence in India), and thoroughly confident in their opinions. The only result is a mass of testimony so conflicting as to make a satisfactory and influential report thereon impossible. Parliament already knows all about India that can be known, without the advantage of long personal residence in the country. What we really want is the expression of concerted views on the part of half a dozen men with true insight into the possibilities of our position.

A ROYAL COMMISSION would be better than any Select Committee we could appoint, but all notion should be abandoned of sending the Commission to India. If Parliament desires that the Commission should prove abortive, it will order it to sit in India. It was this mistake that has made the Famine Commission so complete a *failure*. The whole atmosphere of India is charged to saturation with "officialism." The only "society" there is for a Commission to mix with in India is an "official" society full of conventional and false ways of looking at things. To send, therefore, a Royal Commission to India would be to make it frustrate. Nor is there any necessity to send it. The Commission should sit in London. It is of equal importance that the element of Indian Civilianism in its constitution should be a very subordinate one, for it is this "Civilianism" that the Commission will virtually have to try. Much will depend upon its President and Secretary. Lord Derby would, we believe, be the best man the Government could nominate as President. The Secretary should, under no circumstances, be an Indian official, nor should the Commission be very numerous, we think, but restricted to some six or eight members, selected with care. We want men like Mr. Fawcett, Professor Caird, Sir Arthur Hobhouse, Sir Erskine Perry, Sir David Wedderburn, Mr. Stansfeld, Sir Louis Mallet, Mr. Samuel Laing, and an Indian Civilian or two, not of the Temple or Frere order, but like Mr. Raymond West, Mr. Pedder, or Mr. Peile, with their technical knowledge of the revenue and judicial administration of India. The Secretary of the Commission should be a thoroughly well-informed non-official. A Royal Commission of this order might reasonably be hoped to produce a report of great value to us in our present circumstances, a report fraught with hope for the people.

WE publish below our third article on the Reform of Parliament. In this article we have attempted to detail a system for securing a just and equal representation of the people of England, by a redistribution of seats. We have no hope, of course, of seeing the plan adopted, but it is necessary to familiarize the public mind with the nature of the reform that has to be accomplished, before the House of Commons can reflect a just representation of the population. In our next number, we shall attempt to do for Ireland and Scotland what we have done in this article for England and Wales. We write under a depressing consciousness of the hopelessness of any adequate reform in the constitution of the Lower House until the fatal ascendancy which the territorial interest is permitted to assert in both is overthrown, and the representation of the land reduced to its just and equitable proportions to every other interest in the realm. Does any one suppose for a moment, that if the great mercantile interests of the kingdom were



permitted to obtain an ascendancy therein approaching to that which the land is permitted to assert, there would be any hope of enlightened legislation for improving the condition of the masses of the population? The most cursory attention to the facts suffices to show that while the landlord and the capitalist so completely swamp the working men in Parliament there is no hope of wise and unselfish legislation. When we speak of "working men" in this association, we do not mean the mere labourer or artizan, or physical toiler, but the vast body of more or less educated Englishmen whose sweat of mind and brow makes England what she is amongst the nations. Until the representation of property in both Houses is reduced to its just proportion to that of labour, "representative government" will never be anything but a phrase with us. There is but one way, probably, in which this reform can ever be accomplished, namely, by regulating the numerical strength in which the owners of land above a certain rental, can be allowed to sit in Parliament at all. It is the unjust ascendancy of the landed interest in Parliament that has stereotyped the condition of the poor. No one, we hope, will suppose us to be Utopian enough to believe that the poor will ever cease out of the land, but the abject misery of masses of our population is an opprobrium to the nation.

WE have now some very serious advice to press upon the Advanced Liberal Party in the House. The great maxim of enlightened English reformers has ever been "change, but without revolution." Now, there are two great measures of reform upon which Advanced Liberals are at one—(1) Reform of the House of Lords, (2) Disestablishment of the Church. There is only one way of approaching both these measures. We repudiate everything like "revolution" in each alike. We want reform in the House of Lords, and we want the National Church enfranchised and set free from the trammels of its connection with the State. For ourselves, we say plainly that we approach the latter subject from a somewhat different standpoint than the Dissenters. The Anglican Church is our own Church, and for it we have a profound love and veneration. It is because we love it, and would see it purer and more powerful for good than it has ever yet been, that we long to see it "enfranchised." We have no quarrel with those who call for the disestablishment of the Church, but, for ourselves, we demand its enfranchisement; and do so in common with what is, perhaps, the most enlightened, and, in these days, the most earnestly religious, part of the Church itself. We have no sympathy whatever with the Erastianism of the Low Church School, and their monstrous fiction of the Royal Supremacy. The King neither *is*, nor can be, the Head of the Church. The noble martyr protest that Dr. Chalmers and the six hundred clergymen of the Church of Scotland made, some forty years ago, in giving up their all to found the Free Kirk of Christ in Scotland, has borne its legitimate fruit, and the Church of England to-day is full of men with whom the conviction is daily deepening that the only way to heal its divisions is to enfranchise it from its dependence upon the State. Now, it so happens that the very first step to be taken in reforming the House of Lords, and reforming the National Church, is one and the same, namely, the exclusion of the Bishops from the former, and placing them in their true and rightful position in the Church. If the Advanced Liberal Party are wise, they will, for the present, drop all agitation for what they call "Disestablishment." The country is plainly not ripe for such a measure. It would at present be revolutionary and full of harm. We are not speaking of Scotland, but of England; and as to

England, it is perfectly clear to ourselves what the first step should be. The Church itself is prepared for a change that would be in no sense whatever revolutionary, and that would produce nothing but good to State and Church alike. What is it that makes the English Prelates so incessantly pointed at, but the pomp and vanity that are inseparable from their position as peers of Parliament? The Church of Rome puts us to shame, for its constant succession of bishops of an order almost unknown in the Anglican Church, men whose lives are as saintly as their "calling," and whose revenues, however vast, are devoted in numberless instances to purposes of piety and charity alone. We never can have bishops like these in the Anglican Church, while they are peers of the realm. In Parliament, their entire history is one over which the nation may well blush. When have the Anglican bishops ever been found on the right side in Parliamentary divisions? The very fact that the order is one of the strongest Tory elements in the House, and that their votes may be said, with historic truthfulness, to have been always on the side of human selfishness and tyranny, ought to convince the Bishops themselves that there is some fatal mistake in their sitting there at all. What, then, the Liberal party has to do, in concert with the Church itself, is to demand that we revert to what the great statesmen of the seventeenth century—the Elliots, Pym, and Hampdens 240 years ago—did for the nation, only to be undone by that precious Nell Gwynne *Defender of the Faith*, Charles II. The value of a definite programme to the Liberal party would be enormous: and, here is its very first item. Call it Disestablishment, or with us Enfranchisement, it is a platform on which the intellect and conscience of the masses of Englishmen, whether Churchmen or Dissenters, could stand together. The Ministry cannot propose the reform, but the leaders of the Liberal party may with the utmost propriety: and if in earnest they will. They will have the "conscience" of the Bishops themselves with them, and the exclusion of their body from the Lords will distinctly lessen its power for evil. The time has long since gone by, when any good might be hoped for from the presence of the Bishops in Parliament. Their influence upon the State is distinctly evil, while their worldly *status* is fatal to their proper influence in the Church.

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THE "county members" have contrived to show pretty effectually, in the debates of the last few weeks on the Malt-tax and the Hares and Rabbits Bill, the true nature of their friendship for the farmers. The simple truth is, that our landowners represent no interests whatever, and advocate none in either House, but those of their own order. They are hastening on some drastic legislative change:—of that they may be very sure; and it is time that the form it must take should be carefully considered: To suppose that the country will permit itself to be ridden to death in the future, as it has been in the past by these magnates, argues a strange want of acquaintance with the great currents of thought and feeling that are every day gaining in force and clearness of direction in the country. The guidance the Tory landowners have been under since they broke away from the leadership of Sir Robert Peel, to graduate in the academy of Mr. Disraeli, seems to have demoralized them thoroughly. Under Sir Robert Peel's guidance, the great Conservative party were honestly educated in the wisdom of subordinating pretensions and traditions, that are inconsistent with the welfare of the country as a whole, to the necessities of the times, particularly of the poor. Under Mr. Disraeli they have been "educated" in courses of the deepest insincerity. They have been taught to bend all their

powers to persuade the nation that the simplest reforms in the landed system of the country are destructive of the rights of property, and opposed to enlightened legislation, by interfering with the great principle of freedom of contract. The sinister guidance which they have followed for the last thirty years has ended in destroying all honest purpose in them as a party. Their one idea of government has come to be the preservation of their own interests, under loud professions of concern for the Constitution, for the national honour and prestige, and for the farmer.

The sincerity of their concern for the Constitution was shown in the last Parliament by their forcing an Imperial title upon the Queen, and converting the Majesty of England into a trumpery travesty of the tawdry splendour of the Great Mogul. In their love of the ancient Constitution of this monarchy, they discovered that its true seat of empire was the plains of Delhi, where the great Enchanter led them, with dulcimer and psaltery, to set up the brazen image of Jingoism, and declare war upon a neighbouring Prince who refused to acknowledge himself included in the empire of "the greatest Mohamedan power in the world!" So ardently do they love the Constitution of the country, that they were prepared to accept the doctrine that the power of the Crown was far too circumscribed in these days, and that until the Prerogative was allowed to assert pretensions that set the Privy Council, Parliament, and the nation aside altogether, the Empress of India and her Ministers would never occupy their just position amongst the "sovereigns and statesmen" of the world. So jealous are these gentlemen of the national prestige, that they saw no dishonour in championing the Turk against the Christian races driven into rebellion by his cruelties, and no shame in sending our forces to lay waste the territories of a neighbouring people, against whom we had so little cause of war that no one to this hour knows why it was entered upon. Their love of the Constitution is so ardent, that they declared it want of patriotism for Parliament to insist upon knowing *why* the nation was at war, and mere faction to resent the falsehoods with which the "Imperial" Cabinet, "the sovereigns and statesmen" gentlemen, deigned to amuse the country.

AND now they are the farmers' friend! The Malt-tax would not be repealed if they could help it, nor the farmers' crops delivered from the ravages of vermin. As to the Irish tenantry, let them go to America, or to the devil, and the sooner the better. Our friends "the hereditary legislators" have travelled far in the last six years, to the pipe and tabret of the high-souled leader whom they preferred to the vacant place of the unworthy Peel. We venture to prophesy a little: it will not be long before the Earl of Beaconsfield's followers become the mere ramp of the Conservative party. Insincerity must have nearly done its work of disintegration by this time. The influence of the Peers may hold it together for a time, but the end of Beaconsfieldian Conservatism is not far off, with the cause in such a state as it now is in the Commons.

If a farmer either in England or Scotland fails to pay his rent when due, the landlord can distrain his goods for the amount, but has no power to evict him from his farm. In Ireland the case is otherwise. Let the peasant farmer in that island fail to pay, and his landlord can come down upon him at once and evict him. Now we have had, as every one knows, three successive harvests so

deplorably bad, that a mass of capitalist farmers both in England and Scotland have thrown up their farms rather than risk what remains to them of their capital in so treacherous a climate. The peasant farmers of Ireland are supposed to have lost twelve to thirteen millions sterling in the same three years, from the same cause. Masses of them are of the cottier class, and dependent upon the annual returns of the soil to their industry, to pay their rent at all. They have fallen into arrears, and in these circumstances the landlords are using their default to evict them from their holdings, and doing so with a hardness and determination that threatens to produce rebellion, if not civil war, in the land. So deeply does the injustice of their course offend the conscience of the people, that the police have to be called out in large numbers to make the eviction, seventy to two hundred of the constabulary being required; and the Ministry are expected to fold their hands and do nothing, the landlords affirming that the State has no right to interfere with this extreme assertion of their so-called "rights." By evicting in this way it is clear that the occupancy right of the tenant is practically confiscated, the landlord taking occasion of the tenant's distress to appropriate to himself the value of that right; and when the Ministry insist that this occupancy right shall be valued by independent authority, and compensation made if the landlord insists upon evicting, the landlords in both Houses interfere with a passionate and determined veto. Gentlemen, you have ruled the kingdom too long. You have selfishly subordinated every national interest in the country to your own, and are minded to retain your power. Well, the nation will try a throw with you before long, and do not accuse it of provoking the quarrel when it comes. To speak of the Parliament of this kingdom as representative of the nation, is the idlest nonsense, with the landlord element in both Houses swamping all other interests without an effort. Suppose we try a Parliament representing the working men of the nation, with a House of Lords representing its merchants, manufacturers, men of science and literature, in the same overwhelming strength which the landlords have so long possessed. It will come to this, and the scandal of the Irish Relief Bill will help it on very materially. They will not have change, and they must take the alternative, which is revolution.

AND now what about this Ireland and the relations of these landlords therewith, who tell us in Parliament that the land is *theirs*, for the extremest assertion of their rights? How long will the heavens have patience with these men! Listen to what Count Cavour said of them and their rights:—

All the world knows the long and melancholy history of the miseries of Ireland. For eight centuries has this country endured every kind of oppression and persecution. . . . During this period, Ireland presents the saddest spectacle to be found in any civilized country—complete and absolute oppression of the poor by the rich, of him who labours by him who possesses, organized by law and maintained by the ministers of justice.

Here is the foundation of these "landlord" rights laid bare, not by English Radicals or Chartists or Home Rulers, but by the greatest European statesman of modern times. Let us hear him still:—

During the greatest part of the eighteenth century, the Irish peasant was reduced to a state of slavery, worse than that of the negro in the Antilles.

And who reduced him to this condition? The same landlord Parliament that to-day passionately and scornfully demands,—the right to evict at will. We are

tempted to ask—if there is to be eviction, which party ought to go—the peasant or his oppressor? But let the Count go on:—

If the Melbourne Ministry could have commanded in the House of Commons a majority strong enough to have compelled the House of Lords to adopt the remedial measures which it had prepared with a view to remove the grievances of Ireland, all the wounds of that country would have been on the way of cure.

We suggest again, if there is to be eviction at all, which party ought to go—the peasants or the peers? The landlords have not enjoyed their right, the right to play the oppressor, long enough yet, we suppose! And censures upon their course are the malignant diatribes of fanatical Communists.

Now that we have begun, we may as well, perhaps, lift the veil a little higher, and, with Count Cavour still as our guide, explore the history of these embittered quarrels about the land, that have made Ireland an opprobrium to us throughout the civilized world:—

Ireland, and especially Catholic Ireland, is a country exclusively agricultural. The cultivation of the ground is the chief, not to say the only, resource of the great majority of the population. This is ordinarily a condition eminently favourable to the maintenance of order and of peace; but here it is otherwise. The land, to which the Irish are attached by an insurmountable necessity, belong almost wholly to a foreign race, which has for them neither sympathy nor affection, with which they are not united by the multitude of moral ties that everywhere else exist between the owner and the cultivator of the soil. The wars of invasion first, and religious strife afterwards, have several times transferred the property from the hands of the ancient possessors of the soil to those of the conquerors or the persecutors of the country. As a consequence of the successive confiscations which took place during the whole course of the seventeenth century, Ireland has been divided into two hostile classes, one which possesses, the other which tills, the soil. Its population is composed of proprietors, Protestant, intolerant, haughty, treating with contempt those whom they have conquered; and of tenants, Catholic, poor, ignorant, superstitious, animated by an inveterate hatred of the despoilers of their country. Such a social state has no parallel in Europe. Russia itself is, in this respect, in a more satisfactory condition.

The italics are ours. Now it is these proprietors, the descendants and representatives of this ancestral oppression, who to-day tell us that the heavens will fall if, after three years' fruitless cultivation of his land, the peasant, upon failure to pay his rent, may not be straightway evicted and got rid of. Oh, my brother, we are doomed to hear strange things in this nineteenth century, in spite of the enlightenment and philanthropy which are its boast.

But the peasant must be evicted for his own good. He has so incorrigible a love of the potato, and so brutal a desire to beget children, that it is the truest pity to drive him remorselessly from home and country. My landlord friends, we might hear this patiently, perhaps, from any lips but yours! Who but you is it that have brought him into this condition? Listen to this indictment from the same unerring hand, and perhaps even your thick hides may wince a little under the lash:—

The Catholic cultivator regards the Protestant proprietors as cruel strangers who have robbed him of his goods—as sacrilegious persons who have profaned his holy temples—as enemies, still stained with the blood of his forefathers. To form an idea of the state of misery and degradation into which the tyranny of William III. plunged Ireland, we must seek the terms of comparison in America—in the countries in which slavery still exists in all

its hideousness. . . . The majority of these proprietors, caring very little to embellish or improve their estates, and pursued, besides, by a feeling of insecurity from which they cannot escape, think only of drawing from them the most money possible, without being obliged to make hazardous advances. The misery of Ireland raised up a class of grasping men who wonderfully strengthened these dispositions. These men, called "middlemen" (*entremetteurs*), rented from the large proprietors who did not reside on their estates a vast extent of badly cultivated land, unprovided with any sort of farm-buildings, or of the means of cultivation. Thereupon they divided the land into very small portions, and without even spending a farthing upon them to bring them into condition, they sublet them to the wretched inhabitants of the country, among whom were often the descendants of the ancient proprietors who had been dispossessed by war and confiscations. This operation was often repeated; and the same domain passed into several hands, by division and subdivision, before coming to him who was finally to cultivate it; so that it is not rare, even at this day, to find between the proprietor and the true cultivator a hierarchy of five or six farmers, holding one from another. This organization of agricultural labour is, beyond contradiction, the worst that can exist. Nevertheless, as this agricultural system, however detestable, was eminently convenient to the proprietors, the Irish Parliament and the courts of justice did not cease to favour it. In order better to secure the payment of their rents, the great landowners, who had at their disposal the majority in the Houses of Parliament, passed a law which rendered the farmer cultivators responsible for what the farmers intermediate between themselves and the proprietor might owe to him. Thus, a wretched peasant, after having paid an exorbitant rent to the man who had let to him the field on which he had so much difficulty to live, was often called upon to pay the debts which the larger farmers, to him unknown, had contracted with the proprietor of the soil. This monstrous iniquity, this scandalous abuse of power, which would of itself suffice to explain the agrarian outrages which ever have been so frequent in Ireland, subsisted even to 1830.

Through long centuries of oppression and violence, the infamy of which we to-day inherit, it is Landlord legislation that has reduced the peasant farmer to the position which foreign statesmen reproach us with. And in the very House where they have for centuries "established injustice by a law"—the House which has been witness to their crime, and whose records bear it in perpetual remembrance—they dare talk of the rights of property so acquired, and demand their extremest assertion. Who, by the eternal ordinances of justice, is the real "husband" of the soil? Is the land *your* spouse, or the "wife" of the man whose toil and sweat and blood declare him her lawful husband? If anything were wanted to intensify the indignation of the country, it would be the tone of deprecation with which the greatest Minister of modern times has felt compelled to invite your lordships to remember that the poor have rights in the soil as well as you. Good heavens, rights! What are your rights but the inheritance of an infamy of wrong-doing to the "husband" of the soil. And men wonder at that phenomenon, we call the Home Rule Party.

Few Englishmen can at all realize the heartless cruelty of these "evictions." Let us show them the picture of one, as the late Mr. Kay gave it, that they may know what it is that excites the Irish peasant to madness: "In passing through some half-dozen counties, Cork (especially in the western portions of it), Limerick, Clare, Galway, and Mayo, you see thousands of ruined cottages and dwellings of the labourers, the peasants, and the small holders of Ireland. You see from the road-side twenty houses at once with not a roof upon them. I came to a village not far from Castlebar where the system of eviction had been carried out only a few days before. Five women came about us as the car stopped, and on making inquiry, they told us their sorrowful story. They were not badly clad; they were cleanly in appearance; they were intelligent; they used no violent language, but in the most moderate terms told us that on the Monday week pre-

viciously those five houses had been levelled. They told us how many children there were in their families: I recollect one had eight, another six; that the husbands of three of them were in this country for the harvest; that they had written to their husbands to tell them of the desolation of their homes. And I asked them what did their husbands say in reply? They said, 'They had not been able to get any breakfast!' It is but a simple observation, but it marks the sickness and the sorrow which came over the hearts of those men who here were toiling for their three or four pounds, denying themselves almost rest at night that they might make a good reaping at the harvest, and go back that they might enjoy it in the home that they had left. All this is but a faint outline of what has taken place in that unhappy country."

If the leaders of the Home Rule party were not Irishmen, they would have seen long since, that instead of addressing themselves to the people of Ireland, who want no enlightening as to the wrongs of their country, it is to the English people that they should address themselves. Why is it that a few Englishmen here and there sympathize so deeply with the Irish party, but because they know and understand how cruel are the wrongs which English legislation and English violence have heaped upon the Irish people? We tell Mr. Parnell and his followers, with deep sincerity, that they have chosen the wrong field for the "agitation" to which they are committed on the subject of the land in Ireland. Incredible as it may seem to them, not one Englishman in a thousand understands the merits of the long and bitter quarrel which they are prosecuting in Ireland. It is not the people of Ireland, we say, who want enlightening upon the subject, but the great heart of the English people. If Mr. Parnell knew Englishmen as well as he knows his own countrymen, he would know how deep is our ignorance, as a nation, of the wrongs which have eaten all loyalty out of the Irish heart, and converted the Irish people into the deadliest enemies of the Anglo-Saxon. Thus in spite of the vehement and prolonged debates in Parliament over the "Compensation for Disturbance Bill," you will not find one Englishman in five hundred who knows the precise nature of the measure which the Government sought to pass, nor the exact circumstances which made them propose it to the Legislature. If Mr. Parnell would organize a series of great meetings throughout England in the coming autumn, for the exposition of the miseries under which the Irish peasant groans, and the course of English legislation which has brought them about, he would deserve the gratitude of both countries. How is it possible for this or any English Ministry whatever to carry such measures through Parliament as the condition of Ireland demands, while the mass of the English people have no conception whatever of what that condition is, nor how it has been brought about? If Mr. Parnell is bent upon severing Ireland from England's rule, and nothing but a revolution of this order will satisfy him, he will persist in his present course; but if he really desires to see a great healing Act of the Legislature passed to settle the land question for all time, in the only way of which it admits of being settled, it is to the hearts of the English people that he should address himself. We avow our belief that if the people of England can once be made to understand the wrongs of the Irish peasant, and to discern clearly their true historic cause, the House of Lords will have to give way, or will be removed out of the way altogether. The history of the present session shows plainly that no Ministry can do anything, until the English people assume an attitude upon the Irish question, before which the Lords must give way. Mr. Parnell has only to settle

his programme of reform, and give it such a shape as to commend it clearly to the sympathy and judgment of Englishmen who are *not* landlords, and he will not stand alone at public meetings in this country, but will find Englishmen of the highest character and powers ready to help him to secure justice to the Irish people. This is the true door of hope for Ireland, and not Irish rebellion. We have had Irish martyrs enough, as it is.

It is an injustice to the many good men who entertain strong conscientious objections to the Revenue derived by the Government of India from opium, that their views should be expressed with the acrimony that distinguishes the writings of the *Friend of China* on the subject. Our remarks upon the subject seem to have irritated the paper deeply, and in its last issue we read :—

Who ought to pay the cost, Great Britain or India? India, undoubtedly, *if she could*. As to this, there is not—so far as we are aware—any serious question raised by anybody. The challenge thrown out by Lord Hartington and Mr. Fawcett, that an increase of our income-tax should be proposed, was not based on any abstract theory of right, but on the alleged impossibility of raising revenue in India in any other way. THE STATESMAN is pleased to regard the opium revenue of India as a set-off against the sixteen millions of "Home charges," exacted from India, a portion of which he considers to be unjust. On this ground, he vehemently opposes disturbing the opium revenue. According to him, Great Britain robs India of an annual tribute of—let us say—six and a-half millions in Home charges; but, on the other hand, repays this six and a-half millions by the opium tribute extorted from China; therefore, it is all right and fair for India, and those who propose to disturb so equitable an arrangement, are blind and wicked fanatics, utterly heedless of the welfare of our Hindu fellow-subjects!

Our readers can themselves judge both of the tone and the truthfulness of writing of this order. Instead of looking upon the men who are uneasy about this subject as "blind and wicked fanatics," we have the truest respect for them, as our writings have shown clearly enough, we think. It is their misfortune to have their cause discredited by associates who have not the candour to acknowledge—perhaps we ought to say, have not the calmness to see—the force of the objections which lie against the agitation.

INDIA lies bound hand and foot by us. We administer the revenues we raise from the millions of its people as we please; we exact those revenues without even the form of consulting the people, or the pretence of a form. In our own case, we hold this to be tyranny of an order so unendurable as to justify the extremity of civil war and rebellion. Now, admitting that there are great difficulties in the way of relieving India of this yoke, what are we to say of an agitation that tells us that the moral "responsibility" of such an administration is still not ours, but that of the people subjected to the yoke? It is we who exact the revenues, decide what their sources shall be, and how they shall be disposed of; and we do it by military force, pure and simple. And to enable us to get our Home charges, we use our command of the sea-board of the country to compel the Chinese to pay us a contribution of six or seven millions a year, by establishing a monopoly of the Indian supply of opium to the Chinese people. In these circumstances certain English gentlemen conceive a conscientious belief that it is an immoral thing to maintain the monopoly, and make this gain out of it; and they sternly command the English Government to sacrifice the revenue so obtained, on the ground that



it is a "national sin." Instead of using our military force to tax the Chinese in this way, we should relieve *them* of the burden and put it upon the Hindus, that their conscience—the English conscience—may be at ease. That the people of India have any right to be consulted in the matter never enters their mind. The British Pharisee persuades himself that we make an exaction upon the revenue of India that is perfectly just and proper, and that we have administered those revenues in the past, and are still administering them, in a way that must commend itself to the conscience of every man. The ignorance of this phenomenal Pharisee is too profound to permit his even entertaining a suspicion that there has been any wrong done by us to India. British rule has been an infamy for its exactions from the revenues of India. But then, it is not our better knowledge that makes us speak thus, but that we are "blind and wicked fanatics" to talk so. My *Friend (of China)*, if your anti-opium agitation is as well founded in morals, as our charge against the misrule that has reduced 100,000,000 of people in India to a depth of wretchedness that is indescribable, you deserve to succeed, and we wish you "God speed" with our whole heart. We have sent the knife deep into the cancer that underlies these ceaseless professions of a "morality" that, somehow or other, is never to cost us anything. If this opium revenue is immoral, it is *our* immorality that levies it; and that levies it for the purpose of making India pay to the last farthing, every charge we have put upon her in the past, and are putting upon her to-day, in this Afghan War, for example, into which it was the people of India, we suppose, that led the nation. If England has nothing more to answer for in India than her export duty upon a poisonous drug that the people of China will have, even though they grow it themselves, we, for our part, think we may, upon the whole, congratulate ourselves. We are sorry to assume this tone, but it is necessary when we are told boldly that India "ought," of course, to find the six millions a year which the tender conscience of Englishmen compels them to exact in some way or other for an Afghan war! We could respect an agitation willing to pay threepence in the pound for conscience' sake; but we have no respect for the cheap morality that stipulates that the threepence shall be laid upon the Hindus. It was not so that the nation redeemed itself from the stain of slavery; and if this anti-opium agitation is to command respect, it must fight shy of such advocates as the *Friend of China*. The fact, we suppose, is that the writer knows neither the history of our rule of India nor the condition of its people.

We are favoured by Mr. Philip Henry Bagenal, [Barrister-at-Law, Dublin, with a little tract, entitled "Parnellism Unveiled." Mr. Bagenal's object is to discredit the agitation of the Irish Land question by identifying it with Fenianism, of which he declares it to be simply the latest phase, and he affirms that since the days of Jack Cade and his Kentish followers, there never was a more audacious insurrection against law, order, and property. No arguments that its leaders can adduce will ever, says Mr. Bagenal, "prove that the origin of the Land agitation lies in the existence of owners of property." Indeed he tells us that "such a proposition is absurd," and he finds the true causes of the agitation "in the continuance of bad seasons, consequent upon an unfortunate climate, three decisive bad harvests, the bankruptcy of the people, and finally, the arrival upon the scene of action of a band of conspirators pledged to revive the Fenian conspiracy." As the burden of Mr. Bagenal's tract is that Parnellism is simply Socialism, and a revolt against "the rights of property," it is difficult to see the absurdity of attributing it to

"the existence of owners of property." If there were no owners of property, ordinary minds find it hard to understand how there can be any revolt against their existence. If the true cause of the agitation is the misery of the people, as Mr. Bagenal incidentally allows—how is it that he has nothing but indignation to expend upon it? He dilates upon the misery and bankruptcy of the people, and if you will but attribute this wretchedness simply to their unfortunate climate and three successive bad harvests, he is prepared to do—nothing, and to suggest nothing. As to attributing their misery to a vicious system of land tenure, inherited from the landlordism of the last three centuries, it is wickedness itself in Mr. Bagenal's eyes. Now, if required to make a choice between Mr. Parnell's agitation, which at least proposes remedies for the people's wretchedness, and Mr. Bagenal's challenge that we should lay the blame upon Providence and do nothing—we think we should prefer the agitation. Mr. Bagenal and his clients may shut their eyes to the fact if they please, and declare the contention to be absurd: but that the condition of the Irish cultivator has been brought about by English "landlordism," is certain enough to every one but the landlord class themselves. The strength of Fenianism lies in the wretchedness of the Irish people, and if the condition of the Irish cultivator is to be ameliorated, it will be by wise and courageous legislation, of an order that Mr. Bagenal will probably call Communism.

MR. BAGENAL has seen what the great Italian statesman thought of Irish landlordism forty years ago; let him now see how reflecting Englishmen view it to-day. Mr. Charles Wilson (Cheltenham) writes then to the *Daily News*: "The action of the Lords in rejecting the Bill for the temporary protection of poverty-stricken Irish tenants will not improve the position of the landlords, who are the vast majority of that House. The mere landlord—and especially of the Tory type—considers the owner of an Irish estate of much more importance than the six hundred persons which, on the average, are dependent on his dubious sense of justice. The produce of the soil is the chief resource of the Irish people, and that soil is a monopoly in the hands of a few thousands of the population; Irish manufactures having been all but extinguished through English jealousy. Irish land was originally tribal property. The State ignored the rights of the people, and handed over the fee of the land to Court favourites. As the land is a fixed quantity, and the people constantly increasing, the competition for farms has resulted in rents that in very many cases are most exorbitant. The tenants cannot make provision for bad seasons; hence the necessity for British, Colonial, and American charity to ward off starvation. This charity, as well as the State loans to landlords at one per cent., are rates to maintain rack-rents. It does not appear that we can improve the condition of the Irish peasantry without a sweeping reform of our land laws, similar to that which has been effected in Prussia. The Prussian peasantry, sixty years ago, were in the miserable condition which still prevails in Ireland, but they are now owners of the land. The past condition of Prussia is the present condition of Ireland. The best authorities tell us that the produce of the Irish soil would be doubled by peasant owners. I have had considerable experience as a landowner, and take the liberty of saying that the present policy of landlords in exacting more than is due will probably result in their obtaining less than justice in the end. Let me add, that Irishmen are not behind in the race of progress in America and in the colonies." There is but one right solution, we believe, of the question, and it is the natural and righteous one—the husband of the soil must be permitted to become its owner.

It is a misfortune, we believe, for the people of India that there is no hope of the Marquis of Hartington remaining for any very long time at the India Office. If England is ever to rule her vast dependency with more success than she has yet attained, it is absolutely necessary, we are convinced, to make the appointment of Secretary of State for India a permanent one, independent of government by party altogether. Are we really, in this nineteenth century, so bound hand and foot by traditions, that it is impossible for us to import a little "common sense" into the system by which we rule the destinies of 250,000,000 of the human race? India is a study to absorb the undivided attention of the highest and noblest statesmanship England can produce; and we persuade ourselves that we do our duty towards this vast part of the human family, by a system that makes it impossible for their chief ruler ever to have more than a smattering and superficial acquaintance with his charge. At whatever cost, at whatever inconvenience to "parties," common sense tells us that the Secretary of State for India should be subject to removal from his office, only under emergencies of the gravest order. A lifetime spent in the study of Indian affairs fails to master them as they need to be mastered, while we adopt a system under which the portfolio for India is constantly changing hands to meet the convenience of "party" Ministerial necessities. Is it really impossible to find amongst our leading statesmen, a man gifted with talents and wisdom, and willing to consecrate both to this splendid trust as long as life and strength hold out for the work? It is not likely, we fear, that Lord Hartington would accept the position, but we hope we may be pardoned for saying that the Earl of Derby seems to be marked out, by his freedom from party associations, his perfect judgment, and long acquaintance with Indian affairs, as the very man to be Permanent Secretary of State for India, with a right to sit in the House of Commons as well as the Lords, whenever he deemed it necessary to address the Government and the country upon the affairs of its great dependency. We want original statesmanship here, as well as in India, to deal rightly with a trust of such overwhelming magnitude.

Let the Secretaryship for India become, we say, a permanent appointment, and instead of giving him an antiquated and nominal Council that does nothing, and never will do anything, give him any number of Secretaries he requires, selected for their original powers and exact knowledge of India, whom he may make a Council of, as often as he feels it necessary to concentrate the strength of the India Office upon the perplexing problems he has to deal with. The Civilian bureaucracy are ever telling us that India must not be ruled from Downing Street, but by Simlah. Constitute the India Office aright, and do away with that costly and demoralized incubus at Simlah altogether. No light ever penetrates the recesses of the Simlah records, nor will any ever be allowed to pour upon them, while the bureaucratic system lasts. India should be administered to-day from England, as every Indian bank and merchants' office in India is now ruled. Bring India close to the very doors of Parliament, and give a formal and settled allotment of time to the Secretary of State for India in both Houses,—something to correspond with "Government Nights," as they are called in the House. With India in its present condition, wise arrangements should be made to bring it closer to Parliament a great deal than it now is, while divesting the consideration of its affairs of "party" aspects altogether. The thing is quite possible, and might be done at once. Lord Hartington's Budget speech calls for no special comment in these columns. It was a great and noble effort, and it

makes us regret keenly that the speaker is likely to take no more than a passing interest in India. H.M.'s Secretary of State for India is an appointment yet to be conceived and created. If Mr. Gladstone could but find the time to consider this great need, we could then reconcile ourselves for good to his enforced abstention from the consideration of Indian affairs.

A DESIRE is frequently uttered in this country for a genuine expression of Native thought and feeling as to our rule of India. Those, then, of our readers who would like to know precisely what the educated classes of India are at this moment thinking and saying about us, may peruse with advantage two papers which they will find below, (1) on the general subject of our rule, and (2) on the special subject of increased taxation in India. The papers come to us direct from India, and are written, the one by a Native gentleman of Bombay, the other by an educated and well-informed Bengali gentleman. We commend the former paper particularly to the attention of the reader. It portrays faithfully the general impression which our rule makes upon the educated Native mind. The wretchedness of the masses of the people, their exclusion from all positions of influence in their own land, the £20,000,000 sterling annually transferred from their own country to this under the head of Home charges, and private remittance of English fortunes, and the generally selfish character of our rule—are ever present in these days to the educated Native. His mind is full of but one idea, namely, that the advantages of our rule are purchased at a cost that makes it hateful to him. He contrasts it with the rule of our predecessors, altogether to our disadvantage, and would hail its subversion, but that its overthrow would mean anarchy. The reader may take our word for it, that he has in these two papers the genuine expression of Native thought about us, and Native feeling towards us. It is not flattering to our self-love, but if wise, we shall lay it to heart and ponder it well. We are unjust to the people of India, and our rule has brought the masses of the people into a condition of abject misery. Are we to stop there? The nation is kept in a fool's paradise about India under the delusions propagated by the annual official reports it receives from the Indian bureaucracy, guaranteed by the *Times*.

WITHIN the last few months, the nation has suffered two calamities that have moved it deeply. It has seen a great railway bridge fall headlong, in a storm of wind, into the waters below, carrying with it a whole train of passengers, engulfing them in a moment in a destruction too full of horror in its incidents to be willingly imagined. And it has seen a so-called "training ship" of the Navy, with three hundred sailor lads on board, with a picked crew, and officered by men of high ability, founder at sea—no one can tell how. And it at last comes out that the bridge has fallen, and the training ship foundered, because they were bound to do so: the one by its notoriously faulty workmanship, the other by its equally notorious unseaworthiness. Now, the Crown is accustomed to honour successful achievements in engineering and naval architecture, with the approval of the nation; but a spurious tenderness for the reputations of the living is likely to betray us into forgetfulness of what we owe the dead. We have sometimes thought that a Legion of Dishonour should be established, to which, upon full proof of their responsibility for calamities like these, their authors should be publicly gazetted. The man who knows that he has put up a railway bridge so that it is bound to come down, or the dockyard official who selects a ship that he

knows is not fit for her trust, or who, in either case, may justly be held to have had reasonable ground for suspecting the structure, should after impartial inquiry, be gazetted, we say, a member of the Legion of Dishonour. The Earl of Beaconsfield and the other promoters of the Afghan War might give *éclat* to the institution of the new Order by being promoted at once to its highest grade, while the authors of the Tay Bridge calamity and the sorrowful fate of the *Atalanta* might enter its lower ranks. Every one must see that executive responsibility in England has become a complete farce. But one event, as Ecclesiastes says, "happeneth to all alike." It matters not whether the servant of the public fail or succeed in his work, he expects to be rewarded. Upon the whole, it is more profitable, perhaps, to fail, when a sentiment of pity and consideration is then awakened for the "disastrous" servant. And so the Crown promotes him, "lest he should be swallowed up with over much sorrow," we suppose. We would retain the promoting system, but it should be into a new corps—the Legion of Failure and Dishonour, as we say. There is guilt connected with these terrible disasters, as with the Afghan War, and until the nation punishes as well as rewards its servants, there will be no real sense of responsibility in public life amongst us.

AN English correspondent of twenty years' Indian experience in India writes from Lucknow as follows on the famine policy (of Sir G. Couper): "The relief arrangements, so tardily commenced, had to contend against the opposition of Government, which encouraged the heads of villages to cast out those who accepted relief. So late as October last, the sight of the countless starving poor at Bareilly (where I was staying) was appalling. Equally noticeable has been the indifference exhibited by officials for the last three months to a disastrous fever. As a fact, several officials who, according to their wont, set out on their district tours, in which work is notoriously subservient to the conveniences of society, were compelled to turn back, owing to the virulence of the fever, the deaths from which often left not a dozen able persons in a whole village, and consequent scarcity of even hewers and drawers. Yet there has been no inquiry, no report. The *Gazette* statistics show an enormous mortality in Oudh, Cawnpore, Aligurh, and other districts. So serious has this fever been, as often to entirely suspend all business, depopulating whole villages. Fortunately, the worst is now over. The sole account given of it is that it is not Dengue; which, perhaps, is hardly matter for congratulation, as it has carried off many hundred thousands. Had there been, as in Calcutta, a free press to which to appeal, many would have taken cognizance of the disease in the interests of humanity, or, failing that, an official circular issued to the medical staff would have gone far towards effecting an abatement of the scourge. But, as far as I can ascertain, this fever has been recognizedly ignored in official circles."

## OUR LEGACY TO MYSORE.

It is now fifty years since the Government of India assumed the rule of Mysore, on the ground of the maladministration of its own Native Prince. The pretext has been used with such deep insincerity of purpose in India, that we are about to examine it; but before doing so we ask the reader to note the results of our own administration of the province. After fifty years then, of undisturbed rule, during which all the resources of the province have been in our hands to do with them what we pleased, we are about to hand the territory over to the administration of the young Maharajah who is now coming of age. Every effort has been made by the Civilian Government of India to make the sequestration of the province perpetual. The positive orders of the Home Government that arrangements should be made for withdrawing our own executive, and handing the territory back to Native rule, have been treated as such orders are always treated by the insolent and determined bureaucracy that rules India, for this reason in the present case that Mysore has been converted by them into a great "preserve" of highly paid appointments for themselves, the Native Executive being excluded in the usual abominable way from all positions of influence and emolument. The Indian bureaucracy have ruled Mysore just as they willed. Every advantage that it was possible to give them, or possible for them to seize, they have had. There has been no interference of any kind with them to hamper their action, while they have had the singular advantage (in India) of being able to retain the entire revenues of the province for expenditure within its own borders.

The Imperial Treasury at Calcutta, which drains the revenues of our own provinces away from them to defray our vast military expenditure and Home charges—together, £30,000,000 a-year—has made no claim upon Mysore. The province pays simply a tribute of £200,000 a-year to the Treasury; the remainder of its revenues are all its own, and have been spent within its own borders. And now, after fifty years of an administration free from all impediments and

hindrances whatever, and with profound peace throughout the period, and after filling the province, we say, with highly paid English officials, and excluding Native gentlemen from the service of their own country as incompetent, this astonishing bureaucracy has contrived to starve to death in the last four years one and a quarter millions of the people, by their own admission, out of a population of but five millions. They have run the Treasury simultaneously a million sterling into debt, and if report speak truly, have permitted a third of the State jewels to be made away with, no one knows how or by whom. Now here plainly is an opportunity of seeing what Civilian rule under the most favourable circumstances can accomplish. It is absolutely impotent for good: selfish to the last degree of immorality: fatal beyond expression to the people. The Government of India, in its resolution on the subject, admits that the late dreadful sufferings of the people were brought about by its failure to "understand the phenomena" of the famine. Every one else understood those phenomena; the bureaucratic Government of Calcutta alone could not. After starving to death a full fourth of the population, *with the province full of highly paid Civilian officers*, we are now about to hand the territory over to its young Prince, with a million of debt tied round his neck, and one-third of his State jewels misappropriated. This then, is Civilian government, with every advantage that it could ask for. Can we wonder at the condition of our own provinces under a rule like this, a rule weighted in our case with the exactions we make upon the people's industry? To look for reform from the Indian bureaucracy itself is preposterous, and the sooner the nation wakes up to the fact the better. We shall now examine the selfish and dishonest plea on which this service has based its every "annexation" in India. No Native rule in that unhappy empire has ever shown such deplorable results as our own fifty years' administration of Mysore by our highly paid Civilian agency. Compared with such a rule as this, Native rule deserves the highest praise we can give it.

"The Prince," wrote Bossuet in his Universal History, "must not be regarded as a private person; he is a public personage. All the State is in him; the will of all the people is merged in his." This was the origin, the revered and honoured origin, of the saying attributed to Louis XIV., "*L'état c'est moi.*" It has never been an accepted maxim in Great Britain, but has ever been, and still seems to be, the central principle and working pivot of the system of Political Agency, pursued and directed by the Indian Foreign Office. Every one who has at any time attached himself to the thorough-going official school in India, whether as public func-

tionary, historian, or journalist, has been tainted with the same mischievous notion. During the meretricious brilliancy of Lord Dalhousie's reign this doctrine was perpetually forced upon the allied and protected States, not for their improvement and preservation, but as an engine for their destruction. The school of Indian annexationists found great facilities for each desired acquisition of territory, by refusing to see any obstacle before them except the Prince's person. That obstacle, according to their doctrine and practice, was very easily surmounted, was converted indeed into a stepping-stone. The Prince was made the sole representative, the personal embodiment of the State. He was set up, however, like a nine-pin, only in order to be knocked down. So long as he is on the throne, his absolute power must not be limited, or he would have "virtually no sovereignty at all;" he would be "in leading strings," "a mere puppet," and "a sham Sovereign." Reforms in his administration must not be pressed upon him, because such interference would be "unwelcome" and "subversive." But he might be coerced, as was the Nizam in 1853, into giving up the administration of his best provinces to us. If any conveyancing business had to be done, the Prince's name was all-sufficient either for colourable consent or for unwarranted responsibility. If the reigning Prince for the time being were an infant ward, under the tutelage of a British Resident acting in his name, with unlimited powers and without any interruption or intermission, he might yet be made answerable even to his dethronement, exile, and spoliation, for a rebellion in his dominions, excited and extended by our own mismanagement. Though he should be "a crazy hypochondriac," like the King of Oudh, or an old man desperate with deferred hope, like the Maharajah of Mysore, he was nevertheless fully qualified to transfer all his possessions by his signature to a treaty or to a will, and might justly be teased, or cajoled, terrified, or coerced into doing so. But, with or without the form of his extorted consent, the misconduct or incompetence of the reigning Prince justifies his removal, and his removal extinguishes the rights of his family, annuls all treaties, terminates indeed the separate existence of the principality, which naturally and necessarily merges in the paramount Empire as an ordinary province. The corporate rights of a State, or of any class or family, except that of the Prince—distinguished only to be despoiled—are not recognized in the least. The East India Company, in treaties with Indian Princes, has plenary power and perpetual succession. But whenever the convenient occasion offers, a treaty contracted with a Nawab or a Rajah, to last "as long as



the sun and the moon endure," is declared to be a "personal" treaty, good for one life only on the Indian side, but for all time and all purposes on the other. From the official or civilian point of view this convenient interpretation of the law of nations and of special compacts, is intelligible enough. For annexation means promotion. Whatever is good for the Civil Service must be good for the Empire. The world is the inheritance of the saints: and we are the saints. Native reforms merely impede, or defer our inheritance. That "the Services" should have a bias that way we can understand. But making every allowance for the effect of strange terms and forms, too likely to strengthen the hands of subordinate experts, we still cannot account for Viceroys and Secretaries of State failing to enforce the broad and statesmanlike views to which they occasionally give expression.

Nothing can be more liberal or more equitable than the general instructions repeatedly given by the Home Government, without distinction of party, from the time that the present Maharajah was recognized in 1867 as heir to his adoptive father, down to the present day, for the gradual substitution of Natives for Europeans in the administrative system of Mysore. The prospective restitution of Native rule had been resisted to the utmost by what may be called the professional interest, and always on the same grounds, the impossibility of controlling the personal misconduct, or correcting the personal incompetence, of a Hindu Prince. It would really seem as if the unjustly protracted supersession of the old Maharajah had poisoned and perverted the judgment of almost every one who has been in a position to exercise a direct and immediate influence over the settlement of Mysore affairs. The twelve years of the present Rajah's minority, were preceded by twelve years in which Mysore was looked upon as a predestined prey, and the feeling of disappointed greed has not been yet purged from the official bosom. Councillors and Secretaries, Chief Commissioners and their assistants, have never been able to address themselves honestly to the work of restitution. Except under the influence of peremptory orders from home, and then only within the last three years, it looked very much as if they had no intention of doing it at all. The method and conditions of restitution seem never to have been sincerely, or seriously considered. The Viceroy in Council, and the majority of the Secretary of State's Council in 1866, opposed the decision of Lord Salisbury and Sir Stafford Northcote to maintain the Mysore State, by objections that betrayed their complete inability to conceive of any plan for reforming a Native State, or for limiting absolute power therein. "The withdrawal of the European officers" "would be tantamount

to the collapse of order, and a rapid return to confusion and insecurity of life and property." If the young Prince were allowed to succeed, "he must become the actual ruler, and administer justice and the revenue according to his own views and principles." If his despotic power were in any way curtailed, he would be "a nominal Rajah," and "the merest puppet." Mr. R. D. Mangles, who had for twenty years advocated annexation in the Court of Directors and the Indian Council, protested in 1866 against Mysore being "handed over to the capricious domination" of a Maharajah, instead of being left under "a just system, administered by such men as Cubbon, Bowring, and Charles Saunders."\* At the same period another highly respectable retired Civilian in the Indian Council, Mr. H. Thoby Prinsep, maintained that it would be impossible "to make over a large territory" to be "managed according to the caprices of a Prince and his favourites, with unchecked powers."† Why must "capricious domination" be assumed as inevitable? Why must the "caprices" of a Prince, or the "powers" of his "favourites" be unchecked? Is the British Government really incapable of reconciling Imperial supervision with local self-government? Why cannot "a just system" exist in Mysore, under a Maharajah as well as under a Commissioner? "Cubbon, Bowring, and Charles Saunders" were not allowed to exercise "capricious domination;" and yet they were not ridiculed as "sham rulers" or "mere puppets." Nor are such contemptuous epithets usually applied by English politicians to the constitutional Princes of Europe.

Mr. L. B. Bowring, the Chief Commissioner who succeeded Sir Mark Cubbon in 1861, remained in charge till 1869. Having been originally sent to prepare the way for annexation, it fell to his lot, under the restorative policy of Lord Salisbury and Sir Stafford Northcote, to enthrone the infant Rajah, and to make the first arrangements for the transition period of his Highness's minority. While annexation, secretly decreed, hung over Mysore in the old Maharajah's declining years, Mr. Bowring did much to subvert the thrifty system of Sir Mark Cubbon, and to aggravate the difficulties of transfer to Native rule, by multiplying and complicating establishments. He seems to have been quite unable, after restoration had been ordered, to clear his mind of the usual Foreign Office cant as to "everything in a Native State depending upon the caprice of

\* "Mysore Papers," 271 of 1867, p. 13.

† "Mysore Papers," 271 of 1867, p. 9.

one man"—"the whole framework of Government and society depending on the action of a single man, who, in the case of a Rajah, may be supine, or in that of a Dewan, may be incompetent."\* These are Mr. Bowring's own words, and the only remedy he can devise for such unsatisfactory conditions is to put the Rajah into leading-strings. The "irresponsible action of the Rajah" is to be "controlled by the advice and, if need be, by the authority of a British Resident." Thus only can "adequate precautions be taken against any abuse of arbitrary power."† Like Mr. Mangles and the gentlemen of the Calcutta Secretariat, he can form no conception of an Indian State under any but personal rule. He can conceive no medium between a despot and a mere puppet.

Our own political creed is very different. We should not regard a Maharajah of Mysore, whose power was restricted by some of those "regulations and ordinances" which the British Government can prescribe under Article IV. of the Subsidiary Treaty, as degraded into "a puppet," but as exalted into a constitutional sovereign. Except by such default and neglect of our own as permitted the late Maharajah, at the age of sixteen, to snatch the reins from Poorniah's hands, and to bear despotic rule unchecked for twenty years, no Rajah of Mysore can govern "according to his own views and principles," unless those views and principles are approved by the Imperial Government. But notwithstanding the salutary provisions of the Treaty, no process or principle of guidance for the executive management of Mysore as a Native State ever seems to have been considered by our Government. No "regulations or ordinances" were imposed on the Mysore State by British authority between 1799, when the Rajah was installed, and 1832, when he was superseded. And so far as can be gathered from the Parliamentary Papers, no scheme for limiting arbitrary power by "regulations and ordinances," as contemplated in the Treaty, seems ever to have been conceived as an essential of reconstruction, by any Chief Commissioner of Mysore, or any magnate of the Imperial Government, at home or in India. According to Mr. Bowring, the personal despotism of the Rajah can only be tempered by the personal interference of the Resident. This hopeful forecast, received apparently without cavil at Calcutta, provides for a dual government intrinsically loose and lawless, and irresponsible on both sides. The two heads of such a government may work together amicably, or may be irreconcilable: the results may for a time be good or bad; but neither

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\* "Mysore Papers," 385 of 1878, pp. 20, 21.

† *Ibid.* p. 21.

the subjects of the State nor the Imperial Power can have any safeguard or assurance beyond the personal qualities of the Prince and of the Resident. In justice to Mr. Bowring, however, it ought to be understood that his notions were by no means novel, but that such is the general course and practice of Anglo-Indian Political Agency.

We find Mr. Bowring seriously deprecating the accumulation of a sum of money in the Mysore Treasury, as if such a fund could only become pocket-money for his Highness, and lead him into habits of profusion. "It has been found necessary," says Mr. Bowring, in a despatch dated 10th of November, 1868, "to withdraw several lacs of the trust fund for the payment of the late Maharajah's debts, and the amount now funded is only 25½ lacs" (£250,000), "but the accumulation of a large sum of ready money might, perhaps, on the young Chief's attaining his majority, be fraught with danger to him."\* And the Chief Commissioner then advises, in substance, that the money shall be spent, usefully if possible, but anyhow spent. It must be gratifying for Mr. Bowring in his retirement to learn, that his very original policy has been accepted, and carried out effectually. The great "accumulation," the "large sum of ready money," has entirely disappeared. The "danger" which Mr. Bowring dreaded no longer threatens the young Maharajah's majority. Not only has "the trust fund" gone, but the successors of Mr. Bowring have put a check on the young Rajah's extravagance in the shape of a respectable State debt of about a million sterling.

The annual revenue of Mysore under the administration of Poorniah, from 1799 to 1811, did not exceed £600,000; yet he managed, starting with an empty treasury, to amass for the State a fund of two millions. The Commissioners of the present advanced school, who think little of Sir Mark Cubbon, started with the million which he left in hard cash, and a revenue which he had raised to a million a year, and contrived between 1861 and 1879 to get rid of "the trust fund"—that encumbrance "fraught with danger"—and to give the young Maharajah on his coming of age a healthy stimulus to economy in the shape of a million of debt.

Did it never strike Mr. Bowring, or any Commissioner, Councillor, or Secretary, that, under Article IV. of the *Subsidiary Treaty*, "a regulation or ordinance" could be promulgated, in such a form as to secure for his Highness all the grace and credit of con-

\* "Mysore Papers," 385 of 1878. p. 73.

currence, establishing a distinction, both in account and in custody, between the Privy Purse and the Treasury? That distinction, identical with the distinction between the *Fiscus* and the *Ararium*, though often evaded or set aside, as it was in the decline of the Roman Empire, is perfectly familiar and well understood at every Native Court. It was established by the wisdom of Captain Grant Duff, in the Sattara State, and scrupulously observed from 1819 to 1848, until that invaluable centre of order and political stability was swept away by the short-sighted greed of Lord Dalhousie. Two successive Rajahs of Sattara were quite content with a fixed Civil List; and the young Maharajah of Mysore, with a strong Dewan and judicious Resident, could easily be trained in those constitutional ways which involve a fixed provision for the Prince's comfort and dignity. A great deal of the hackneyed and evasive sarcasm to be expected from Anglo-Indian officials, active and retired, when the reform of Native States is discussed, may be spared or spurned aside when the fact is realized that there is no necessary or inherent connection between constitutional government and an elected representative assembly. The two things are distinct. Public law is one thing, and popular liberty another. It is a great step in progress when the first is gained; the other may follow sooner or later. But in truth neither the one nor the other finds much favour in the Political Agency of India. It is impossible to perceive in any of the measures concerted or suggested between Bangalore and Calcutta, the slightest evidence of an honest and earnest intention to reconstitute the Mysore State on a firm basis and with self-acting appliances. We bequeath the young Maharajah a million sterling of debt. This and the memory that we starved a million and a quarter of his unhappy subjects to death in the last year or two of our rule without excuse of any kind for the crime, is the nett result, up to this day, of British administration. Better things may be expected from Lord Ripon and Lord Hartington. Of the powers that be in Mysore there can be no hope at all. They have been tried, and in every sense found wanting. There is no administrative success or financial gain there to set against the loss of popular confidence and general respect. A real reform would be as fatal to them as a real investigation, and so long as they are allowed to play at both with the sole aid of intimate friends and old subordinates, the results will be deceptive and must be ultimately disastrous.

## THE PEASANTRY OF INDIA.

IN the *Amrita Bazar Patrika*, a Calcutta weekly paper conducted by Natives, there appeared on the 15th April, 1880, a grimly humorous exposition of what purported to be the "creed," or confession of personal faith, by an Anglo-Indian Administrator. It ran as follows:—

I am an Englishman; I can, therefore, beat two Frenchmen, two Germans, and five Russians. This is the advantage I possess over those nations. The neighbouring nations know it, and an Englishman is, therefore, not only respected but regarded with awe, on the Continent. There, in the excess of their respect, the hotel-keepers call every Englishman "Milord." . . . . I feel I am born to rule others. That feeling is natural and strong within me. As the young of the cobra comes out of its egg with its poisonous fangs complete, capable of dealing death all around, so the Englishman comes out of his mother's womb with all the faculties necessary for the purpose of governing others in the highest state of efficiency. . . . . An Englishman, therefore, need not be trained in the art. He may be at once entrusted with any responsible duty. He must, of course, be at the top, for that is his natural place. If he is a collector of revenue to-day, he may be safely entrusted with the charge of deciding most intricate civil suits to-morrow. From thence he may be safely transferred to the Forest Department, and from this to outwit Mahommed Jan, and induce him to come to terms with the Government. As an Englishman, I feel that I am not only fit for any post, but I know I can fulfil my task better than a man of different nationality would do in my place. . . . . Russia has the bad habit of dethroning monarchs and taking away the liberty of nations. This we Englishmen cannot bear. Our destiny is to protect nations from aggression. . . . . It may be said that we, too, sometimes take away the liberty of nations. But, then, we English have privileges—special privileges. When we take away the liberty of a nation, we only confer upon them a great boon, and they receive us with open arms. This is a great fact. We Englishmen may oppress a people, and make them pay for us, and do many other things which would not be endurable from any other people, but we Englishmen only burden them with eternal gratitude by such acts; for the blessings of English connection are so great that a nation would most cheerfully prefer to be a slave than to cast it off.

The accuracy of these lively observations will be questioned by few who have been long in India, and therefore witnessed the invincible self-esteem of British officialism in that country. A young

civilian or a young lieutenant is no sooner landed in the country than he deems himself better fitted to discharge any duties whatsoever than any man of the two hundred millions of human beings who are the natural and rightful owners of the country. Very rarely indeed does this conviction fail him as he rises in the service. In most cases it grows stronger, for as he rises he encounters less and less contradiction. To our countrymen in the East, India is merely the "milch-cow" whence they are to obtain sustenance sufficient to enable them to return to their native land. The only way to effect this with expedition is to stand well with the powers that be. Clearly then, the schemes and ideas of these "powers" are not to be subjected to a rude and unsympathetic criticism by subordinate officials; they must be accepted implicitly, as the revelations of a superior wisdom, in closer neighbourhood to the fountain and source of absolute truth. In this way a strange kind of false conscience is developed in the minds of British bureaucrats in India. It may be designated an "official conscience," the primary law of which is not fealty to truth, but what is called "loyalty to Government." This "loyalty to Government" is set forth as having in it something grand and heroic, like the charge of the Six Hundred in the Valley of Death,—

Their's not to reason why,  
Their's not to make reply,  
Their's but to do or die,—

the somewhat important distinction being, unfortunately, ignored, that while the Light Brigade rode into the jaws of death, the devotees of the "official conscience" are riding only with high emoluments into the enjoyment of large pensions. The "men of light and leading," the Lieutenant-Governors, Chief Commissioners, and Members of Council, who distribute honours and emoluments, naturally love to surround themselves with those in whom this "official conscience" is most highly developed, in preference to all others among the sons of men. These are the men who can be trusted to "carry out orders"—who, as they assure us, "take an interest in their work," and who are perpetually burning incense for the delectation of the "men of light and leading." As for those fallen natures who perversely believe, and insist upon pointing out, that India is not a place wherein administrative infallibility regulates the destinies of the best of all possible worlds,—these are consigned to a doom fit for such dispositions. They are excluded from the official Paradise, and are sent forth to study repentance, and develop, if they can, the "official conscience" in malarious and

remote stations, which have been known to bring back many an erring and rebellious spirit to walk in the straight path of "loyalty to the Government." Surrounded thus by satellites,

Ever singing as they shine,  
The hand that made us is divine.

a great Indian official regards himself as being in wisdom superior to Solomon in all his glory. He will undertake with a light heart the vastest schemes of legislation, the most sweeping social revolutions, and record the gloriousness of his achievements in his own official reports. True it is that these achievements, for the most part, are allowed to bear very little fruit. His successor has his own crotchets to carry out, his own desire for distinction to be fed; and amid the hosannas of *his* satellites "loyal to the Government," he too frequently begins by uprooting what his predecessor has planted, and sowing his own crotchets in their place. But though all else change in India, there is one thing that never changes, and that is the issue of roseate reports setting forth the achievements of each successive Governor-General or Lieutenant-Governor, as the case may be. It is the publication of these reports which has wrought that deep-seated impression, which must be effaced before any real good can be done, that our administration of India has been a constant passing on from one successful and benevolent achievement to another. A belief more erroneous it would be difficult to discover among the errors and superstitions of humanity. Our administration of India has been a series of well-meant but disastrous blunders interspersed with positive crimes. It would be difficult to lay the finger on any one of our achievements and say, in the light of the knowledge that we now possess, "This was a success." The claim that we have given "peace" to India is hardly true, for up to the suppression of the great Mutiny, five years seldom passed away without India being, in one part or another, the scene of some devastating war in which we were one of the principals. And if in the word "peace" should be included the happiness and prosperity of the people, then the twenty years of British peace have been more fatal to life and happiness than even our wars. I know well the charge that will be brought against statements of this kind. Let those who would condemn them as exaggerated read on to the close of this paper; they will find that I have not thus expressed myself without sufficient justification.

I cannot, of course, in the space of a brief article, give the record of *all* our failures; but I choose that particular matter in



which we might have achieved our greatest success had our administration of India been marked by those excellences which are generally believed to be its leading characteristics. I mean, of course, the condition of the agricultural population. Almost all the wealth that there is in India, is obtained from the cultivation of the soil. The bulk of our revenue is derived from the land. It is, therefore, a primary interest, as it is a first duty of such a Government as ours, to have special regard for the prosperity and well-being of the agricultural classes. And in no particular have we been wont to contrast our rule with that of Native rule so largely in our own favour, as in our dealings with the land. Our fixed and equitable assessments have, so we have declared, enhanced the value of landed property. Our great public works have enormously increased its productiveness; and the order we maintain throughout India has given security and peace to the ryot and his family. Under the benign protection of the British Government, they can enjoy the fruits of their toil in unmolested quiet. There is not one of these beliefs which is not delusive. Our dealings with the land have been more completely destructive of all ancient proprietary rights than was the Native rule which preceded our own. Our rigid and revolutionary methods of exacting the land revenue have ground the peasantry down to the lowest extreme of poverty and wretchedness, and the decrees of our law courts have been the means of laying upon them burdens heavier far than any they endured in times earlier than our own. Not a year passes which does not see such Bills as these introduced into the Council of the Government of India—*Deccan Ryots' Relief Bill*, *Jhansi Zemindars' Relief Bill*, *Oudh Talookdars' Relief Bill*. These Bills are measures of relief in favour of the victims whom our administrative system has impoverished. They all disclose the same history, and proceed upon an identical method, which I find described as follows in the columns of the *Amrita Bazar Patrika* :—

The Government makes demands on the people which they cannot meet, and they are obliged to resort to the money-lenders. In this manner the Government goes on filling its coffers till the people can no longer get a loan. When the Government is perfectly assured that it is no longer possible for the people to get a loan to meet its demands, and that they are heavily and hopelessly in debt, then it steps forward and declares all engagements of the people with money-lenders dissolved. Thus, the money-lenders are made to contribute to its coffers in this roundabout way. Is not this very clever?

This is how the matter strikes an intelligent Native; and it is interesting to set beside *his* view of the matter that of a highly-placed English official—no less a personage than the Lieut.-Governor

of the Punjab. In the discussion on the Deccan Ryots' Relief Bill, Sir Robert Egerton expressed himself as follows—(the italics are mine):—

The circumstances which have led to its being introduced seem to me to be of such general prevalence throughout India, that the mode in which they are to be treated in the Deccan may possibly form a precedent in other parts of the country. . . . . There are parts of the country in the Punjab, as doubtless there are in every Presidency, where the rainfall is uncertain, and the crops precarious; yet in all those parts of the country the Government has introduced its revenue system, which obliges the peasant proprietor to make payment of a fixed sum at fixed times, as Government revenue; and the Government has imposed most stringent conditions in regard to the realization of this revenue. *It seems to me that but too little stress has been laid upon this cause, which must in a great degree contribute to, if not entirely originate, the indebtedness of the Deccan ryots. The ryot who has become indebted to a banker is obliged to satisfy the Government demand in cash; to procure that cash he has again to resort to the money-lender; and as long as the Government demand regularly comes upon him he is obliged to go again and again to the money-lender, in order to procure cash to meet it. Every one knows the great stringency of these regulations, and it seems to me unreasonable that while we uphold stringent regulations for our own revenue, we should make such alterations in the law in regard to ordinary private contracts. I think it would have been more satisfactory if we had been told what measures the Bombay Government proposed to produce in order to enlighten the burden which the rigorous demand of Government revenue imposes upon the peasant proprietors.*

The condition of the Deccan ryots has become so abnormally miserable that the cry of their distress has reached even the careless ears of the British public. The danger now is lest indolent people should be persuaded that the condition of the peasantry in the Deccan is exceptional. In the foregoing extract from Sir Robert Egerton's speech we have the assurance of that experienced officer that it is the rule throughout India, rather than the exception. And with what exact fidelity the Government has been producing elsewhere the same pitiable results as in the Deccan, may be seen by the following passage from Mr. Bassett Colvin's speech, when introducing the *Jhansi Zemindars' Relief Bill*. In the Jhansi district, as in the Deccan, the rainfall is precarious; and so long as this State was under Native rule, this fact was recognized, and revenue arrangements made accordingly. The State demand varied from year to year, according to the greater or less abundance of the harvest. This would not do for us. We were above the variations of the seasons. We introduced into Jhansi, as elsewhere, our rigid revenue system, our stereotyped demand, and the result is that in less than thirty years the landowners have been completely ruined. Says Mr. Bassett Colvin:—

When they (*i.e.*, the Jhansi zemindars) undertook, in a district with prec-

rious harvests, to pay a fixed sum annually in all years, not a sum varying (as it previously did) with the produce of the year, I think it is certain that they undertook what they could not possibly perform. *Sooner or later the zemindars must have broken down.* It is no wonder, when war, famine, pestilence, and murrain passed over the community in successive waves of calamity, that the zemindars should have been overwhelmed and ruined. . . . *They are between the upper and the nether millstone. They are crushed between the impossibility of withholding their revenue from the Government above, and the impossibility of exacting their rents from the tenants below.*

Assuredly, there is no wonder that, under such circumstances as these, these luckless zemindars were "overwhelmed and ruined." The wonder is that the fact could not be discerned by our sagacious Indian administrators until it had actually happened. But this is the way in which we govern India. So long as the administrative machinery will work at all, our leading officials resolutely shut their eyes and ears to its increasing crankiness, extracting such comfort as they can from the reflection that, in all probability, they will have left the coach before the final and hopeless breakdown. The primary object and desire of ninety-nine out of every hundred Englishmen in the Indian service is to obtain a pension and leave the country. The Indian official is, literally, a hireling who careth not for the sheep whom he is expected to tend. His object is to earn a livelihood, not to redeem a ruined people. His official position, as well as his feelings, are unaffected by either the censure or the approval of those over whom he is set to rule. He has not that absolute and immediate personal interest in the good government of the country which is the indispensable condition of any vigorous effort to search out and rectify abuses. The world, in all probability, has never seen an administration so entirely above all checks save those supplied by the moral sense of the individual members composing it; and every student of history knows what an irresponsible bureaucracy is capable of without any shock to what it calls its moral sense. The first and the second Afghan wars may be cited as cases in proof. The fact is, that if India is to be governed with even moderate success, we must take the people into our councils to a far greater extent than we have done hitherto. The question whether the Natives are equal in governing capacity to ourselves, is altogether irrelevant. At any rate, they know their own needs and understand their own interests far better than Englishmen can do, and to exclude them, therefore, from an active and responsible part in the work of governing India is deliberately to prefer ignorance to knowledge—darkness to light. At the same time, we must not imagine that we

shall obtain this sorely needed light by the admission of Natives into the Civil Service. That which is required in India is information regarding the country and its people untainted by official bias, and independent of the Government; and this we can never get except from representative assemblies chosen to assist the deliberations of provincial governors, and with a controlling power over expenditure. That any such reform will be bitterly opposed by the official classes is certain; that it will be denounced as wild, impracticable, destructive of order, and so forth, is also equally certain. Who ever heard of an irresponsible bureaucracy who supposed that any good could ensue from the curtailment of its immense power of mischief-making? But the change is inevitable; and what the British nation has to decide is, whether it shall be a spontaneous concession to the people of India, or whether it shall be delayed until the present system has finally collapsed, amid bloodshed and disaster such as occurred in 1857. Enough, however, of this digression for the present. Let us get back to our proper subject, which is to illustrate the effects upon the Indian peasantry of English land administration.

The land settlement, as it exists to this day in Bengal, Behar, and Orissa, originated, as most people are aware, in a gigantic act of confiscation. The real proprietors of the land were dispossessed, and by a stroke of the pen, a body of tax collectors was transformed into absolute owners of the soil of these provinces.\* So much is known to all men; but there is also a prevalent impression that this huge confiscation was done unwittingly—that the authorities at Calcutta were really under an impression that the tax collectors thus converted into landowners had always been landlords of the regular English type. This is a mistake. The *status* of the zemindar was perfectly well known; he was regarded simply as a servant of the Company, and as such he came under the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in Calcutta. This last circumstance it was which induced the Executive to convert him into a landowner. By so doing, the zemindar was put beyond the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, but remained under that of the district courts of the Company. So long as he was regarded merely as a servant of the Company, suits could be instituted against him in Calcutta; his person and his moveables were liable to seizure; and this had actually taken place in several instances, to the grievous embarrassment

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\* The same fatal error, in substance, was allowed to be made by Sir Richard Temple but fifteen to twenty years ago in the Central Provinces, while the fact seems to be unknown in this country.—Ed.

of the English officials employed in getting in the revenue. The Executive Government, therefore, after long deliberation and controversy, determined to transform him into a proprietor of the soil, in order to relieve itself from a recurrence of this embarrassment. Sir John Shore—afterwards Lord Teignmouth—pleaded hard that the new order of things should be established in the first instance for ten years only, in order to see its practical results. But Lord Cornwallis and the Home Government were inexorable. Having resolved that their *quondam* tax collectors were to become the landed aristocracy of India, they did not shrink from investing them with the virtues which an ideal aristocracy ought to possess. Under the stimulus of property, the tax collector, they thought, would clear forests, apply capital to the land, and exercise a beneficent and elevating influence over his tenantry. Most people are acquainted with the rapid disappointment of these insane expectations. Our manufactured aristocracy proved altogether unequal to the onerous responsibilities thus recklessly thrust upon them. They could not collect their rents. They became bankrupt by hundreds. Their estates were put up to auction, and purchased by astute officials and others, who thought that a good thing could be made by speculating in land. In a very few years after the enactment of the Permanent Settlement, Lord Cornwallis's "landed aristocracy" had ceased to exist, and about two-thirds of the soil of Bengal was owned by Native officials, Native bankers, and other absentees. Thence arose that grievous curse of the lower provinces, the *ticcadaree*, or hire system, as it is called. These absentee landlords let out their estates to any one willing to take them for a permanent quit rent, leaving him to recoup himself at the expense of the miserable ryot in the best way he could. The consequences which ensued constitute, perhaps, the gloomiest episode to be found in the history of British India. Large tracts of land were depopulated, and tenanted only by wild hogs. As late as 1852, the following is the picture drawn of the Bengal ryot by one of his own countrymen :—

In Bengal, the ryot will be found to live all his days on rice, and to go covered with a slight cotton cloth. The demands on him are endless. This prevents the creation of capital, and prolongs the usurious money system. Bengal is noted for the exuberance and fertility of the crops; but the present condition of the ryot is miserable. His monthly expenditure is from 1½ to 3 rupees, or from three to six shillings; but there are not five out of every hundred whose annual profits exceed 100 rupees, or £10. . . . He lives generally on coarse rice; and pulse, vegetables, and fish (a mere drug in Bengal) would be luxuries: his dress consists of a bit of rag and a slender sheet; his bed is composed of a coarse mat and a pillow; his habitation a thatched roof upon supports; . . . he toils from morn

till dewy eve; he is a haggard, poverty-stricken, wretched creature. . . . Even in ordinary seasons, and under ordinary circumstances, the ryots fast for days and nights from literal want of food.

This being the testimony of a Native, may be suspected of exaggeration; I add, therefore, the evidence of an indigo planter, of the same date:—

I question if the ryot is better housed, or better clothed, or better fed, than he was fifty years ago; he is always in debt, and always in need, and always liable to be oppressed by any man who has power over him. . . . The poorer classes in Tirhoot are even worse off than they are in Bengal. A Bengal ryot has always a tenure of land which he cultivates at a perpetual rent; but in Tirhoot the ryot has no position; he has not a bit of paper which gives him any right to hold his land longer than the proprietor chooses to allow him. I have known a person take a property, and a few days after the lease was taken I have seen all his crops destroyed, and his fields preparing for indigo cultivation. Had there been a right system of tenure, that could not have been the case; but the law is not strong enough. . . . The district of Mymensing, which embraces an extent of land 5,000 miles square, is supposed to contain 800,000 inhabitants. I do not believe there are twenty individuals who possess from £10,000 to £20,000; the greater part of the proprietors are all in debt; the ryots are all in debt; and their debts are generally incurred to exacting bankers. I have known in my experience hundreds of ryots paying 60 per cent.

If space allowed, it would be easy to add to these testimonies others of the same kind to almost any extent. But the utter wretchedness of the peasantry in the Lower Provinces is a fact that few will care to dispute. The point, however, on which I wish to insist is that this wretchedness is a direct consequence of British rule. It is the outcome of Lord Cornwallis's dealings with the land; and this alone should suffice to extirpate that most mischievous delusion, that the people of India must be happy and prosperous under our rule, because our intentions towards them have always been so benevolent. Good intentions have, in numberless cases been as conspicuously lacking in our treatment of the people of India as other conditions indispensable to successful government. But had it not been so, to imagine that good intentions can atone for the failure of ignorance is simple folly.

But, it may be urged, the evidence you have adduced at present regarding the state of the peasantry in the Lower Provinces, refers to thirty years ago; have you none which refers to the present time? "The Ruin of an Indian Province," by Charles James O'Donnell (a member of the Bengal Civil Service), gives us the latest information on this subject. This little pamphlet deals with the province of Behar, and the facts which

it contains have already attracted the notice of the Secretary of State for India.

Exceeding Portugal in area, it (Behar) is thronged by a population equal to that of the whole kingdom of Prussia, including Hanover. Its name, said to mean the land of spring, proclaims its generally pleasant and salubrious climate, which, even at the most dreaded period of an Indian summer, may be described as the most endurable mean between the fierce torrid heats of Delhi and the stagnant vapour bath that envelopes Calcutta. It is hard to exaggerate the fertility of this favoured region. Unlike Bengal, which depends for the most part on a single crop—the great rice harvest of the winter, the failure of which must entail famine—Behar is protected from such a calamity by three equally important harvests, in spring, autumn, and winter, consisting of wheat, barley, pulses, rice, greater and lesser millets, and Indian corn, besides sugar-cane and poppy.

The population of this province are peaceful, industrious, and submissive. Here, then, if anywhere, the excellence of British rule ought to shine out with peculiar lustre. If we cannot find a thriving and happy peasantry in such a province as Behar, it will be unnecessary to prosecute the search into other districts. Well, they are not to be found in Behar. That province, by the admission of all who are acquainted with it, is remarkable for the utter wretchedness, the hopeless destitution, which are chronic among its people. Their condition is thus described in a recent report by the Magistrate of Patna:—

The expression "living from hand to mouth" has assumed for me a more definite and tangible, though less satisfactory, meaning than it ever had before. I have been into and over the houses of hundreds of the poorer classes, and have seen how they live and what they eat. *I could not have believed, had I not seen it for myself, how abject is their poverty.* . . . Many of them do not know what it is to have two meals a day; and most of them do not know, when they rise in the morning, whether they will get one full meal or not. *Wages have remained as before, while the prices of all kinds of food have increased.* Overpopulation seems to be an effectual bar to any further material improvement that might otherwise be brought about by increased means of communication, by education, and other similar means.

To this distressing picture we add Mr. O'Donnell's official report of the condition of the people in the district of Sarun:—

It is, however, a fact that the average size of the farms does not exceed five beegas,\* and that seven persons, according to the census, constitute a household. The average value of the crops produced in one year, taking good land with bad, on a single beega is Rs.25, of which Rs.8 is payable in rent. Therefore, amongst the poorer classes (that is, some 600,000 persons), a family has to subsist on

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\* A beega contains an area a little larger than an English acre.

Rs. 108 a year, or only a rupee and four annas each a month—i.e., a little more than two shillings a month. Yet even this condition represents a state of things much more favourable than half of the poorer classes, or 300,000 persons, can obtain. Tens of thousands of them have not more than two beegas of land. . . . There are, besides, the landless day-labourers, who number from 10 to 15 per cent. of the inhabitants of every village. How they contrive to subsist in years of scarcity . . . . . is a more difficult question than most people are prepared to answer. The fact is, that the possessors of a larger kind of farms, with areas of from fifteen to thirty beegas, know the importance of preserving this class alive, and also of preventing them from emigrating through distress, and give them just enough food to keep body and soul together.

The testimony of Mr. Toynbee and Mr. O'Donnell is abundantly confirmed by Sir Ashley Eden, the present Lieutenant-Governor of Bengal. He writes as follows :—

In the . . . . . report of the Commissioner of the Bhangulpore division, a lamentable account is given by the sub-divisional officer of the state of things in the Banka sub-division; two-thirds of which are leased out in farms to non-resident speculators, while, in the remaining one-third, at least half of the landlords also are non-resident. The farms run usually for seven years, and are only renewed on the payment of a heavy and increasing premium, which falls entirely on the ryots. *The tenants are said to have no rights, to be subject to the exaction of forced labour, to illegal distraint, and to numerous illegal cesses*, while the collections are made by an unscrupulous host of up-country (bailiffs). There can be no doubt whatever that the combined influence of zemindars and land-speculators have ground the ryots of Behar down to a state of extreme depression and misery.

Leaving Behar, I will pass on to Orissa. What do we find to be the state of the peasantry here? I quote the testimony of an experienced Civil officer. He calculates that a ryot in tolerably comfortable circumstances, after the sale of his crops, and the payment of rent, may find himself in possession of Rs.57, with which to support himself and his family during the year—say 10s. a month. This is not a large income to subsist upon, but the ryot is very far from retaining the entire amount undiminished. There prevail in Orissa a multitude, which no man can number, of what are called “illegal cesses,” but which are very regularly levied, none the less, and these are described by our Civil officer as follows :—

The zemindar comes first with his demand for his four annas here, and six there; so much for a son's marriage, so much more for a daughter. The universal Festival of the Car, in which the unwieldy “*rath*” of Juggunath is dragged half a mile along a road, in order that it may be dragged back again the week after, is made the occasion of a levy of one rupee a head from all the peasantry of a populous estate. This levy will produce five thousand rupees, of which barely five hundred will be spent on the purpose for which it was ostensibly raised. Then the zemindar has had to pay seventy rupees income tax, and



forthwith "*tikkhus*" is collected at two annas in the rupee from every cultivator. Or the magistrate has made a Ferry fund road through the estate, and though the zemindar has received ten times the value of the land in compensation, yet he finds it necessary to recoup his imaginary losses by taking one anna in the rupee from all his tenants. But besides these general and financial measures there are also special and personal inflictions. A neighbour's cattle have eaten half a field of paddy, and the ryot carries off the offending cattle to the pound, whence they are only released on payment of four annas a head. Off goes the owner of the cattle to his zemindar to complain, and by dint of a judicious present secures his interference. The ryot who so rashly impounded his neighbour's cattle is seized, brought up, and made to pay double the Government fine. . . . . By these means, supplemented by the zealous action of a horde of naibs, gomashtras, peons, and dalals (*i.e.*, servants of the zemindar engaged in rent collecting), and completed by the Brahmin, whose dole and presents must on no account be left unpaid, our typical ryot will be lucky if he save in the course of the year twenty rupees out of his fifty-seven. . . . Such is the picture of a man removed above the lowest grade of poverty. But this lowest grade, what of it? What of the man who tills with borrowed bullocks his little patch of one or two acres, whose wife, clad in one filthy rag, scarcely sufficient for decency, labours at unwomanly tasks through the long day to add a few farthings to the scanty store, and who, bent with fatigue, and prematurely old from want and exposure, may be seen at nightfall picking the tasteless leaves of wild spinach from the margin of the fetid tank to eke out the unwholesome meal of coarse rice which must suffice her and her starving family? Not even their squalid hut, with its forlorn inhabitants, escapes the lynx-eye of the *piyada* (zemindar's cess-collector). They must pay their quota to swell the flowing stream of extortion; there is the lean cow, sell that and pay; there is one brass drinking-vessel, he will take that in lieu of the demand.

This terrible picture of the life of an Orissa peasant appeared some years ago in one of the Calcutta journals, and it had the effect of inducing the Bengal Government to institute an official inquiry into the levy of "illegal cesses." It was discovered that the zemindars in the district of Balasore were accustomed to exact from their tenants, no less than eleven "illegal cesses," levied at fixed periods, and seventeen "casual exactions on special occasions." The Collector at Balasore described the process as follows:—

Some zemindars take even more than these; but the above, though not exhausting the list, are the principal. They are not all taken in all estates, but many of them are universal. In addition to this, several zemindars are in the habit of making their ryots supply them with cloth and other articles at rates far below the market price. *Khilwan Sing, who is by far the worst of all, lends his ryots one rupee's worth of rice, at a time when prices are high, say eight seers for one rupee, and at a time when prices are low, after harvest, he takes one rupee's worth of rice, say sixty-four seers, from them, thus getting sixty-four seers for eight lent, or eight times the original quantity. This he defends as quite fair.* . . . . . It appeared to me that all these zemindars were lamentably and surprisingly ignorant of the state of affairs existing in their estates. Most of them

leave the management of details to their subordinates or agents, a class whose rapacity is notorious in all parts of India where they exist. The zemindar only knows that when he wants money, he tells his agents to raise it from the ryots under some pretext or other, and raised it is accordingly. . . . I may also add, that the condition of the ryots . . . is miserable in the extreme. Their houses have not been repaired for three years; they have barely enough cattle to plough with; they are scantily clothed and insufficiently fed, and from sheer want many of them are now working as coolies on the canals, though they have enough land to support them if they were only allowed to enjoy the fruits thereof.

The Commissioner of the Orissa Division, in forwarding the letter of the Balasore Collector, expressed his conviction that it disclosed "a state of affairs very general in all parts of Orissa."

Let us now turn from Orissa to Bengal proper. When making his fatal settlement with the Bengal zemindars, Lord Cornwallis was not unmindful of their tenantry. The understanding was that as the British Government was content to limit its demand, for a perpetuity, on the zemindars, so these also should limit their demands on the cultivating peasantry. Above all things, zemindars were strictly forbidden to levy any cesses over and above the rent due to them from the land. But amongst the many evils resulting from this permanent settlement, perhaps the worst has been that it has acted as a wall shutting out the great agricultural population from the cognizance of the British officials. In Bengal there was no attempt at those settlement operations, in order to assess the value of the land, which in other provinces bring our Revenue officers in such frequent and intimate contact with the rural population. The landowners on the rent-roll of each collector were comparatively few in number; and so long as they paid up the revenue on the day appointed, the collector was too busy or too indolent to inquire how he got it, or what he did with his land. So the agricultural population were given over, helpless and having no appeal, to a body of rapacious land-holders. The result is thus described by a Bengal Civilian :—

The zemindar and ryot are as king and people; they are as monarch and subject. What the zemindar asks, the ryot will give; what the zemindar orders, the ryot will obey. The landlord will tax his tenant for every extravagance that avarice, ambition, pride, vanity, or other intemperance may suggest. He will tax him for the *kheeraki* of his naib, for the salary of his ameen, for the payment of his income tax, for the purchase of an elephant for his own use, for the cost of the stationery of his establishment, for the cost of printing the forms of his rent receipts, for the payment of his expenses to fight the neighbouring indigo planter, for the payment of his fine when he has been convicted of an offence by the magistrate. The milkman gives his milk, the oilman his oil, the weaver his cloths, the confectioner his sweetmeats, the fisherman his fish. The zemindar

ines his ryots for a festival, for a birth, for a funeral, for a marriage; he levies black mail on them when an affray is committed, when one man lives clandestinely with his neighbour's wife, when an abortion is procured. He establishes his private pound, and realizes five annas for every head of cattle that is caught trespassing on the ryot's crops. . . . . These cesses pervade the whole zemindari system. In every zemindari there is a naib (deputy), under the naib there are gumashtas (agents), under the gumashta there are piyadas (bailiffs). The naib exacts a perquisite for adjusting accounts annually, at two pice, or sometimes one anna, for every rupee he may collect. The naib and gumashtas take their share in the regular cesses; they have other cesses of their own. The piyadas, when they are sent to summon defaulting ryots, exact from them four or five annas a day. It is in evidence before the Indigo Commission that in one year a zemindari naib, in the district of Nuddea, extorted ten thousand rupees from his master's ryots. It is within our own knowledge that, quite lately, a zemindari naib received a *salaami* (i.e., congratulatory present) of one thousand rupees. . . . . This system of cesses has eaten like an incurable disease into the social organization of the country. An energetic Government might have grappled with the question, and succeeded in abolishing a system which, though forbidden by law, yet flourishes in undisturbed luxuriance; yet no one raises a hand on behalf of the ryots; no one speaks a word in their interest. . . . . It seems almost as though they were doomed never to be emancipated from their present degrading life.

Considerations of space compel me to stop here. It would be easy to go through almost every province of British India, and, in the light of similar unimpeachable testimony, to have shown the wretchedness of the agricultural population. But enough, perhaps, has been said to show how little cause we have to boast of the results of British rule in India, so far as the great mass of the population is concerned. Under British rule, the soil of India has either passed, or is fast passing, into the power of land-speculators and money-lenders, while the ancient landowners have been converted into half-starved, poverty-stricken serfs on the fields which were once their own.

## THE INDIAN FAMINE REPORT.

It is difficult for earnest men, with the Indian Famine Report at last in their hands, to speak courteously of its framers. Since Lord Northbrook left India, after showing with the utmost clearness the way in which these calamities might be successfully encountered, the bureaucracy of India, under Sir John Strachey, Sir Richard Temple, and Sir G. Couper, have starved 5,000,000 to 6,000,000 of the wretched people to death, by deliberately reverting to the old and cruel Civilian policy of allowing the people to pull through these calamities as they can. They have thus successfully got rid of 5,000,000 to 6,000,000 of what the 'bureaucratic organs call "the surplus population" of the country. With such emphasis did these gentlemen reverse Lord Northbrook's action, that Sir George Couper issued express orders in the North-west Provinces, in October, 1877, that no relief should be given to the dying people. The heart of England was stirred to its depths by rumours of the dreadful sufferings they were enduring, and the India Office at last appointed a Commission to report upon the tragedy that was known to have occurred. Everything, of course, depended upon the constitution of the Commission. The Indian Press had charged Lord Lytton, Sir John Strachey, Sir Richard Temple, and Sir George Couper, in the most express and formal manner, with being the authors of the horrible mortality that had occurred. The Commission was decided upon at home, but the nomination of its members was entrusted to the Government of India, which straightway proceeded to appoint Sir John Strachey's own brother (General Richard Strachey) to be its president. We sometimes wonder whether the people of this country will ever get their eyes opened to the real character of the rule we are suffering in India. Sir John Strachey was under positive indictment, and the service to which he belongs straightway appoint his brother to be the president of the tribunal that is to try him. The result is, that this most costly Commission is unable to produce any report at all for two years and a half, owing to the stubborn fight made by

the Civilian members thereof to whitewash every reputation that was compromised by the dreadful calamities of the last four years. And when the Commission does at last bring out, what can be called a report only by courtesy, we are presented with half a dozen trumpery maps of no value whatever, and some sixty or seventy pages of desultory observations upon the general history and character of these calamities, that are simply a reflection upon the names appended thereto. The only part of the report that has any value whatever, is Professor Caird's dissent, and for it we honour him deeply. The report itself is not worth review. Its proper place is the fire. All that is of value therein has been said fifty times before, with more honesty of purpose. The report is mere "padding" about the climate, the rainfall, the area of previous famines, anything, in fact, that will fill up fifty pages of print made to look like a report. And *this* is the official report of a calamity in which 5,500,000 of people are admitted to have perished. The Commission elaborately evades throughout, all notion of inquiry into the charges made against the officials whom we have named as the authors of these dreadful sufferings. Professor Caird and Mr. W. E. Sullivan have, no doubt, striven earnestly for an honest report, and we are indebted to these gentlemen for half a dozen pages of "dissent," which they introduce with a few lines of preface, in which they say :—

The people of England can hardly realize the loss by death in the last Indian famine. Upwards of 5,000,000 of human beings, more in number than the population of Ireland, perished in that miserable time. If the people of this vast metropolis, with the millions in its neighbourhood, were all melted away by a lingering death, even this would not exceed in numbers the loss of India. A result so fearful in extent, and so heartrending in its details, was brought about by want of timely preparation to meet a calamity which, though irregular in its arrival, is periodical and inevitable.

The meaning of this is clear enough to the initiated, but it is not the tone, we think, in which we had a right to expect the independent members of this costly Commission would have spoken. In the first paragraph of their dissent they say :—

The terrible fact of 5,000,000 people having been allowed to perish in the last famine is sufficient proof that past experience must serve more as a warning than a guide. The complete breakdown that then occurred was but a repetition, on a larger scale, of the failure which has characterized the administration of every Indian famine in this century, *with the single exception of that of 1874*, which was ruled by the principle that, before all other considerations, the saving of life should be the first object of a British Government, armed with absolute power, and therefore the more responsible for the lives of its helpless subjects.

• We are here told that the administration of Lord Lytton, with Sir John Strachey, Sir Richard Temple, and Sir George Couper as its instruments, was "a complete breakdown," a mere repetition on a larger scale of the failure which had characterized every Indian famine but one, namely, the Behar famine of 1874. And instead of putting a brand on the men who, while dishonestly professing to follow the policy of 1874, secretly reversed it all, the Commission pass the matter over in silence. We owe it to the resolution of Professor Caird alone, that Lord Lytton's administration does not escape altogether. The Commission has thus proved an utter *fiasco*, the miserable people of India being saddled with its heavy cost. As might have been foretold of a Commission so constituted, no one is blamed by them. It is true that, in some way or other, 5,000,000 to 6,000,000 of people have been starved to death; and that Lord Northbrook showed clearly in 1874 the way to prevent a recurrence of such tragedies. The only thing now left is to move the thanks of both Houses to Lord Lytton and his colleagues, for carrying the people successfully through the calamity of famine, and simultaneously compelling the Afghans to become a strong, friendly, and independent power! We ask seriously if this Commission is to be the sole inquest the nation means to make into an administration of this order. Our bitterness must be forgiven. It is the bitterness of men who, with the utmost earnestness and persistence, pointed out all through the period the inevitable result of the courses that were being followed. How can we recal the history of either the war or the famine, without bitterness in memory of these facts?

## PARLIAMENTARY REFORM.—III.

## REDISTRIBUTION OF SEATS.

IF there be in the theory of our far-famed British Constitution one point more firmly established, more widely boasted of, than any other, surely it is that the people are represented in the House of Commons. If there be one point in that representation for which, from the days of Simon de Montfort to our own, our greatest statesmen have contended, surely it is that it should be equal and complete. And yet, for well-nigh six centuries, has the Parliament which has been the offspring of this great theory, sat and legislated, and left almost intact, a system in which the first point is not fully realized, and the second point not realized at all ; a system, if indeed it be worthy of the name, which is the rank residue of successive periods of feudal despotism, monarchic favouritism, and political corruption. Shall the sun of this century of Titanic human progress set on this unfulfilled promise of our past, or shall the Parliament of 1895 be worthy of its progenitor of 1295 ? The wants of vast bodies of the people are groaning in hidden miseries amid our more densely-populated places, and there is none to carry their groans to the power that can remedy them, and, if they be but adequately heard, will remedy them. Those to whom the hard task is assigned are, for the most part, be they ever so willing and laborious, quite overwhelmed with the mass of the claims upon them, and cannot even hear them themselves, much less carry them all on to their proper destination. Hence results that a large portion of the most dense of our populations are not, and cannot, under our present division of labour, be represented at all. The time is indeed come for reform. Year by year the evil grows worse:—populations increasing, and needs accumulating unknown and unsatisfied. May those who see the great truth that the true glory and welfare of the nation consist in the welfare of all its people, and who realize more fully than others how many and how grave are the unrepresented evils threatening the masses of our populace with decay, or even now destroying them, inquire carefully into the facts

of that representation, which should be a complete mirror of the whole life and needs of the people!

It may be well again to observe that this question of the equalization of representation—or, in other words, of the redistribution of seats—is wholly distinct from the question of the extent of the suffrage. Full representation of the whole people equally, does in no way imply universal suffrage. Indeed, it might very well exist in a noble and unselfish form of aristocratic government without any degree of popular suffrage whatever; as, for instance, if the Privy Council governed the country (as in Norman times), and each member of the Privy Council had a portion of the people allotted to his charge. A wise king like the first Edward, however despotic and averse to popular control, would in the interest of his country, so divide the representation as best to reflect the claims of the people in the Legislature. Whether it be true or not that the original cause of the enfranchisement of the boroughs was the difficulty experienced by the royal officers in collecting arbitrary taxes, it is none the less true that behind this cause lurked the true cause;—that all stable government was impossible without a proper hearing of the interests, needs, and opinions of the governed. This cause operates as surely in one age as in another. Nor is it to be expected that a power actually appointed by the people itself, will continue for long without a due sense thereof. Should it do so, it will as surely be again recalled thereto, as it was before 1832, by a recurrence of those shocks which establish governments by showing them the true basis of their stability. Those, therefore, who fear democratic rule should see in the proper equalization of electoral districts, an opportunity for so systematizing government that its power may be better used, and the people being more fully satisfied therewith, may seek no other form of rule.

Further, be it observed that this approximation of the fact to the theory of our Constitution, should receive the especial attention of statesmen before it is pressed upon them from without. For it will only be pressed from without when the evils, which would gain a due hearing thereby, have reached such a climax that the masses will rise as they rose in 1832. It cannot be too strongly impressed upon the minds of all practical politicians that the body whose votes send them to their responsible positions, are but a small fraction of the body for which they are most gravely responsible, and that their duty lies most clearly not only in consulting the opinions and needs of their electors, but much more, in watching with incessant care the more weighty and, at a crisis, overwhelming claims of the masses they do theoretically, and ought practically, to



represent. The class of electors under the present property qualification is undoubtedly a comfortable and, perhaps, a rather selfish class. There are few in it who are touched by those evils which most affect the masses of the populace, and most require the attention of legislators. Those who have risen from amid and out of the marsh of miseries, have so risen chiefly by the operation within them of a spirit which rather estranges them from, than attaches them sympathetically to, the lower ranks. Moreover, the present electors, even in the largest constituencies, are not inadequately, even if disproportionately, represented; nor are they likely on their own account to move strongly, if at all, for a more equal division. For the sake of the large masses crying out below them, they are for reasons just stated, little likely to rouse themselves from their comfortable apathy, whose best interest, in its own narrow opinion, probably lies rather in conservatism of every kind than in true national progress;—an apathy lulled, too, into peace of conscience by many assurances, even from so-called Liberal minds, that those only who can rise to the glorious property qualification of the electorate, are worthy of a real claim on the Legislature, and that all others are only to be regarded in so far as their thousands of existences affect the richer centuries above them.

All true and noble statesmanship is, indeed, so firmly based upon the consideration of universal interests, and so little affected by that of class interests, that it is firmly believed this great question will eventually be settled on the broad principles here advocated. The practical difficulties are undoubtedly very great. But so they were in 1832 and in 1867; and yet the voice of justice, the cry of common sense in the public streets, in the great cities, strengthened the hands of the great rulers who saw their needs and the Legislature's duty,—strengthened them beyond the resistance of puny and selfish opponents. So will it be again, nor long hence will it be so, if only there arise leaders to urge again, to urge finally, how utterly devoid of a rational basis, of real effect, of common fairness, is that which, in our ignorance of facts, or our wanton falseness, we hold up to our people as a representative system. One there was indeed who, at the time of that infamous piece of political dishonesty of 1867, saw how poor a sop for the people was that mutilated fragment of Liberal principles—who, neglected by a tired party, in vain raised his voice for some vital changes, and stood to the last, in solitary grandeur, the one true, earnest man who would not connive at the deceitful compromise. Twice since then have the people shown their confidence in his purity and strength of purpose. Firmly and quietly now may they strengthen him in his resumed

rule, and, "roused like lions out of slumber, in unvanquishable number," carry him irresistibly to the attainment of that change which he insisted on in the Bill of 1867—a more adequate distribution of seats.

It must now be our business to show as minutely as present space will allow, how the equalization of electoral districts may be effected. It has been assumed that the county remain the unit of division, and that distribution of seats be made in due proportion to the population, in each such unit or county; the internal equalization within each unit being dealt with simultaneously as a matter of secondary and less, though not of small importance. With this view, a table was formed on p. 159 of the July number of *THE STATESMAN*, based on the Parliamentary returns of the Census of 1871, to show the present inequality of representation both as regards population and electorate, and as regards the number of boroughs and their population in each county. The considerations which make the problem not wholly a mathematical one were entered into at some length, and the law, that intelligence and needs of populations vary directly as their density, discussed. The chief modification to be considered was held to be a comparative diminution of the number of representatives allotted on an equal standard to the quiet agricultural regions. A close consideration of the table aforesaid will show that the balance is now so largely in favour of those counties, that the most sanguine person may well be content if they are only reduced to a standard of equality, and leave the further diminution for a second effort.

It will now be well to consider each county in succession, and show how the present representation may be transformed in accordance with the annexed table, showing the number of representatives due to each county on gross rental, electors, and population respectively, along with the present actual number of members, and in two further columns the comparative inequality of present distribution in the counties, exclusive of their contained boroughs, and *vice versé, mutatis mutandis*. The table is based upon the following facts and averages:—

	Present Members.	Gross Rental.	Average Gross Rental per Mem.	No. of Electors.	Average Electors per Mem.	Population.	Population per Mem.
England.....	459	£121,677,861	£265,093	1,938,216	4,222	21,495,181	46,830
Wales.....	80	5,418,993	180,466	112,912	3,763	1,217,135	40,671
Total.....	489	£127,091,854	£259,908	2,051,128	4,194	22,712,296	46,446

Before proceeding to the redistribution, let us observe, for the purpose of setting at rest any English or Welsh jealousy of Scotland or Ireland, that if the last two parts of the United Kingdom were

included, the average population per member would be 48,288, instead of 46,446; further, that, with the present number of seats, England would lose 14, and Wales 5, and Scotland and Ireland would gain 10 and 9 respectively, in a fair distribution to the population of each. How these gains will be arranged for the sister countries without subtracting from the English seats cannot be discussed here, but must unquestionably be treated in any Reform Bill brought before the Parliament in which all three have a voice.

We shall now consider redistribution in each county of England and Wales, taking them in alphabetical order, as there is no reason for any other. It will be our object to use the existing divisions of counties and boroughs as far as possible, disfranchising as little as possible, and simply altering the contents in such a manner as to effect due equalization within the old frame. So far we agree with the Tory resolution of 1867, that it is not expedient to disfranchise boroughs, and take the preferable course of merging small into districts. Populations are given in brackets in thousands.

*Bedford.*—The town of Bedford (17) should lose one member, and be combined with Luton (17), and also with Biggleswade (4), Dunstable (4), and Leighton Buzzard (4). The district would then only number 46,000, and the county with two members be fairly represented.

*Berks.*—One county member must be taken away, and the excess in the county given to boroughs; or, as we prefer, the county retain its three members, and one borough district be formed of all the present four boroughs, with one member. Reading (32) and Windsor (14) would form a full district. Abingdon (6) and Wallingford (6) might well merge themselves in the county; if not, they might be added to the district, and would certainly not confer any great burden on the member.

*Bucks* must be treated in the same way as Berks, the same alternative being open. For the same reason (that the county is chiefly agricultural), we prefer to leave the three members to the county, and make the boroughs into one district, with one member—viz., Aylesbury (28), Wycombe (10), Buckingham (7), Marlow (5); or, perhaps, merge the last two named in the county.

*Cambridge.*—The University must, for special reasons, be unaffected, and not considered a part of the representation. The town of Cambridge (33) should lose one member, and have Ely (8) and Wisbeach (9) joined to it.

*Cheshire.*—This county could be far more effectually represented with the former division into two, as several boroughs should be

brought into a separate existence, which it is at present difficult to arrange. East Cheshire (196) only needs four members, and has three large boroughs, which must be preserved. The only plan is to give the division one member only, and reserve three for the boroughs;—one for Macclesfield (35), one for Stalybridge (29), and one for Stockport (53). To reduce the division within the grasp of one member, Dukinfield (14) and Hyde (14) should be joined to Stalybridge. Mid-Cheshire (123) needs three members, of whom two should remain with the division as now, and the new one be given to a district of boroughs, comprising Runcorn (12), Altrincham (8), Northwich with Witton (5), Sandbach (5), and Congleton (11). West Cheshire (241) will retain its present five members, but one of the Chester City (37) members should be given to Crewe (17), Nantwich (6), and Over (5). Birkenhead is a large constituency, but not large enough for two members, and its contiguity and connection with Liverpool give it a kind of secondary representation.

*Cornwall* must again learn to resign the royal favours of the Tudors. The divisions had better retain their members. Four members then remain for the boroughs, which at present, with a population of 66,000, have nine members. There are no large places, except Penzance (10) and Redruth (10) and Camborne (7), which claim notice. Hence it is clearly best to give one member more to each division, and to create two districts with one member each. One district might comprise Launceston (5), Bodmin (6), Liskeard (6), Truro (11), Redruth (10), and Camborne (7). The other would have Penrhyn and Falmouth (16), Helston (8), Penzance (10), and St. Ives (10).

*Cumberland* should again be united, instead of being split in two. The whole should then return three members. Cockermouth (7), Whitehaven (18), Workington (8), and Maryport (7) should form a district, returning one member; Carlisle (31) and Penrith (8) a second, also returning one.

*Derbyshire* has its just number of members. It would improve their distribution to merge North and East in one, with three members, and give one to Buxton (4), Glossop (17), Chesterfield (11), and Matlock (5). Derby town, with two members (61), should be increased by addition of Belper (8), Ripley (5), and Ilkestone (9), to throw a more even burden on the two division members.

*Devonshire* returns eleven members for six boroughs (208). Barnstaple (12), Tiverton (10), Bideford (7), Ilfracombe (5), South Molton (4), Crediton (4), should form a district, returning one member. Exeter (44) should return one, and not two. Torquay

(21), Brixham (5), Teignmouth (7), Exmouth (5), and Ottery St. Mary (4), should form a district, with one. In the Southern Division, Tavistock (7) should be merged in Devonport (64), returning two; and Plymouth (70), with its two, should have Dartmouth (5) added, and perhaps Totnes (4).

*Dorsetshire* returns seven members for six boroughs (52). All these—viz., Bridport (7), Dorchester (7), Poole (10), Shaftesbury (10), Wareham (6), Weymouth and Melcombe Regis (13)—might well be made into one district, with one member; or the county might return two instead of three, and two districts be formed from above towns with one each.

*Durham* is a very active and populous county, especially in its Northern Division (439). This should be divided into two divisions, each returning two; or, as it is a small part in area, should return four members. Durham City (15) should give up one member, and also take in Consett (6) and Houghton-le-Spring (5). The member so gained should be given to a Gateshead district, comprising Gateshead (48), with its present one member, and Jarrow (18) and Felling (6), and some other regions of that active part. In the Southern Division, Bishop Auckland (9) should be added to Darlington (27).

*Essex* has its due number of members, but there should be a considerable internal redistribution. In the east, Colchester (26), Harwich (6), Maldon (7), and Halstead (6) should form one district, with one member, instead of three boroughs, with four members. In the west, Chelmsford (9), Saffron Walden (6), Dunmow (7), Waltham (5), and Ongar (7) should form a district, with one. In the south, West Ham (63), with Barking (6), Romford (6), and Wanstead (5), should return two members.

*Gloucester*.—The Western Division (158, without the population of boroughs,) should be split in two, or have four members. Stroud (38) should lose one of its members, and also comprise Cirencester (7); Gloucester (32) should also lose one, and include Tewkesbury (5). Of the four seats so gained, one should go to Bristol, two to the Western Division, and one resigned as being in excess of population.

*Hampshire* has eleven members for eight boroughs (225). Andover (5) and Petersfield (6) should be merged in Winchester (16), and with Basingstoke (5) added, they should return one member, instead of four, as now. In the Southern Division, Lymington (5) should be merged in Christchurch (15), with one member. Southampton (53) had better yield one member to Portsmouth (113), now returning two, and Fareham (7) and

Gosport (7) be joined to Portsmouth. In the Isle of Wight, Ryde (11), Cowes (8), Ventnor (4) should be added to the present borough of Newport (8).

*Herefordshire*.—The county must give up one of its three members, and Hereford (18) be combined with Leominster (6) to return one member.

*Hertfordshire* has its due number of seats, but the town of Hertford (8) should not return one member alone. Bishop Stortford (6), Cheshunt (7), Hemel Hempstead (6), Hitchin (7), St. Albans (8), and Watford (7), should make up a district with it.

*Huntingdonshire* must yield one member; and there seems no reason why the little borough, Huntingdon (6), should be preserved, the less as there are no other towns to combine with it.

*Kent*.—Canterbury City (21) must lose one member, and attach Ashford (8) and Faversham (7). Dover (28) must yield one, and attach Hythe Borough (24). Sandwich Borough (14) must attach Ramsgate (14), Margate (12), and Whitstable (5), and return one instead of two members. A third member should then be allotted to the Eastern Division. In Mid-Kent, Rochester City (18) must yield one member, as also Maidstone (26); another town, Tunbridge Wells (19), being attached to the latter borough. In West Kent, Bromley (10) and Dartford (8) might well be added to Greenwich (169), which would then have a right to four members. Three members should be then given to the division, as it is populous, but contains no other large towns.

*Lancashire* affords the first great difficulty in redistribution, as most people will demur to its sudden acquirement of so many as twenty-eight additional members. Let us, however, see how they are required. For this purpose it will be convenient to take the existing divisions. North Lancashire (295) needs six members. Three should be given to the division, and one to a district of boroughs, formed of Barrow (18), Ulverston (6), and (if fit for political trust again) Lancaster (17). Preston (85) would retain two. North-east Lancashire (335) needs seven members. Blackburn (82) has two, Burnley (44) one. Clitheroe (12) has one, and must attach Colne (7) and Padiham (6). Accrington (22) and Haslingden (7), with Darwen (21), must be made into a new district, with one member. The division itself will retain two members. South-east Lancashire (1,273) now returns twelve borough members and two division members, and should return twenty-seven in all. Manchester (379) needs five more members, and Salford (124, with extended boundary) one more. Rochdale (63), with Littleborough (8) and Milnrow (5) added, could claim one more. Todmorden (12)

and Bacup (17) need one; Heywood (21), and Crompton (7), and Royton (8), one; Middleton (14), and Prestwich (7), and Radcliffe (11), one; Barton (19) and Stretford (11), one. Oldham (118), with Mossley (10), would need a third member. The thirteenth additional one is due to the division. South-west Lancashire (915) has now eight members, and claims twenty. Of these twelve additional, seven are due to Liverpool. St. Helens (45) claims one; Farnworth (13), and Widnes (14), and Garston (6) one; Ince (12) and Hindley (10), and Atherton (7) and Tyldesley (6) one; Southport (18) and Ormskirk (6) and Chorley (16)—which is more conveniently allied here than in its own division—one; Bootle (16) and Walton (6) and Waterloo (6) one. Wigan (39) must yield one member, which is due to the division.

*Leicestershire* has its proper number, nor could the distribution be much improved.

*Lincolnshire* has to yield four seats. Lincoln City (27) only needs one instead of two; Boston (18) likewise, after combination with Spalding (9), only one; as also Grantham (13), after merging with Stamford Borough (6). For further improvement, Louth (10) should be added to Grimsby (27).

*Middlesex* (2,539) is at present attended to by eighteen members, and claims fifty-four or thirty-six additional. These should be given to—Chelsea (258), three; Finsbury (452), seven; Hackney (362), six; Marylebone (477), eight; Tower Hamlets (391), six; and Westminster (246), three. The City (74) should yield up two of its four members. District boroughs should be formed of—Acton (8), and Brentford (11), and Chiswick (8), and Ealing (10), with one member; of Twickenham (10), and Hounslow (9), and Uxbridge (7), with one; of Hornsey (19) and Tottenham (23), with one; and of Edmonton (14) and Enfield (16), with one. The remaining member of the thirty-six is due to the county.

*Monmouthshire* has a claim on one new member, who should, without the least question, be assigned to a new district, comprising Tredegar (12), and Abersychan (14), and Blaenavon (10), and, perhaps, Pontypool (5) and Abergavenny (5).

*Norfolk* is duly represented, but Yarmouth should have one of the King's Lynn members, if it has been punished long enough by disfranchisement. This would rectify the internal division.

*Northampton* has to yield two members. The two boroughs, Northampton (45) and Peterborough (15), do not require two members each. Indeed, even with one member, Wellingborough (9) and Kettering (7) should be combined with the latter to increase its size nearer the standard.

*Northumberland* must lose one, which can well be taken from Berwick (13), with its two members. Moreover, it would be only fair to merge Berwick in Morpeth (29), and give the member so gained to Newcastle (128), with Bedlington (13) and Walker (8) added. Alnwick (6) could at any time be put in with Morpeth and Berwick.

*Nottinghamshire* exceeds its due by three. This county (319) is only a small one, and, having some towns of some size, should never have been split in two. The only satisfactory course would be to reunite the two divisions. To Nottingham Borough (86), with two members, Basford (13), Snenton (12), and Lenton (6) should be attached. East Retford (49) would be sufficiently represented by one member. Newark (12) would yield one member, and be combined with Worksop (10), Mansfield (12), and Sutton (7); and to the united county would remain three members.

*Oxfordshire* has three seats in excess. The University is not considered. Oxford City (33) should be deprived of one member, and have Banbury (10) and Woodstock (7) attached to it.

*Rutland* should be represented by one member only; why should it have a special privilege? Even then it is largely represented.

*Salop* must give up four seats. Shrewsbury (23), including Oswestry (7) and Wellington (6), should return only one member; so also Wenlock (21), with Bridgnorth (7) and Ludlow (6) merged in it.

*Somerset* has to lose one member. Frome (10) should be merged in a district, with Bath (54) and Weston (10), the two members now representing Bath only being assigned to the district. Taunton (15), now returning two members, should be combined with Wellington (5), and eventually also the disgraced Bridgewater (12), and return one only; and the member so gained should be given to Mid-Somerset (120), which has not sufficient large towns to form a district.

*Staffordshire* has its due number of members, but they require a far different distribution. How can any statesman, any population, tolerate one in which Wednesbury (117) has one member, while Tamworth (5), Newcastle (16), and Stafford (16) have each two? Tamworth (5), Lichfield (7), and Burton (20) should be combined under one member; Walsall remain as it is; and the densely populated active district which comprises Wednesbury (itself 25), West Bromwich (48), Rowley Regis (23), Darlaston (14), Smethwick (17), and Tipton (29), making in all 156,000,—should have three members, either as a district or in separate boroughs. This adds one member to the Western Division (312) as a whole, giving it seven instead of



six. The seat so given is due from East Stafford (279), which only requires six, and not seven members. Stafford (16) having no other except very small boroughs contiguous, which can be combined with it, must be merged in the great Wolverhampton region of boroughs, these being constituted as one district with four members, or as two or three boroughs. In the Northern Division, Newcastle should be combined with some other township, and then return one member, and the remaining three borough members be distributed equitably to the Stoke District, Leek (11), with its silk manufacture, being also brought in. It is impossible to show this internal redistribution in Staffordshire briefly, as the boroughs are many and important, and have been much complicated by their amalgamation under single towns, like Wednesbury. The above sketch, however, points out broadly the course which should be taken. The gross inequality of the present system is almost as extreme in this county in its internal relation as that of Wiltshire in its external relation to other counties, showing that even where to a superficial glance all looks fair and equal, the most absurd injustice lurks.

*Suffolk* has one excessive seat. The internal distribution, too, needs change; and as there are few considerable towns, and the county is so largely agricultural, it is best to add one member to the Eastern Division (200). Ipswich (42) should then be deprived of one member, and Lowestoft (15), with Gorleston (7) and Beccles (5), receive one. The Western Division (148) should retain its two members, and have Bury St. Edmunds (15), Eye (6), with Sudbury (7) and Stowmarket (4) as a district, returning one member only.

*Surrey* requires twelve additional members. Of these, ten are due to the East Division (749) and two to the middle. Lambeth (379), instead of two, should have eight members; Southwark (208), instead of two, four; Croydon (55) one; and the tenth new member is due to the division. In Mid-Surrey one member should be given to a district comprising Richmond (15), Kingston (15), Surbiton (7), and Wimbledon (9); and, as Reigate is disgraced, the second new seat should be conferred on the division. In West Surrey the only change requisite is an increase of Guildford Borough (9) by addition of Epsom (6) and Dorking (5) and Farnham (4).

*Sussex* has six excessive seats. Hastings (33) should lose one, and also comprise Rye (8). Brighton (103) should take in Hove (11), Lewes (10), and Eastbourne (10), and then return three members; or, if preferred, Lewes might comprise the two, and continue separate. In the west, New Shoreham (37) should attach Worthing (7), and only return one member. Chichester (9), Horsham (8), and Midhurst (6) should then form one district, with

one member; and, finally, the West Division, being small, must yield one member, some of the small towns being, perhaps, added to the above district.

*Warwickshire* needs an addition of three seats. Birmingham (344) requires seven members—that is, four additional; Coventry (41) must attach Nuneaton (7) and Rugby (8), and return one member instead of two. In the Southern Division, Warwick Borough (11) must yield one member, and eventually also comprise the disfranchised Leamington. The members so gained must go to Aston Manor (34), with Stratford-on-Avon.

*Westmoreland*, though only returning three members, has only 65,000 of population—scarcely enough for two. Nor is it easy to effect a remedy, as there are no boroughs to combine with the little Kendal (13). Perhaps the best course is to leave Kendal alone, and if towns spring up in the future, make it a head of a district. Then one member must be taken from the county, the sitting member having even then only 51,000 under his care.

*Wiltshire* has the most grossly excessive number of boroughs of any of the counties. Scarcely six members are its due, and it returns fifteen. The remedy is very simple. Existing boroughs number 105,000: Trowbridge (11), Bradford (5), and New and Old Swindon (11) should be added; this total of 132,000 requires three members. Three are left for county, which, exclusive of above boroughs, only numbers 125,000 (the same as Hereford). The right course, then, is to unite the two divisions of the county under two members, and to create three sets of boroughs. Cricklade (43) must lose one member, but can remain separate. Old and New Swindon (11), Malmesbury (7), Chippenham (7), Calne (5), Marlborough (5), and Bradford (5) must form a district with one member. Trowbridge (11), Westbury (6), Devizes (7), Wilton (9), and Salisbury (14) will form another district for one member.

*Worcestershire* must yield three members—indeed, very nearly four. The Western Division (66, without boroughs) is too fully represented by two members; still they may be left, as none is required for boroughs. Kidderminster (21), Bewdley (7), and Stourbridge (9) should make one district with one member; Worcester City (38) should attach Great Malvern (5), and only send one member. In the east, Dudley can be preserved; Evesham (5), Droitwich (9), Bromsgrove (7), Oldbury (16), and Redditch (6) must combine under one member. It would, perhaps, be well to take one of the members from the Western Division and give him to Dudley (82).

*Yorkshire*.—The East Riding suffers from want of two seats.

Bridlington (6) and Great Driffield (5)—and eventually Beverley (10), now disfranchised—should be added to Hull (123), which should then return three members. The second additional member is due to the division, which numbers 128,000, exclusive of those boroughs. The North Riding has an excess of five seats, through the prevalence of small boroughs. Malton (5), Northallerton (5), Richmond (5), and Thirsk (6) must be combined in one district, and even then are a small charge for one member. Whitby (13) and Scarborough (24) should be joined under one member instead of three. York City (48) would be amply represented by one member; the one gained should be given to the division, which numbers 186,000, exclusive of boroughs, and is no light charge, therefore, for even three members. The active and populous West Riding requires eighteen additional members to do its work. Of these, the Eastern Division (546) claims three; the Northern (479), four; the Southern (794), eleven. The Eastern Division requires a thorough revision. How can the representation continue as it is for a single session? Pontefract (11) with two members, and Ripon (7) with one, and Knaresborough (5) with one, while the populous southern region of the division is crowded on a few members! Ripon (7), Knaresborough (5), and Harrogate (7) united make but a small borough for one member. Bingley (7), Otley (6), North Brierley (14), Yeadon (5), Heckmondwike (8), and Clackheaton (6) would, as one district with one member, relieve a thick region. Pontefract (11) should attach Castleford (6), Goole (7), and Selby (6), under one member. Finally, Leeds (259) requires three more members to equalize it. In the Northern Division, Bradford (145) claims a third member. Halifax (65) should be associated with Brighouse (6), Elland (6), Sowerby (13), Ovenden (7), and Rastrick (6), under its present two members. Keighley (20), with Shipley (12), Skipton (6), and Thornton (6), will form another good district for one new member. The division itself then remains, without any considerable places to be combined, with a population of 184,000; this clearly requires four members, and it might be desirable to split the division into two constituencies. In the Southern Division, Dewsbury (54) should attach Batley (21), Birstal (6), Morley (9), Thornhill (6), and have two instead of one member; Huddersfield (74), with Golcar (6), should have two; Wakefield (28), with its present one member, should be enlarged by association with Ossett (9) and Soothills (8); Barnsley (23), with Darton (5), should have one member; Doncaster (19), with Rotherham (26), should also have one member; and, finally, Sheffield (239) should have five members instead of two. Four new members

are then left to satisfy the needs of the division, which, exclusive of above boroughs, measures 258,000, and would be conveniently split in two, with three members for each sub-division.

Having disposed of the redistribution of the English seats, we will now pass on to the Welsh, reserving all comment for the end of the work.

*Anglesey* might be amply represented by one member, for there cannot possibly be said to be a double interest in such a small region; the boroughs are very small, and should be merged in the county,—at any rate, till they increase considerably in size and separate needs.

*Brecon*, though not nearly large enough for two seats, might be argued to have such considerable manufacturing interests as to deserve a borough representation. But if we look at the facts, we find Brecknock (5) and Brynmawr (5) the only towns which could be represented, and on a very little further investigation conclude that all can be attended to by one member, and therefore merge little Brecknock town in the county.

*Cardigan* requires no change, though it is questionable whether the representation would not be more effectual if the little boroughs would sacrifice themselves to the county and possess their two members in common.

*Cardmarthen* and *Carnarvon* are fairly well arranged, though it is difficult to see why in the borough district of the latter Criccieth, of 812 people, and Nevin, of 1,791, should be included, and Ynyscynh-diarn, of 4,367, and Llandudno, of 2,762, rejected.

*Denbighshire* does not require three members. Some of the small towns should be added to the district, and the division (now 84) would be diminished within the power of one member. Flintshire needs no change, except the connection of Rhyl (4,229) with the district.

*Glamorgan* is in want of two more members. The present districts are truly ludicrous. Merthyr (94) must remain as it is, with two members; Cardiff (57) should be separated under one member, so also should Swansea (57); Aberdare (36) should be enfranchised; Neath (9), Aberavon (12), Briton Ferry (5), Canton (7), Mountain Ash (7), Roath (8), and Cwmdru (6), should be formed into a district, with one member. The few petty villages at present connected with the Swansea and Cardiff districts should be merged in the county.

*Merionethshire* and *Montgomeryshire* require no change whatever, unless the latter (67) could be represented by one member instead of two.

*Pembrokeshire* must yield one member by combining its two districts of borough into one; they will then number only 35,000.

*Radnor* will also be well off with one member, its little villages really having no claim to separate representation.

The work of redistribution, in accordance with standard of population, is now complete. The object throughout has been to consult this standard in its fullest meaning, without any partiality or prejudice whatsoever. If considerations of party are to be introduced in the first draft of such a settlement, there is, indeed, very small chance of attaining to anything like an equitable solution. That party considerations will, on the first attempt to practicalize any such plan, be brought to bear upon it, as they have been upon all great Reform Bills, is just as certain as it is certain that ultimately some such measure must be carried. For, however much party government is of the essence of the English Constitution, no one with any historical knowledge would attempt to deny that, if once the people become thoroughly conscious of the wrongness and unfairness of any part of the system of government, they will not be stopped by any mere party feeling in producing a rapid remedy; and, as has already been insisted above, it behoves wise statesmen to foresee, by a reference to those eternal principles of truth and altruism which must eventually, by the agency of the progress of the vast mass of mankind, if by no other, assert themselves, what points of reform are to be struggled for. The immense difficulty of carrying any scheme of equalization as effective as the above lies in the fact that all the strength of the small constituencies will be opposed to the comparative diminution of their importance in the country. This opposition nothing but the resolute support given by the majority of the people—and it is clearly a vast majority—to any Government which will be patriotic enough to initiate the thorough reform, will avail to overcome. There is clearly little doubt but that the demonstration of the national will, in such large regions as Lancashire, Yorkshire, Surrey, and Middlesex, would execute that will. It overcame the Duke of Wellington.

But let us reflect a little upon the nature of the redistribution proposed in these pages. Disfranchisement has been almost totally avoided. Every little borough has met with due regard, and been treated according to its population. Nor this only. If the annexed table of statistics be examined, and compared in detail with this redistribution, it will be found that the wealth (as represented by the gross rental) and the electorate of each place have also been considered. Where there is a great discrepancy between the number of seats due on population, gross rental, and electorate,

it can be explained by reference to the peculiar conditions of the place. The reason for variation on electorate is, of course, the mixture of the two qualifications of suffrage in considering county and boroughs together. For instance, Essex shows ten members due on both population and rental, and only six on electorate, because there are only three small boroughs of 40,000 in the county, giving, therefore, only a small number of electors on the wider qualification of burgesses. Stafford, on the other hand, shows fourteen due on population and rental, and twenty-three upon electorate, because the boroughs make the electors very numerous.

It may be objected that the scheme is not a perfect equalization. The reply is, that no scheme can be a perfect equalization unless all the relations of topography, history, occupation, and race be wholly neglected, and a blind division made, which would cut up towns in a ludicrous manner. These relations, more especially that of occupation and interest, as exemplified in the commerce and manufactures of the place, have been carefully considered, though not with one-hundredth part of the care or detail which they should receive, and only could receive, from the great staff of a Government office, with all its machinery for information. It was intended to enter into these various reasons for the grouping adopted in many places, but space would not allow it. It is hoped that an intimate examination of the scheme will show fair care to have been taken for these most important conditions of the question.

A short summary of the total effects of the scheme will best show its purpose and the gravity of the changes proposed, as well as the necessity for them. The changes in the boroughs may be summarized as follows: Fifty-four, having a population of less than 10,000, have been merged in districts, and it has been recommended that two others under 10,000—viz., Brecon (6) and Huntingdon (6)—should be merged in their little containing counties. Thirty-four boroughs, between 10,000 and 20,000, have been increased to a proper size by combination in districts with the smaller boroughs; twenty-five of them, which return two members now, are deprived of one; further, it has been suggested that Montgomery (18), Beaumaris (13), and Kendal (13) should be merged in their counties. Of the boroughs between 20,000 and 30,000, thirteen have been increased by combinations, and nine of them which returned two members deprived of one. Ten boroughs, containing less than 40,000, have been increased by additions, and two—Coventry (41) and Gateshead (48)—over 40,000 have been enlarged, the latter of them having obtained an additional member. Eighteen

boroughs between 30,000 and 50,000 have been deprived of one of their two members.

Of the boroughs containing between 50,000 and 100,000, nine have been increased so as to be worthy of their two members; of these nine, Huddersfield (74), Dewsbury (55), and Rochdale (68), only return one member at present. Three boroughs, York (50), Stockport (53), and Southampton (53) have been reduced to one member, and London City (74) has been reduced to two in lieu of four seats—truly a most necessary change. Swansea (57) and Cardiff (57) have been separated from their districts.

Of the boroughs between 100,000 and 200,000 the majority have received additional members. Bradford (145), Brighton (103, increased), Bristol (182), Hull (123, increased), Newcastle-on-Tyne (128, increased), Oldham (113, increased), Portsmouth (113, increased), Salford (124, extended), and Stoke District (131), or nine in all, have received a third member; Greenwich (169, increased), Wednesbury District (116, increased), and Wolverhampton District (156, increased), have received two members in addition to their present two. The larger towns and cities have received large additions to their representation. Southwark (208) has been raised from two to four seats; Chelsea (258), Sheffield (239), Westminster (246), from two to five seats; and Leeds (259) from three to five seats; Birmingham (344) from three to seven; Manchester (379) from three to eight; Hackney (362), Lambeth (379), and Tower Hamlets (391), from two to eight; Finsbury from two to nine; Marylebone from two to ten; and Liverpool from three to ten. It is, perhaps, scarcely necessary to state that these vast boroughs would have to be sub-divided, as the Metropolis now is, so that their many members might be returned, not by one, but by several electoral bodies. These vast boroughs now return thirty members; under the reform they would return ninety-three.

The changes in the counties it is scarcely necessary to summarize, as they are slight and can be easily gathered by reference. It would be interesting to show how many new places are brought into representation under the system proposed, and to show the many and various urgent claims they have; but there is not space for this here. One point will be clear, from the detailed redistribution, to every careful reader, that far more places are brought in than are merged in districts. A national claim is heard at the expense of the separate individuality (not their real individuality, for they are not disfranchised,) of a number of small political units.

The chief objection raised will be that a vast political power is

placed in the hands of the more populous districts, and more especially of the small area which contains the metropolitan boroughs. Is there really any good reason in this objection? Is there much or little truth in the great law that needs and intelligence, which are the two bases of claim to representation, vary directly as the density of the population? Or will opponents go back, in fact, as so many do still in feudal feeling, to the old Tory argument of 1832, and say that areas of land must be the standard of division? Or is the idea that an occasional genius may be shot through a pocket borough into a career which he would almost certainly attain to in a better way with a struggle, to be the excuse for the retention of a system whose defects allow of—nay, perhaps create—more evil than ever the genius so encouraged can remedy or compensate for with his work for good? Or, again, are the small ambitions of landowners and patrons to be held sacred, and their desire to have seats all over the kingdom for their children and clients to be satisfied? No, not one of these arguments will stand, not till the end of this great century. They will be crushed into eternal silence by the stern, just will of a great people, led on to reform by a far-seeing, unprejudiced, and altruistic body of rulers, some true aristocracy, that can rule, and dare not lie! Not bleak areas of unpeopled land, not narrow wishes of inert landlords, shall be the bases of the new representative system, but the flesh and blood of the myriads of active men, women, and children, with all their needs and mighty life and action; not the false attachment of a few places to precedent without reason, or to the shadow of a historic greatness, but the massive thought and collective feeling of great populations, the vast soul of humanity, with all its irrepressible power of progress. Many individuals, many classes, may stand up and resist; leaders may be wanting—even Liberal leaders may shrink; but let the voice of the great people be raised, and it shall indeed be heard and answered.



## PARLIAMENTARY REFORM STATISTICS.

*N.B.—Population and Rental in Thousands, and Electors in Hundreds.*

County.	Gross Rental.	Members due on Rental.	Number of Electors.	Members due on Election.	Population.	Members due on Pop'n.	Present Members.	Av. Pop. per Mem. in Co.	Av. Pop. per Mem. in Boro's.	Deduct or Add.
Bedford .....	780	3	87	2	146	3	4	64	8½	-1
Berks .....	1,250	5	150	3	196	4	8	43	12½	-4
Buckingham .....	1,122	4	145	3	175	4	8	40	11	-4
Cambridge .....	1,267	5	141	3	186	4	5	51	17	-1
Cheshire .....	2,987	11½	521	12	561	12	14	58	16½	-2
Cornwall .....	1,344	5	251	6	362	8	13	74	7½	-5
Cumberland .....	1,236	5	201	5	220	5	8	41	14½	-3
Derby .....	1,338	7	295	7	379	8	8	53	30½	
Devon .....	3,023	12	460	11	601	13	17	65	19	-4
Dorset .....	1,066	4	140	3	195	4	10	47	7½	-6
Durham .....	2,935	11	592	14	685	15	13	94	34½	+2
Essex .....	2,724	10½	247	6	466	10	10	71	10	
Gloucester .....	2,889	11	583	14	534	11½	13	63	31½	-1
Hants .....	2,601	10	437	10	544	11½	16	64	20½	-4
Hereford .....	980	4	125	3	125	2½	6	34	8	-3
Hertford .....	1,163	4½	103	2	192	4	4	61	8	
Huntingdon .....	480	2	46	1	63	1½	3	27	8	-1
Ipswich .....	4,900	19	712	17	848	18	21	80	24½	-3
Lancaster .....	13,753	53	2,672	63	2,819	60½	32	145	69	+28
Leicester .....	1,542	6	289	7	269	6	6	43	47½	
Lincoln .....	3,260	12½	437	10	436	9½	14	57	11½	-4
Middlesex .....	20,175	77½	2,174	52	2,539	54½	18	138	141½	+36
Monmouth .....	854	3	115	3	195	4	3	78	39	+1
Norfolk .....	2,693	10	358	8	438	9½	10	66	11	
Northampton .....	1,645	6	199	5	243	5½	8	45	16	-2
Northumberland .....	2,164	8	292	7	386	8½	10	44	38½	-1
Nottingham .....	1,621	6	344	8	319	7	10	43	24½	-3
Oxford .....	1,137	4	156	4	177	4	7	42	13	-3
Rutland .....	183	¾	20	½	22	½	2	11	0	-1
Salop .....	1,592	6	227	5	248	5½	10	47	9½	-4
Somerset .....	2,940	11	336	8	463	10	11	59	21	-1
Stafford .....	3,646	14	1,007	24	858	18½	19	53	41	
Suffolk .....	1,988	7½	226	5	348	7½	9	71	13	-1
Surrey .....	6,575	25	874	21	1,091	23½	11	81	121	+12
Sussex .....	2,531	10	367	8	417	9	15	50	20	-6
Warwick .....	3,135	12	721	17	634	14	11	58	57½	+3
Westmoreland .....	474	2	69	2	65	1½	3	25	14	-1
Wilts .....	1,693	6½	239	5	257	5½	15	38	9½	-9
Worcester .....	1,772	6½	399	9	338	7½	11	53	13	-3
York—E. R. ....			300	7	268	6	4	69	64½	+2
N. R. ....			431	10	293	6½	12	93	10½	-5
W. R. ....	11,747	45	1,875	45	1,874	40	22	155	59	+18
WALES—										
Anglesey .....	187	¾	50	1	51	1½	2	37	14	-1
Brecon .....	271	1	45	1	59	1½	2	51	9	-1
Cardigan .....	226	¾	63	1	73	1½	2	63	11	
Carmarthen .....	503	2	112	3	115	2½	3	44	26	
Carmarvon .....	401	1½	87	2	106	2½	2	78	28	
Denbigh .....	505	2	102	2	105	2½	3	42	21	-1
Flinth .....	378	1½	71	2	76	2	2	26	24	
Glamorgan .....	1,776	6½	363	8	397	8½	6	81	59	+2
Merioneth .....	204	¾	33	1	46	1	1	46	0	
Montgomery .....	374	1½	75	2	67	1½	2	48	19	
Pembroke .....	412	1½	92	2	91	2	3	57	17½	-1
Radnor .....	172	¾	30	1	25	½	2	13	7	-1

## THE FINANCIAL CONDITION OF BRITISH INDIA IN 1859-60.

BY THE LATE COLONEL SYKES, M.P., F.R.S.

[NOTE.—*The following paper, which was read by the late Colonel Sykes, M.P., at Edinburgh, in September, 1859, is republished by us as a starting-point for students who desire to compare the state of the Indian Finances under the Crown in the last twenty years, with their earlier history under the East India Company.*—ED.]

THE Financial Condition of the British Government in India has for a few years past been the subject of the most conflicting statements; high authorities, even in Parliament, have recently declaimed against a perennial deficiency, from which there was no recovery, because a crushing taxation had reduced the people to indigence, and a succession of loans had only relieved immediate difficulties, to accumulate and enhance those difficulties in the end. These statements appear to me to have had their origin in the vague and indefinite associations that the ceaseless wars which had been carried on in India, occasionally at enormous cost, had necessarily involved Indian finance in inextricable confusion.

I am free to confess that some years ago I had considerable misgivings, and was influenced by appearances. Occupying at that time a position in the Home administration of the affairs of India, I caused, in December, 1842, a statement, from an early period, to be drawn up in the proper department at the India House, of the real condition of the Receipts and Expenditure in every branch of revenue and charge at each Presidency, together with the pressure of the interest of the debt in relation to the annual net revenue. To limit the very great labour which an annual statement for a lengthened period would entail, I adopted the expedient of taking every tenth year for each Presidency, commencing with 1808-9. That statement was laid upon the table of the Court of Directors on the 14th December, 1842, and on the 12th March, 1852, I caused the statement of the fifth decennial period to be produced, comprising the financial year 1849-50. These statements I shall now lay before the Section, together with the necessary comments, and as the sixth decennial period is not yet arrived, I shall limit my range to the year 1857, giving the actual financial condition of India when the Mutiny began, because in that year the absolute statistics terminate. But as the Secretary for India has submitted to Parliament *estimates* of the gross revenues and charges for 1858-59 and for 1859-60, I shall make such use of them *quantum valeat* as may aid in considering the finances immediately and prospectively.

In addition to the above, the House of Commons granted me a return of the annual increase or decrease of the Indian debt from the year 1800 to the latest date, together with a statement of the gross revenues of the several Governments,

with a column indicating the annual percentage pressure of the interest of the debt; but as the revenues are given in gross, without deduction for charges of collection, the percentage pressure is somewhat more favourable than in my decennial returns, as I calculated it upon net revenue only. The headings of the several columns of Revenue in my decennial statement are "Gross Receipts," "Charges of Collection," "Net Receipts," and "Percentage Charge of Collection," and the Revenues comprise "Land Tax," "Excise" (markets and liquors), "Customs," "Salt," "Opium," "Stamps" and "Post Office," and Tribute from Native Princes. The charges are arranged under the several designations "Civil and Political," "Judicial," "Police," "Mint," "Marine," "Military," "Buildings and Fortifications," "Miscellaneous," and "Interest upon Debt;" and the percentage of the whole charge under each head to the net revenue is given.

I propose to treat—

- 1st. Progress of Revenue.
- 2nd. " of Charge.
- 3rd. " of Military Charge.
- 4th. " of Civil Charge.
- 5th. Pressure of Interest of Debt.
- 6th. Financial Condition during the years of the Mutiny, and lastly,
- 7th. Prospective Financial Condition of India.

And first to notice shortly the result of the statements laid before the Court of Directors in December, 1842, and in March, 1852, the details being available in the statements themselves.

1. It will be observed that the net revenue of British India in 1809-10 was over £11,000,000 sterling, and that through the successive decennial periods up to 1849-50, it continued to increase up to £19,500,000 in 1849-50, excepting after 1829-30, when the progressive increase was checked to the amount of a few hundred thousand pounds; but in 1856-57, at the commencement of the Mutiny, by the Parliamentary Return 201, Sess. 2/59, the gross revenue had reached the unprecedented amount of £33,250,000.

2. The whole charges, it will be seen by the table, increased from £11,000,000 in 1809-10, through the successive decennial periods, up to £16,500,000 in 1849-50; but the Indian surplus, which in 1809-10 was only £131,000, in 1849-50 had become £3,104,000. The Parliamentary Paper 199, Sess. 2 of 1857, shows that the whole charges in 1856-57 amounted to £25,500,000, but this must be exclusive of the charge for collection, as the revenues of that year exceeded £33,000,000, *vide* Parliamentary Return 201, Sess. 2 of 1859, and there was a final surplus over every charge, Indian and Home, of £82,143, *vide* Parliamentary Return 199, Sess. 2 of 1859.

3. The military charges have always been, and it is to be feared always will be, the chief drain upon the Indian Exchequer. Great as the pressure of the military charges is in England, it is nothing comparable with the pressure in India. Up to the outbreak of the Mutiny, however, the table shows that in 1809-10 the pressure which was 58·87 per cent. of the net revenue, and which in 1819-20 rose to a maximum pressure of 64·75, which it has not even attained in the enormous outlay to suppress the Mutiny, from 1819-20 gradually declined, and in 1849-50 was only 51·86 per cent., or a little more than half of the revenue of British India; but in April, 1857, before the outbreak of the Mutiny, according to Parliamentary Paper 199, the military and naval charges had fallen to 45·55 per cent.; a diminished amount of proportionate charge which had not been

experienced in the preceding fifty-six years. It would have been happy for India and England that this had been continued.

(A.)—*India.—1809—1849.—Revenues and Charges.*

REVENUES.	Net, 1809-10.	Net, 1819-30.	Net, 1829-30.	Net, 1839-40.	Net, 1849-50.	Gross, 1857.
	£	£	£	£	£	
Bengal and Agra .....	7,151,	8,476,	9,524,	8,962,	18,700,	20,669,
Madras .....	3,620,	3,429,	3,401,	3,433,	3,478,	5,767,
Bombay .....	466,	1,110,	1,278,	1,346,	2,330,	5,405,
Punjab .....	...	...	...	...	...	1,461,
<i>Total</i> .....	11,238,	18,016,	14,200,	18,742,	19,510,	38,908,
<b>TOTAL CHARGES :—</b>						
Bengal and Agra .....	5,984,	7,360,	7,385,	7,541,	10,400,	16,493,
Madras .....	3,463,	3,757,	3,445,	3,478,	3,073,	5,177,
Bombay .....	1,628,	1,816,	2,275,	1,984,	2,839,	5,143,
Punjab .....	...	...	...	...	...	1,264,
	11,076,	12,934,	13,107,	13,004,	16,404,	28,079,
<i>Surplus in India</i> .....	131,	182,	1,092,	737,	3,105,	3,611,
<b>MILITARY CHARGES :—</b>						
Bengal and Agra .....	2,972,	3,022,	3,498,	4,115,	5,897,	6,129,
Madras .....	2,581,	3,033,	2,633,	2,764,	2,364,	2,865,
Bombay .....	1,062,	1,512,	1,501,	1,052,	1,817,	2,131,
Punjab .....	...	...	...	...	...	161,
<i>Total Military Charges</i> ..	6,616,	7,568,	7,633,	7,932,	10,079,	11,463,
<b>PERCENTAGE OF :—</b>						
	Pr. ct.	Pr. ct.	Pr. ct.	Pr. ct.	Pr. ct.	
(1.) Military Charge .....	58·877	64·290	53·754	57·721	51·662	45·55
(2.) Interest of Debt .....	18·010	12·805	13·124	9·756	10·512	7·19
(3.) Civil and Political ....	7·221	8·900	9·575	12·296	8·902	*9·62
(4.) Judicial .....	7·525	6·800	7·107	9·565	7·180	9·38
(5.) Provincial Police .....	1·991	2·093	1·535	2·062	2·062	
(6.) Buildings and Fortificns.	1·639	1·756	2·810	1·428	1·661	

The above table exhibits the abstract *net* financial condition of British India at five decennial periods, from 1809-10 to 1849-50, both inclusive. The 000's at *unit* are omitted. The column for 1857 is from Parliamentary Paper 199, *Sess.* 2/59.

*Note.*—The pressure of the military charges in 1857 upon the net revenue, according to the Statistical Tables of the United Kingdom, was only 41·61 per cent.

4. The civil charges, which by many persons have been stated to be disproportioned to the resources of the Government, would appear in 1809-10 to have amounted only to 7·22 per cent. of the net revenue, and though they had risen to 12·29 per cent. in 1839-40, they fell again in the next decennial period to 8·90

per cent., and in 1857 they were 9·62 per cent. of the net revenue: these do not include the judicial charges, which during fifty years appear to have borne with very little variation of pressure upon the net revenue, the minimum being 6·80 per cent. in 1819-20, and the maximum 9·56 in 1839-40, and in 1849-50 they had fallen to 7·18 per cent., and in 1857, inclusive of police, they were 9·38 per cent. of the net revenue.

Previously to going into a review of the Indian and Home debt as a corollary to the preceding observations, it will be right to annex Tables I., II., and III., of B, illustrative of the development of the resources of India from the abolition of the exclusive trading privileges of the East India Company in 1834-35 until 1856-57, which show that the imports of merchandize had increased 233 per cent., and of treasure 661 per cent.; and that the exports had increased 217 per cent., and that 542 per cent. had taken place in the increased export of treasure, the amount in 1834-5 being only £194,740; the balance of trade in favour of India during those twenty-two years having, in fact, been paid by an importation of bullion to the value of £94,517,189, of which only £18,162,794 had been re-exported, leaving £76,354,395 in India to increase the wealth of the country.

(B.)—India, 1834-56.—Imports and Exports.

(I.) IMPORTS.

Year.	Merchandise.	Increase.	Treasure.	Increase.	Merchandise and Treasure.	Increase.
	£	Per cent.	£	Per cent.	£	Per cent.
1834-35 .....	4,261,106	233	1,893,028	661	6,154,129	365
1856-57 .....	14,194,586		14,413,698		28,608,285	

(II.) EXPORTS.

Year.	Merchandise.	Increase.	Treasure.	Increase.	Merchandise and Treasure.	Increase.
	£	Per cent.	£	Per cent.	£	Per cent.
1834-35 .....	7,993,420	217	194,740	542	8,188,161	224
1856-57 .....	25,888,453		1,252,613		26,591,066	

(III.) Total TREASURE Imported and Exported from 1834-35 to 1856-57.

Total Imported .....	£94,517,189
Total Exported .....	18,162,794
Remained in India .....	<u>£76,354,395</u>

Of these £76,000,000 sterling the sum of £66,224,172 were coined into Company's rupees in the Mints of Calcutta, Madras, and Bombay, from the years 1835-36 to 1853-54, both inclusive.

*Debt.*

Having discussed the several headings of revenues, charges, civil and military establishments, and the annual pressure of the interest of the debt in relation to net revenue for half a century past, it remains to notice, before proceeding to the present financial condition of British India, to give some details, although curtailed, of the progress of that debt which is declared by part of the press, European and Indian, and by some Indian officials, to bear with such crushing weight upon the resources of India as to put into jeopardy the fulfilment by the Government of India of its pecuniary obligations. I am enabled, by a return (201/59, Sess. 2) which the House of Commons granted upon my motion, to place before the Section the absolute annual increase, decrease, and rate per cent. of the portions of the debt in India and England from the years 1800-1 to 1857-8, with estimated continuations to 1859-60, the annual amount paid for interest, and the annual gross revenues of the several Governments in India, together with the annual percentage pressure of the interest of the debt upon the *gross* revenue.

The Indian debt in 1800 was £14,125,384, and the interest paid upon it was £1,342,854, portions of it running at rates of 12, 10, 9, 8, and 6 per cent., and the average rate of interest was 8·00 per cent.; the *Home Bond* debt was £1,487,112, and the interest 5 per cent.; the pressure of the interest of the whole debt, Indian and English, was 13·63 per cent. upon the gross revenue of the year. Lord Wellesley's wars with Scindia and Holkar caused the Indian debt gradually to increase until the year 1807-8, when it amounted to £30,098,857, and the annual interest to £2,339,087, at rates of 10, 9, 8, and 6 per cent., but the average rate of interest by occasional redemption had fallen to 7·77 per cent. in India. The Home Bond debt, however, had increased to £4,205,275, and part of the bonds issued were charged with 6 per cent. The maximum £6,565,900 of the Home debt occurred in 1811-12 at a maximum interest of 5 per cent. until 1816-17, when the interest was reduced to 4 per cent., since which date it has occasionally been as low as 2½ per cent., and has never risen above 4 per cent. until the present year. The pressure of the interest of the whole debt, Indian and Home, in that year pressed with more severity upon the gross revenues than it had ever done before or has ever done since—namely, 15·90 per cent.; the pressure of the preceding year of 16·59 per cent. having been caused by an accidental falling off of a million in the revenue of the year 1806-7.

The Indian debt of 1807-8 after the Scindia and Holkar Wars, was gradually diminished by redemptions until 1810-11, when it had fallen to £22,545,843, and the interest had fallen to £1,503,434, and the average rate of interest to 6·66 per cent.; the Home debt was £4,906,000, and the pressure of both debts upon the gross revenue had fallen from 15·90 in 1807-8, to 10·62 per cent. in 1810-11; and I may here state, once for all, that notwithstanding the increase of debt in India to £60,704,084 in 1857-58, and in England to £6,799,400 in 1811-12, the pressure of the interest afterwards from 1810-11, in consequence of the revenue progress, never exceeded a pressure of 11·84 per cent. in 1812-13, and in 1834-35 fell to 6·70 per cent., and in 1857-58, in the height of the Mutiny, with a total debt of £60,734,084, only amounted to 7·43 per cent. Up to 1810-11, by successive redemptions, the loans at 12 per cent. were got rid of, but those at 10, 9, 8, and 6 per cent. remained, and in 1810-11 a financial operation took place similar to that which involved Lord Dalhousie in so much obloquy in 1853-54; the Government found itself in a position, from its cash balances to propose to its

creditors to accept a lower rate of interest or repayment; and the result was the redemption of £21,071,435, by the transfer of £17,696,900, and the payment in cash of £3,374,435, reducing the whole debt, as before stated, to £22,545,843, and the average rate of interest to 6.06 per cent., but still having some unmanageable loans at 9, 8, and 6 per cent. In 1811-12 and the two following years, the Home Bond debt was increased to its maximum amount, £6,565,900; but it must have been for temporary purposes, as the debt in 1814-15 was reduced to £4,376,976, and occasional reductions taking place. In 1840-41 it was only £1,734,300, at rates of 3 and 3½ per cent.

The Afghan War, however, occasioned its increase, but in 1856-57, at the date of the Mutiny, it had only risen to £3,894,400—a less amount than it stood at forty-nine years before.

But to revert to the *debt in India*: the Nepaul War and the first Mahratta War occasioned its increase in 1819-20 to £31,338,855, but the cessation of hostilities enabled the Government in 1823-24—that is to say, within three years—to repeat the financial operation of 1810-11, and to offer creditors a lower interest or repayment; the consequence was, a redemption of £13,849,487, a re-investment of £11,190,123, a payment in cash of £2,659,364, and the reduction of the debt to £24,595,901, at an interest of £1,468,009, the average rate being 5.96 per cent.; the gross revenues of India in this year being £21,280,384, and the pressure of the interest of the debt had fallen to 7.55 per cent. of the gross revenue.\*

The first Burmese War of 1824-25 and its consequences then ran the debt up to £38,316,486, but, as on former occasions, peace brought with it financial power; the 8 per cent. loan was extinguished in 1833-34; and in 1835-36 another financial operation took place, which reduced the debt to £31,821,118, at an interest of £1,426,362, or an average of 4.49 per cent., the loans being at 5, and 4 per cent. During the years from 1839-40 to 1852-53, the Afghan War, that of Sind, the first and second Sikh Wars, and the second Burmese War took place, and the consequence was a progressive increase of the debt from £32,246,573 in 1838-39, to £52,313,094 in 1852-53, the interest of the debt being £2,479,133, and averaging 4.73 per cent.; but such confidence existed in the resources of India and in the Government, that money was raised at 4 per cent., large subscriptions were annually pouring in to the open loans, and in 1852-53 the cash balances had risen to the unprecedented sum of £15,389,135, the usual and necessary cash balances being about 10 millions.

These cash balances, which had been increasing from 1845-46, had often attracted the attention and comment of the Court of Directors of the East India Company, and Lord Dalhousie has been involved in considerable obloquy in consequence of his financial operation of 1853-54 in reducing the 5 per cent. loans to 4 per cent., on the ground that he really had not the means of doing so, and that a deception was being practised upon the public. In justice to Lord Dalhousie, it may be asserted that he had just as much the means of effecting his objects as his predecessors had who effected their successful financial operations in 1810-11 and 1823-24, or as the English Government had in reducing the interest upon consols and other public debts; and, in truth, Lord Dalhousie was prompted to his undertaking by the Court of Directors, and I have no hesitation in saying that, in my place in the Court of Directors, I had for several years

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\* The following are the average rates of interest on the debt mentioned in the text:—

8.09 in 1800-1.  
7.77 „ 1807-8.

6.06 in 1810-11.  
5.96 „ 1823-24.

4.49 in 1835-36.  
3.89 „ 1853-54.

before denounced the system of allowing the cash balances to increase without applying any unrequired surplus to the extinguishment of debt.

The financial operation took place in 1853-54, upon the termination of the second Burmese War, just as the former financial operations had successfully taken place after the first Mahratta War, and after the second Mahratta War, and £26,222,452 were redeemed, £25,672,234 transferred; the difference, £2,550,218 being paid in cash, and the Indian debt, which had stood at £52,813,094 in 1852-53, was reduced to £49,762,876 in 1853-54. The great object was to reduce the interest of such 5 per cent. loans as could be handled, and the result was, in consequence of the subscription of £587,400 to a 3½ per cent. loan, that the average interest upon the whole Indian debt was reduced to 3·89 per cent.

The gross revenues of India in 1853-54 were £28,277,580, and the pressure of the interest of the whole debt, Indian and Home, was 7·80 per cent. With this prospect of satisfactory financial progress, the outcry was raised in England, and chiefly by a small party in the House of Commons for a large outlay upon public works. The Home and Indian authorities gave way to this outcry, and the consequence was an immediate deficit of £2,114,674 in 1854-55; and on the 20th April, 1855, to carry on the public works, it was absolutely necessary to open a 5 per cent. loan. As Lord Dalhousie had just completed his great financial operation of reducing the interest of the chief part of the 5 per cent. debt by the aid of the unprecedented cash balance of £15,389,135, the public, ignorant of his means when he made the successful attempt, and equally ignorant of the compulsory character of the Public Works Loan, attributed to him wilful deception when he proposed to the holders of 5 per cent. debt to accept for the future 4 per cent. or repayment; but it will be seen from the above facts that he acted throughout in good faith, and is not blameable for uncontrollable circumstances.

The annual outlay for Public Works\* swelled the Indian debt from £49,762,876 in 1853-54 to £55,546,650 in 1855-56; but, as I have shown above in the details of the progressive revenue and charge, there was every probability of the revenues, which had increased in 1856-57 to £33,303,391, covering even the charges for extraordinary public works; and the fact took place in 1856-57, when there was an absolute surplus over all charges, Indian and Home, of £82,143 (*vide* Parliamentary Paper 199, Sess. 2 of 1859), the more so as the pressure of the interest of the whole debt, Indian and Home, had diminished to 7·19 per cent. upon the gross revenue, an amount below which it had only been reduced once in the last fifty-seven years—in 1834-35, when it was only 6·70 per cent.

The outburst of the Mutiny, however, raised the debt in India at once in 1857-58 to £60,704,084, and in England to £6,799,400, but as this brings me to the present financial condition of India, for which a separate notice is necessary, I shall conclude the statistical and historical account of the Debt incurred by the East India Company in the administration of the affairs of India since 1800, with

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\* Expended upon roads, buildings, &c., *exclusive* of repairs and military buildings:—

1853-54	£703,756
1854-55	1,416,659
1855-56	2,012,452
1856-57	1,996,583

£6,129,405

and in 1857-58, *including* repairs and military buildings, £2,066,811.—*Parliamentary Paper 199, Sess. 2 of 1859.*



asking whether, from the official facts stated, there are sufficient grounds for the clamour raised against the East India Company for the last few years; that their administration had involved the finances of India in inextricable confusion, and with the prospect of early bankruptcy; whether, on the contrary, it was not the fact that, at the time the Mutiny broke out, the finances of India were in a more healthy condition than they had ever been before?

Connected with this part of Indian finance, it is right to mention that, when Parliament in the India Bill of 1833 abolished the trading privileges of the East India Company, 13 millions of their commercial assets were arbitrarily transferred in aid of financial responsibilities in India, incurred exclusively for political purposes, wars, aggressions, and annexations of territory, which the Court of Directors had systematically discouraged, indeed often denounced.

#### *Present Condition.*

Having reviewed the past financial condition of British India for more than half a century within the domain of legitimate statistics, that is to say, facts—the absolute records reaching to April, 1858—the next part of my labour is the consideration of the *present state* of the finances; but as they are in a confessedly abnormal and transitory condition; moreover, as the figures indicating that condition for the years 1858-59 and 1859-60 result from estimates, any elaborate attempt at deductions would be misplaced, as they could not have a trustworthy value. It will suffice, therefore, to give the figures as presented to us by the Governor-General, Lord Canning, in his letter of 1st April, 1859, with only passing comments.

In 1857-58 the debt in India was increased from the past year by £5,157,434 at 5 and 5½ per cent., and in England by £2,905,000 in 4 per cent. debenture bonds; the total interest payable in India and England being £2,355,838, the gross revenue being £31,706,776, and the pressure of the interest of the debts having risen from 7·19 per cent. in the previous year to 7·43 per cent. in 1857-58, the first year of the Mutiny. The cash balances, however, on the 30th April, 1858, amounted to £13,877,376, which was about 3½ millions more than the amount usually desired. We now step from actual results to estimates for 1858-59 and 1859-60. Those of the former year will have the nearest approach to truth, as the results have been chiefly ascertained; the estimates for 1859-60 are simply probabilities, but with sufficient bases for realisable truth.

The following table exhibits the estimates as supplied by the Governor-General under date of the 1st April, 1859:\*

1858-59.		1859-60.	
Revenues.	Charges.	Revenues.	Charges.
£ 38,671,798	£ 41,053,405	£ 36,190,349	£ 39,183,807
Indian deficit .....	7,381,606	2,943,458	
Home charges .....	5,924,441	4,299,666	
Total deficit .....	13,306,047	7,243,124†	

\* Parliamentary Paper 94, Sess. 2 of 1859.

† This includes the proposed expenditure of £2,696,604 on Public Works extraordinary.

These extracts necessarily imply that an addition must be made to the total debt of £67,503,484, Indian and Home, in 1857-58,\* of £13,306,047 deficit in 1858-59, which would raise it therefore to £80,809,531; and of £7,243,124 deficit in 1859-60, raising the debt in 1859-60 to £88,052,655; the annual interest in the former year being estimated at £3,021,140 with a pressure of 8·97 per cent. upon the gross revenue, and in the last year the interest would be £3,383,291, and the annual pressure 9·34 per cent.; the gross revenue in the first year being estimated at £93,671,798, and for 1859-60 at £96,190,349, but there is reason to suppose the debt in India will have been increased beyond the above estimates, and the Home debt will amount to £26,996,017, in 1860. The expected improvement of £2,518,551, in the receipts in 1859-60, results chiefly from the following sources, additional import, export, and excise duties, and improvement in land returns, viz. :—

Customs .....	£726,708
Salt .....	147,200
Opium .....	417,866
Sugar .....	114,692
Mints .....	25,110
Miscellaneous .....	95,295
Land revenue and other items .....	726,703

These improvements may or may not be realized to the extent expected.

The present condition with a deficit of £20,549,171 for the years 1858-59 and 1859-60, and with the following loans respectively at the discount named on the 31st May, 1859, namely, the 4 per cent. at 26 to 26½ per cent.; the 5 per cent. Public Works Loan 14½ to 14¾; the 5 per cent. loan of 1856-57 at 14¾ to 14⅞, and the 5½ per cent. loan of 1859-60 at 6 to 6½ per cent. discount, is sufficiently embarrassing and unsatisfactory, the more so when it is found that the subscriptions to the 5 per cent. loan of 1856-57, which averaged £142,497 per week from the 3rd August to the 30th November, 1858, suddenly fall off to £69,766 per week from the 7th December, 1858, to the 25th January, 1859, and that the consequent 5½ per cent. loan, although guaranteed for twenty years, was as above stated at a discount of 6½ per cent., doubts being also entertained of the £5,600,000 required being subscribed, which would entail the necessity for the transmission of more bullion from England in addition to the £3,000,000 already sent; moreover, the Home 4 per cent. debenture loan of 1858-59, although subscribed for at 95, and repayment guaranteed in five years being at a discount of a ¼ to ½ per cent.† Such, then, is the present condition of the Indian finances, and the past having been already reviewed, the future now remains to be considered.

#### Prospective.

I now propose to consider the *prospective financial* condition of British India, and as history teaches by example, if we vaticinate for the future, guided by deductions from the past, it will probably be admitted that there is really nothing to justify either alarm or distrust in the elasticity of the financial resources of India. It is shown from the parliamentary returns that from the year 1800 up to the commencement of the lamentable mutiny of 1857, there had been a progressive increase in the gross revenues of India from £10,485,059 in 1800, to

\* Vide Parliamentary Paper 201, Sess. 2 of 1859.

† These debentures have since risen to a premium of 1½ per cent., and the new 5 per cent. loan, contracted for at 97, has risen to 108½ to 104.

£21,708,776 in 1857-58, and an estimated revenue of £36,190,340 in 1859-60, and the war receipts of the years 1855-56-57, had respectively been £24,342,421, £25,962,651, and £27,124,322.

Very heavy drains were occasioned by the two Mahratta Wars of 1803-4 and 6 and 1817-18; the Nepaul War of 1814; the two Burmese Wars of 1824-25 and 1852; the first of which, and its consequences, occasioned an absolute addition to the public debt of India (deducting redemptions) of £11,865,413 sterling; the Afghanistan War of 1839-42, which increased the Indian debt (deducting redemption) by £6,180,487; the two Sikh Wars of 1845-6 and 1848-49 and Punjab annexation, which increased the debt (deducting redemption) by £9,906,665. Notwithstanding the wars, however, the military charges which in 1809-10 absorbed 58·87 per cent. of the *net* revenue, and which rose in 1819-20 to 64·29 per cent., in 1849-50 had gradually fallen to 51·66 per cent. of the *net* revenue; and even the gigantic military establishments consequent on the Mutiny, have only raised the percentage pressure upon the gross revenue to 58·4 per cent.—a less amount than it had been in 1809-10 and 1819-20.

The pressure of the interest of the debt which in 1809-10 was 18·01 per cent. of the *net* revenue; in 1839-40 was 12·12; 1839-40 it was 9·75 per cent.; and in 1849-50 it was 10·51. The Parliamentary Return 201, Sess. 2 of 1859, gives the annual condition of the Indian debt from 1800. From this return it is seen that the pressure for those years was 15·58, 9·77, 10·45, 7·92, 9·29, but as the calculations are based upon the gross revenue, they necessarily have a more favourable aspect than those based upon the *net* revenue. The same return shows that in 1857 when the greatest clamour was raised against the East India Company for financial mismanagement, involving prospective bankruptcy, the pressure of the interest of the whole debt of £55,546,650 was only 7·19 per cent., a less amount than it had ever been since 1800, except in 1834-35, when it amounted only to 6·70 per cent. on a debt of £36,250,297.

The successive wars, the increase of debt, the enlargement of establishments, civil and military, necessarily retarded the period when the revenue and charges could be brought into equilibrium; nevertheless, successively for the years 1850-51, 1851-52, and 1852-53 ending with 30th April, 1853, there was an absolute surplus of revenue over all charges, inclusive of the Home establishments, of £506,572, £738,775, and £632,372, and in 1857, as already stated, of £82,143, and the cash balance in the treasury of £15,889,135 in 1852-53,\* exceeded the amount ever before known. The clamour, however, of *soi disant* Indian reformers in the House of Commons for extraordinary outlays upon public works induced the Indian Government in 1853-54 to precipitate the undertaking of extensive works, which partly occasioned a deficiency in a time of peace in that year of £1,962,904, in 1854-55 of £1,620,407, and in 1855-56 of £820,003; but on the 30th of April, before the mutiny of May, 1857, this deficit was converted into a surplus of £82,143, *inclusive* of an outlay of £2,024,094 upon the extraordinary public works then in progress. At a time, therefore, when the finances of India were barely more than equal to the charges, the sudden demand of £2,000,000 per annum for extraordinary public works threw them into temporary confusion, and Lord Dalhousie was obliged to open a public works loan.

Had however the Mutiny not occurred, there is no doubt the revenue of £33,908,351 in 1856-57 would have sufficed to cover all charges even with the

\* *Vide* Parliamentary Return 190, Sess. 2 of 1851.

charges extraordinary for public works; much of which, moreover, particularly that part laid out in promotion of irrigation, may fairly be considered as mere investment of capital, with a certain prospect of reaping high profits. There is ample proof also in the progressive financial strength of the Government,—of increasing confidence in the public mind,—and of the large disposable capital in India in the gradual reduction of the average interest payable for loans from 8·09 per cent. in 1800, gradually to 3·89 per cent. in 1853-54, by successive commutations of interest, as shown by the Parliamentary Return 201, Sess. 2 of 1859, for creditors would scarcely have accepted a gradual diminution of interest for their money, had their confidence in the Government been shaken, or had they supposed there were more satisfactory modes of investment. Further proofs of a gradually improving healthy condition of the finances, is shown in the Parliamentary Paper, No. 201, Session 2, already frequently referred to; for though the Indian and Home debt has increased from £15,612,496 to £67,503,484 in 1857-58, the last year of absolute figures, the pressure of the interest of the debt in relation to the gross revenue, had fallen from a maximum pressure of 16·59 per cent. in 1806-7 to 7·43 per cent. in 1857-58, that is to say, the revenues have increased in a greater ratio than the pressure of the interest of the debt. It will be borne in mind also that the revenue on three successive occasions in 1810-11, 1823-24, and 1853-54, had been in a condition to hazard great financial operations for the reduction of the rates of interest from 12, 10, 9, and 8 per cent. to 3 per cent.—operations which on each occasion proved successful.

I have designedly omitted all consideration of the moneys passing through the hands of the East India Company for investment in railways in India, as the receipts and payments on the capital account balance each other, the money in fact being received by one hand and paid away by the other; but as the sums so invested amounted on the 12th August last to £23,250,480, and as most of the advances have a guaranteed interest of 5 per cent., repayable in time from the profits of the respective lines, and which interest is now a charge upon the annual revenues of India, minus the net profits of the railway above 5 per cent.: in a prospective view of the revenues and charges of India, it is to be hoped a time will arrive when the railways will earn their 5 or more per cent., and the present annual charge for interest of railway capital will not only cease, but repayments may be expected for the present annual outlay, and to this extent the future financial condition of India will be improved. Interest has already been paid to the amount of £3,729,443 upon railway capital, which is so much lent, but it has helped to embarrass the finances. Nor must we omit the consideration that all that portion of outlay upon public works extraordinary, relating to systems of irrigation, and which presses with so much severity at present upon the finances of India, can fairly be considered as an investment of capital which, judging from the past, will ultimately give a return varying from 10 to 100 or more per cent. Another satisfactory prospect is in the ultimate productive working of the enormous amount of silver which has been poured into India, and which has remained in India since the year 1800, being in fact the balance of trade in favour of India.

I have shown from the Custom House returns from 1834-35 to 1856-57, that £94,617,189 of treasure (silver bullion and coin) have been landed in India, and of that sum only £18,162,794 have been re-exported, leaving a balance in India of £76,354,395; and of this sum no less than £36,224,172 have passed through the mints of Calcutta, Madras, and Bombay, and been converted into Company's rupees. It is asserted by many that the silver is hoarded, but the owners would

scarcely have paid seniorage and had the silver melted and converted into rupees for the sake of hoarding; and it is more probable that it was wanted to pay for the annual enormously increased production of indigo, sugar, oil seeds, lac dye, &c., &c.—improving, therefore, the means of the cultivators. If we take into consideration the period between 1800 and 1835, for which I have not given returns, the probability is that about £150,000,000 sterling of silver have remained in India, realizing even at this day the assertion of Pliny, that India is the sink of the precious metals.

The £10,000,000 sterling which have been laid out upon public works since 1853-54 for irrigation purposes, can only be looked upon as a reproductive investment; sums so devoted hitherto having returned from 5 to 200 per cent. upon the capital invested.

With a view to establish speedily an equilibrium between receipts and charges in India, Lord Canning has established a commission of three high officers of financial reputation. This commission is now actively at work, and I have reason to know, from sufficient authority, that while the highest efficiency is preserved, the expenditure may be reduced, chiefly in the military branches, to the footing on which it stood in 1856-57, which would at once relieve India from financial embarrassment without increased taxation.

It may be objected that there ought not to have been a progressive increment of debt, but the successive wars rendered it inevitable; moreover, as a question of public policy, it has always been an object to link the interests of native capitalists in India with those of the British Government through the medium of pecuniary obligations. But if the administrators of British India be considered criminals or blunderers in running up a debt of £100,000,000 and spending £1,307,910 per annum during sixty years, of borrowed money, what shall be said of the administrators of England, who in 100 years have run up a debt of £805,000,000, and whose AVERAGE annual expenditure of borrowed money beyond income has been £4,792,134!!

Now the figures and facts I have produced are not my facts and figures, they are from official and Parliamentary sources; neither are the numerical results which I have deduced from these figures and facts specifically my results for which I am personally responsible, because any other reviewer of the subject matter I have laid before the Section, would have been constrained to bring out the same results if the calculations be correct. The results, therefore, did not admit of being influenced by any bias or prejudice of mine, and I am anxious this fact should be thoroughly appreciated, and proper confidence placed in those results, for upon a right understanding of the past financial condition of British India, and a proper knowledge of the resources of the country, depends not only the hazardous and even mischievous experiment whether increased taxation in India should take place AT ALL, but whether capitalists and those with small disposable funds should be led to invest, upon the guarantee of the revenues of India, free from that distrust and misgiving which at the present moment paralyze the Government of India, by causing inability to raise money even at exorbitant interest, and which distrust deters the home capitalist from giving his aid, except upon conditions which necessarily enhance the embarrassments of the Indian exchequer. The pressure of the interest of the debt of India in relation to its revenues in 1857 before the Mutiny, was 7·19 per cent., and the debt was 1·79 year's purchase of revenue. Even in 1859-60, with an estimated debt of £98,000,000, the pressure of the interest would be 13·54 per cent., and the year's purchase 2·43. Contrast this with the

debt of England in 1858, and we find the results of the annual pressure of interest upon the income 48·37, and year's purchase 12·24. Even with England's wealth and gigantic resources, these facts have an unpleasant bearing, and it is not beyond the verge of possibility, in case the annual votes increase for the next twenty years in the same ratio as they have done for the last twenty years, that the exchequer of England may look to that of India for aid, rather than the exchequer of India to that of England. On the whole, therefore, judging from the past financial condition of British India, as exhibited in the preceding official figures, and particularly upon the important fact that in 1857 there was a surplus of revenue over all charges, India and Home, of £82,000, we are justified in anticipating a similar condition of the Indian finances the moment the charges consequent upon the Mutiny are got rid of. We have only to restore to the peoples of India that confidence which they enjoyed previously to the Mutiny of one of the three Native armies of India, and in which a fraction only of the peoples of India took part. We have only to act with forbearance toward their intense religious prejudices, and to afford them cheap and ready justice, and India will become, as heretofore, auxiliary to the political strength and wealth of England.

*Note.*—The following *Estimates*, continued to 1860-61, contained in a despatch from the Government of India dated 30th September, 1859, indicate that the ultimate deficiency on the 30th April, 1861, inclusive of Home charges, will be £3,350,680 only, and the cash balances in the treasuries of India £12,551,246.

1860-61.	Revenues.	Charges.	<i>Estimated Home Charges, 1860-61.</i>	£
	£	£	Charges on the Revenues of India, per statement 2nd April, 1859 .....	5,153,
Government of India	3,545,	15,472,	<i>Add</i> —Interest on loan to be raised in London in 1859-60, say 7 mlns. at 5 per cent., and 2 mlns. at 4 per cent.....	,330,
Bengal .....	13,167,	4,085,		5,483,
N.-W. Provinces ...	5,810,	2,267,	<i>Deduct</i> —Stores included in Indian revenue accounts .....	1,246,
Punjab .....	2,955,	1,837,		4,237,
Madras .....	6,317,	6,715,	<i>Deduct estimated surplus in India...</i>	,877,
Bombay .....	7,107,	7,647,	<i>Estimated ultimate deficit, 1860-61 ...</i>	3,359,
	38,902,	38,025,		
<i>Surplus in India...</i>	...	877,		
	38,902,	38,902,		

(D).—RETURN of all LOANS and REPAYMENTS of DEBTS at the several Presidencies in INDIA, and Interest at which the several Loans were contracted, together with the Annual Gross Revenue of showing the Annual Percentage Pressure of the Interest of the Debts in relation to the Gross

## (I).—LOANS AND REPAYMENTS.

1234567891011											
YEARS.	Loans Contracted						Total Loans contracted in India and England being Totals of columns Nos. 2 and 5.	Repayment of Debts.			
	In India.			In England.				Debt Redeemed during the Year in India.	Amount of Bonds paid off in England.	Total Debts Redeemed in India and England being Totals of columns Nos. 8 and 9.	
	Amount of Debt at the end of each Year.	Debt contracted during each Year.	Rate Per Cent.	Amount of Bond and other Debts at the end of each Year.	Amount of Bonds Issued.	Rate Per Cent.					
	£ Mins.	£ Mins.	Per cent.	£ Mins.	£ Mins.	Per cent.	£ Mins.	£ Mins.	£ Mins.	£ Mins.	
1800-1	14,12	3,78	12, 10, 9, 8, 6	1,48	..	5	3,73	1,27	,02	1,30	
1801-2	15,88	2,61	12, 10, 9, 8, 6	1,44	,17	5	2,79	,85	,21	1,07	
First Mah-ratta War.	1802-3	17,51	3,55	12, 10, 9, 8, 6	1,73	,28	5	3,88	1,92	..	1,92
	1803-4	19,92	3,14	10, 9, 8, 8, 6 1/2	1,82	,21	5	3,85	,73	,11	,85
	1804-5	22,72	3,40	12, 10, 9, 8, 7, 6 1/2	2,30	1,28	6, 5 1/2, 5	4,68	,60	,71	1,31
	1805-6	25,98	4,90	10, 9, 8, 8, 6 1/2	2,58	,30	6, 5 1/2, 5	5,30	1,64	,21	1,85
	1806-7	28,20	5,36	12, 10, 9, 8, 6	2,88	,50	6, 5 1/2, 5	5,87	3,14	,20	3,35
1807-8	30,09	5,82	10, 9, 8, 6	4,20	2,01	5	7,84	3,93	,68	4,62	
1808-9	29,62	2,26	10, 9, 8, 6	4,85	,64	5	2,91	2,74	..	2,74	
1809-10	25,92	2,71	10, 9, 8, 6	4,90	,45	5	2,76	6,41	..	6,41	
1810-11	22,54	17,60	9, 8, 6, 4	4,90	..	5	17,60	21,07	..	21,07	
1811-12	23,77	2,93	9, 8, 6, 4	6,56	1,66	5	4,60	1,70	..	1,70	
1812-13	24,24	1,02	8, 6, 5, 4	5,38	,19	5	1,22	,55	1,38	1,94	
1813-14	24,87	,64	8, 6, 5	4,48	,58	5	1,18	,20	1,43	1,45	
Nepaul War.	1814-15	25,62	1,62	8, 6, 5	4,37	..	5	1,62	,87	,10	,93
	1815-16	26,00	,48	8 & 6	3,96	..	5	,98	..	,41	,41
	1816-17	26,71	,71	8 & 6	3,95	..	5	,71	..	..	,01
Second Mah-ratta War.	1817-18	27,28	,57	8 & 6	3,95	..	5 & 4	,57	..	..	..
	1818-19	28,80	1,62	9, 8, 6	3,95	..	4	1,62	,10	..	,10
	1819-20	31,33	2,61	10, 9, 8, 6, 5	3,92	..	4	2,61	,07	,03	,11
	1820-21	30,72	,28	10, 9, 8, 6, 5, 4	3,92	..	4	,28	,90	..	,90

Note.—To save lateral space in the columns, the last FOUR figures in the money totals are column 9 the figures ,02 are to be read 20,000, the real amounts in both cases centages are in full.

in ENGLAND, annually, from the Year 1800 to the latest Dates inclusive; specifying the Rates of each Presidency, and total Annual Revenue of BRITISH INDIA from all Sources; with a Column Revenue.—(Compiled from Parl. Paper 201, Session 2/59.)

## (II).—INTEREST AND REVENUE.

11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	
Amount Paid for Interest.			Amount of Gross Revenue.						Percentage Pressure of the Interest of Debts in relation to the Gross Revenue.	Cash Balances in the Indian Treasuries, 30 April annually.	YEARS.
In India.	In Eng-land.	TOTAL.	Bengal.	North-West Pro-vinces.	Punjab.	Madras.	Bombay	TOTAL INDIA.			
£ Mins.	£ Mins.	£ Mins.	£ Mins.	£ Mins.	£ Mins.	£ Mins.	£ Mins.	£ Mins.	Per cent.	£ Mins.	
1,34	,08	1,42	6,65	..	..	3,54	,28	10,48	13,63	..	1800- 1
1,48	,07	1,55	7,12	..	..	4,72	,30	12,16	12,80	..	1801- 2
1,44	,07	1,52	8,38	..	..	4,72	,35	13,46	13,29	..	1802- 3
1,75	,08	1,83	8,06	..	..	4,65	,55	13,27	13,83	..	1803- 4
1,82	,08	1,90	9,33	..	..	4,89	,71	14,94	12,74	..	1804- 5
2,16	,12	2,28	9,54	..	..	5,01	,84	15,40	14,86	..	1805- 6
2,26	,14	2,41	9,16	..	..	4,60	,77	14,58	16,59	..	1806- 7
2,33	,15	2,49	9,97	..	..	4,92	,77	15,66	15,90	..	1807- 8
2,23	,23	2,46	9,81	..	..	4,96	,74	15,42	16,90	..	1808- 9
2,16	,27	2,43	9,59	..	..	5,37	,69	15,65	15,58	..	1809-10
1,50	,26	1,77	10,68	..	..	5,23	,75	16,67	10,62	..	1810-11
1,57	,26	1,84	10,70	..	..	5,15	,74	16,60	11,09	..	1811-12
1,59	,33	1,93	10,39	..	..	5,25	,68	16,33	11,84	..	1812-13
1,63	,37	2,01	11,17	..	..	5,23	,75	17,22	11,66	..	1813-14
1,66	,25	1,92	11,15	..	..	5,32	,81	17,29	11,10	..	1814-15
1,68	,23	1,92	11,31	..	..	5,10	,81	17,23	11,14	..	1815-16
1,72	,23	1,96	11,85	..	..	5,36	,86	18,07	10,84	..	1816-17
1,77	,21	1,98	11,69	..	..	5,38	1,30	18,37	10,78	..	1817-18
1,86	,15	2,01	12,43	..	..	5,36	1,66	19,45	10,37	..	1818-19
1,72	,15	1,87	12,24	..	..	5,40	1,57	19,23	9,77	..	1819-20
2,00	,16	2,17	13,54	..	..	5,40	2,40	21,35	10,10	..	1820-21

omitted; for instance, in column 8, of 1800-1, the figures 1,27 are to be read 1,270,000L., so in being respectively 1,274,832L., and 29,500L., and so on with the rest of the figures. The per-



## WHOLE OF INDIA.—RETURN

## (I).—LOANS AND REPAYMENTS.

(1.)—LOANS AND REPAYMENTS.											
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	
YEARS.	Loans Contracted						Total Loans contracted in India and England being Totals of columns Nos. 2 and 5.	Repayment of Debts.			
	In India.			In England.				Debt Redeemed during the Year in India.	Amount of Bonds paid off in England.	Total Debts Redeemed in India and England being Totals of columns Nos. 8 and 9.	
	Amount of Debt at the end of each Year.	Debt contracted during each Year.	Rate Per Cent.	Amount of Bond and other Debts at the end of each Year.	Amount of Bonds Issued.	Rate Per Cent.					
	£	£	Per cent.	£	£	Per cent.	£	£	£	£	
	Mins.	Mins.		Mins.	Mins.		Mins.	Mins.	Mins.	Mins.	
1821-22	29,29	,01	6, 5, 4	3,92	..	4	,01	1,43	..	1,43	
1822-23	27,25	,16	8, 6, 4	3,92	..	3½	,16	2,20	..	2,21	
First Burmese War.	1823-24	24,59	11,19	8, 6, 5, 4	3,92	..	3½	11,19	13,84	..	13,84
	1824-25	25,26	1,97	8, 6, 5, 4	3,92	..	3	1,97	1,30	..	1,30
	1825-26	30,57	7,12	10, 8, 6	3,78	..	4	7,12	1,81	,14	1,95
	1826-27	32,27	2,88	5, 4	3,78	..	4	2,88	1,18	..	1,18
	1827-28	36,70	5,11	8, 6, 5, 4	3,78	..	4	5,11	,68	..	,68
	1828-29	36,46	1,46	5, 4	3,78	..	3	1,46	1,71	..	1,71
	1829-30	37,05	,82	8, 6, 5, 4	3,78	..	3	,82	,23	..	,23
	1830-31	38,31	1,33	8, 6, 5, 4	3,78	..	2½	1,33	,07	,04	,12
	1831-32	37,68	4,86	8, 6, 5, 4	3,52	..	2½	4,86	5,49	,20	5,70
	1832-33	37,87	2,55	8, 6, 5, 4	3,52	..	2½	2,55	2,36	..	2,36
1833-34	37,82	2,78	8, 6, 5, 4	3,52	..	2½	2,78	2,78	..	1,78	
1834-35	36,25	3,38	6, 5, 4	3,52	..	2½	3,38	4,96	..	4,96	
1835-36	31,82	2,24	6, 5, 4	3,52	..	4, 3½, 2½	2,24	6,67	..	6,67	
1836-37	32,43	1,19	6, 5, 4	3,52	..	4	1,19	,58	..	,58	
1837-38	32,26	1,45	6, 5, 4	3,52	..	4, 3	1,45	1,62	..	1,62	
1838-39	32,24	,59	6, 5, 4	1,73	..	3	,59	,61	1,78	2,40	
Afghan-istan War.	1839-40	32,75	,64	6, 5, 4	1,73	..	3½, 3	,64	,13	..	,13
	1840-41	34,18	1,54	6, 5, 4	1,73	..	3½, 3	1,54	,10	..	,10
	1841-42	36,67	2,61	6, 5, 4	1,73	,16	3½	2,78	,13	,16	,30
	1842-43	38,74	2,45	6, 5, 4	1,79	,10	3½	2,55	,98	,10	,48
		1843-44	40,14	1,66	6, 5, 4	1,73	..	3½, 3	1,66	,25	..
1844-45	41,20	1,11	6, 5, 4	2,29	,56	3	1,68	,06	..	,06	
First Sikh War.	1845-46	41,59	,38	6, 5, 4	2,29	..	3½, 3	,38	..	..	..
	1846-47	44,58	3,00	6, 5, 4	2,29	..	4½, 3½	3,00	..	..	..
	1847-48	45,95	1,73	6, 5, 4	2,70	,50	4½	2,23	,35	..	,35
Second Sikh War.	1848-49	47,15	1,28	6, 5, 4	3,89	1,10	4½	1,33	,03	..	,03
	1849-50	50,03	2,89	6, 5, 4	3,89	..	4½	2,89	,01	..	,01
	1850-51	51,19	1,23	6, 5, 4	3,89	..	3½	1,23	,06	..	,06
1851-52	51,21	,79	6, 5, 4	3,89	..	3	,79	,78	..	,78	

*of all Loans, &c.—Continued.*

## (II).—INTEREST AND REVENUE.

11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	
Amount Paid for Interest.			Amount of Gross Revenue.						Percentage Pressure of the Interest of Debts in relation to the Gross Revenue.	Cash Balances in the Indian Treasury, 30 April annually.	YEARS.
In India.	In England.	TOTAL.	Bengal.	North-west Provinces.	Punjab.	Madras.	Bombay.	TOTAL INDIA.			
£ Mlns.	£ Mlns.	£ Mlns.	£ Mlns.	£ Mlns.	£ Mlns.	£ Mlns.	£ Mlns.	£ Mlns.	Per cent.	£ Mlns.	
1.89	,15	2.05	13.39	..	..	5.55	2.85	21.80	9.41	..	1821-22
1.76	,16	1.92	14.31	..	..	5.58	3.27	23.17	8.30	..	1822-23
1.46	,14	1.60	12.99	..	..	5.49	2.78	21.28	7.55	..	1823-24
1.49	,13	1.62	13.52	..	..	5.44	1.78	20.75	7.84	..	1824-25
1.79	,11	1.90	13.15	..	..	5.71	2.26	21.12	9.00	..	1825-26
1.88	,15	2.04	14.81	..	..	5.98	2.58	22.38	9.13	..	1826-27
2.13	,15	2.28	14.97	..	..	5.34	2.54	22.86	9.96	..	1827-28
2.11	,15	2.27	14.83	..	..	5.57	2.33	22.74	10.00	..	1828-29
2.15	,11	2.26	13.85	..	..	5.41	2.42	21.69	10.45	..	1829-30
2.22	,09	2.31	14.11	..	..	5.35	2.54	22.01	10.51	..	1830-31
1.87	,09	1.97	11.74	..	..	4.47	2.09	18.31	10.76	..	1831-32
1.86	,09	1.95	12.24	..	..	4.10	2.12	18.47	10.56	..	1832-33
1.75	,10	1.85	11.61	..	..	4.35	2.29	18.26	10.15	..	1833-34
1.70	,09	1.79	15.29	4.89	..	4.48	2.18	26.85	6.70	..	1834-35
1.42	,08	1.50	8.28	4.83	..	4.59	2.42	20.14	7.49	..	1835-36
1.44	,11	1.55	8.61	5.05	..	4.61	2.70	20.99	7.41	..	1836-37
1.42	,13	1.56	9.08	4.36	..	4.81	1.58	20.85	7.51	..	1837-38
1.41	,08	1.49	8.77	5.04	..	4.95	2.38	21.15	7.06	..	1838-39
1.54	,05	1.59	7.84	4.89	..	4.97	2.40	20.12	7.92	..	1839-40
1.61	,05	1.66	8.43	4.68	..	4.97	2.80	20.85	7.98	..	1840-41
1.73	,06	1.79	8.82	5.19	..	5.01	2.80	21.83	8.23	..	1841-42
1.84	,06	1.90	9.08	5.32	..	5.08	3.12	22.61	8.42	..	1842-43
1.90	,05	1.95	9.84	5.36	..	5.07	3.30	23.58	8.30	11.02	1843-44
1.94	,06	2.00	9.90	5.52	..	4.99	3.14	23.66	8.49	11.53	1844-45
1.96	,06	2.03	10.39	5.53	..	5.00	3.33	24.27	8.37	9.54	1845-46
2.11	,07	2.18	11.52	5.93	..	5.13	3.49	26.08	8.36	10.69	1846-47
2.13	,10	2.28	10.07	6.05	..	5.21	3.57	24.90	9.17	10.03	1847-48
2.24	,15	2.39	10.11	5.98	..	5.15	4.14	25.39	9.41	11.04	1848-49
2.38	,17	2.55	10.90	6.21	1.28	5.00	4.10	27.52	9.29	12.43	1849-50
2.44	,14	2.58	10.42	6.09	1.59	5.08	4.40	27.62	9.37	12.98	1850-51
2.43	,12	2.55	10.40	6.19	1.21	5.23	4.78	27.83	9.17	12.87	1851-52

First  
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War.First  
Sikh  
War.Second  
Sikh  
War.

\*  
(I.)—LOANS AND REPAYMENTS.

WHOLE OF INDIA.—RETURN

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
YEARS.	Loans Contracted						Repayment of Debts.			
	In India.			In England.			Total Loans contracted in India and England being Totals of columns Nos. 2 and 5.	Debt Redeemed during the Year in India.	Amount of Bonds paid off in England.	Total Debts Redeemed in India and England being Totals of columns Nos. 8 and 9.
	Amount of Debt at the end of each Year.	Debt contracted during each Year.	Rate Per Cent.	Amount of Bond and other Debts at the end of each Year.	Amount of Bonds Issued.	Rate per Cent.				
	£ Mins.	£ Mins.	Per cent.	£ Mins.	£ Mins.	Per Cent.	£ Mins.	£ Mins.	£ Mins.	£ Mins.
Second Burmese War.	1852-53	52,31	1,12	6, 5, 4	3,80	..	3	1,12	..	..
	1853-54	49,76	25,67	6, 5, 4, 3½	3,89	..	3½	25,67	28,22	..
	1854-55	51,61	2,19	6, 5, 4, 3½	3,89	..	4	2,19	..	..
	1855-56	53,84	2,55	6, 4, 3½	3,89	..	4	2,55	..	..
Mutiny.	1856-57	55,54	2,47	6, 5, 4, 3½	3,89	..	4	2,47	..	..
	1857-58	60,70	0,25	6, 5, 4, 3½	6,79	2,90	4	12,16	4,09	..
	*1858-59	68,08	7,38	6, 5½, 5	15,11	5,92	5	13,30	..	..
	*1859-60	71,02	2,94	6, 5½, 5	26,99	4,24	5	7,28	..	..

\* This amount is a 4 per cent. Debittr., under Act 21 Vict.—58-9 & 59-60 are *Estimates*. Up as 1s. 10½d. only. Now all accounts are Co.'s Rs. 2s.—

REVENUE, 1849-50.

Classification.	Bengal & N.-W. Provinces.		Madras.		Bombay.		All India.
	Net Receipts.	Cost of Collection.	Net Receipts.	Cost of Collection.	Net Receipts.	Cost of Collection.	Cost of Collection.
	£ Mins.	Per cent.	£ Mins.	Per cent.	£ Mins.	Per cent.	Per cent.
Land Sayer, &c. ....	8,879,	9'07	3,156,	12'91	2,163,	13'30	10'61
Customs .....	869,	12'10	76,	20'97	245,	15'31	13'50
Salt .....	1,464,	10'50	859,	6'03	202,	7'23	9'42
Opium .....	2,625,	3'83	..	..	684,	1'43	3'34
Stamps .....	341,	4'82	35,	12'04	53,	5'14	5'48
Tobacco .....	..	..	58,	9'44	..	..	9'44
Post Office .....	14,	88'45	..	..	..	..	..
Miscellaneous .....	240,	..	323,	..	22,	..	..
	14,432,	9'01	4,007,	13'25	3,369,	11'98	10'25
Allowances, &c. ....	732,	..	529,	..	1,089,	..	..
	..	..	..	..	2,330,	..	..
Deficit .....	..	..	..	..	509,	..	..
	13,700,	..	3,478,	..	2,839,	..	..

of all LOANS, &amp;c.—Continued.

## (II).—INTEREST AND REVENUE.

11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	
(11)—INTEREST AND REVENUE.											
Amount Paid for Interest.			Amount of Gross Revenue.						Percentage Pressure of the Interest of Debts in relation to the Gross Revenue.	Cash Balances in the Indian Treasuries, 30 April annually.	YEARS.
In India.	In Eng-land.	TOTAL.	Bengal.	North-west Provinces.	Punjab.	Madras.	Bombay.	TOTAL INDIA.			
£	£	£	£	£	£	£	£	£	Per cent.	£	
Mins.	Mins.	Mins.	Mins.	Mins.	Mins.	Mins.	Mins.	Mins.		Mins.	
2,47	,11	2,59	11,21	6,12	1,23	5,31	4,71	28,60	9'07	14,58	1852-53
2,09	,11	2,20	11,22	6,17	1,29	4,98	4,60	28,27	7'80	15,38	1853-54
2,03	,15	2,18	11,69	6,25	1,30	4,92	4,95	29,13	7'52	14,06	1854-55
2,18	,15	2,33	13,01	6,26	1,29	5,28	4,95	30,81	7'56	10,16	1855-56
2,36	,15	2,52	14,07	6,59	1,46	5,76	5,40	33,90	7'19	12,84	1756-57
2,24	,15	2,39									
2,66	,36	3,02	14,41	3,04	2,45	5,67	6,11	31,70	7'43	13,87	1857-58
2,19	,15	2,35									
..	..	4,15	14,49	5,08	2,88	5,63	6,58	33,67	12'35	14,61	1858-59
..	..	4,90	15,68	5,49	2,86	5,76	6,18	36,19	13'54	11,89	1859-60

to 1856 from the year 1833, (when the accounts were adapted to 2s.) the Sicca Rupee was considered 10 R. = 1l., and rendered in Pounds at 2s.

## CHARGES, 1849-50.

Classification.	Bengal & N.-W. Provinces.		Madras.		Bombay.		ALL INDIA.
	Charges.	Percentage of other Charges to Net Revenue.	Charges.	Percentage of other Charges to Net Revenue.	Charges.	Percentage of other Charges to Net Revenue.	Percentage of other Charges to Net Revenue.
	£	Per cent.	£	Per cent.	£	Per cent.	Per cent.
Civil and Political ..	1,018,	7'43	330,	9'47	389,	16'71	8'90
Judicial .....	937,	6'84	226,	6'49	232,	9'96	7'15
Police .....	810,	2'26	79,	2'28	130,	5'57	2'60
Mint .....	..	..	3,	..	..	..	..
Marine .....	75,	0'55	5,	0'14	173,	7'42	1'30
Military .....	5,897,	43'48	2,364,	67'96	1,818,	77'99	51'66
Buildings & Fortifications	273,	1'99	17,	0'48	34,	1'47	1'66
Miscellaneous .....	164,	..	..	..	..	..	..
Interest on Debt .....	1,935,	14'12	50,	1'43	66,	2'85	10'51
	10,609,	..	3,074,	..	2,842,	..	..
Deductions .....	118,	..	..	..	3,	..	..
Total Charges ..	10,491,	76'57	3,074,	88'37	2,839,	121'85	84'08
Surplus .....	3,209,	..	404,	..	..	..	..
	13,700,	..	3,478,	..	2,839,	..	..

(E).—*Whole of India.—1800-1860.—Financial Abstract.*

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11
Years.	Amount of Debt in India on 30th April each Year.	Rate Per Cent. of Interest.	Amount of Debt in <i>Andam</i> on 30th April each Year.	Rate Per Cent. of Interest.	Total Amount of Debt, Indian and Home.	Annual Interest on Total Debt, Indian and Home.	Average Rate of Interest Per Cent. upon Total Debt.	Amount of Gross Revenue of British India.	Percentage Pressure of the Interest of Debts in relation to the Gross Revenue.	Cash Balances in the Treasuries in India on the 30th April Annually.
1860-1 .....	£ 14,125,	12, 10, 9, 8, 6	£ 1,487,	5	£ 15,612,	£ 1,420,	£ 8.09	£ 10,485,	Per Cent. 13.63	£ ..
1867-8 .....	30,098,	10, 9, 8, 6	4,205,	6, 5½, 5	34,304,	2,492,	7.77	15,669,	12.90	..
1868-9 .....	29,620,	10, 9, 8, 6	4,864,	5	34,474,	2,408,	7.16	15,525,	15.90	..
1810-11 .....	32,545,	9, 8, 6, 4	4,900,	5	27,445,	1,772,	6.66	16,679,	10.62	..
1811-12 .....	23,779,	9, 8, 6, 4	5,565,	5	80,345,	1,841,	6.06	16,605,	11.09	..
1819-20 .....	31,338,	10, 9, 8, 6, 5	3,923,	4	35,262,	1,879,	5.33	19,230,	9.77	..
1823-24 .....	24,595,	8, 6, 5, 4	3,922,	3	28,518,	1,608,	5.96	21,290,	7.55	..
1830-31 .....	38,316,	8, 6, 5, 4	3,795,	2½	42,051,	2,314,	5.50	22,019,	10.51	..
1835-36 .....	31,831,	6, 5, 4	3,533,	4, 3½, 2½	35,344,	1,509,	4.49	20,148,	7.49	10,217,
1852-53 .....	52,313,	6, 5, 4	3,899,	3	56,212,	2,596,	4.61	28,003,	9.07	15,989,
1853-54 .....	49,762,	6, 5, 4, 3½	3,899,	3½	53,662,	2,307,	3.89	28,571,	7.80	14,067,
1856-57 .....	55,546,	6, 5, 4, 3½	3,894,	4	59,441,	2,396,	4.24	33,303,	7.19	13,876,
1857-58 .....	60,704,	6, 5, 4, 3½	6,799,	4	67,503,	2,355,	4.48	31,706,	7.48	14,611,
*1858-59 .....	68,085,	6, 5, 4	15,110,	4	83,195,	*4,150,	*5.0	38,671,	*12.85	13,877,
*1859-60 .....	71,020,	6, 5½, 1	20,996,	4, 5	98,026,	*4,901,	*5.0	36,190,	*13.54	11,806,

\* Estimates.

N.B.—The 6 per cent. which stands in the Interest column of the Indian debt for every year, is not for money borrowed, but is a liberal contribution made by the East India Company upon subscriptions from the pay of the Civil and Military Services, as capital for their Pension and Widows' Funds.—The 000's at *unit* end are omitted.

## A PICTURE OF BRITISH RULE.

*(By a Native Gentleman.)*

THE English nation has no reason to be proud of its administration of India. The feeling in this country is unanimous that for the past twenty years India has been sinking in a slough of poverty. Laws are so arranged and taxes are so devised as to reduce the Native to the last extremity. In every town the unvarying complaint of the people is that poverty and misery have made gigantic strides in the last thirty years. Salt law, stamp law, Abkary law, municipal law, forest law and a hundred other laws, press so heavily upon the masses of the people that the prevailing feeling against the Government is one of hatred; while Dr. Hunter, Colonel Anderson, and the whole official circle maintain that, under the benign rule of England, India has become prosperous. There is no doubt that under her administration commerce has improved and been greatly extended, and the intellectual condition of the people much advanced; it is true that it affords protection against foreign invasion, and secures the country from internal violence and bloodshed; it has established schools, colleges, libraries, and museums; it permits the press to work as a national educator; it has constructed railways, roads, and bridges, which facilitate intercourse, and has made great irrigation works for the improvement of land. The Natives of the country have become so conversant with the English language and literature, that they edit English newspapers, and write books in prose and poetry; while the discoveries of science are placed within the reach of those who wish to know them. No one can deny all these advantages, which are surely the results of British rule. Notwithstanding, however, all these improvements, there is no doubt that the country has become totally impoverished, and was never in such a distressful condition as it is at present. Famine, the high price of food, the extinction of the aristocracy, and various industries, and above all, the incessant drain of money, have produced an amount of misery that never existed under Hindu, or Mogul; Tippoo Sahib, or the Peishwas. Their Governments spent a good deal of money on useless works, but the money still remained in the country. Agriculture flourished, trade and commerce went on smoothly, as far as the knowledge of the people permitted. The native aristocracy spent large sums of money in the country, encouraged arts and industries, improved land, and planted trees. They constituted the support of many poor and unfortunate men. The old houses once existing in towns and cities bear undeniable witness to the prosperity then prevailing. One thing to be remarked is that the coast is in a better condition than the interior. Much business is transacted at the seaports, but in the Mofussil there is an appearance of general destitution and misery. Large houses are in ruins; many have been pulled down and sold. Gold and silver ornaments have gone to the Mint. The agricultural population have no means to prosecute their avocation.

The price of food is so high that, through inability to purchase it, the people have scarcely strength to work. They have no seed, clothes, or cattle. Many are literally starving; large numbers have already died. They have no support from the aristocracy or moneyed class. All are beggars, and under the curse. The evil is aggravated by demands for extraordinary assessments, and municipal and local taxes. Although it was graciously proclaimed from the Throne that no one should be allowed to die of hunger, many millions have died of starvation, and many are dying yet. While labouring under these calamities, those who were hardly able to keep their body and soul together had to see their lands and houses sold for assessment, and the excess proceeds credited to Government as fines. Such a policy has never befallen India under any ancient dynasty. Large tracts of land have now become desert. Many cruelly attribute the poverty of India to the laziness and improvident habits of the people; but the real cause of our misery is that there is no money in the country. Its every nerve is dried up. In every quarter—Ahmedabad, Surat, Poona, Nasik, Sattara, Sholapur, Ahmednagpur, Ratnangiri—nothing but destitution, complete and entire, meets the eye. The Konkan is the scene of chronic famine. Agriculture and commerce are languishing above the Ghauts. The demands of the State intensify the distress. Notwithstanding all this, the official class is unwilling to recognize the facts, because reflecting on their own administration. While proclaiming the benefits of British rule, they have as much sympathy for the people as fishermen have for the fishes. The critical state of the country can, however, be no longer concealed. Different theories are propounded by the official class with a view to conceal the facts, and explain away the real condition of the people. Some urge the laziness and helplessness of the Natives; others say that economy has not kept pace with the increase of population, and that the money-lenders oppress the cultivator. Some say that railways take away all food from the districts, and that the recurring famines have produced scarcity. On the other side, it is urged that the assessments and taxes are too heavy, and that India is not treated with justice; that Natives are excluded from every lucrative appointment, and that England has not redeemed the pledges so often given to the Natives. The question is, whether British rule has improved the country and made it prosperous. We think that the real causes of poverty throughout the country are three cancers in the core of the administration—viz., the State Secretary's bills, private remittances, and interest. These three items take about twenty millions sterling from India annually. Thus nearly half the revenue of the country goes to a foreign land, whose sole return is talent and strength. India is the great bazaar where Englishmen sell not only their commodities, but their talents, at an enormous price—not at the desire of the people, but by the interposition of Government. Any country, however rich it may be, if regularly drained of its capital, obviously cannot enjoy prosperity. It is urged that India cannot of itself produce good government, and therefore must part with half its revenue, and send it to England to get administrators from that country—such as governors, councillors, judges, collectors, engineers, doctors, chaplains, bishops, military and political officers, forest officers, barristers, and many more than are necessary. None know the value of money better than Englishmen, and they keep every place of profit and honour to themselves, and pay English work ten times as high as that of the Native. This policy is carried down even to a ticket-collector on the railway, who gets five times as much as a Native for doing the same work, simply because he is the son of an Englishman! It

is true that India did not produce good government, and therefore there was room for British rule; but India is not now what it was sixty years ago. Their contact with civilization, and the progress of education, have widely changed the people. They very rightly entertain an ambition to rise in the service of the State. In proportion to their introduction into the State offices, the evil of one cancer will be reduced; but promises and obligations on this head are so ingeniously evaded as to impress all who know the facts, with an idea that there is no such thing as good faith in Englishmen. Every attempt to rise, on the part of the Natives, is opposed by the ruling and interested *Grand Mahajan of India*, who thinks that India should always remain to England what a maharwada (usurious banker) is to a Brahmin village. It is very well for Dr. Hunter to speak of seven invasions in the last century, but history and his statistics clearly show that British rule in seven years costs more than as many invasions in a century. All the money which was drawn by the Mogul nobles, Tippoo or Mahrattas, was returned to the soil in some shape or other. They built edifices, and made gardens, constructed mosques, and planted mango groves; and the money came back to the people from the treasury every year. There was then sap in the roots of the tree, and it circulated through the branches of the nation. The people improved land, built ghats, and bestowed charities; and still the money came back. Now the circulation is stopped, and money does not enter the system, but flows through external channels direct to England, where the wealth of India, acquired from Ramchundra to Allumghur, is now accumulated. The command of money is transferred to that country. It aggrandizes the English nation, but not India. It may be said that it comes back in the shape of railway capital, but India has to pay the interest thereon. If they had been made out of the capital of India, interest would have remained in the country. Every person who comes from England aims at being a prince, and tries to make his purse as long and as heavy as he can. The competition for this end is keen.

All conquerors, we know, favour their own race, but the Great Mogul's friends—Syads, Piers, Arabs, and Turks—remained in India, and did not take away money as is now done. In a work by a Madras missionary, written for the Christian Vernacular Education Society, entitled "What has England done for India?" the author recommends the Natives to look forward to the learned professions, commerce, and agriculture. But the writer, like Dr. Hunter, forgets that India is governed by foreigners, who occupy all the lucrative posts, and who have all patronage in their hands. All State promotions are made from England. English barristers who come to India are presented with fine appointments in the High Court and elsewhere, while Native barristers, who have spent ten thousand rupees in a foreign country, are left to shift for themselves. They must be content to hear that there is not a subordinate judge of his position in the whole country, nor are there half a dozen honest men to be found fit for conciliators. These statements are put forward by men interested in keeping all emoluments to themselves. In point of fact a Native sub-judge is quite equal to any judge, collector, assistant judge, or assistant collector, as regards education and standing. But this will never be admitted by those interested in the matter. Impartial on-lookers express the truth that is burked by officialism; for the officials, who are simply anxious to secure their vested rights, as they say, can only obtain their end by disparaging the Natives and excluding them from the administration. It is a rule of evidence that an interested witness should not be credited, and according to this canon, Dr. Hunter and his supporters cannot be considered as bearing reliable testimony. It boots little to rake up the old tale of the Delhi



massacre by Nadir Shah. These stories, however coloured, will not account for the total impoverishment of the country. The fact remains that India is being destroyed by a process of vivisection, as it were. The mere narration of old barbarities will not heal the existing evils. Legislation, even though supported by education, cannot bring in wealth. The railways and increase of population have nothing to do with the poverty of the country. There are vast tracts of land lying waste through want of capital to cultivate them. The official classes are apt to attribute the result of their own maladministration to the Marwadi money-lenders; but I think erroneously. The latter are the chief supporters of agriculture. The Relief Act cannot but fail in its objects, owing to the incessant drain upon the resources of the land. The reduction of this drain is the only sure and certain remedy for the existing privations. The bleeding operation has been going on for a hundred years, and all the energy of the country is exhausted. The only way to secure the good-will of the people is to give them a share in their own government. The present policy of "everything for us and nothing to you" is most disheartening and irritating to the nation. The official circle speak of the oppression of the money-lenders, but they, no less than the cultivators, are being ruined by unintelligible laws and heavy taxes. Twenty years ago their class was far more numerous and influential, and the country more prosperous. The heavy taxes on justice, would be more tolerable if we had but the advantage of the money set in circulation by those taxes. As it is, the money goes to enrich the nobility and gentry of Europe, while India is left in destitution. The taxes are so heavy and the machinery so needlessly cumbrous that all the courts effect is the impoverishment of the land and the multiplication of impracticable paper decrees. Eight judges are frequently employed where two would suffice; the remaining six merely lead a Nabob existence. A Civilian must by all means be conciliated by promotion. Every interest is consulted except that of the Natives. Barristers grumble, and they must have lucrative posts. The only class which charms the deaf adder in vain are the Natives, and it matters little that judgeships were promised to them twenty years ago. Such promises are cheap, and mean nothing. When a bill is proposed to provide appointments for Europeans, they are appointed even in anticipation of the proposition becoming law; but it matters not if the Natives have to wait for twenty or a hundred years for the fulfilment of distinct pledges. To overcome the difficulty of getting a law through Parliament, Natives are mentioned, and their qualifications defined, but the framers of these Acts know that the clauses referring to them are blanks, and never to be put into operation. If a European is striving for a post, the Chief Justice and everybody concerned is sure to make an earnest recommendation that the place should be filled up. If a Native stands for the appointment, the whole body is unanimous in stating that the place need not be filled up, and that the work is much reduced. By these manoeuvres the Natives are constantly kept out. All laws on their behalf are inoperative. I do not mean to urge that Englishmen should be banished from the service. I know well that there is need for them. But there is a glut of them. What I would suggest is that there should be one well-paid Native appointment for every well-paid English one. All Residents and Political Agents might be English, but their assistants in every case should be Natives. The Commissioners of Division are perfectly useless, and act only as additional postmasters or impediments to business. They should be entirely superseded. All forest, registration, and postal appointments should be given to the Natives. All engineers should be Natives, except those who superintend a district. By this means much expense would be saved, and the country be reanimated. Many are now engaged in seek-

ing the cause of the impoverishment which is everywhere apparent ; many discern the truth, but shift the burden on to others. So long as Natives lose honour, profit, and position, no improvement of any kind can take place in the condition of the country. The whole nation is becoming a nation of beggars, unable to improve or cultivate trade. There is already a heavy tax on education which prevents a large number from availing themselves of it. Justice is a mere mockery. In the courts, a claimant has more to lose than to gain. If the present state of matters is allowed to remain for twenty years, the whole nation will be insolvent, while the capital will be safely lodged in Great Britain. The money-lenders, who are now so much condemned, are indispensable to the country. Weavers, oilmen, paper-makers, blacksmiths, and many others are starving and fast disappearing. Service is the only means of obtaining a livelihood. There is no trade or calling which will give maintenance to a hard-working man, while taxes are increased year by year. They are realized by the addition of interest, and the seizure of property. All mercy, moderation, and liberality have departed from British rule. The most oppressive money-lender would not act towards his debtors as English rulers are acting towards their subjects. The result is too sad to be longer screened. Of yore, many poor and unfortunate people took shelter under a wealthy aristocracy, which does not now exist. The English aristocracy is separated from the country in feeling and sympathy, and does nothing for the poor. Its one object is to accumulate and transfer to England as much wealth as possible in the shortest time. No government ever existed in India so peculiar as that of the English. It had invaders, organized dacoits, and freebooters ; but they all lived in the country, and the transfer of property was from one village to another, or from one district to another ; but never before was it sent 7,000 miles from the country to become utterly unprofitable to it. The miserable Hindu says, " Beat me on my back, but not on my stomach ; " but the time has come when the rod is applied to the stomach of the Native. The London *Statesman* declared the evil when it said : " We speak advisedly when we say, that we doubt if there ever was a period in the history of India when the masses of its people endured such general and cruel suffering as they have endured of late years under the government of our countrymen. We put aside for the moment the consideration of its causes. We affirm simply and positively that if the rulers are to be judged by the well-being and happiness or otherwise of the masses of their subjects, then a verdict of condemnation must go forth against ourselves. The people of this country have no conception of the misery, through which the people of India have gone in the last few years ; and the all-important fact is this, that it is our rule that has been the cause, either directly or indirectly ; and much of this suffering has been determinedly ignored by the Government."

Bombay, 1880.

## LOCAL TAXATION IN BENGAL.

(By a Native Gentleman.)

It is too commonly the fashion now-a-days, when commenting upon the increase of taxation in India, to leave out of account the increase there has been in local taxes. How heavily the people have been taxed of late years for local purposes, over and above the Imperial or provincial taxes, will appear from the following list of taxes of purely local application in the Lower Provinces:—

1. Road cess.
2. House cess.
3. Municipal house tax.
4. Toll-bar tax in municipalities.
5. Cart or wheel tax in some municipalities.
6. Tax on ferries in navigable rivers.
7. Tolls on navigation in Nuddya rivers.

Now most of these taxes have been invented to afford relief to the provincial revenue, by transferring one head of expenditure after another to the local revenue. Thus, for instance, since the passing of the Bengal Municipal Act, in 1876, almost all the expenditure on police, hospitals, vaccination, &c., has been shifted (to the great burdening of the Mofussil municipalities) from the provincial treasury to that of the municipal funds. So also, from the date of the enactment of the Road Cess Regulations, in 1872, all expenditure on district roads has been thrown upon the Road Cess fund, while the Government has appropriated to its general revenue, the profits of ferry rents and other sources of income by which these feeder roads have hitherto been maintained. Before the passing of this Road Cess Act, the revenue derived from ferries, toll-bars on roads, tolls on navigation in the Nuddya rivers, and so forth, and known under the name of "Amalgamated District Ferry Fund Revenue," used to remain at the disposal of the Bengal Government, by which grants were made, through the Public Works officers and the local authorities, according to the requirements of each district, irrespective of their proportionate yield of revenue, for the construction and repairs of the roads. Thus, for instance, though the district of Nuddya yielded more than ten lacs of rupees from its tolls on navigation, and ferries, the Government used to grant not more than two lacs of rupees for its roads. In course of time, the harassing tax on the numerous toll-bars in the district was to a great extent abolished, while those only which lay within the jurisdiction of the municipalities were retained. Then the profits of ferry rents and tolls on navigation were, on the creation of the Road Cess system, alienated from their primary object and incorporated with the provincial revenue, to meet the deficit under other heads, leaving the construction and repairs of the local roads to the Road Cess Fund entirely.

The history of the tolls on navigation in the Nuddya rivers is unique in its nature. The three great tributaries of the River Pudma—I mean the Bhagiruthee, Telinghee, and Mathabhanga—are designated officially Nuddya rivers, on the navigation of which, inland transit duties are levied from every traffic boat. At three different places these tolls are levied, viz., at Tangypoor on Bhagiruthee, in Mohishgunj, at the confluence of the Bhagiruthee and the Telinghee, and lastly, at Krishengunj, on the Mathabhanga, by the side of the Eastern Bengal Railway. Before the opening up of the railway, the Mathabhanga toll, near Krishengunj, used to yield a net rent of nearly two lacs of rupees a year, which has dwindled down to something like Rs.50,000 or Rs.60,000. The Mohishgunj toll yields an annual revenue of nearly a lac of rupees, while that at Tangypoor or Bhagiruthee gives a net rental of more than two lacs of rupees. So that the aggregate of these three tolls amounts to not less than five lacs of rupees. Now the original purpose for which these tolls were established was to keep these much frequented channels of navigation open throughout all the seasons, to prevent them from silting up. With this view, a proper staff of engineers was maintained from the revenue of these tolls. The cost of maintaining a suitable establishment for the collection of the duties, as well as for the protection of these rivers, is very trivial in comparison with the large revenue derived therefrom. But the Government, instead of applying the surplus to the benefit of the district, has transferred it to the general revenue.

Such being the facts of the growth of the local taxes, it is, indeed strange to see men like Sir John Strachey declaring in public, that India is not at all heavily taxed. The facts ought to be laid bare before the English public with a view to its condemnation by the enlightened public opinion of England.

## HOME AND FOREIGN AFFAIRS.

IF a seemingly general conviction can be accounted as founded upon fact, the defeat of Kuskh-i-Nakhud has had a result for which even that heavy disaster can hardly be regarded as having been too heavy a price to pay. It has (so it is reported) convinced the Government that the "honour of the country" is not involved in the maintenance of a puppet Wali over Kandahar. Southern Afghanistan, like Northern Afghanistan, is to be evacuated at the earliest possible date; the old frontier is, we trust, to be resumed along its whole length; and the war in Afghanistan will be shovelled away among the dreary records of the past without other memorial than exists in wounded and bleeding hearts. What a ghastly story it has been of futile and purposeless wrong-doing! And, even now, we have not read down to the closing page. For ourselves, we are free to confess that we cannot follow the progress of the relieving columns towards Kandahar without profound anxiety. The dangers which surround their march are not, to our thinking, specially great; and if there was but right on our side, we should follow their march with cheerfulness and hope. But in *this* war in Afghanistan, as in the last, there has been a Nemesis dogging our heels, and which has "mocked the counsels of the wise, and the valour of the brave." Hence the repeated humiliations we have had to endure, and hence also the doubt, the fear, that some additional disaster lies hidden for us in the immediate future. However that may be, the Government is highly to be commended for the courage which determined them to withdraw our troops from Kabul, despite of the troubled state of Southern Afghanistan. The ten thousand men who would have remained at Kabul after the departure of General Roberts could have rendered no assistance to that officer if disaster overtook him after he had left Ghuznee behind him; but in such an event they would themselves have been besieged, and in a position of considerable danger. By retiring to Jelallabad such a danger is averted, without the dangers which the column under General Roberts must inevitably encounter being at all enhanced.

The progress of General Roberts has been greatly facilitated by the extraordinary proceedings of Ayoub Khan since the battle of Kuskh-i-Nakhud. Such a double operation as we are now carrying out in Afghanistan would be simply impossible in the face of an enemy of ordinary intelligence and some degree of mobility. With his superior numbers, and his overwhelming weight of artillery, Ayoub Khan might crush the British columns, one by one, before they had the opportunity to effect a junction. But in order to do this, he ought at once to have marched beyond Khelat-i-Ghilzie, and effecting a junction with Mahommed Jan and Hashim Khan, given battle to General Roberts. By awaiting at Kandahar, he lays himself open to a combined attack from the garrison, and from the armies both of General Roberts and General Phayre, an attack which it is absurd to suppose he can successfully encounter. So obvious does this appear, that it

seems to us in the highest degree improbable that Ayoub Khan will wait to be attacked. As soon as General Roberts has passed Khelat-i-Ghilzie we expect to hear that Ayoub Khan has raised the siege of Kandahar, and retreated across the Helmund. [This anticipation has been fulfilled since the notice was in type.—ED.]

Lord Hartington, in explaining the Indian Budget to the House of Commons, took occasion to say that but for the war in Afghanistan, the finances of India would have been in a very prosperous condition, showing, in fact, a surplus of no less than eleven millions. There has not been a surplus, in the usual Indian sense of the word, of income over expenditure since the Crown assumed the government of our Empire, the debt having increased during the same time to an amount far in excess of the entire total of the (so-called) surpluses. From the eleven millions we ought to deduct the money which has been borrowed for reproductive public works, the proceeds of the Famine Insurance Fund, the £670,000 illegitimately squeezed out of the Provincial Governments in order to give a specious appearance of prosperity to the Imperial Budget, and the remissions of revenue, which, from prudence not less than humanity, ought to have been granted to the agriculturists of the Deccan and the North-west Provinces in the terrible famine year of 1877-78; and when we have deducted these various items, we should find the surplus converted into a very considerable deficit.

Lord Hartington's comments on the fraudulent character of the last Indian Budget were couched in that strain of unwise tolerance which passes, in these modern days, as something essential to British statesmanship. Lord Hartington disclaimed the thought of imputing aught akin to an intention to deceive in those who are responsible for this notorious Budget, "because the character of those engaged in framing these estimates is such as altogether to preclude the possibility of suspicion in that respect." It is worth while to mark the singularly euphuistic manner in which the sentence is constructed. It seems entirely to exonerate Lord Lytton and Sir John Strachey from the charge of crooked intentions, and as such the remark will be generally understood. But, in point of fact, it does nothing of the kind. It merely exonerates "those engaged in framing the estimates," who are certain subordinate officials, not Lord Lytton or Sir John Strachey. The act of which Lord Lytton and Sir John stand convicted is, not merely of accepting an inadequate estimate of expenditure, for the framing of which they might plead that they are not directly responsible, but of making a misleading use of the estimates which *had* been framed. Major Newmarch, the officer responsible for these estimates, had been careful to state that the amount of expenditure, therein provided for, would suffice only upon the condition that the war was brought to a speedy conclusion. The estimates were, nevertheless, paraded before the English public by the Government of India, as sufficing, without any such qualification. In a despatch to the Government of India, dated June 7, 1880, Lord Hartington points out this exceedingly suspicious circumstance, and makes the following apposite remarks thereupon: "I am unaware of any circumstances which could have enabled the Government of India, at any moment since the commencement of the present year, to anticipate the termination of the campaign of 1880 before the later months of the autumn; and all the information which I possess points to an opposite conclusion. . . . It does not, therefore, appear that when the estimate of Major Newmarch was finally accepted by the Government of India, on the 18th February, any reasonable hope could have been entertained of 'an early settlement of affairs beyond the frontier,' on which assumption alone the estimate of Rs.2,00,00,000 had been considered by

that officer to be 'probably' sufficient; and I am unable to understand how the Government of India, fully acquainted as they must have been with the political and military position of affairs in Afghanistan, could have arrived at the conclusion stated in the fourth paragraph of their letter of the 4th May, that there was 'no apparent cause for distrusting the sufficiency of the Military Department's estimates.' "

It is natural that Lord Hartington should be unable to understand how the Government of India contrived to read into its estimates an interpretation precisely the reverse of that which was legibly written there; and if the official character of Lord Lytton and Sir John Strachey were really such as to "preclude the possibility of a suspicion" that they made this strange mistake except in a spirit of pure innocence, the mystery would be altogether past finding out. In actual fact, however, there is nothing mysterious in the matter at all. No intelligent person in India, either European or Native, ever supposed for an instant that the Indian Budget would contain an honest estimate of the expenditure on the Afghan War. It would have been to fly in the face of reiterated experience to have credited the Government of India with candour and veracity in such a matter as this. Everybody, we say, anticipated the production of a fraudulent Budget; and when the Budget was published every one saw that the anticipation had been verified. Nothing now remains to be done but for the Crown to recognize the fact also, and raise Sir John Strachey to the peerage. This appears to be our present method of appreciating the acts of great public malefactors.

Abd-al-Rahman Khan, the Ameer whom we have decided to recognize, has not as yet been either killed, or expelled from his capital. The one or other event will, in all probability, be postponed until we are fairly out of the country. It is very improbable, we are assured, that Abd-al-Rahman Khan will be accepted as Ameer by the Ghilzies, so long as Yakoub Khan or his son is alive. Meanwhile it would be interesting to know what the Government propose to do with Yakoub Khan. Nobody any longer suspects him of having been an accomplice, either direct or indirect, in the massacre of the British Embassy. Few people who have read the Blue-books can suppose that the Afghan soldiers assembled at the Residency, in order to make an attack upon it. It seems all but certain that they were, in the first place, fired upon by the inmates of the Residency. An eye-witness thus describes the scene which took place when the three regiments declined to receive one month's pay as an equivalent for the three which was due to them: "A mutineer and ringleader, on throwing down his pay, was thrashed by the Brigadier and Colonel, on which the men rose and stoned their Colonel, and rushed off to the armoury and seized their arms, and made a rush on the Ameer's quarters; but the gates were shut to, on which they went off, after hurling stones and clods at the Ameer's doors, to the Residency. *The Escort turned out and fired on them, killing and wounding some ten or twelve men, and closed the gates.*"

It is no doubt that luckless volley "killing and wounding some ten or twelve men," which cost the British Embassy their lives. But, at any rate, all the accounts agree in the utter helplessness of Yakoub Khan to quell the riot; and to this day, no reason has been given for his deportation to India, and his detention as a State prisoner. No reasons have been given, because there are none to give. His deportation was one of those blind proceedings which the Government of Lord Lytton identified with "the practice of Statecraft in its more occult branches." What we would suggest to the Government is that they should transform Yakoub Khan from a State prisoner into a State

guest, and hold him in reserve as the Ameer of Afghanistan when Abd-al Rahman Khan has been expelled. That Abd-al-Rahman will be expelled, theris, we imagine, but small doubt.

The Lords flung out the Irish Compensation for Disturbance Bill by an immense majority, and the consequences of this act are already apparent in the heat and violence with which popular agitation has recommenced in Ireland. The ensuing winter will be a period of grievous anxiety and difficulty to those entrusted with the conduct of affairs in Ireland. It was, doubtless, a very keen sense of this, which caused Mr. Forster's attack on the Member for Tipperary. We have no wish to extenuate Mr. Dillon's offence—nay, we are ready to concede that his speech may have deserved the epithets of "wicked" and "cowardly" which Mr. Forster considered himself justified in applying to it. Nevertheless, and whatever the heinousness of Mr. Dillon's offences, was there a member of the present Cabinet who was in a position to denounce them? What, we should like to ask Mr. Forster, is the "wickedness" of Mr. Dillon's speech as compared with the wickedness of either the Zulu or Afghan War—what its "cowardice" compared with the cowardice which produced the fraudulent Indian Budget? There is again, no man who worked so zealously to drag his nation into a destructive and dishonouring war, as did Sir Henry Layard. But, as in the case of Sir Bartle Frere and Lord Lytton, the Government are so filled with admiration for his "zeal and abilities," that they continue to charge his full salary to the British taxpayer, although the man himself has been relieved from his duties. For the Lyttons, the Freres, and the Layards we have nothing but honeyed words; for Mr. Dillon nothing but curses and execrations. Why this difference? Gentle reader, the difference lies in a nutshell. Mr. Dillon has not the seal of officialism on his forehead and in his right hand. He has no powerful friends to get up embarrassing debates in the House of Commons, and it is unreasonable to expect that officials should treat members of the sacred brotherhood as they treat vulgar unofficial persons. It is an unwritten law of the British Constitution that the official is always to be regarded as a creature to whom sin is impossible, no matter what the nature and magnitude of the crimes which he has committed. Therefore it is that Lord Hartington describes Lord Lytton as inferior certainly to Babbage's calculating machine in matters arithmetical, but, morally, a Nathaniel, an Israelite without guile; therefore it is that the astounded British taxpayer finds that he is paying full salary to Sir H. Layard because of his extreme "usefulness." Mr. Dillon is not an official personage, and is never likely to be one. Nevertheless, this misguided person has had the audacity to speak in such a way as to enhance the Irish difficulty, and Mr. Forster's only regret is that he cannot be punished without increasing his capacity for enhancing the difficulty.

We have called attention to this striking contrast in the Ministerial treatment meted out to two classes of public offenders, because we are convinced that a serious public danger is involved in it. It seems to us hardly possible to conceive of three men doing more in their different spheres, to blight the prosperity and destroy the honour of the country than was either done, or attempted, by Sir Bartle Frere, Lord Lytton, and Sir Henry Layard. Assuredly, we do not believe there is a genuine Liberal in the United Kingdom (outside of the world of officialism of course, where it would seem "no cold moral reigns") who does not feel the acts of these men as a stain upon his own personal honour and humanity. But Euphuistic Officialism not only does *not* censure them,—it pats them on the back; compliments them on their zeal and abilities, and even testifies its belief in the



immaculate purity of their moral character. Thus it is that Government ceases at one and the same moment, to be a terror to evil-doers and an encouragement to them that do well. The principle of individual responsibility is destroyed, and with its destruction the nation loses the single guarantee it possesses for the ability and integrity of its representatives in distant continents. The Ministry cannot know how deeply they wound the convictions of the most earnest of their supporters by these uncalled for and repeated eulogies upon men, whose sole claim to notoriety is the zeal with which they lent themselves to carry out a policy which the nation has condemned. So deep, none the less, is the wound that has been thus inflicted, that multitudes are incapable of doing justice to the unquestionably great services which already the Government has rendered to the country. Even this mutilated session will, before it closes, have to record the passing of a larger number of important measures than could be set down to the preceding Government during their entire tenure of office; while Mr. Gladstone's Supplementary Budget has given to the country a financial reform second hardly to any that even he has carried. But the greatest service, perhaps, which they have rendered to the nation, is the successful stand they have made against Obstruction. Obstruction, we may hope, is killed. There was only one way of killing it, and that was to make those who practised it suffer without having obtained the satisfaction of achieving that at which they aimed. Obstructing Liberal measures, is a pleasure and a duty which no British Tory ought, or is likely, to neglect. But, then, there is a higher duty still, which no British Tory can leave unaccomplished, and retain an easy conscience and a mind at rest; and that duty is to commence shooting grouse on the 12th August. This, from that date, constitutes the whole duty of the British Tory; and if the practice of Obstruction interferes with its due fulfilment, then the practice of Obstruction must be given up. There is a time for all things.



# The Statesman.

No. III.—August, 1880.

## EDITORIAL NOTES.

THE heavy disaster which has befallen us at Candahar will, we may hope, finally awaken the nation to the duty already widely felt therein, of holding an inquest upon the blood that has been shed in this most guilty war. If its authors are allowed to escape the full exposure of the crime into which they have plunged the nation, and the just punishment of which we are but reaping in this calamity, we shall despair of the future of our country. We are at last made to taste something of the anguish of those sufferings which, in the wantonness of irresponsible power, we have carried into every valley of the Afghan people. Our arm will never be nerved with power to face the emergency we have provoked, until a stern determination fills the heart of the nation to begin by exemplary punishment of the authors of this most wanton crime. Mr. Disraeli has run his sinister course to some purpose. Let the nation call him to account for it, and by signally punishing both him and his instruments, wash the innocent blood we have shed from our own skirts. The new Ministry deserves heavy blame for its manifest disposition to pass over in silence the conduct of its predecessors. They were returned to power to reverse what had been done, while the exigencies of his position compel Mr. Gladstone to frustrate the wishes of the great majority of the nation. The fact is, that until Parliament is radically reformed, and the landed interest which now rules therein reduced to a position subordinate to those of the nation as a whole, there is no hope of wise and righteous guidance of public affairs. Some of the Tory journals are unwise enough to profess that this terrible disaster in Afghanistan is attributable to the new Ministry. The nation could desire nothing more earnestly, than that the leaders of that party should attempt to fasten the responsibility of the calamity upon their successors. They are far too astute to take a course that would result in a demand on the part of Ministers that inquiry should be made into the history of this great crime. The nation will see the Tory leaders overwhelming the Government with assurances of sympathy and support, the price being that no inquest is to be made into the past. It is the nation meanwhile that suffers and bleeds, in atonement for Executive crime.

It is a striking illustration of the inability of Parliament to compass the duties devolved upon it, that within the last month we have seen a Bill [the Educational Endowments (Scotland) Bill], introduced by Earl Spencer into the House of Lords, the real intention of which was no more suspected by Earl Spencer himself than by nine-tenths of the Peers who gave it their support. The Bill was brought into the Imperial Parliament and debated by the Lords, without a suspicion of the purpose for which it was drafted. The Preamble of the Bill is admirable, but then it hides from every one but those who know its real purpose the subtle dishonesty it is intended to cover. Under the plausible profession of an earnest desire to reform the administration of the educational endowments of Scotland, the Bill has a special but concealed purpose, which is to confiscate the great Heriot Trust in Edinburgh, for the education of poor children belonging to that city, for the aggrandizement of the University. You must go to Edinburgh to understand what the Bill really is, and the sinister and fraudulent purpose it is intended to serve. Heriot's Trust is a noble endowment for the education of poor children in Edinburgh. The Trust has been so ably administered that it has become exceedingly wealthy, and marvellously efficient in realizing the intentions of its founder. The University, meanwhile, is poor, and the Trust has long been the object of envy by the Governing Body of the University; and these gentlemen have at last ventured a bold stroke for the transfer of the Trust funds to themselves for the education of *the rich*, while they get the Bill brought into Parliament under the plausible preamble that it is expedient to reform the educational endowments, not of Edinburgh, but of "Scotland." Now, were Scotland allowed a reasonable measure of Home Rule, by Parliament divesting itself of powers that it cannot properly administer, and were the Bill presented to a local legislative assembly in Edinburgh, it would never have passed a first reading, so notorious and so dishonest is the object it is intended to secure. The Bill is opposed by the unanimous vote not merely of the Governing Body of the Trust, but by the Town Council of Edinburgh, the Trades' Council, the Citizens' Committee, and the United Liberal Association, which is petitioning Parliament against the measure, as not only violating every purpose of the Trust, but every principle of self-government and Liberal traditions. There are particularly nasty features about it. Thus, while secretly confiscating this splendid Trust for the poor of the city, the Bill is cunningly drafted (Clause 7) to protect an Endowment that was misappropriated in the same way some years back—the well-known Fettes Endowment—the testamentary object of which has been completely frustrated in the interests of the better classes, and the administration of which has become a public scandal for the jobbery which has prostituted its funds to the creation of half a dozen highly paid appointments. So anxious are the gentlemen who drafted this precious Bill for improved administration of the educational endowments of Scotland, that while attempting to seize upon the great city Trust that educates *five thousand* of its poor, they take great pains to prevent any interference with the five highly paid appointments which have been secured by misappropriating the funds of the Fettes Endowment. The nasty purpose is, of course, concealed, being so carefully wrapped up in the provisions of Clause 7 as to give no chance of detection to the casual reader of the Bill. The real object of the measure is, happily, we believe, well known by members of the Lower House and by the Home Secretary. The Bill is an outrage upon the principles of local self-government, and it is most unfortunate that it should have been brought in under a Liberal Ministry. The Ministry has been imposed upon by the parties interested in passing the measure, and the timely

disclosure of its purpose will reduce its scope to dimensions that will be found suddenly to deprive its promoters of nine-tenths of the interest they profess to feel in its success. The University clique will wire-pull the *Scotsman* to no purpose when the great Liberal party in the Commons know the real objects of the Bill.

THE improvidence of the contracts sanctioned by Parliament, at intervals in the last thirty years, for the carriage of the Eastern Mails, is shown by the answer given by Mr. Fawcett, on the 15th ult., to Mr. Baxter's inquiries into the terms recently made with the P. and O. Company for their renewed service to India, China, and Australia. Mr. Fawcett said:—

The annual loss to the revenues of the United Kingdom on the contract for the mails to India, China, and Australia was in 1867 £216,000; in 1877-78, £239,000; and the estimated loss on the year 1878-9 is £246,000. The estimate of the loss which would have been incurred if the postage had been reduced to half the amount would be no more than £26,000 in addition to the loss actually incurred. With regard to the other question, it may be correct to state that the contract speed of the Peninsular and Oriental Company in carrying the mails to India, China, and Australia is somewhat over eleven knots an hour—I believe the exact figure is eleven and a half. I am by no means answerable for this contract, which was entered into before the present Government came into office, and I voted against it. The average length of the Orient unsubsidized company's passages is thirty-nine and a-half days. In only one instance has that time been exceeded. The rate of speed of the Orient Company is considerably faster than that of the subsidized company, being fourteen to fifteen knots. The passages have been under forty days, and in one instance their vessels completed the passage in thirty-five days.

We thus learn that for the paltry sum of £26,000, additional to the present loss of £246,000 annually incurred upon this service, the rates of postage to the East might have been reduced to one-half their present amount. We learn, further, that while the contract with the P. and O. Company, under which they are receiving nearly half a million sterling a-year, stipulates for a speed of eleven and a-half knots only per hour, the unsubsidized vessels of the Orient Company contrive to make fourteen to fifteen knots! The twelve years' contract with the P. and O. Company, made in 1866, was a scandal to the Select Committee that reported upon it and the Parliament that sanctioned its terms. The Editor of this paper was twice before the Committee, and used every effort to prevent the acceptance of the contract. But the Committee was packed with nominees of the Company—the only members of the Committee who regularly attended its sittings. And so, in spite of the clearest evidence that the Atlantic steamers were making an average speed of thirteen to fourteen knots across the billows of that storm-tossed sea, the Select Committee professed to do their duty to the nation by reporting in favour of a contract that gave the P. and O. Company nearly half a million sterling a-year for twelve years, to carry the Indian and Australian Mails at eight and a-half or nine knots an hour. In essence it was a corrupt contract, the Company getting what terms it pleased from a Committee crowded with its own nominees. When the contract was at last laid before the House, the standing orders—which require such contracts to be “tabled” a full month before sanction—were suspended, and the contract passed at a day's notice. It is very Radical, no doubt, and very revolutionary, to insist that government of this order should come to an end, but come to an end it must. Mr. Fawcett intimates clearly enough his own estimate of the character of the new contract sanctioned

by the late Government, and we may hope that the nation has now seen the last of these "Select Committee bargainings" with the P. and O. Company.

WE have so much real sympathy with the Home Rule party, that we feel no hesitancy in speaking plainly as to the tactics which they followed in the last Parliament, and which some of them are but too disposed to renew in the present. Let the reasonableness of their claims be what it may in their own eyes, they cannot be permitted to dragoon the House as they are attempting. If the present leader of the House permits this small party to enact such scenes therein as were permitted under Sir Stafford Northcote, to the degradation of the House in the eyes of the country, he will deserve great blame. If the "forms" of the House really permit such abuses, the forms will have to be reconsidered, and should be reconsidered without delay. It is a degradation to the whole nation for the House to permit this small knot of Irishmen to obstruct its business as they have hitherto been permitted to do. The most generous consideration should be shown to them, but every attempt to dragoon the House into their views peremptorily disallowed. The country will certainly support a Ministerial resolve that the great Assembly of the nation shall not be at the mercy of the Irish, or of any other party of obstructives. The Standing Orders may possibly require to be modified, but the House has been very properly reminded by Mr. Gladstone that while the Speaker is the guardian of "order" therein, the House itself is the guardian of its own character. In the nature of things, the House must possess the right, in common with every such assembly, to suppress whatever degrades its character or proceedings. The party too often uses the forms of the House to secure "licence" therein, not freedom of debate; and it is astonishing that the O'Donnell incident should have occupied five minutes of its time. The Conservatives for six years had a powerful majority behind them, and should lay aside the resentment with which, in common with the Home Rule party, they are evidently disposed to regard the turning of the tables upon them for a while.

LORD LYTTON, General Roberts, and Sir John Strachey will shortly be arriving in England, and the nation will certainly expect Parliament to bring these officials to its bar for what the *Daily News* (19th July) rightly calls their "buccaneering pleasure trip into Cabul, for the excitement of the thing."

A sort of buccaneering pleasure trip was made into Cabul for the excitement of the thing; and now the pleasure is over, the penalty remains. The extravagantly false estimates which were laid before the country in February were not, of course, in any sense fraudulent, but they showed a heedlessness and credulity involving great self-deception, and only less culpable than deliberate deceit.

It is too characteristic of the *Daily News* to weaken its own writings in this doubtful way. It was long before our daily contemporary could prevail upon itself to describe this Afghan War in the proper terms. *Three times over within eighteen months* has the nation been deliberately deceived as to the cost of the war. We say "deliberately," for it is only to trifle with public intelligence to affect to believe that either Lord Lytton or Sir John Strachey supposed that a war which had assumed such dimensions was being waged at the cost they put forward. Their statements were received with derision in India itself,

and we refuse, as earnest men and as honest publicists, to accept the suggestion that *they* only were misled, when no one else was. It is impossible to characterize this second Afghan invasion in terms too scathing. The instruments of the crime knew well what they were doing, from the Earl of Beaconsfield downwards. They have involved the nation in shame and bloodshed, the end of which no one can foresee. They have spent well on to twenty millions of money already on their "buccaneering pleasure trip," and if there is any sense of accountability, any sense of religion, in the nation, it will insist upon Parliament bringing them to its bar.

WE shall not cease to demand the formal arraignment of these great criminals. We believed it to be impossible, with the history of Lord Auckland's crime fresh in all Indian memories, that they would dare to repeat it, without the excuse which that unhappy nobleman could honestly plead. Lord Auckland was *dragged* into his crime, where these men rushed into it under the pure Jingo inspiration begotten of the new-fangled thing set up at Delhi under the name of Imperialism. Their crime is tenfold heavier than that of Lord Auckland. While that unhappy nobleman became nearly insane upon its review, our miraculous Premier, light-hearted Lytton, and frivolous officials at Simlah make *their* "buccaneering trip" a sort of pirouette dance, blind-folding both Parliament and the nation as to what they were doing. If they are allowed to escape under the shadow of the Throne, which has showered promotions and decorations upon them all, we shall despair altogether of English institutions. Under no other Government in the world would they be permitted to escape; while the prostitution of public honours that has been boldly resorted to, to secure their immunity, intensifies the character of their conduct. They fought their way into the war, through a hedge of warnings and remonstrances that they declared were misplaced and needless, until the nation suddenly found the crime which it dreaded was already consummated. We demand inquiry as a prelude to punishment, and that the Throne shall not protect them.

WE have got into this position as to the responsibilities of public life amongst us, that, ~~let~~ the Ministers of the Crown follow what courses they may, the only punishment they have to dread is retirement from office for a while. They may betray the nation by systematic deception into courses of the deepest immorality and open crime; they may spend forty, fifty, or a hundred millions of the hard-earned resources of the people, at a time of deep and universal commercial suffering; they may plunge into wanton and unprovoked wars, shedding the blood of weak and unoffending neighbouring people in torrents by the national arms, making their land desolate with fire and sword, and filling special circles in our own country with widows and fatherless children; they may refuse for years to appeal to the country upon their course, and, when forced to make that appeal, on penalty of treason, use every art that baseness can suggest to awaken a strife of nationalities amongst us that may toll in their favour; and when all is over, and in vain, the scales having fallen from men's eyes, they go to the Throne, and, as its responsible (!) advisers, counsel Her Majesty, the beloved Queen of Englishmen, to throw a protecting agis over themselves and every instrument of their crime. Having prostituted the prerogative, and made the Throne an accomplice in their guilt, and looking

carefully to see that their instruments are covered by an act of condonation that elevates every criminal amongst them in social rank, by decoration and promotions, they then leisurely resign themselves to the retirement which the verdict of the nation necessitates, to organize themselves into a settled conspiracy to make the rule of their successors impossible. We tell the nation once more that these men should be impeached. They have made us, as a people, shed human blood in torrents, causelessly and without provocation, simply to make their rule popular; they have involved us in embarrassments and losses that are incalculable to the "seeing eye;" and, after decorating themselves with honours and rewards, they consent to retire from office for a few months or years, until our system of political life shall bring them again into power to repeat the same crimes. Mr. Gladstone's Ministry cannot, we fear, move in this matter. It is a subject for the independent members of the House, as representatives of the nation, to deal with. The autumn vacation should be spent in preparing the public mind for the indictment of the ex-Ministers at the commencement of the next session. There is no hope of right-minded and earnest rule for England, if these men are to escape. We almost wish that neither Mr. Gladstone nor Mr. Bright were in office, that they might awaken the country to the necessary course of action. The want of earnestness shown by the Liberal press in this matter, reveals how little deep sense there is of what national crime means. We can condemn it sternly enough in others; we are ready to condone it in ourselves. The only wholesome end of the Earl of Beaconsfield is his expulsion from Her Majesty's Privy Council. And with him should go his ally, the Marquis of Salisbury. The nation would then see, for the first time, a sense of responsibility to the nation in its Executive Ministers. Neither of these men, we say, should be allowed again to enter the Privy Council. An address to the Crown should expel them, when the nation would see an end for all time to wanton war and reckless military expenditure, to revive the drooping enthusiasm of parties. What these men have cost the country, we cannot even estimate.

THE conduct of the Opposition in this new Parliament is not likely, we think, to be soon forgotten by the nation. Animated with bitter resentment at the overthrow of that majority which had the nation under its feet in the last Parliament, they seem to have resolved themselves into a phalanx of "irreconcilables" to the supremacy of conscience in the national counsels. Their use of the Bradlaugh incident simply to damage Mr. Gladstone, and to arrest, if possible, all legislation in the House, and now their combination to make the relief of Irish distress impossible, are silently noted, and will not be forgotten. The heart of the people is profoundly moved, Mr. Cohen justly remarks, by the spectacle of "the Prime Minister, with the weight of years upon him, attending day after day and night after night in the House of Commons, ready at any moment to answer, in the most patient, the most indulgent, and the kindest manner, the gibes and sneers and sarcasms of men who have nothing else to do than devote their days to prepare them." Never, to our thinking, has Mr. Gladstone shown truer moral greatness than in his bearing towards the Opposition he has had to encounter in this Parliament. The Ministry is making an earnest effort to save a multitude of the Irish tenantry from impending eviction and beggary, while their opponents spend night after night, as Mr. Thorold Rogers says, in "talking nonsense, or taking useless divi-

sions." The nation will not forget it, we say. Lord Beaconsfield has "educated" his party into a spirit and attitude that should exclude it from power for the next generation of years.

It would really seem that a man has only to leave India with a broad, deep mark of administrative failure upon him, to be received in this country as a statesman. Sir Bartle Frere left India in 1867 under a cloud so deep, that he ought never to have been employed again. He was the efficient cause of the ruin of the Bombay community, by the way in which he ministered to the delusions of the great share mania that engulfed its fortunes; while he had previously shown a feebleness and moral cowardice in the great indigo quarrel in Calcutta, that left an indelible brand upon him. Instead of being quietly shelved for his known incompetency in India, he was translated, by some occult influence or other, from the Governorship of Bombay to a seat in the Council of India, there to bring upon the country this Afghan War. Sir Bartle Frere's fatal readiness to see morality divorced from politics, makes him a most dangerous counsellor. He is enamoured of what is "right" if it is but popular; but if excuses are wanted for what is "wrong," he is a master of the art of involving the simplest question in perplexity and doubt. His personal character meanwhile, and the confidence he inspires in Exeter Hall, lead to the notion that there can be nothing morally wrong in what such a man proposes or advocates. If he were a cynic or scoffer, he would be far less dangerous. Constituted as he is, there are few men who more easily obtain the confidence of the crowd. In the hands of a Minister like Lord Beaconsfield, he became a mere tool to betray the religious world into a blind confidence that what so good a man advised was sure to have no moral taint upon it. Give us, a thousand times over, the rugged straight-forwardness of a Lawrence. India will reap this one good from Sir Bartle Frere's administration of the Cape—that he will never be its Viceroy; a danger that was clearly threatening it before these disasters at the Cape came to prove the justice of our judgment upon him when leaving India in 1867.

WE reviewed the later years of his Indian career for publication in the last number of *THE STATESMAN*, but the manuscript was lost on its way to the printer. We shall probably attempt the task again, and couple the review with a notice of Sir Richard Temple's career. The nation is widely under the belief that Sir Richard Temple ran a great career in India. The legacy of mischief he has left the Empire in his "famous" settlement of the Central Provinces, and in his unsettlement of Lord Northbrook's famine policy, ought to be well known in the India Office; while the two great acts of his administration in Bombay were the enthusiasm with which he hurried forward the ridiculous expedition of the 7,000 Sepoys to Malta, and the spending some millions of money on a railway through the Bolan Pass, to assist Lord Lytton's buccaneering raid upon Cabul and Candahar. The money has been thrown into the sea. Were Indian officials but made accountable to the nation for what they do, Sir Bartle Frere would have been struck off the list of active service under the Crown, when the Bank of Bombay fell in 1866, as Sir Richard Temple should be now for his complicity in this Afghan crime, following upon a career of utter charlatanism as an Indian



official. They are men of the same type precisely, while the *Times* is tuned by the hands that play upon that organ, to assure the nation that they are great and successful administrators!

THE world has never, perhaps, seen a spectacle of such feebleness as our rule of India to-day presents. Instead of a high, resolute, and somewhat enthusiastic tone in our officials, we have a self-indulgent, pervading desire to scrape through the routine of each day's work, so as to secure as much leisure and as much mild dissipation as they can. Instead of earnest, prolonged counsel, in which the sufferings of the people and the issues of peace or war are laid bare, and considered with the seriousness that a rule of 200,000,000 of people ought, one would think, to command—our officials are impatient to get away from the files and records of the office to the lawn-tennis party, the drawing-room, and the billiard or whist-table. The world, we say, has never seen so strange a spectacle before as our present government of India. It is becoming a system of mere dead bureaus more and more every year, without a symptom of vitality or enthusiasm in its task. The conception of government, as carried on for two-thirds of every year at Simlah, is fatal to efficiency and to all sense of responsibility. The system is that of a Secretary with a lot of files and pigeon-holes, as the whole art of government; while it has become the habit of the Indian Civilian of to-day to carry loyalty to the orders of his superiors to a pitch that is simply immoral. The responsibilities of our district officers, for instance, are such, that they cannot convert themselves into mere wheels in the great administrative machine. The ideal civilian in India has come to be a man who devotes himself to the authority to which he is subordinated, as if he were a mere machine, his own reason and conscience being dethroned, and his only virtue being that of blind obedience. We are Imperialized, in fact. The phenomenon we speak of is inseparable from Imperialism. An Imperial rule will not tolerate remonstrance from those it deigns to employ in the work required of them, and at last remonstrances cease to be offered. It is a distinct disadvantage to any young civilian to show the least enthusiasm in his work, or concern for the condition of the people amongst whom he lives. He is expected to be the mere creature of the routine orders of his department, and to "make things pleasant" for those above him. If he shows any independence of mind, or uneasiness at the condition of the people, he will get a black mark against him to a certainty at head-quarters, where the one object is to perpetuate the illusions of the fool's paradise in which the Supreme Government has chosen to dwell. And so we have the spectacle of a highly-paid bureaucracy blandly presiding over the destinies of 200,000,000 of people, the masses of whom are steeped in the deepest wretchedness, and whose fortunes are separated by a great gulf from the sympathies of their foreign rulers. It cannot last, if the world is really under moral government.

ONE of the most important questions in our treatment of Indian famines is the question whether the Government of India at such seasons should not prohibit the export of food grains therefrom altogether. Sir George Campbell, it may be remembered, urged this step upon the Government at the commencement of the Behar famine, in October, 1873. We thought him to be right then, and we still hold him to have been right. The first and obvious remedy for

short harvests, in a country that can never hope to see its food stores replenished from abroad, is to retain what it has. The exports of wheat and other grains from India, that went on vigorously all through 1876 and part of 1877, very appreciably enhanced prices, and aggravated the sufferings of the people. Madras and Mysore needed every maund of rice and wheat that the Central Provinces could spare, and the permitting of export to go on at such a period, was a patent economic blunder. Indian officials constantly take hold of the notion that political economy forbids this, that, and the other thing, concerning which political economists have said nothing, but refer us to the statesmanship of common sense. Thus the Government of India made it a grievance against Nepal in 1873-4, that it prohibited the export of rice in that year. But Nepal was right to do so, when it saw that it had not food enough for its own people, and had no hope of replenishing its stores from abroad. If the men who insist otherwise would but state clearly to themselves the grounds on which they decide, they would soon come to the conclusion that one of the lessons we have to learn in Indian famine is that we should stop the export of food at such seasons altogether. Thus, in reporting upon the famine year 1877-78, we find the Commissioner of Chuttsigshur, in the Central Provinces, writing :—

So keen was the demand for grain for export, that every nook and corner of the country was traversed by travelling traders, who made their purchases from house to house, and so gave to every ryot who had grain in hand, however small in quantity, an opportunity of disposing of it at his own door for high prices. The labouring population undoubtedly felt the dearness of grain, but agricultural and trading prosperity led to labour being in request, and only in a small tract of poor country in the Samhalpur district did any distress occur.

The accessible districts of the provinces had been already drained, before the urgency of the demand reached remote Chuttsigshur. The land revenue of the year was collected with unusually little need for coercive measures, while the stimulus to cultivation had led to a larger area being cultivated than in any previous year. "It is, however, to be remembered that the stocks of grain have been dangerously reduced." On this subject the Commissioner of Nagpore says :—

I do not think we ought to disguise from ourselves the fact that the recent famine in Southern India has drained our stocks, that the seemingly inexhaustible stores of Chuttsigshur have been nearly exhausted, and that they cannot be replenished except by a succession of good harvests more than sufficient to feed the population and to meet the outside demand.

Under such circumstances as existed from October, 1876, to the end of 1877, all over India, the Government should have prohibited the export of food grains altogether. We shall wait with interest for what the Famine Commissioners say upon the point. Bearing in mind the fact that India depends entirely upon herself for food, and that no attraction of high prices can ever bring supplies to her, let the extremity of her children be what it may,—we have held for many years that when the country suffers a failure of harvest, the export of grain ought to be suspended. It never has been yet in these calamities, and that they have been intensified thereby is certain.

## MEMORANDUM ON THE CONDITION OF INDIA.

[BY THE EDITOR.]

I BELIEVE it to be impossible to exaggerate the importance of an inquiry into the subject of Indian Finance. The error that has marked every approach to the subject hitherto is the notion that it is simply a question of accounts that has to be dealt with. The effect of this has been that we have mistaken accountantship for statesmanship. Every effort of the last twenty years, from the day when the late Mr. Wilson was sent out from the English Treasury to Calcutta to take charge of the Indian finances, has been more or less inspired by the belief that it was the system of accounts that required reform, and that what was chiefly needed was improved book-keeping. The introduction of the English methods of estimate and audit undoubtedly marked the beginning of a new and improved system; and so much care and attention have since been bestowed upon the Accounts department, that there is little, I believe, left to be desired in this direction. It is not our accountantship that is at fault in India. The last twenty years of our administration of its finances might almost be described in a word as "the book-keeping period." The extraordinary estimates of the last eighteen months as to the cost of the Afghan War, have not arisen from any defect in book-keeping. Our book-keeping is perfect. But no system can be worked by steam; and the undoubted cause of these astonishing estimates has been an unwillingness to look the real, the inevitable cost of the war in the face. There has been a strong desire to minimize the cost and defer its acknowledgment until the latest possible moment, under the consciousness that the nation has regarded the war with ever-growing uneasiness from its commencement.

The "book-keeping era" has lasted long enough—too long, indeed. What the condition of India calls for at our hands is not accountantship, but statesmanship, and statesmanship of the very highest order. The condition of the masses of the people has, I am satisfied, steadily deteriorated under our rule, until it has become deplorable beyond belief. Our twenty years of "improved book-keeping" have but mocked the necessities of a people, living upon the very verge of famine from one decade to another. They have been asking us for bread all these years, and we have offered them a stone. I shall attempt to show in this memorandum what the condition and circumstances of the people really are, and the nature of the vast and complex problem with which we have to deal. It is very idleness to attach a feather's weight to the character of the recent estimates, except as a symptom of the demoralized condition of the "departments" by which we are "administering," but in no true sense of the word "governing" the Empire we have assumed, for good or evil, over 250 millions of people, without an adequate thought anywhere, except perhaps in Mr. Bright's mind, of the nature of the task we have set ourselves, and of its responsibilities. With the settling down and hardening of our rule into a system of mere routine, there has been a steady decline in the *morale* that animates the Services. The foreign administration we have set up over the people, becomes year by year more unfit for its task, and more desirous to escape from it at the earliest moment that a pension or a competency can be secured. With the establishment of a settled routine of procedure, the personal character of the instruments by which it is conducted has necessarily become less and less influential, until the machinery of the State goes on almost, as it were, alone. There is no longer any room in India for a career like that of the late Medows Taylor, whose interesting "Story of my Life" reveals clearly enough to the discerning mind the secret of our initial and early success as rulers. There is no longer any place, I say, in our system of government for the display of the fine character and administrative abilities of a Munro, or Mountstuart Elphinstone, a Malcolm, Metcalfe, or a Medows Taylor.

It is a distinct disadvantage in these days for any young man who enters the Indian Civil Service, to possess strong individuality of character, a keen sense of responsibility, or a quick sympathy with the people. He is sure to evince these qualities if they are in him, and equally sure of getting a mark set upon him as a troublesome or dangerous nuisance. He must view the wretchedness of the people with the indifference begotten of despair of all attempts

to better their condition. Within the last two years, the whole body of our district officers (collectors and magistrates) in Oudh and the North-west Provinces, were formally ordered to close their eyes to the spectacle of millions of the people dying of hunger; and when the tragedy was over, the Supreme Government of the country dared to issue a formal letter of approval by the Viceroy in Council, of the "foresight, humanity, and energy" we had shown in alleviating and mitigating sufferings *that were not even permitted to be mentioned* by the executive officers who were in contact with the bitterness of death. The Parliament and people of England seldom or *never* hear a true report of matters from the Imperial departments in India, which are the only channels through which information is communicated to this country at all. Let me give some recent instances of the fact. A few months ago, then, the English people were called upon to admire the administrative skill with which the "Salt and Customs Line" of Central and Northern India had been abolished by Sir John Strachey, with the consent of the Native Princes of Rajpootana. Now, the reform was carried by placing heavy pressure upon those Princes to make them acquiesce in a scheme that raised the price of salt to the fifty millions of their subjects, to the same rates that prevail in our own territory. It was a very desirable reform for ourselves, but a most objectionable measure to the Native States, whose Princes felt an honourable and deep repugnance to a measure that raised the price of this necessary of life to the many millions of their own subjects, to rates similar to those levied from our own people. I must not be understood to blame Sir John Strachey for desiring to see the Salt Line abolished. It was a desirable reform in itself, and one that might with propriety have been kept in view in every modification of our engagements with the Native States so seriously affected thereby. What has been concealed is the fact that the measure was forced upon the Native Princes, and has been the occasion of the deepest heartburnings amongst such of them as identify themselves with their people's interests. Our Indian officials are simply "trustees" of the English nation, and the country has a just expectation and a right to be told the true history of their proceedings. But this is what the officials of that country never dream of doing. They are never held back from courses they are bent upon, by any notion of accountability to the nation for the justice of their proceedings. A certain policy seems to them desirable or necessary, and they follow it without scruple as to the means by which it is carried; but they take tacit precautions that the English people are kept in ignorance of those means. "Thus

the nation is made to believe that the Native States of Rajpootana co-operated willingly and cordially with our Foreign Office at Simlah, in carrying a measure that was obnoxious to the last degree to their Princes, whose consent thereto was wrung from them by a course of procedure that the nation would never have sanctioned had the facts been honestly disclosed to it. Pressure of a most improper order was used to compel the assent of the Princes to a measure that they abhorred. Now the nation never hears of these facts. A despatch that conceals the true story is addressed to the India Office, and, in routine order, finds its way into a Blue-book. Instead of the true story, an essentially untrue one is laid before the country, and the matter then passes into oblivion, until a rebellion comes. It must be needless for me to recall the utter misleading of the country in the last three years, as to every essential fact of our relations with the late Ameer of Cabul.

The system by which we rule India is that of a narrow bureaucracy, which keeps the essence of its proceedings absolutely secret from outsiders. They are no more communicated to Parliament than to the country. They are oftentimes not known even in the India Office itself; the "files," as they are called, of the Secretariats consisting largely of demi-official letters, that contain and conceal the true record of the proceedings. The veil is sometimes lifted by an accident, but it is a far cry to India; and there is no way by which the insincerity of the official record and its concealment of facts can be detected, but by a course of persistent interpellations in Parliament that would weary and disgust its members. I have adduced the abolition of the Salt Line and the getting up of this Afghan War as illustrations of the system upon which we are administering India, with a hollowness and insincerity on the part of our officials that is fatal to all hope of righteous rule. The fault which I charge upon the system is so grave that I think it desirable to give another illustration or two of its working. Many persons must remember a letter to the *Times*, published by that journal a few months ago, under the signature of a gentleman for whose personal character and attainments I have a true respect: I mean Mr. C. A. Elliott, formerly Secretary to Government in the North-west Provinces, and now Secretary to the Famine Commission, the report of which Commission is so impatiently waited for. Now, in his letter to the *Times* it is not Mr. Elliott who is speaking, but the "official" of that name. The letter, as a consequence, had so subtle a virus of insincerity and untruthfulness running through it, that Mr. Caird, who is the most eminent member of the Commission, felt bound to repudiate its statements

emphatically in the next day's issue of the paper. There was no excuse for Mr. Elliott, as no one can possibly know better than he how utterly misleading were the suggestions and statements made in his letter. The most fatal feature of this demoralization is the fact that none of our officials seem exempt from it. To name Mr. C. E. Bernard, the new Commissioner of British Burmah, is to praise him; and yet Mr. Bernard, two years ago, at Simlah, did not hesitate, as Home Secretary, to draft or append his signature to a letter of the Supreme Government, addressed to Sir George Couper, complimenting him upon his active measures for the relief of famine in the North-west Provinces. The letter was so absolutely untrue in its statement of facts, that no one who knew Mr. Bernard personally, could account for his signature to such a document. All that the bureaucracy at Simlah could do to conceal the facts of Sir George Couper's administration from the knowledge of this country they did; and with such success, that not one Englishman in ten thousand seems to know that there was any famine in the North-west Provinces at all in 1877-78.

Hateful and heavy as is the charge, I affirm that the official bureaus of India so systematically conceal the true character of their proceedings, that the nation may not accept a statement that emanates therefrom. They know what an English administration ought to be, and what the nation desires it to be; and when the "official" course is not in accordance with the national ideal, the facts are boldly made to conform thereto. I will not in this association pass over the conduct of our Indian Foreign Office of late years towards Sir Salar Jung; for I do verily believe in my heart that if the nation had a clear understanding of what that course has been, public indignation would burn so fiercely against the men who have disgraced us, as to compel their retirement in a body from the public service. We owe more to Sir Salar Jung than we can ever as a people repay; while the Indian Foreign Office has pursued him for years, with a course of petty insults and provocations that has finally given place to an apparently deliberate attempt to break down his administration of the Nizam's country altogether, by forcibly intruding a colleague upon him, whom we should not dream of employing ourselves, and who, as a fact, has completely paralysed Sir Salar Jung's power, and will rapidly reduce the Nizam's country to the condition from which Salar Jung had rescued it. I will not be deterred, in submitting this memorandum, from avowing my mournful belief that it is the very success of Sir Salar Jung's administration, that is the real cause of his persecution. We are administering no province in India of our own,

with anything like the success that Sir Salar Jung has had in the Hyderabad territories. And the fact is too much for the equanimity of the bureaucratic mind. Sir Salar Jung's claims upon us are so oppressively weighty, while his administration of the Nizam's country is so putting our own to shame, that we cannot tolerate it. The charge is so serious that I shall presently confirm it, as it will furnish me with a groundwork for the reforms in our whole administration, that I shall by and by suggest.

#### EXHAUSTION OF THE SOIL.

THE problem we have to deal with is seriously complicated by facts that have never secured the attention they ought to have commanded, and that have only of late years, indeed, been noticed at all:—I mean the exhaustion of the food stores of the people, the exhaustion of the soil itself, and the fact that there is no provision whatever in India for the poor, on which we may cast them in the famines which are now of necessary, normal recurrence in the country. It is a striking illustration of the perfunctory manner in which we have discharged our duties as rulers, that it is only within the last few years, that the suspicion has been excited that the soil over wide provinces of India is exhausted. The State is the great landlord of the country, and every report upon the vast estate it has administered, has teemed with descriptions of its tropical luxuriance. It was easy, of course, to be deceived by appearances; and the astonishing rapidity with which forest and jungle assert their dominion over fields that had been laid waste by the devastations of civil war, and the invasions to which the land was exposed, created an impression that the natural fertility of the soil was inexhaustible. We were living in a fool's paradise of our own creation. The alarming fact has at last dawned upon us that, instead of a fertile soil, the people are cultivating fields that show every symptom of exhaustion, when the returns to their industry are carefully investigated. The first suspicion of a fact that is now widely admitted arose in my own mind some ten years ago, while editing the *Agricultural Gazette of India*, a journal established by myself in 1869. Up to that time, there was no agricultural journal of any kind in India. In establishing it, I had no foregone conclusions to establish. I was simply impressed with the necessity of some such periodical in a country so purely agricultural, and in which the revenue of the State was absolutely dependent upon the land. I was led to its establishment by a belief that the State assessments upon the land were out of all proportion lower than they



be. The assurance of Mountstuart Elphinstone and others that the land was held to be moderately assessed under our predecessors when the State claim was limited to a third of the gross produce of the soil, had been ever present to my mind, during the many years in which I had strenuously opposed the permanent settlement, as it is called, of the State demand. I saw clearly that, from the simplicity of the people's tastes and mode of life, we could never hope to derive a revenue of any importance from indirect taxation of the order that yields so immense a proportion of our own national income. I knew, meanwhile, that the gross claim of the State upon the soil of India amounted, in round figures, to but £20,000,000 sterling a-year; and to suppose that this amount represented one-third of the gross produce of the agriculture of the country seemed to me a *reductio ad absurdum*; while, to heighten its intensity, the statement was made on all hands that our "assessments" were so heavy that, instead of one-third of the produce only, they formed a rack-rent of one-half the crops. I began, therefore, twenty years ago, to urge upon the Government the absolute necessity of statistical inquiry into the agriculture of the country; and I at last established the *Agricultural Gazette*, as a record of every fact concerning it that appeared in the newspapers of India, or that I could gather from the reports of our officers who were engaged in the survey and settlement of the land. The Central Provinces were at that time under process of "settlement," and, in studying the reports of the officers engaged therein, my attention was arrested by the fact that they all agreed in declaring that the famous black soil of the Nerbudda Valley yielded but a return of 350 lbs. to 600 lbs. of wheat to the acre. The same figures, or nearly the same, were returned by every officer engaged in the work; but none of them being practical agriculturists, its strangeness escaped remark by them altogether. Now, I knew that the average yield of wheat per acre in England was twenty-eight bushels per acre, fifty to sixty bushels being a not infrequent return to high farming. For a long time I insisted that the returns must be erroneous, and considerable discussion arose as to the fact. Suffice it to say, that it slowly dawned upon me that this proverbially rich soil really yielded no larger a return than was affirmed; and in carrying my inquiries into "settlement" proceedings in the North-west Provinces, I found the general fact to be that, instead of the soil possessing the extraordinary fertility that had been supposed, there was every symptom of its exhaustion. A very remarkable settlement of the land was made in the time of the Emperor Akbar, by his great Minister, Todur Mull, whose assessments, I found, were not empirical, and put our own

entirely to shame. He began by instituting a careful and minute record in *all the provinces of the Empire*, as to the actual yield of the soil; and he had the inquiry protracted over a cycle of nineteen years, before he ventured to affirm the average returns to the cultivator's industry. Now, these observations are all recorded in the *Ayeen Akberri*, and in comparing them with the less systematic and less protracted, but still careful, inquiries of our own officers, at intervals in the last hundred years, there seems to be no doubt whatever, that the soil has steadily deteriorated in fertility, until over wide areas of country the wonder is that the land should be cultivated at all. I do not think there can be a reasonable doubt that one part of the problem we have to face at the outset, is the alarming fact that, with a rapidly increasing population pressing upon the soil, its fertility is steadily diminishing, except in the deltaic regions of Bengal, Burmah, Coconada, and Sindh. The fields are cultivated with the utmost patience and diligence, but there is no manure for them, except immediately around the villages, and no stock to re-fertilize them. The cattle have dwindled in number and in size, as the cultivators have become poorer and poorer, the pasture lands becoming more and more contracted, from the necessity of raising supplies of food for an increasing population. Now, any inquiry into Indian finance that ignores this vital subject will be useless for all purposes of improved or hopeful administration, and it is idle to conceal from ourselves how vast and complicated the task really is.

I may here point out that the great question of irrigation is so closely connected with the subject that it must be regarded as part of it. It has been too readily taken for granted that, under a tropical sun, we need simply water to insure the productiveness of the soil. The problem is far from being of this simple order. It has yet to be established that the vast and costly system of artificial irrigation by which we have hoped to protect the North-west Provinces from famine, is not accelerating the exhaustion of the soil, while containing within itself the seeds of fatal and unforeseen evils. I merely mention the subject here, as another factor in the difficult problem with which we have to deal.

#### EXHAUSTION OF THE FOOD STORES.

A question closely connected with this exhaustion of the soil, is the exhaustion of the food stores of the country, which is the immediate cause of the terrible suddenness with which famine in modern days supervenes upon a failure of harvest. The

time is well within the memory of many old officers still living, when there was not a village in India that had not a year or two's supply of grain in store as a provision against famine. To this hour, no well-to-do ryot in Lower Bengal and other districts feels at ease in his mind, unless he has a full two years' supply of rice or other grain stored under his own hand. The horrors of famine are so burnt into the cultivator's mind, that no price will tempt him to leave his homestead bare of food.

Now, the decrees of our civil courts and our railways between them have so completely exhausted these stores, that over wide areas of country there are no food stores whatever, to feed the people in emergencies. Fifty years ago, there was not a village in the Deccan, that did not normally hold large supplies of grain in store, as a provision against failure of the rains and harvests. The trader or banker formed but one of the brotherhood of the village community, and though holding a lien upon these village stores, he never dreamed of forcing their sale to repay himself his advances. He could not indeed have sold them, for in the absence of communications with the markets that have grown up under our rule upon the coast, there were no markets to which he could send them. The disintegration of the village communities, that has followed upon the introduction of our civil courts, has broken up all sense of brotherhood and common sympathy between the Marwarree money-lender and the ryot; and, under the temptation of high prices, and the facility of sending the village stores to the Coast ports by railway, the food stores have been drained to absolute depletion. The villagers are consequently now living literally from hand to mouth; the surplus grain of a bountiful harvest is no longer garnered in their homesteads for seasons of scarcity, but goes at once into the Marwarree's hands, for transport to the export markets upon the coast. This exhaustion of the food stores of the people, has been steadily progressing under our rule until they have disappeared. In the terrible famines of the last few years, the very last reserves appear to have been reached, by the tapping of the Chutteesghur and Raipore districts, in the hitherto inaccessible country beyond Nagpore. Within the last very few years it was common enough for the grain of those districts to lie rotting in the villages, or to remain unreaped in the fields, from the absence of any market for it, and the want of communications. The sore distress of the last four years has now tapped even these last reserves of the country, and I instance the fact simply to illustrate how complete the process of depletion has become. Here again, consequently, is another great

factor in the terrible problem we have to deal with. We have an exhausted soil, and a vast population living thereon without food stores of any kind in reserve. And then comes the final consideration, that this population is entirely dependent upon its own resources, and that there is no means whatever of replenishing them from abroad. It is this last fact that gives such importance to an inquiry into the propriety, in the existing circumstances of the country, of permitting the export of food therefrom, when famine looms upon the land.

#### *EXPORT OF FOOD.*

It cannot be too vividly apprehended, that India depends absolutely upon herself, for the food required to sustain her population alive, and I should hope that the attention of the Famine Commission has been closely directed to the fact. I urged it upon the Commission, while it was sitting in India, with much persistence, as I am impressed strongly with the conviction that the export of food should certainly be arrested in India whenever famine is seen to be approaching. A very few minutes' reflection suffices to show that there are no markets whatever from which food can be drawn to India under the attraction of high prices. In the first place, there are no stores upon which India can possibly draw, and consequently no markets to supply her wants. Because England is able to draw wheat in large fleets from California, Canada, and Australia, for the supply of say ten millions of her population, the thought is entertained that the millions of India might do so too. But when famine overtakes any province of India, its population must perish, unless some other province of India can supply it with food. The one mistake made in the treatment of the Behar and Bengal famine of 1873-74 was the not recognizing this fact, and so the costly attempt was made to supply the distressed districts with rice drawn from distant Siam. Political economy was supposed to teach that the markets should be left free at such periods, and that we should trust the attraction of high prices to draw food in the necessary quantities from distant markets. But there are no such markets for India to look to. It was Burmah and the Punjaub that supplied the Bengal need, while the Government itself had to be the importer. The exhaustion of the food stores of India, and her absolute dependence upon her own fields for their replenishment, invest this question of the export of food in times of scarcity deepening into famine, with great urgency; and as these periods are now of normal recurrence, the whole question of

Indian Finance is mixed up therewith. I mention, in connection with this subject, the mournful fact that, owing to the universal indebtedness of the cultivating classes, a favourable or bumper harvest only aggravates the misery of the people. The price of grain at such periods falls to nothing, and the money-lender takes the crops for a mere song. Here again, is a vital factor in the fiscal problem. By exacting the land revenue in money, we compel the cultivator to let his harvest go to the money-lender, for whatever he is pleased to give him. I have long thought, and persistently suggested, that the experiment of taking the *land revenue in kind* ought to be tried, under competent supervision. I know of course, the stereotyped objections that are raised to payments in kind; but India is in circumstances new to political economy altogether. Economists have never yet imagined such a condition of things as exists therein; and I care nothing for my own reputation in affirming that we ought long since to have tried intelligently the experiment of reverting to the system of taking payment of the *land revenue in kind*, to checkmate, as I think we could thereby, the trade of the money-lender. I can only say that I should like to have the trial of such an experiment entrusted to myself. As it is, we have reduced the cultivator to a condition of abject poverty by insisting upon payment in money; and it is not too much to ask that we should try the experiment, upon a limited scale, of reversing our action. The way to try it is simple enough, except to men who persist in crying, "There is a lion in the way." Give me a single pergunnah in Oudh, and let me select my own instruments, and if I did not in five years show a peasantry redeemed from poverty, I am very much deceived. As the great landlord of these stricken millions, whom our own action has reduced to destitution, we have duties towards them that will never be discharged under the hide-bound, routine, perfunctory system we have set up over them, as the final outcome of our statesmanship.

#### INDIA MUST NOT BORROW.

The importance in these circumstances, of our completing the railway communications of the country should, one might think, need no enforcement. It is the railways that have exhausted the food stores of the country, and it is to them mainly we must now look to equalize the distribution and price of every provincial harvest. It was a most fatal mistake that was made a year ago by the late Government, in stopping all expenditure upon public works that could be stopped, and not only so but in breaking up the

admirable staff that had been slowly organized by twenty long years of effort. Had Mr. Fawcett but understood India as fully as he sympathizes with it, he would never have lent his influence to this disastrous and most wasteful step. We shall have to rebuild what the exigencies of the Afghan War led the ex-Ministry into pulling down. If the people of India are not to become an opprobrium to British rule by perishing of hunger thereunder every few years by millions, we must press on to completion a network of railways, that will enable us at any moment to direct what surplus food there is in its provinces, to localities where the harvests have failed. Happily for the people and for us, it is not often that a failure of the rains is general. A scanty rainfall on the western side of India, will not infrequently mean a very heavy fall in the Nerbudda Valley and the north-west. But famine is very quick in its operation. A week's actual want of food in any district means the death of millions, and our railway system must be carried to far greater lengths than it now is, to equalize the distribution of food amongst the provinces. If we are to wait for the completion of the system until we can do it out of dribblets of savings from the taxes—as no other land on earth has been made to wait—we may make up our minds to the constant recurrence of calamities such as those of the last four years, the true story of which, if told, would make every one's ears tingle that heard it. America constructed 80,000 miles of railway in the very same period during which we painfully managed to build 7,000 by fits and starts, ever stopping to take breath and ask if we were not going too fast! No one doubts that America did wisely to construct this vast system of communications out of borrowed capital. Had she adopted the principle we have laid down in India, and decreed that her people should go without railways until they could build them out of savings from the taxes, does any one suppose that she would to-day have an annual revenue showing £21,000,000 of surplus in a single year?

It is impossible not to feel indignant with the narrow selfishness of which our financial relations with India have ever been the expression. We seem incapable of a generous thought towards our great dependency, in our determination to be absolutely "safe" as regards the Home charges. Thus it is selfish timidity only that prevents our seeing that our only wise policy is to construct *all* works for the improvement of the land out of the cheap capital that English capitalists offer with both hands for the purpose. We might, if we pleased, establish a sinking fund, over a period of years, for the redemption of the loans. Instead of this, India is required herself to find the capital she wants, or to go without

roads, railways, and canals, in spite of the "incalculable," the "incredible," the "enormous benefits" which the English capital we have had the daring to borrow is yielding, by Sir John Strachey's own statement. It is not statesmanship; it is the neglectful selfishness that has neither heart to conceive nor inclination to study, what the hope of profitable relations between the two countries prescribes. I hold to-day, upon this subject, the language I have ever held. In the midst of incessant official changes of view, I have never ceased to point out that our true policy in the matter of public works is that which was timidly followed in the construction of the guaranteed lines of railway, that are now admitted to rank among the chief benefits of our rule. Instead of wisely committing ourselves to this policy for good, we have adopted it one year only to abandon it the next, revive it timidly in the third, and then knock it altogether on the head in the fourth. The perpetual changes of policy that have been made, have been a scandal for the weakness they have disclosed in our government of the country. At one time we have made up our minds that the railways and canals of India should really be made with the cheap capital that England is offering to us for the purpose, and that India alone of all the world is not permitted to accept. At another, we are told that we ought to build them out of an income tax that reached but one man out of a thousand; at another, that it is right to borrow for railways, but not for canals; at another, that we ought not to borrow for either; at another, that we must break up the public works expenditure into fanciful divisions of ordinary and extraordinary, directly remunerative and indirectly remunerative outlay. Three years ago, a new division was made, and "*the partially directly remunerative, indirectly wholly so,*" were to be built out of taxes. I long since lost all patience with the folly. The accounts of India, honestly and intelligently summarized for the last twenty-five years, showing its expenditure out of taxes upon railways and canals, and the enormous simultaneous outlay upon new and permanent barracks, new roads, new civil buildings of all kinds—that should have been constructed upon the principle of a sinking fund throughout—would show that no country in the world, except England, has so clear a right to borrow. Made out properly, a summary balance-sheet of the last twenty years would show that, instead of deficit, there has been an immense surplus. Our financiers have never been able to see the wisdom of such an exposition of the national credit. They would seem almost to have wished to injure the credit of our dependency, and place it at a disadvantage in the money markets of the world.

When I think of the Afghan War, and the two score millions that will be engulfed therein before the army, in its disorganized condition, with depleted arsenals, and bloated departments, is brought back to its normal condition, and recal the fatal break-up of the Public Works Staff as a measure of economy, I feel that if ever men deserved impeachment, it is the men who betrayed the nation into this heavy crime, and then sought to redeem their credit by a ruinous and wasteful blow at the very foundation of the one great department on which all hope of the future rests. We must rebuild the Public Works Staff, but pay it less, and *must borrow boldly* the capital required for the great public works which the exigencies of the country absolutely necessitate.

### *EFFECTS OF BRITISH RULE.*

WHAT the Government and people of England have to wake up to, is the fact that instead of British rule having enriched the people of India, it has reduced the masses of them to a poverty so abject as to be nearly incredible. The fact of their growing impoverishment under British rule, and by that rule as its cause, is persistently concealed from this country in the official reports of our Administration. The Parliament and people of England are flattered and amused from one year's end to another, by delusive official accounts of the growing enlightenment and prosperity of the people under "the blessings of British rule;" while the leading journal of the Metropolis systematically lends its columns to the support of the plausible tale, and resents every effort to disabuse the public mind of the delusion. It has been my invidious task for years in India to expose the hollowness of official assurances upon this subject; and while respected, I believe, as an authority upon Indian economics and finance, I have of necessity incurred much ill-will and unpopularity from my refusal to look at matters through the coloured spectacles with which non-official, as well as official, Englishmen in India are accustomed to see things. The conviction has steadily grown upon me, that we are committed to an impossible task in attempting to "govern" India directly as we do by an executive machinery so foreign as our own to the social life, habits, traditions, and sympathies of the people. Asked to sum up my own appreciation of what our rule has done for India in the way of benefit to its people, I should reply that we have rescued it from the anarchy into which it had fallen through the break-up of the Mohammedan rule, and from the constantly recurring fear of inva-



sion. In addition to the great blessing of domestic order and outward security, our presence has given a shock to the people that is everywhere awakening them from the sleep of ages, and familiarizing them with a new order of ideas. The missionary, the schoolmaster, and the University, have happily united, and are steadily raising the popular standard of opinion and thought amongst the people, and introducing, by Western literature, the conception of a higher morality and of a new political life amongst them. To these benefits must be added the introduction of the railway, telegraph, and cheap postal systems, with the impetus they give to the growth of industrial life and the widening of the mental horizon of a people. Finally, there is the enrichment of the classes who are engaged in the conduct of the external trade of the country, and of the small zemindar class, transformed into landlords of the English type, in Bengal, by the mistaken legislation of Lord Cornwallis; an error allowed to be repeated but ten to fifteen years ago by Sir Richard Temple in the Central Provinces. I think I have now summed up all the advantages that can be predicated as the fruits of British rule.

On the other hand, the evils which have resulted from that rule are, I believe, incalculable. In our insular impatience of every national institution that differed from our own; our rule has been one sustained effort to fuse and recast everything in India, in the moulds of English thought, feeling, and development. In our impatience of what we frequently despised, for no other reason than that we did not understand it, we have broken down every relation of class to class, and disintegrated the whole social and political life of the people. The subversion of Native rule, and the substitution of a rule of foreigners in its stead, was a vast revolution in itself; while not content with this change in the life of the people, we have set ourselves from the first to remodel their every institution upon Western and, indeed, English ideas. And the result is what might have been foretold. The people are docile, and accustomed by long ages of submission, to obey their rulers blindly. They have conformed to our laws and regulations, without a thought of actively resisting us; and to-day India presents the spectacle of a vast and noble tree that has been torn up from the soil, while every leaf droops and withers from the disruption of its roots. My own belief, I confess, is that the future well-being of India is now largely dependent upon the fate of its Native States. These have escaped, hitherto, the violent disintegration of their old national and social life, while they have all the advantage of immediate contact with the forces for good, that redeem our direct rule from

being a pure, unmitigated curse to our subjects. Instead of contracting the area of Native rule, the time I am persuaded, has come when we should reverse our action altogether and steadily place back under Native administration, much of the territory we have unwisely annexed, and brought under a rule that can never in the nature of things prove a successful one. A few years of delusive and seeming prosperity have commonly enough attended upon our "annexations," to be followed by a period of steady and continuous decline, without hope of recovery, so far as I can see, but from the retracing of our steps, and undoing what we have hastily done. I must not be understood for a moment to mean that I would withdraw from empire in India. We could not do so, even if we desired it. Nor is there any need. But we must be content with Empire, and gradually withdraw from the impossible task we are now attempting of directly administering the domestic affairs of the people. The task is impossible. We are separated from their sympathies by a gulf which there is no bridging. Instead of drawing nearer to the life and regard of the people, we are of necessity becoming more and more alienated therefrom; and it is Utopian to dream of counteracting this natural tendency of things by the praiseworthy efforts of individual Englishmen and Englishwomen, moved by a generous pity for the people whose rule we have undertaken only to find out how impossible is the task. The possibility of amelioration by legislation, mainly of a "repealing" order, I do not doubt; but the only adequate reform we can make is by withdrawal from a position that is a false and impossible one in its very nature. Instead of attempting to retain the administration of the Berars in our hands, at the expense of our reputation for good faith and justice towards the Nizam, or framing excuses for prolonging our hold upon Mysore, simply that we may keep it as a "preserve" for so many well-paid appointments, every consideration of honour and regard for the well-being of the people requires us to give both back with spontaneous readiness and grace. Prolong our direct administration of affairs in India as we may, we shall never have anything to show as its results, that is not of the sickly and exotic order of hot-house cultivation. If we would see India really reaping what we call "the blessings of British rule," it is a fruit that must be grown "in the open." British rule will have to be confined to the natural and legitimate task of being a wall about the people, until their contact with European civilization and their growth and consolidation into a self-governing community or communities, shall enable them to relieve us of the task. The state of our finances in India is but the outcome of the unnatural

system of meddlesome government that we have set up over them, under which the natural development of the people from within, is paralyzed and made impossible.

#### NATIVE ADMINISTRATION.

About two years ago, a Revenue officer in the Nizam's service, knowing the interest I have taken for many years in the condition of the people, sent me a copy of a report he had just sent in to the Nizam's Government as to the state of his district. I knew previously how successfully the Nizam's territory was being administered by the Nawab, Sir Salar Jung, to whom we owe so heavy a debt as a nation, but this report astonished me. The writer (Mr. Furdoonjee Jamshedje, Superintendent of the Revenue Survey, H.H. the Nizam's service) did not himself know the full significance of his statistics, and I wish to be allowed to reproduce here a notice of the report, which I wrote in the *Calcutta Statesman* at the time :—

“ We have now before us some very interesting extracts from a Settlement report of the Nizam's districts in the Decçan, adjoining the very territories in which the misery of our own ryots led to the disturbances of 1874-75. The astonishing success of Sir Salar Jung's administration has been known to us for years, and the Government could hardly do better, we think, than make it the subject of close investigation. The popular belief that the Native States are very badly administered, is, we are convinced, one of those delusions that exact inquiry would go far to dissipate. Were it true, it is inconceivable that the people should deliberately prefer such rule to our own. We remember being greatly struck some years ago, when reviewing the Settlement report of the Soopa talook in the Surat collectorate, by the fact disclosed by the Settlement officer (Mr. Beyts), that although the talook was in an unusually prosperous condition, there was a steady migration of the people therefrom into adjoining districts belonging to the Gaekwar. Now this migration was going on, at the worst period of what was declared to be infamous misrule in those territories. Mr. Beyts declared himself puzzled to account for the migration, and well he might be. The Soopa talook possesses an exceedingly rich and fruitful soil, and although our highest assessment was but Rs. 9 the acre, the ryots were steadily leaving our territory for the Gaekwar's, where the very same soil was assessed at Rs. 26 per acre. Such assessments are hardly known in India except in Guzerat, and we know no inquiry the Government could undertake, so likely to

bear important fruits as a close investigation, by really able officers, into the circumstances that lead to this exodus. For it is not in Guzerat only, that it occurs. We have heard at intervals, for years past, of the people leaving the Central Provinces in shoals, and migrating therefrom into the Nizam's territories on the one side, and the Gwalior territories on the other. Phenomena of this kind are so suggestive, that were our administrators but alive to their importance, they would search to the bottom of them to find out their real causes. Mr. Beyts, we remember, attributed the migration from the Soopa talooka into the Gaekwar's villages to the fact that no grog-shops were allowed in the latter; and he told us that we were losing the quietest and best disposed and most respectable of our own cultivators, by their inability to endure the evils which our licensed grog-shops had introduced into British villages. This may have been, and probably was, one of the causes of the exodus, but we suspect that our administration of justice, our civil courts, would be found to have very much to do with it. In the Central Provinces, we have a strong suspicion that Sir Richard Temple's 'malgoozar' would be found to be the evil, from which the people are escaping across the frontier. We can but call the attention of the Government to these phenomena; and we have done so repeatedly. We have now, by accident, this Settlement report of the Paitan talooka of the Nizam's territories before us, and while our own districts in that part of the Deccan are filled with a body of despairing cultivators, who are completely in the hands of the Marwarree money-lender, and rising in their wrath upon him to destroy him, we find the Nizam's territory flourishing, and filled with a prosperous peasant tenantry. The administration of the Nizam's provinces came under Salar Jung's hands in 1853, and this Paitan talooka at that period seems to have been suffering from a long course of oppression, under the ruinous system of 'farming' the revenues, that was allowed to prevail in the Khas Mehal (Government) estates of Bengal, down to Sir George Campbell's rule only the other day. The Board of Revenue, which has much to answer for in Bengal, had perpetuated this fatal system; and we think it was Sir George Campbell who finally swept it away. In Paitan, as everywhere else, it had ground the people into the dust; but better days came for them under Sir Salar Jung. The system of farming the revenues, was put an end to once for all. The assessments were reduced—probably in imitation of what Salar Jung saw our own officers Wingate and Goldsmid doing in our Deccan collectorates—and remissions of arrears were granted the unhappy people. A stop was put to the exaction of *nuzzerana*, or

presents, enforced upon the ryots on all occasions of rejoicing, marriages, and festivals. The numerous cesses imposed upon the people under incessant pretexts were swept away and abolished, and the annual settlement of the assessments was made direct with the ryot. And now observe what followed. Slowly but steadily, the face of everything began to change; and the ryot to arise from his wretched and stricken condition. The unhappy peasantry who had been driven from their ancestral lands, at once began to return to their old loved heritage, with the passionate fidelity that is so striking a feature of the people. Plenty began to smile upon the land; the old fires that had gone out were rekindled on the old hearths of the deserted homesteads. But Mr. Furdoonjee's figures are more eloquent than any words, and we invite the attention of the Government to the following statistical facts of this Paitan talooka, that they may be contrasted with the misery that is driving our own tenantry into rebellion, in the adjoining districts of Ahmednuggur. We cannot afford room for the figures in detail, but give them at intervals of five years, simply remarking that the progress is continuous, year by year, throughout the period :—

Cultivated.			Assessment.		Cultivators.	
Acres.			Rs.		Mirasdars.	Oopris
1854	...	51,528	...	98,805	719	932
1859	...	99,618	...	1,19,385	820	1,095
1864	...	113,201	...	1,49,083	1,200	1,488
1869	...	124,419	...	1,59,321	1,425	1,503
1875	...	157,544	...	1,55,656	1,573	1,444

"We ask the Government earnestly to lend us its attention as we look at these figures. The most uninformed, the most casual observer, sees that there is astonishing progress here: but no uninformed eye can tell its possessor what the figures really indicate. We ask our Settlement officers to look at the figures. Some of them will discern what they mean, if others do not. Even Mr. Furdoonjee, who records them, does not seem to discern the significance of what they really disclose. You have here proof of a people progressing in a prosperity the roots of which go deep down into the soil. Does the reader observe—that whereas at starting the *Oopri* cultivators heavily outnumbered the *Mirasdar*, the fact is at least reversed, and that in the last year of the record we have 1,573 *Mirasdars* against 1,444 *Oopris*? Well, the *Mirasdar* of the Mahratta country, and of Southern India generally, is the "occupancy ryot" of Bengal, and something more; while the *Oopri* is the tenant-at-will. While the "occupancy ryot" is being destroyed by the ten thousand, under the Temple-settlement of the Central Pro-

vinces, and is doomed to disappear, the class is steadily growing under the Salar-Jung-settlement of the Nizam. No more striking fact could be recorded; none more gratifying. The *Mirasdar* is the peasant cultivator whom no man can turn out of his homestead; and here, under Native rule, if nowhere else in India, is this happy phenomenon found. *Miras* means more than occupancy: it means private property. The iron hand of the Mogul obliterated it widely, and under our rule it has all but disappeared. The *Mirasdars* are the village commune. The one tenure is free, the other a base tenure. We cannot hope to make the general reader understand what the fact means in village life, or its enormous importance to the people. It is what we want everywhere in India, and what, by an unhappy perversity, we have been destroying almost everywhere, and notably of late years in the Central Provinces. The *Oopri* does not belong to the village at all. He is called in to assist the *Mirasdars*, and is simply their tenant-at-will, being a stranger to the commune. Mr. Furdoonjee would do well to inquire closely into the important fact which his figures disclose, and tell us how it has come about. We can see partly how it has; for observe, in the next place, that while the cultivated area is more than three times as large in 1875 as it was in 1854, the assessments aggregate but 55 per cent. more than they were. Thus the assessment has fallen from an average of Re. 1-14-0 per acre in 1854 to less than Re. 1-0-0 per acre in 1875. Here is Sir Salar Jung's secret, the talisman by which he has created his 1,573 *Mirasdars*. And observe, finally, that while the average size of the holdings in 1854 was but 31 acres, it had risen in 1875 to 52 acres. The facts are simply astonishing, and if the Government were wise, it would at once depute an officer to inquire closely into the condition and progress of the talooka. Lest any should think that we write this article to glorify Salar Jung and Native rule, we tell them that the report reached us quite unexpectedly but a few hours ago, from Mr. Furdoonjee himself, with the following letter:—

Aurangabad, Deccan, June 27.

DEAR SIR,—Your encouraging review of my report on the present condition of the cultivators in H.H. the Nizam's dominions, which appeared in the December number of the *Indian Agriculturist*, emboldens me to send you to-day, by book post, a further extract from my Settlement report. I trust you will think it interesting enough to give it insertion in your invaluable journal, the *Indian Agriculturist*. Apologising for the liberty I have taken in addressing you,

FURDOONJEE JAMSHEDJEE,  
Superintendent of Revenue Survey and Assessment,  
H.H. the Nizam's Service.

"The truth is, Mr. Furdoonjee does not himself see the full significance of his statistics, our comments upon which will, we have no doubt, surprise him a good deal. Now, here is a picture of Native rule, accidentally brought under our eyes for review. We know no part of British India that we could turn to for a picture like it; and we have no doubt whatever, that if any intelligent and well-informed officer of the Government goes down to this Paitan talooka to tell us all about it, he will find peculiarities of administration, bringing blessings to the people unknown under our own rule, because of the interval, the gulf, by which we are separated from Native life. We beg the Government once more, in conclusion, to depute some one to examine closely into the condition of things in this talooka, and we prophesy beforehand what he will find there. He will find there, to begin with, a very inexpensive administration. There will be no Englishmen, drawing salaries out of all proportion to the means and condition of the people; no civil courts, with a costly and complex machinery of highly-paid judges, a luxuriant and corrupt amlah, with swarms of pettifogging vakeels and pleaders to reduce the law and justice administered therein to a rogue's labyrinth; no corrupt police, tyrannizing over the people; no grog-shops, to demoralize the villages; no money-lenders owning the land, and cultivating it by a body of ryots, reduced to slavery under them. We think we may prophesy all this, and more, safely. It will be strange if he should not find some distress in the talooka, owing to the drought of the last two years, but we doubt if anything approaching to famine will be found there at all. What, then, could be more important than this inquiry? We have long thought that, instead of extending our administration in India, true wisdom would suggest our contracting the area of our direct rule wherever it was possible to substitute indigenous rule in its place.

"The truly astonishing facts disclosed in this casual report of the Paitan Talooka of the Nizam's country, should sink down into the mind of every man who really desires to see the people of India redeemed from the wretchedness and misery that are now wide-spread amongst them. Imagine for a moment, a district in which the average holding is fifty-two acres, while the people are everywhere rising into the status of the *Mirasdar*: Mr. Furdoonjee tells us that the cultivated area has risen in twenty-two years from 51,500 acres to 157,500, the average assessment simultaneously sinking from Re. 1-14-0 per acre to less than Re. 1-0-0. But the fact, surprising as it is, sinks into insignificance when we learn, in the next place, that whereas there were but 719 *Mirasdars* in 1853, the number had risen to 1,573 within twenty-two years; the *Oopri*

tenants of these *Mirasdars* rising from 932 in number to but 1,444. We have here every symptom of a prosperity, the roots of which go deep down into the very structure and framework of society. The *Miras* tenure is not known, we believe, either in Bengal or Northern India. It is a very ancient tenure of the Deccan and Southern India generally. Few ancient deeds of the kind remain, but modern ones were commonly enough stumbled upon by our Revenue officers when we succeeded to the Peshwa's rule. The tenor of the document, or *Miras-puttur* (pottah), as it was called, invariably runs that 'the possession is conferred from generation to generation, as long as the grantee or his heirs shall continue to pay the Government assessment according to the established usage of the village.' The deeds were granted by the mookudamm or patel of the village, all the *Mathubars* or magnates of the village signing them also, and all the *Bura balaotee*, or village officers, attesting the deed as witnesses. It was a solemn acceptance of the cultivator into the village brotherhood, the commune. Imagine a *mahajun* (money lender) claiming to enter it, under the decree of a Civil Court! The ruin we have wrought in India, by disintegrating and breaking up these organizations only that we might introduce our own insular, unwise institution of landlord and tenant, with 'freedom of contract' crazes, makes us ready sometimes to weep with passion. And infatuated as we are, we persuade ourselves that our rule is too good, too enlightened, for the people, whom we have simply destroyed by our insane conceit that what is not English must be bad and unwholesome, and should be got out of sight and under ground as quickly as possible. And a charlatan of a Richard Temple comes in with his *malgoozar*, to rack-rent and destroy the commune and the brotherhood of men standing shoulder to shoulder in all calamities, and carrying the village through famine as one man. What do a people like this want with poor laws or poor rates, when there is an elder brotherhood fighting the common calamity, and showing itself a very fatherhood to the unprivileged *Oopri* and the labourer, down to the very outcast of the community, the *Mang* and the *Mhar*. We must find space and time to tell our readers at length what it is that our rule has destroyed in India, and the misery we have occasioned by introducing institutions in its room, that deny every tradition of the people, outrage every sympathy in their nature, and have made a vast anarchy and chaos of all classes, setting every man's hand against his brother, in a selfish strife for individual safety. Visit this *Paitan* talook, and contrast the condition of its people with their state in our own adjoining districts, as described



by the Deccan Commission. Listen to what Mr. Pedder (Secretary to the Government of Bombay) told us two or three years ago—

In one case a Sowkar took advantage of the temporary absence of a perfectly solvent peasant to obtain, on the plea of his having absconded, an *ex-parte decree*, with immediate execution, on a bond of Rs. 500, borrowed to provide the land with the means of irrigation, sold the estate, worth Rs. 6,000, and bought it in himself for Rs. 1½!

“Again—

A few years ago, an old peasant in the Gaekwar's country, then infamously misgoverned, was complaining to a British officer of the oppression his village suffered from, but on being asked why he did not come into British territory, where land would be given him, he replied, “God forbid! At least we have no civil courts!” There is, however, a depth lower than penury or exile. Sometimes the wretched debtor executes an agreement which almost avowedly makes him the bond slave of his creditor. In one case cited by the Commission, a cultivator and his wife, after their land and property had been sold, passed a bond to labour for their creditor for thirteen years, *desh* or a *per-desh*, home or abroad, for food and tobacco and one blanket a year!

“And again—

Jan, an old widow, borrowed Rs. 150, many years ago, for the wedding of a son, since dead. Thirteen years ago, for this debt, she executed a mortgage bond for Rs. 300, and gave possession of her land, about forty acres, with a well. The Sowkar has had the entire produce of the land ever since, and will neither restore the land nor give an account. Twenty years ago, Andu borrowed Rs. 17, in cash, and a maund of grain—has paid at different times, in liquidation, Rs. 567, and has executed many bonds, two of which for Rs. 875 are now outstanding.

“And even these are not the worst cases. The Marwarree money lender, who alone can read or write in these villages, will even use his power to claim the cultivator's wife and daughter for his lusts as part of his bond. Our rule has proved but a blight and curse to the people over wide territories of the Empire; and the extent of the ruin must be known, apprehended clearly and forcibly, before an adequate remedy will be found. The perishing of those 500,000 people in the North-west last winter, is only a *symptom* of the widespread disease and ruin in the country, wrought by our mingled stupidity, conceit, and selfishness, while the misery of the people is crying to Heaven against us.”\*

\* The appearance of this article created some sensation at Simlah, and the Government of India did, I believe, institute inquiries, as I suggested, into the facts; but the public was not taken into its confidence. So much jealousy, moreover, is felt of the administration of Sir Salar Jung, and so much unwillingness to entertain the thought of returning the Berars to their rightful owner, the Nizam, his master, that there is room to fear that the Simlah Foreign Office is bent upon frustrating his efforts and making them abortive. Within the last two years they have forced a Co-regent upon him, with equal and, indeed, superior

Let me now contrast with this picture of Native rule the testimony of our own officers as to the condition of the cultivators in British territory. While a chorus of Indian officials in England were assuring us, then, last winter, that everything is well in India, and the *Times* was endorsing their assurances, and telling the world that they who say otherwise are "slanderers" of their countrymen, one of the oldest and most experienced members of the Civil Service in India, was quietly passing through the press an essay on "Agricultural Reform in India," which should sink deep into the mind of every one who seeks to know the truth upon the subject. The author of this essay is Mr. Hume, one of the few Indian civilians who have made agriculture their study. Ten years ago, Mr. Hume was selected by the late Earl Mayo to found the new department of Agriculture, Revenue, and Commerce, as it was at first called, the designation being afterwards changed to that of Revenue, Agriculture, and Commerce, under orders of the Secretary of State. Mr. Hume was Secretary in the department down to its abolition a few months ago, under the financial pressure brought upon us by the Afghan War. Mr. Hume is now freed from the trammels of an office that identified him too closely with the Government to make it possible for him to say publicly, what he now deems it his duty to make known as widely as he can. Instead, then, of confirming what Dr. Hunter said a few months ago at Edinburgh about British rule, Mr. Hume confirms every statement that I have ever made upon the subject, and every contention with which I have been identified for many years. The Anglo-Indian press, unfortunately, counts for so little in this country, that I rejoiced heartily at the appearance of Mr. Hume's "official" essay. What I had long wanted, and felt the want of keenly, at last came unexpectedly in the very shape, and at the very moment, I desired it to come. No man will question Mr. Hume's exact knowledge of the subject. If there is an authority in India upon the subject, it is he. His abilities, his long experience, and his ten years' incumbency of the Secretaryship to the Government of India, in the great department of Revenue, Agriculture, and Commerce, make him an authority from which there is no appeal. And Mr. Hume tells us that the statements which I have made as to the results of our rule upon the condition

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powers, whose character is so infamous that he was forbidden by our own Government ever to appear in the Nizam's durbar, when the British Resident was present. The result is that the Nizam's territory is again lapsing into disorder, and I fear that, terrible as the charge is, it is a true one, that this is being deliberately brought about by our Foreign Office to discredit Native rule. I am fully sensible of the gravity of the charge, but I have seen so much unscrupulous conduct in that office, that I am resolved to state boldly what I think.—  
H. K.

of the people, are not merely true, but are an under-statement of the facts. The burden of Mr. Hume's story is, that we have so unintelligently and apathetically governed the country, that we have allowed its agriculture—and it is a purely agricultural land—to go steadily from bad to worse, until the soil is at the point of exhaustion, and the people everywhere sinking into deeper and ever deepening poverty, until their wretchedness has become extreme. Every failure of harvests has, at last, come to mean famine. The people are still what they ever were—a patient, frugal, toiling people, deserving everything that enlightened rule can do for them; while our rule, though full of philanthropic aim, has been so unintelligent and so permeated with a blind belief in what is English, that we have broken up the old indigenous institutions of the people, under which they had grown up during two thousand years, in comparative ease and comfort, and substituted in their room “institutions” of our own, unsuited to the genius and traditions of the people, with the effect of disintegrating native society altogether, and demoralising and pauperising the people nearly everywhere :

Brimful of philanthropy, we could not let well alone, or indeed believe that anything could be well for others which was not in accordance with what we thought good for ourselves. With our innovations, our exotic systems of land and law, we have dissolved the bonds of society, we have turned peace into war, we have arrayed every class against that on which it was most dependent, capitalists against landlords, landlords against tenants, every man almost against his fellow. . . .

There is not, I believe, a single wise and good native of India who will not freely admit that, whatever the failings and shortcomings of individual officers the motives and intentions of the British Government, where India is concerned, have, on the whole, been pure and noble. But I fear that there is not one who would not condemn, in terms stronger than I have the heart to use, the cruel blunders into which our narrow-minded, though wholly benevolent, desire to reproduce England in India has led us. . . .

No one saw that the people were, on the whole, happy and contented as they were; that their past sufferings, where they had suffered, were due, not to any defects in their position or rights as established by custom, but to those rights having been ignored, and that custom having been over-ridden. . . .

Let others write panegyrics on those who “first planted the seeds of a civilised system of jurisprudence in India:” I, looking sadly now on the Upas tree that has crowned their labours, can only say:—

*Ille et nefasto posuit die,  
Quicunque primum, et sacrilegè manu,  
Produxit, arbos, in nepotum  
Pernicem, opprobriumque pagi!*

It is an injustice to Mr. Hume to produce but this single extract

from his essay, which teems with matter of the highest moment. If England is to continue to rule India, she must make radical changes in her system of government. A bureaucracy of strangers and foreigners, bent upon nothing but making a fortune, or earning a pension as quickly as possible to enable them to retire from the country, will never discern the real needs of 200 millions of people. A quick, deep, abiding sympathy with the people is wanted, and must be elicited in some way or other, where at present there is almost none. Was any people in the world ever yet governed wisely by strangers and aliens, the mass of whom regard their exile with impatience, and long to get it over, while engrossing to themselves every position of dignity, influence, and emolument in the land of their temporary sojourn? India presents at this moment, a problem of the deepest importance to the statesman, the economist, and the moralist alike. For myself, if I had no faith in what is sometimes sneered at as "England's mission" in the East, and in the Divine government of the world, I should look for a great cataclysm as its final close. The problem we have to deal with is *not* a hopeless one, but its solution involves what men without insight upon the subject call the loss of *prestige*. It means the giving back of territory to native, indigenous rule; abolishing the exotic, sickly, selfish, and impossible rule we are attempting to maintain in our own interests, treating India as a vast preserve for our sons and nephews to make their fortunes in.

I could not do better than ask to be allowed to put Mr. Hume's Essay into this paper bodily, containing as it does the fullest and most circumstantial endorsement of my estimate of the general results of our rule. "Wherever," says Mr. Hume, "we turn, we find agriculturists burdened with debts running on at enormous rates of interest. In some districts, *even provinces*, the evil is all-absorbing,—a whole population of paupers, hopelessly meshed in the webs of usurers." The italics are mine; and, with the exception of some parts of Bengal, British Burmah, and perhaps the Punjaub, Mr. Hume might, I think, have made the same general statement of the whole of British India. I think Mr. Hume should have said all this before, and not have waited the break-up of his department, before giving confirmation to my own persistent remonstrances upon the subject. Late as his testimony is, its nature is such, that to refuse any longer to open our eyes to the facts, would surely be criminal.

Another witness I shall again quote is Mr. W. G. Pedder, recently transferred from the Secretaryship to the Government of Bombay to a Secretaryship in the India Office. Here, again, no exception

can possibly be taken to the evidence. Mr. Pedder is a friend of my own, of a good many years' standing, and in days gone by was one of my most valued collaborateurs on the *Times of India*. When, two years ago therefore I determined to publish a *Statesman* in London for the purpose of enlightening home opinion as to the facts and results of our rule, I fully reckoned upon Mr. Pedder's sympathy; but the atmosphere that pervades his Service proved too much for him, and in reply to my invitation that he should assist me, I received, to my astonishment, a letter from him expressing strong disapproval of my whole enterprise. Our dirty linen should be washed in India, where there are no spectators to note its condition. Mr. Pedder could not stand its being aired in London. And yet he himself had exposed it pretty effectually, as it seemed to me, in the *Nineteenth Century* for September, 1877, from which I proceed to make another quotation or two. He is writing primarily of the Deccan cultivators, who under their complication of miseries, broke into riot and insurrection five years ago; but he says (p. 181):—

It must be remembered that the question of debt is an almost equally pressing one in almost every province of India, and equally affects not the yeomen alone, but every class of landowners, from the Rajpoot or Mohammedan noble to the aboriginal tribes of the hill and forest.

And what is this condition, this state of the masses under our rule? I cannot quote Mr. Pedder's harrowing facts; it is sufficient that I give his closing sentences:—

It is not too much to say that British honour, and the character, if not the stability, of our empire in India, are at stake. We justly reprobate Ottoman misgovernment, and pity the unhappy peasant of the Turkish provinces. *It is a serious reflection that almost equal misery is being inflicted over a far wider area, under the best-meaning of Governments, and through the most scientific of systems.* (p. 197.)

The italics are again mine. And yet Mr. Pedder warmly resents my publishing a *Statesman* in London, to make the deluded Home public take hold of these melancholy conclusions. He simply does not like non-official interference, in pointing out the national peril and dishonour. Mixed up with, and a part of this "best-meaning of governments" and "most scientific of systems," he does not like the direct challenge that it is the Government and the system that are the parents of the misery he portrays. It is his "own order" mainly that is answerable for this wretchedness, and he does not like the outside challenge that it is so. That we are committed to an impossible task, and that the outside observer should discern

this clearly and insist upon it, is naturally repugnant to the foremost men of the system.

Let me now turn to a smaller man, but an undoubtedly able one :—I mean Mr. C. J. O'Donnell, of the Bengal Civil Service, author of the well-known "Black Pamphlet," and brother of the Mr. Frank O'Donnell who contests with Mr. Parnell the leadership, in the House of Commons, of the Home Rule party. Mr. C. J. O'Donnell is a young civilian of some eight years' standing. He is an official of quick observation and generous sympathies, who has passed much of his Indian service in the province of Behar, and a month ago he published the results of his observation of our rule therein, in a pamphlet issued by Messrs. C. Kegan, Paul and Co., under the title of the "Ruin of an Indian Province." Nothing could be more painful or more true than the picture which Mr. O'Donnell draws of the condition of the twenty millions of people in Behar. I content myself with reproducing its final paragraph, in which Mr. O'Donnell says :—

As an official, I feel I have done no more than my duty. In India, every servant of the Crown is not only an official in the narrower sense of the word, bound by the rules of official subordination and reticence, but a trustee of the public honour. I have written under the sincere conviction that the condition of the great province of Behar, with its twenty millions of people, is a disgrace to the English name. (p. 31.)

Five or six years ago, when I was acting as one of the Secretaries of the Bengal Government, I gave some special attention to the condition of the cultivators in the province of which Mr. O'Donnell writes, and I found that, under the institutions introduced by ourselves into the province, the actual cultivator of the land received but six-sixteenths of the produce of his fields, the remaining ten-sixteenths being swallowed up by the Government demand upon his industry, or the claims of the middlemen class our legislation had given birth to, as a vampire upon the land. Imagine the condition of English agriculture under a system which exacted from the farmer two-thirds of his crops as rent and taxes !

I would stop here but that I must show what are the direct results of bringing territory administered by Native rule, under our own administration ; and I instance the little principality of Jhansi, so cruelly and unjustifiably confiscated in 1854 by the late Lord Dalhousie. A very painful picture of the misery of its people appeared in the semi-official *Pioneer* in 1878, occupying more than two columns of the paper, and describing very accurately, I believe, the causes which have proved so fatal, under British rule, to their well-being.

With official disingenuousness, however, the journal suppressed all mention of the fact that it is *our rule* that has destroyed the people. At the time when Lord Dalhousie declared this little principality escheat, assuring the English nation that there were no *heirs*, since the deceased Prince had left no *sons*, Jhansi was declared to be "the garden of India." I forget by whom the expression was used, but remember it very well; and no attempt was ever made to contest the statement that there was no province of India in which the people were more wisely governed, or afforded stronger evidences of material prosperity. But the earth-hunger was upon us, and in violation of our formal treaties with the State, we set aside the collateral heirs of the deceased Prince and his adopted son, that we might make the territory our own. The manner in which the spoliation was carried out was of a piece with the act itself. We appropriated not only the *Raj*, but the private possessions of the dead man and his little court. We put up to auction the very toys of the children in the zenana. We took everything, under the pretence that it was State property, and not private. The only thing that we refused to have anything to do with were the debts of the dead man. *They*, we said, were his private affair; everything else belonged to us, because he had left no heirs, and we, therefore, were of course his heirs. I speak from memory, but if I remember rightly, we took the whole of the private property, and told the Ranee to pay the debts as she could. We spoiled the widow and the relations of the dead Prince, of their livelihood and possessions, and within three years Jhansi was one of the centres of the rebellion, and the scene of the terrible tragedy known as the "massacre of Jhansi." The Ranee took up arms and fell, lance in rest against us, before Gwalior. She will be the heroine of a great romance some day, when the memory of her savage reprisals upon innocent Englishwomen and children have faded from men's memories. But the wrong we did this woman and her little Court, was a small matter compared with that we did her people. So little imagination have we, as a race, that it seems impossible to make the average Englishman understand the revolution which the substitution of British for Native rule really means. It means that there is no longer a Native gentleman or influential Native "official" left in the territory. The entire class is extinguished at a blow. The Court vanishes as at the touch of a wand. The men, women, and children of quality and condition, who constituted it, disappear into gullies and back alums, such as they are pining in to-day in Lucknow, there to perish slowly of inanition and want. Nurtured in luxury, and unaccustomed to fight their way in the world, owing to the seclusion

and state of dependence in which they have been brought up, the women take to embroidery or sewing, to obtain their daily bread. The men sink into vagabondage. Their story is, "We cannot dig; to beg we are ashamed." With the disappearance of the Court, its local expenditure disappears; and the revenues, instead of being spent within the State itself, are diverted by our collecting agency into the distant Imperial Exchequer, to pay the debts of an alien body of rulers, and maintain their armies, and the costly establishments incident to foreign rule. The whole fabric of Native society totters to its fall under the change, and is disintegrated and dissolved by the breaking up of the indigenous machinery for administering law and justice, and for the collection and disposition of the revenues. Everything is revolutionized at a stroke, the old fabric shivered to atoms, and a new brummagem article, worked by steam, is set up to "regenerate," as we say, the people. The destruction of the old landmarks of custom, usage, and wont, the strangeness of the new laws, the new *personnel* of the administration, the economic pressure of the foreign tribute upon their industry,—stun and paralyze the unhappy people; and before they are even aware of his powers under our rule, the curse of the usurer, the Marwarree, has spoiled them of their possessions. And then an "official" comes, at the end of the first twenty-five years, to paint, in interesting and sad colours, a picture of the ruin we have brought upon the people. But, with artistic skill, he takes care, while noticing every evil that afflicts the people, to keep carefully out of sight the source from which the evils have come upon them. The *khans* grass, the *bunneah*, the locusts, the Marwarree, fill the canvas of the painter. The guilty cause of all is artistically kept out of sight. In our selfish greed, we spoil a friendly people of all that nations hold dear, of all that we ourselves hold dear, and when a blight comes upon our course, and the people become a reproach to us for their misery, we are ready to acknowledge every cause of their ruin but the right one. If we really want to rescue the miserable people of Jhansi from the ruin we have brought upon them, we should give the territory back to its own rule. Put Dinker Rao, Salar Jung, any Native officer of high character and distinguished service and abilities, at the head of the Raj. Let him select his own judges, collectors, and native police, and pay them, not the wild salaries of our commissioners and collectors and English judges, but the modest wages of Native States. Cease to drain the people of their revenues for our own distant Exchequer. Shut up our costly and prostituted so-called courts of justice, where the rich oppressor and the scoundrel *amlah* rob the people of their possessions. Restore the punchayets,



and demand but *one thing* of the Prince you make ruler—"that Jhansi again becomes a garden of India" in his hands. Our life for it, the people will make it so. Instead of draining them of every anna we can get from them, leave *all* these for twenty years in restitution of our past wrong-doing; and let Jhansi pay, finally and permanently, simply its fair contribution towards the defence of the Empire. Give Jhansi over, I say, to enlightened *Native* rule, triumphing over the selfishness which has cursed both it and ourselves by its annexation. Exact nothing from the Prince we set up, but just, enlightened, loyal rule, and a fair tribute to the cost of defending the Empire. It is radical, statesmanlike reforms such as this that the dangerous and deplorable condition of India calls for. All the tinkering of our Legislative Councils and Acts of Parliament, will never accomplish what "restitution" would do. Restore Jhansi to Native rule. Make the Prince a real feudatory of the Empire. Bid him be upright and of good courage to undo the mischief that we have ourselves done, and know not how to undo; and we shall then "regenerate" Jhansi. We shall never regenerate it by English commissioners, collectors, and judges on salaries that place an impassable gulf between them and the people; or by laws that violate every instinct, tradition, and custom of the people; while we are simultaneously exhausting them of the revenues that should be spent within their own borders. Let there be nothing of *us* in the restored State but the moral purpose which the presence of Christianity in the country and the higher education of the universities have begotten. Let no one say "The men are *not* to be got." The men are to be got. The one thing we have done for India in our travail, is the birth of these men on all hands. Excluded from our older provinces, we must open for them a career in restored Native States. If we have but the courage of single-mindedness to do the right thing, there is regeneration of the people as the reward.

It is on grounds such as these, that I affirm our great want in India to be the want of statesmanship. It is not through defective book-keeping, or imperfect accounts, that we are in our present chronic state of distress. It is that we have mistaken our true *rôle* in India, and have accepted the selfish counsels of a short-sighted expediency for the suggestions of statesmanship. I might add a score of other testimonies to the miserable condition into which our rule has brought the masses of the people, and indicate at length its causes. But my purpose is to concentrate attention upon the general fact that our direct administration of affairs in India has ended in pauperizing the people, and in some instances, as that of Jhansi

and Oudh, with a rapidity that is positively startling. I know of no province to-day in India, of which it can be unhesitatingly affirmed that the masses of its people are in comfortable circumstances. I am not sure that it might not be affirmed of the eastern districts of Bengal, and partially perhaps, of the Central Provinces; but in both alike are the unsettling and disintegrating effects of our rule in full operation; and the problem of the rescue of the people from this state of matters, is the real problem of Indian Finance, if we mean to approach the subject with an adequate sense of our responsibilities.

### ABOLITION OF THE USURY LAWS.

We could have no more striking illustration of the evils which have resulted from our impatience, than the wide-spread ruin which has come upon the people through the abolition of the ancient usury laws of the country. By the Hindu law in force before the introduction of British rule, the utmost of a money debt that could be recovered at law by the money-lender, was double the original amount lent. In our ignorant impatience of a state of matters that we did not understand, and which we insisted upon reforming upon English methods, we abolished all usury laws whatever, and as the result, handed the cultivating classes over in mass, to a slavery to the money-lender worse than death itself.

There is no exaggeration, no extravagance of language in the statement. There are Indian civilians who have painted the picture in colours as dark as my own, while resenting the charge that it is their rule, the administration of their own narrow bureaucracy, that has produced this state of matters. Thus Mr. W. G. Pedder, the new Secretary at the India Office, translated thereto only a year ago from the Bombay Secretariat, and whom I have already quoted, describes the state of things as follows :—

The indebted peasant executes a bond bearing high interest, and burdened with onerous conditions. For a couple of years he is not pressed, but when the period of limitation is drawing near, he is told that his payments cover only what he has had in necessities, and that the sum borrowed with interest is still due. He pays something, and executes a fresh bond on still more onerous terms for the balance, with a premium for renewal. Then he pays all he can, yet, at the end of the next period of limitation, finds that the debt has increased. Perhaps the process of the execution of fresh bonds is repeated again and again, but at last the saukar deems it desirable to bring a suit. In nine cases out of ten it is decided *ex parte*, because, the people say, it is useless to appear in court unless they can deny execution of the bond sued on, or without the aid of a pleader whom they have not means to pay. The creditor then partially executes the

decree by sale of the cattle, household utensils, and other personal property of the debtor, and holds over him the threat of imprisonment in satisfaction of the balance. Even female honour is sometimes the price of forbearance, as in one case cited, in which a saukar thus compelled his debtor to give him his wife and daughter as mistresses. Thenceforward, lending the peasant on exorbitant terms the seed and cattle absolutely necessary for cultivation, he takes all the produce of the land except the barest subsistence of the nominal owner and his family.

But sometimes the creditor sells the land of the debtor in execution, and usually buys it in at a price very far below its value, leaving the balance of the decree unsatisfied, since no peasant dares to bid against a powerful saukar, and it would be thought unbusinesslike in another saukar to do so. Then the best that can happen to the unfortunate yecman is to remain as a tenant at will at an exorbitant rack-rent on the land he once owned. In one case cited the former proprietor is paying 67 rupees rent for fields the Government assessment on which is  $7\frac{1}{2}$  rupees. If the creditor does not allow this, the peasant flies the country, and tries to begin life again in some distant locality. A number of peasant families from near Poona were met by an official going to Holkar's country 300 miles distant, because "their lands were gone and their creditors were merciless." Even there, unless he takes refuge in foreign territory, the arm of the law reaches the judgment debtor as soon as he has got together a little property, and to this cause is attributed the failure of attempts to repeople a fertile valley among the Khandesh mountains deserted since the Pindari wars. As soon as the colonists, who are assisted with advances by Government, have acquired any property, it is seized in execution of decrees for old debts. Politically, it is a serious matter that the people should be forced to look to the independent States as their only refuge against the harshness of British justice.

A few years ago an old peasant in the Gaekwar's country, then infamously misgoverned, was complaining to a British officer of the oppression his village suffered from, but on being asked why he did not come into British territory, where land would be given him, he replied, "God forbid! At least, we have no civil courts!" There is, however, a depth lower than penury or exile. Sometimes the wretched debtor executes an agreement which almost avowedly makes him the bond slave of his creditor. In one case cited by the Commission, a cultivator and his wife, after their land and property had been sold, passed a bond to labour for the creditor for thirteen years, "desh wa par-desh," at home or abroad, for food and tobacco and one blanket a year.

Now, this testimony is not yet three years old. It appeared in the *Nineteenth Century* of September 1877. I felt reasonably sure that I could count upon Mr. Pedder's sympathy when I told him in 1878 that I contemplated establishing the *Statesman* in London to familiarize the English public with the deplorable condition of things that he had himself thus forcibly described. Instead of this, as I have already said, he resented the proposal warmly. He believes honestly, I have no doubt whatever, in a reform that is to come from within the bureaucracy itself; while I am sure that the hope is chimerical. All history testifies that no bureaucracy ever reforms itself; and it is idle to hope for effectual reforms in India from a body so jealous

of all outside criticism as the Indian Civil Service, and so ready to resent every attempt to throw the light of publicity upon their proceedings, or to enforce responsibility for such guilty conduct as there was among them at Simlah in getting up the Afghan War. The nation will have to pull the Service down, and reconstruct the administration in a way that will secure the full light of day streaming through its every department. I need hardly point out how fully Mr. Pedder admits in the passage I have extracted from his essay, the substance of every charge I prefer against our rule. The abolition of the ancient law and custom of the people as to usury, has been one of the chief causes of the wide-spread misery under our rule; and, as Mr. Pedder says, the people prefer Native rule thereto, even of "the infamous order" of the late Gaekwar's. What more have I said? What more can I say? What Mr. Pedder says is true. British rule is destroying the people, and I have long felt that we should contract that rule as rapidly as we safely can, and restore the people to Native administration.

I add to Mr. Pedder's testimony that of Mr. H. P. Malet, formerly of the Bombay Council, whose personal knowledge of that Presidency stretches over the last half-century. Mr. Malet is writing of the cultivators of the Deccan, the very same class that is flourishing so greatly under Sir Salar Jung's administration of the Nizam's districts, and he says :—

These men are good subjects; patient, enduring, and brave, but very ignorant, very careless, and very-confiding. A commission was appointed to inquire into the grievances which caused the outbreak of 1875. It only proved the continuance of a great evil; nothing new was elicited. All the grievances had been reported on over and over again, between 1833 and 1838; but, with the exception of the Government of Lord Clare, little notice was taken of them. Lands, houses, implements of husbandry, cattle, and goods are all liable to sale, and are sold. The civil courts are now solely used against the cultivators; forgery, perjury, and false accounts are brought into play against those who have no wit of their own, and no money to buy other wit to help them. Time is life to them, the cases went by default, decrees satisfied the bankers, the civil courts became the ruin of thousands. These thousands were the payers of Government revenue; previous to 1836 their oppressors had to assist the general purse; it was right and fair that they should pay taxes for the protection to life and property given by our rule. In 1834 I was ordered to inquire into what were called "objectionable taxes." Those taxes included the bankers and grain dealers, who levied from 75 to 250 per cent. interest from the ryots. In my report of these district taxes I suggested that, as they might be required at some future time, they should be held in abeyance. Before finishing my report on the city of Poona, I was ordered on other duty. Mr. (now Sir) Bartle Frere took up the duty, and eventually the bankers, dealers, and pawnbrokers were relieved from Government taxation, with a promise that the old taxes should never be imposed again. The measure was

very popular with those from whom popularity was then valuable, but it left nearly the entire support of Government on the land tax, and took from the Government an old tax called "dherun puttee," or famine tax, which, though never collected, might now have been very useful. Under the Land Revenue Survey, it was expected that no remission of revenue need be granted in the yearly settlements. From 1838 to 1852 I never made a settlement without being forced to make remissions. Natural or unavoidable causes had brought on penury, but, in all that time, the bankers were exacting their usury from the people. Up to the last year of my revenue service, (1853) I found instances of personal slavery, where, for a few rupees or a few bushels of corn the cultivators had bound themselves on stamped paper to serve their bankers for a certain number of years, or for life. These cases were called personal service, similar to the service of an ordinary servant, but it was not the case—they got food, clothing, and house, but no pay. The ordinary daily pay of an Indian cultivator is about 3d. of our money; on this he could live in his own economical manner, and shift pretty well in times of scarcity. Now that all subsistence has risen in value, and but little food is stored in the villages, the ryots are at once in distress when the season crops fail; the banker sends his slaves to the Government works to maintain themselves, and to pay to him the value of the labour he loses; and thus, instead of mitigating the intensity of distress, our Indian Governments have done a great deal to enhance it. What with the engagements of the Revenue Survey, the Civil Courts, the rapacity of the banker, and the ignorance of the people, a vast social revolution has been going on for many years, tending to the destruction of a race of men [the great agricultural population.—R.K.] who deserve protection and encouragement at our hands. The responsibility is very great. I have confined my remarks to provinces I know, but lately the ryots of Patna [the twenty millions of Behar.—R.K.] are said to have risen in vengeance against their money lenders. The Moplahs in the Madras territory have often done so, and we may assume *that all over India our civil jurisdiction is an error.* If Mr. Fawcett, or any one else, can find a remedy for this state of things, England and India should fall on their knees before him. It is not a canal, a tank, or a well that is wanted, but laws to put all on an equal footing; to administer justice, not equity; to give it speedily and certainly, not in delay and frequent appeals. India is not yet qualified for such courts; acuteness and education use them as the tiger uses his claws upon the helpless creatures. *There is danger in the situation; I have endeavoured to remedy it for more than forty years, but while I have striven for the protection of the poor, others have striven for the benefit of the rich.* The result is before us.

Mr. Malet here tells us, after fifty years' knowledge of it, what the Indian bureaucracy really is, and what it has done for India. He would have resented my statement of it while he was yet an active member of the service, but twenty years of life in England have had their natural effect upon him. He says that "there is danger in the situation," and affirms that "all over India our civil jurisdiction is an error." What more have I said? The nation may choose still to amuse itself with the official plausibilities of Dr. W. W. Hunter, as to the "blessings of British rule," and persuade itself that the *Times* justly treats men with views like my own, as "slanderers of

their country." I can only wash my hands of all complicity in the delusion, after this effort to dispel it.

What we have to get rid of and abolish, is the practical concealment of India from the English Government and nation. I cannot too often repeat that the present state of things has come about through the irresponsibility of the Indian bureaucracy, and the ignorance of their real proceedings and the results of them, in which they are able to keep the nation, the Parliament, and even the very India Office itself. It is the high character of Englishmen only, as a race, their sense of honour, duty, and religion that has prevented the Service degenerating into a corrupt body. The Simlah departments practically have become corrupt, not in the vulgar sense of the term, but in the sense that they never allow the true character of their proceedings to become known, where it would not be convenient to avow what their course has really been. And so, when a Lord Lytton is Viceroy, we get the natural results in an Afghan war, and in estimates three times and nine millions wrong in a single year. The wonder, I believe, is that with India so far off, administered in practical secrecy, such scandals are not more frequent. Parliament will be without excuse if it permits the present state of matters to endure, with such testimony of its effects upon the people as have "officially" been testified by Mr. Malet, Mr. Hume, Mr. Pedder, and now by Mr. O'Donnell. I have made no charges against our system of government that are not true charges. Our administration has been one of feebleness, selfishness, and rashness embodied; and what India wants is not better book-keeping, better accountants, but statesmanship of the highest order—a statesmanship instinct with the requirements of our faith, and excited to the right pitch of earnestness by a sense of the responsibilities we have taken upon ourselves. The great work we have to do is to redeem a hundred and twenty millions of cultivators from the ruin we have brought upon them. It is the administration of "the Land," first of all, that calls for our attention; and in finance, a recognition of the fact that India is so poor that we must help her in every way we can by rigid economy of her poor resources, and a righteous jealousy that we do not misappropriate them by the extravagance of our scale of expenditure, and casual drafts of twenty millions upon her industry for the prosecution of Afghan wars guiltily got up at Simlah. It is Simlah that is destroying the people of India, by a government carried on without the slightest sense of responsibility to any power on earth.

## MEMORANDUM ON INDIAN FINANCE.

[BY THE EDITOR.]

IN coming to the consideration of the Indian finances as they affect ourselves, the foreign Government of India, it is not the state of the Treasury that gives me any alarm ; it is the condition of the people. If we confine our attention simply to a consideration of the ways and means by which we may carry on the government of the country, there is no ground for uneasiness, so far as I can see, either as to the present state of matters or the prospective. But it is this narrow view of matters that I emphatically repudiate. The problem that should command our attention, and that excites my anxiety, is the condition of the people from whom the revenue comes. I remark first, that the ignorance, uncertainty, and confusion of thought that everywhere prevail upon the subject of Indian Finance are attributable to two causes : (1) to the defective and perpetually changing forms in which the accounts are presented to the world, and (2) to the belief that we must follow English methods in devising new ways of taxing them. When we see men like Mr. Bright and Mr. Forster falling into the gravest misconceptions as to the facts of Indian Finance, we may be reasonably sure that their errors are attributable to the form in which those accounts are presented. The goddess of confusion itself would seem to have presided over the Indian Accounts department and the forms thereof in the last twenty years. I mean the forms in which those accounts have been presented to the world. In so far as the mere book-keeping of the finances is concerned, it is probably perfect ; but the forms in which the accounts have been presented, have been the subject of so many changes, that the Indian balance-sheet of any given year, as contrasted with that of earlier periods, is full of pitfalls to the casual student. To make the whole matter so clear that he who runs may read, it is very desirable that Parliament should call for analytical and summarized returns of the accounts of the last twenty years, in some such form as I shall indicate.

In the first place, then, it is very desirable that Parliament should call for a balance-sheet, comparing the assets and the

liabilities of the Empire, as they stood at the close of the East India Company's administration in 1858, and as they stand now. I shall not go into detail, but simply give an outline of what the balance-sheet should show at each period.

I.—*Liabilities of the Indian Government (in Silver).*

	1858. Rs.	1880. Rs.
Indian Debt, in Rupee currency ... ..		
Issues of Notes beyond Coin Reserves and Securities ... ..		
Savings' Banks Deposits ... ..		
Service Funds, in trust with the Government		
Capitalized Liabilities for Pensions, &c. ...		
	<u>Rs.</u>	<u>Rs.</u>

II.—*Liabilities in Gold (Sterling).*

Home English Debt ... ..	£	£
Guaranteed Railway Debt ... ..		
Outstanding Bills of the Secretary of State		
	<u>£</u>	<u>£</u>

I.—*Assets of the Indian Government (Special).*

	1858. £	1880. £
Railways—Guaranteed State Lines... ..		
Interest, Land, &c., paid out of Revenue... ..		
Irrigation Works, Canals, &c. ... ..		
Telegraph Lines ... ..		
Loans to Municipalities ... ..		
Opium Monopoly—Outstanding Advances ...		
Factories ... ..		
Stock on hand ... ..		
Government Stock of Salt ... ..		
Stores Account (Civil)—Railway ... ..		
Irrigation ... ..		
Telegraph ... ..		
Stationery, &c. ... ..		
Cash Balances—England ... ..		
India ... ..		
	<u>£</u>	<u>£</u>



## II.—Assets (General).

	1858.	1880.
State Lien on the Land ... ..		
Waste Lands (culturable) ... ..		
Forests ... ..		
Fisheries, Mines, and Quarries ... ..		
Dockyards and Stores... ..		
Transport Fleet ... ..		
Buildings in England—India Office, Cooper's Hill College, &c. ... ..		
Arsenals and Magazines ... ..		
Marine, and Stores ... ..		
Barracks and Military Buildings ... ..		
Civil Buildings, &c. ... ..		
	<u>Rs.</u>	<u>Rs.</u>

A comparative balance-sheet of this nature, carefully and intelligently prepared, would show the actual position of the Government of India at this moment, as compared with its position at the time when the Crown assumed the direct management of the country. Our circumstances are differentiated from those of other countries by the fact that *practically India has no public debt whatever, and is independent of taxation altogether for nearly seven-tenths of its annual revenues.* Where other countries have to depend upon taxation for the national revenues, we draw the bulk of our income in India from our great estate in the land, and from our great opium monopoly. To state the balance-sheet summarily, it would assume the following form:—

## Liabilities—

Total of Public Debt and Treasury Liabilities (about) £133,000,000

## Add—

Total Guaranteed Railway Capital ... .. 92,000,000

£225,000,000

The ingenuity of man can find nothing to add to these liabilities, while the *special assets* which the State holds against these liabilities are as follows:—

## Assets—

Cash Balances, Loans, Bonds, &c. ... ..	£32,000,000
52,000 Chests of Opium, and Advances ... ..	8,500,000
Government Salt in Store ... ..	2,000,000
Telegraph Lines (estimate) ... ..	5,000,000
Irrigation Works (do.) ... ..	24,000,000
State Railways (do.) ... ..	15,000,000
Guaranteed Railways—	
Company's Capital ... ..	£92,000,000
State Capital sunk therein ... ..	28,000,000

120,000,000

£208,500,000

The figures show that India has, practically, no debt in the ordinary sense of the term. For every shilling of her so-called debt, she has a shilling to show in her cash balances, or her opium go-downs, in her railways, telegraphs, or canals. These are what may be called her special assets. She is meanwhile the owner of a vast national property in land, forests, mines, &c., the capitalized value of which may be moderately stated at £500,000,000 sterling. There is no lien upon this property of any kind, unless we capitalize the pension list she is engaged to pay, and the expectations of State employés. Practically, India is the one country in the civilized world that has no public debt. Her assets in cash, and in great reproductive public works, represent £200,000,000 sterling; while, if we take the national estates into the account, her balance-sheet shows assets of £700,000,000 sterling against aggregate liabilities of but £225,000,000, without taking into account the enormous sums of money that have been sunk in the public buildings, civil and military, of the Empire, upon its fortifications, garrisons, and arsenals, its vast military stores, and transport fleet; all obtained and paid for, not by incurring debt, but out of the current revenues of the country.

And instead of all this being presented to Parliament and to the financial world in a shape so clear that a child might grasp it, we persist for twenty years on end in presenting the accounts in a shape that makes it impossible for any one but a close student to understand them at all, and that suggests steadily from one year's end to another that the country is heavily burdened with debt. We owe it to the perverse shape in which our balance-sheet has ever been presented to the world, that no Minister has yet ventured to propose to Parliament an Imperial guarantee of the Indian debt. Were the state of our finances but clearly understood, the guarantee would be given as a matter of course and of common sense; but while the Finance department is perpetually wringing its hands over what it calls our financial difficulties and chronic deficits, what wonder if the world takes us at our word and asks five per cent. from us on guaranteed railway capital, when our credit ought to command it at three and a-half. There is no concealing the confusion, feebleness, want of courage and insight, with which our finances have been administered. Had they been administered by men of original power, the *whole* debt would have been consolidated into an English  $3\frac{1}{4}$  or  $3\frac{1}{2}$  per cent. stock, saving to the country £3,000,000 sterling a-year; and had the same qualities been shown in dealing with the silver difficulty, the balance-sheets of the last three years would have shown about three millions sterling a-

year better than they have done. It is the statement of a simple fact, that we are at this moment paying away a sum of six millions sterling a-year, through sheer financial incapacity on the part of the Government. Our book-keeping has been unexceptionable; our financing has been that of dotage, and is the true cause of all our embarrassments. No one in the Government has the courage to form an opinion upon the subject. It is thought safer to remain as we are, and run no risks. And yet what the "risks" are no one can tell.

A return of this simple order would show at a glance what proportion the assets of the Empire bear to its liabilities at the present time as compared with the balance-sheet of 1858-60. It does not follow that because our debt has increased, our position has deteriorated. I am persuaded that it has not deteriorated, but very sensibly improved; and the facts for forming a judgment upon the point should be in everybody's hands. It is only the India Office itself that could prepare such a balance-sheet, and the work would require to be done by some one who brought extensive general knowledge of the facts to bear upon the question, and thoroughly grasped and understood the purpose to be served by the return. I could prepare such a balance-sheet myself without any great difficulty, and one that would bear (I believe) the severest examination in detail.

But such a balance-sheet is far from being all that is required in the shape of information for the student of Indian affairs. It would be necessary to add thereto analyzed and summarized accounts of the revenues and expenditure of India, under all heads whatever, both in India and in England, during the same period of twenty years.

### HOME CHARGES.

*Expenditure in England in the last Twenty Years, 1858-1880.*

On Military Stores ...	...	...	...	...	£
Do. Pensions ...	...	...	...	...	...
Do. Depôts ...	...	...	...	...	...
Do. Leave and Allowances ...	...	...	...	...	...
Transport of Troops...	...	...	...	...	...
Interest on Public Debt—English ...	...	...	...	...	...
Do. do. Enfacéd Paper...	...	...	...	...	...
Do. Guaranteed Railways ...	...	...	...	...	...
Civil Stores, Stationery, &c....	...	...	...	...	...
Public Works Stores— Railways ...	...	...	...	...	...
Telegraphs ...	...	...	...	...	...

Civil Pensions—Covenanted	...	...	...	...
Do. Uncovenanted	...	...	...	...
Do. Leave and Allowances	...	...	...	...
Outfit, Allowances, Judges, &c.	...	...	...	...
India Office Charges—Salaries	...	...	...	...
Pensions	...	...	...	...
Buildings	...	...	...	...
General	...	...	...	...
Miscellaneous Charges—Persian Embassy	...	...	...	...
Sultan's Ball	...	...	...	...
War Expenses—Abyssinia	...	...	...	...
Malta Expedition	...	...	...	...
China Expedition	...	...	...	...

I am not sure that the principle upon which this summary and analysis are suggested might not be changed with advantage for a return in which the expenditure was differently classified, as follows :—

Expenditure on Stores—

Military	...	...	...	...	...	...
Civil, Stationery, &c.	...	...	...	...	...	...
Railways, State	...	...	...	...	...	...
Telegraphs	...	...	...	...	...	...
Docks, and Harbour Works	...	...	...	...	...	...
Miscellaneous	...	...	...	...	...	...

Leave Allowances—

Military	...	...	...	...	...	...
Civil, Covenanted	...	...	...	...	...	...
Do. Uncovenanted	...	...	...	...	...	...
Judges, &c.	...	...	...	...	...	...

Pensions—

Military	...	...	...	...	...	...
Civil, Covenanted	...	...	...	...	...	...
Do. Uncovenanted	...	...	...	...	...	...
Judges	...	...	...	...	...	...

Interest, &c.—

Public Debt—English	...	...	...	...	...	...
Do. Enfaced Paper	...	...	...	...	...	...
Railway Capital...	...	...	...	...	...	...

Wars—

Abyssinia	...	...	...	...	...	...
Persia	...	...	...	...	...	...
China	...	...	...	...	...	...
Malta Expedition	...	...	...	...	...	...

Horse Guards Demands—

Depôts	...	...	...	...	...	...
Transport of Troops	...	...	...	...	...	...
Effectives	...	...	...	...	...	...
Non-Effectives' Pensions	...	...	...	...	...	...

## India Office itself—

Buildings	...	..	...	...	...	...
Salaries : Secretary of State	...	...	...	...	...	...
Council	...	...	...	...	...	...
Subordinates	...	...	...	...	...	...
Pensions : Clerks, Messengers, &c.	...	...	...	...	...	...
General Charges : Stationery	...	...	...	...	...	...
Printing, &c.	...	...	...	...	...	...
Miscellaneous	...	...	...	...	...	...
Museum	...	...	...	...	...	...

## Commissions—

Law	...	...	...	...	...	...
Famine	...	...	...	...	...	...
Select Committees	...	...	...	...	...	...

What we want to see at a glance is the items of which the Home charges consist, and how it is that they have risen in the short space of twenty years from four or five millions to sixteen millions sterling a year. I have indicated, of course, the very briefest form of analysis I could, but it would be necessary to show in the returns how each head of charge has expanded during the period. The return should not be bulky, but simple, and intelligible to all. It would need to be prepared by some one who understood clearly the exact purpose for which it was prepared. It should be a *vade mecum* for every successive Secretary of State and member of Parliament who desired to make himself acquainted with the subject of Indian Finance. On the other side of the account, the return should show the various ways by which the India Office had been supplied with the means of meeting this expenditure during the same period, year by year.

Bills upon the Indian Treasury	...	...	...	...	£
Railway Capital received from the Guaranteed Companies	...	...	...	...	
in England	...	...	...	...	
Horse Guards Payments for use of Transport, Fleets, &c.	...	...	...	...	

Turning from the English, or home expenditure and revenues to the accounts of India, the same processes of analysis and summary should be applied to the accounts of the Government of India. As there have been no territorial changes since the Mutiny, a comparison might easily be instituted between the accounts as they stood in the last year of the Company's rule and as they now stand; but it would be well to make the returns show the revenues and expenditure of the year immediately preceding the Mutiny, 1856-57, and then for the three successive periods, 1859-60, 1869-70, and 1879-80. I am aware that it would be possible to prepare such an

analysis and summary as I suggest from the financial statistics annually published by the Government; but few private persons have the leisure and still fewer the inclination for such a task. What we want are the accounts analyzed, and summarized in such simple forms that the facts may be seen at a glance, instead of having to be obtained by individual research. I could myself, without difficulty, prepare such returns as I have long felt to be necessary for popularizing the facts of Indian Finance, and dispelling the darkness in which the subject is at present involved.

#### *NEW TAXES OF THE LAST TWENTY YEARS.*

To dissipate the confusion and uncertainty of the public mind upon this subject, it is very necessary that there should be a descriptive and statistical return of the new taxation that has been imposed upon the country since the Mutiny. It is the constant complaint of the Native Press of India that the people "groan under the burden of the new taxation" imposed by the Crown. The new imposts of which the people complain began with the Income Tax imposed by the late Mr. Wilson in 1860, for publicly protesting against which Sir Charles Trevelyan was recalled from the Governorship of Madras. The impost continued in various shapes down to its final repeal by the Earl of Northbrook, being revived two years ago in a partial and obnoxious shape by Sir John Strachey as a Licence Tax, for provision against famine. In addition to the Income Tax, and its later and modified form of Licence Tax, imposed by the Imperial Government, numerous local cesses of one kind and another have been imposed by the local Administrations of the several provinces, under the "decentralization," as it was called, of the finances in 1869-70, by the late Earl Mayo. To understand, therefore, what the people complain of, it is necessary that we should have a descriptive and statistical return of the various provincial taxes and cesses that have been levied by the local Governments in addition to the general Imperial taxation of the country. The taxes need no justification in principle, as they have been levied for purely local needs; but the wisdom of the forms or methods on which they have been cast, is another and separate question altogether. It may be affirmed generally, I think, that the amount they have yielded has been out of all proportion to the sense of grievance and disaffection they have awakened amongst the people. It cannot be too earnestly affirmed that "direct" taxation should never be resorted to in India, but in the last extremity. Obnoxious everywhere, such taxation is peculiarly odious in India from the general poverty of

the people and the character of the only machinery we have for its levy, while the great bulk of the new taxation has been of this "direct" order. The leading Civilians of the day have been largely smitten with the ideas of the Liverpool Reform Association, and, in spite of the clearest indications of the popular repugnance, have persisted in imposing "direct" rates and taxes both upon the towns and the country, where a wiser statesmanship suggested indirect imposts in their room.

One of the last acts of Sir Bartle Frere's ruinous administration of Bombay, was the sweeping away at a stroke of the old system of town-duties in the island of Bombay, and the substitution of direct rates in their place. This was in 1865. Overlooking entirely the radical difference that exists between a population like that of England, where we find an average of five to six persons to a house, he cast the whole burden of the municipal taxation upon a house-rate, with a population housed at the rate of fifty, sixty, seventy, and eighty persons to a house. So intolerable had the system become in 1868 that, after intense agitation and excitement, the system had to be modified by the reimposition of town-duties. The change was vehemently opposed by the whole force of the Government, but was, happily, made in its teeth, mainly by my own persistent efforts; and the result is that the revenues have ever since been obtained with the greatest ease, and without a murmur. It is the want of statesmanship displayed in India that creates all our difficulties therein, the mischievous and fatal notion that what is wise and suitable in this country in administrative methods must necessarily be so in India. Direct taxation should never be resorted to in India except as a last resort, whereas our modern financiers have shown a persistent leaning to, and determination to introduce, its methods. The taxes we have imposed by these methods have yielded a *minimum* of revenue at the cost of a *maximum* of discontent and difficulty; and until more wisdom is shown in our administration, and less *doctrinaire* folly, our embarrassments will continue.

#### PUBLIC WORKS LEDGER.

I know of no single reform in the system of Indian accounts so imperative as that of making a complete and final separation between our expenditure upon public works, with the revenue derived therefrom, and the annual accounts of expenditure and revenue connected with the ordinary administration of the country. It is now twenty years since I first pointed out the paramount necessity of our

keeping the Public Works expenditure and revenues of India separate and distinct from the ordinary accounts of our administration. I steadily and almost passionately entreated the Government twenty years ago to open a great Public Works ledger, in which every item of outlay upon works for the improvement of the great estate we have in the land, should be distinctly shown, with the revenues arising therefrom, directly and indirectly, steadily posted to their credit. It is, to my own mind, astonishing that our financiers should have persisted to this hour in jumbling up the vast expenditure we have been making upon public works, of a more or less directly reproductive order, with the annual current expenses of our civil and military administration.

I cannot conceive a more wanton, or more mischievous error. We have been steadily making an immense annual expenditure upon railways, canals, tanks, roads, telegraphs, and of late years, upon the conservation of our forests, without an entry in the public ledgers to show either the amount of the outlay, or the return therefrom. We have accomplished an era of twenty years' book-keeping, without an attempt to introduce this first great vital reform of all. What every private landlord, merchant, or manufacturer would do as a matter of course, we cannot be persuaded to do at all. The great works we have been prosecuting are all works for the improvement of the great estate we have in the land, and the very first necessity of the outlay was an exact and continuous record of its amount in a great Public Works ledger. Not a work of any importance should have been undertaken, that had not a distinct ledger heading in the accounts, showing from year to year its accumulating cost for capital outlay, interest, and establishments, with *per contra* entries of the returns derived therefrom, both directly and indirectly. Our long neglect of this simple and urgent reform should not be tolerated for another day.

Analytical returns should be at once called for, of the whole expenditure made upon public works since the Crown assumed the government of the country. There would be little real difficulty in making the return, and a great Public Works ledger should then be opened, showing precisely what each work has cost, and what the return therefrom has really been. A final separation should be made between the Public Works budget of revenues and expenditure, and the annual budget of the ordinary administrative charges and revenues of the State. For want of this simple reform no one is able to tell us whether our Public Works expenditure has been profitable or not; whether the annual accounts show a real surplus or a positive deficit. I defy any man to affirm with certainty



whether the Indian accounts of the last twenty years show a deficit or not. An enormous expenditure upon public works has gone unrecorded into the accounts, and been treated as part of the ordinary annual expenses of the administration. Thus a sum of not less than £30,000,000 (thirty millions) has been drawn from the taxes of the last twenty-five years as a contribution towards the cost of the guaranteed railways, the shareholders' capital sunk therein representing not more than 75 per cent. of the actual outlay upon the lines. The accounts contain in the same way masses of expenditure upon irrigation and other works, and upon the telegraph and postal lines, the whole of which should be eliminated therefrom and entered in a great Public Works ledger, which would show at a glance what the financial results of the outlay have been. I regard this separation of accounts as the one vital reform required in what I call the "book-keeping" of the State. Until the separation is made, Indian Finance will ever be involved in the uncertainty and confusion which now characterize it. The reform is worth almost any outlay, while it could be made without cost. Had my almost passionate counsels for the last twenty years but been adopted, Indian Finance would to-day have been a subject of the utmost simplicity. The Public Works ledger would have shown at a glance the great works of improvement of which the State was owner, while their cost and value would be measured instinctively against the increase of the public debt. The reform should go a step further. The public debt itself should be separated for good, into two great stocks (1) that of the Public debt proper, and (2) the Public Works debt of India. Instead of the multiplicity of loans which now reproach us for the endless varieties of their forms, terms, and conditions, the whole should long since have been consolidated into two great stocks, as simple and as easily understood as the English Three per Cents. As I shall return to this subject, however, I shall not refer further to it here; but every one, I should think, must see at once how immensely it would heighten the credit of India, were the true character of her public debt shown on every bourse in Europe, to be what in the main it really is—a public works debt of a remunerative order. Once more, and finally, I feel that I cannot too earnestly urge upon the Government the absolute necessity of a complete and final separation between the ordinary annual revenues and expenditure of the country, and the vast Public Works income and expenditure, now hopelessly jumbled up therewith. The ordinary financial statement of the year's Revenue and expenditure should be supplemented by a Public Works budget of revenue and outlay. Should the revenue of the latter fail to provide fully for its liabilities

in the way of interest upon the Public Works debt, the cause of the failure would be set forth therein, and a draft made upon the general accounts for the deficiency. I doubt much if there would be any deficiency at all, now that the guaranteed railways are beginning to pay; while the final separation of the two accounts would enable every one to determine with certainty, the true position of the ordinary exchequer. Sir Andrew Clarke told me a year or two ago, how deeply impressed he himself was with the necessity of the reform I have now urged, and I simply cannot understand the apathy with which the present confusion of the accounts is tolerated. There would be no real difficulty whatever in separating the Public Works expenditure since the Mutiny from the Public accounts, and I forbear, therefore, all attempt to anticipate the small official criticisms which the reform is certain to elicit.

#### *AN IMPERIAL GUARANTEE FOR THE DEBT.*

The very simple reform which I have now urged would, I reasonably hope, give the Government of this country courage to propose to Parliament a step that would never have been necessary under wiser administration than we have hitherto shown in India,—I mean the giving of an Imperial guarantee to the Indian Debt. No one who knows the true history of the so-called debt of India, can be in any honest doubt as to whose debt it really is. In any court of equity in the world, it would be declared to be a debt of our own that we have fastened upon the people of India by no law whatever but that of the stronger. The debt is our own, I say, but we have fastened it upon the people of India, and the very least that we can do is to enable them to borrow on the same terms that we do ourselves. I have never seen the shadow of an argument for the withholding of the national guarantee. It would cost the people of England nothing, while it would indefinitely diminish their possible liabilities in the future. The interests of the two countries in the matter are identical. It is of vital importance to England that Indian finance should be successful; while the want of skill with which we conduct every "loan" operation in which the Indian Exchequer is concerned, is a bitter reflection upon us in the eyes of our own merchants and bankers in the East. We persist in opening loans in India, where there is no loanable capital whatever, and although answerable for the Indian Debt to the full extent of every national resource we have, we refuse to give a guarantee to it that would cost us nothing, while it would create a sinking fund that would extinguish the debt itself

altogether in thirty or forty years. The matter long since passed out of the stage of discussion amongst those who are really well informed on the subject; but English statesmen, with whom the question really rests, have no time to devote to its consideration. Had the Indian Debt but been guaranteed by England in 1858, when the present Lord Derby told the Commons plainly enough *it ought* to be guaranteed, there would have been no debt at all to-day. He said, frankly; that he had not the courage to propose it to a House so ill-informed upon the whole subject; and the result is that India is to-day liable for millions sterling a-year that, under wiser statesmanship—a statesmanship that would have cost this country nothing—would have had no place in her accounts at all. Human selfishness is never profitable in the long run, and it has been ruinously wasteful to England as well as India in this matter.

#### REAL DECENTRALIZATION.

Next to the complete separation between the ordinary accounts of Revenue and Expenditure from those of the Public Works department, I know of no reform in the book-keeping of India so necessary as that of distinguishing once for all between the Imperial and the provincial balance-sheets of the Empire. India consists of eight distinct governments or administrations, which are differentiated from each other, not by mere geographical limits, but by radical differences in language, race, institutions, and manners and customs. The people of Bengal are an entirely distinct race from the people of the North-west, from Madras, Bombay, Sindh, and the Punjab. The central Government having ever been at Calcutta, there has been a natural but unwise tendency to administer and legislate for the whole of India, as though it consisted of one race and people. That the fact is otherwise, and that India consists of many nationalities, as distinct as those of Europe, has been recognized from the first; but we have been slow to give expression to it in our legislation and administration. Ten years ago, the late Lord Mayo made an important beginning in the work of what is called in India "the decentralization of the finances of the country." The conception of what required to be done was, however, very meagre and faulty; and the real work of decentralization has yet to be begun. What we really want is a clear and satisfactory definition of what are Imperial and what provincial responsibilities, and an approach to a federative system under which provincial rights and liabilities shall be distinctly defined, with the claims which the central Government

has over them by way of Imperial control. At present the Imperial burdens are very unequally distributed over the provinces. Some of them are made to contribute far too much to these burdens, others far too little. We want a clear and definite division of the Imperial burdens between the provinces, settling once for all the proportion in which each is to contribute thereto, and what branches of the public service are Imperial in their nature, and what local. Thus Oudh is made to contribute, under the present purely empirical system, far more than its legitimate share of revenue to the Imperial treasury, the Central Provinces far less. No attempt has been made to apportion the Imperial burdens fairly between the provinces. Some are heavily over-weighted, as Madras; some altogether under-weighted, as Bengal. If the "officials" of the Calcutta departments are listened to, they will tell you that just and effective inter-provincial finance in India is impossible. It is so only to men who are ready to cry out at every step "There is a lion in the way." There is no practical difficulty whatever in the way of determining at once the proportion in which each province of the Empire may equitably be required to contribute towards the cost of the central Government. A return should be made of the actual revenues that have been drawn from each province during the last twenty years, and the civil expenditure made therein during the same period. The military expenditure must be omitted from the account, on the obvious ground that the national forces are mainly located on the Frontiers, for the common defence of all, while the proportion in which each province should contribute to the cost of the Imperial establishments would be determined by considerations of its population and wealth, the amount of outlay therein on public works, the fertility or otherwise of the soil, and so on. Taxation that may be perfectly just and wise in Bengal, will not be so, by any natural fitness of things, in the Central Provinces or the Punjaub. The truth simply is, that as yet no statesmanship whatever has been brought to bear upon the condition of India, and the confusion and injustice of the existing arrangements are indescribable. In one province the land is assessed at high rates; in another, at rates that are purely nominal—a consideration of itself which notably affects the question of taxation proper to each. Not an attempt has ever yet been made to establish a just system of inter-provincial taxation. We are presented every year with what are called Provincial Balance-sheets; but they are a burlesque of the facts, when we find the Punjaub debited with the whole cost of the vast frontier forces stationed therein for the common defence of all, and Bengal

credited, not only with all the custom duties levied in the port of Calcutta, but with the whole of the revenue derived from the State monopoly of opium. I have called attention to these matters in India incessantly for the last twenty years, but while overwhelmed with compliments for my discernment, have never succeeded in enlisting any practical interest in the reforms which I have advocated, but that are fundamental. The taxation of India can never be of a wise or just order until these simple reforms are made, and an enlightened administration would have made them twenty years ago, when their necessity first began to dawn upon us with the consolidation of the limits of our Empire. The work ought to be done now, done at once; and there is no real difficulty in the way but such as is begotten of *laissez faire* incompetency and apathy.

### THE PUBLIC FUNDS.

The Public Debt should consist of two great stocks, distinguished as (1) the Public Works Debt, representing the whole outlay upon works of a reproductive order, unconnected with the ordinary administration of the country; and (2) the Public Debt proper, representing the aggregate actual deficits of bygone years. I can conceive nothing more calculated to lower Indian credit, or to make Indian stocks unpopular, than the endless confusion of the terms in which they have been issued. The want of skill with which the Indian finances have ever been conducted, is one of the most curious features of our rule, when the financial aptitudes of the English merchant are borne in mind. The mercantile element was, I suppose, the strongest of all in the direction of the old East India Company, and yet nothing could be feebler than its finance, unless it is that which has succeeded it under the Crown. Any one acquainted with the London money market, knows that rupee, or "enfaced" paper, as it is called, is by no means a popular security on the Stock Exchange, while all that we could do to make it unpopular we have done. The fluctuating rate of exchange at which the interest drafts are negotiable, is full of inconvenience to the investor, while the present low exchange deters many from retaining the stock. But there is another fact which greatly damages these securities in the market, and that is the multiplicity and variety of the loans. I have now before me a list of the Indian rupee loans, and adding the Transfer Loan of 1879, in place of the  $5\frac{1}{2}$  per cent. loan then expiring, there are no less than *fourteen* distinct rupee loans, besides debentures. If we had tried to make Indian stock unsaleable, what surer step could we have taken than involving it in the

confusion which so many loans produce? Some of the loans are fixed for all time at 4 per cent., while some of the 4½ per cents. are reducible, after a certain period, to 4 per cent. Some again, are not so reducible, but are due at a given date, which amounts almost to the same thing. Some are in *sicca* rupees, involving a calculation which people not connected with India cannot possibly understand, while one (in *siccas*) pays the investor his interest only twelve months after his purchase, so that he receives no return on his investment until eighteen months have passed away. Interest is sometimes payable half-yearly at dates the most arbitrary, while in other cases the interest is payable quarterly, on dates corresponding with the subscription to the loan. On the debentures again, the interest is payable half-yearly, on 1st June and 1st December. Human ingenuity could not have invented more discordance, or a confusion more irritating to the investor. And, as if in mockery of this confusion, the terms of the last Transfer Loan were made so puzzling and worrying, that many holders, after trying to work out the meaning of the proposals made to them, sold their stock to invest in something clear and understandable—the “beautiful simplicity of the Three per Cents.” The amalgamation of all the Indian loans into consolidated 4 per cent. rupee stocks, would create a security which would be readily dealt with in London, and would become popular. When commenting, two years ago in Calcutta, upon the ruinously wasteful terms upon which the Transfer Loan of 1878-79 was being put out, I showed how enormous and how needless was the loss which attended the operation. It is a plain economic mistake to open loans in India at all, since there is no loanable capital there whatever. I asked at the time—“Is India so rich that we can afford to borrow in her name upon the supposition that her Four per Cents. are worth but 93 to 94, when the ability of a mere clerk directed to the subject, would make the price 100? Is India so wealthy that it is of no moment to her at what rate we put out her loans year after year?” The real wastefulness of that Transfer Loan has been shown clearly enough by the price which the great *Comptoir d’Escompte* of Paris tendered for the loan opened a month ago in Calcutta. I cannot adequately express the sense I have of the wrong done to the people whose affairs we administer without control, by the wastefulness of our past operations in their behalf. We borrow in India, not because it is wise or economic to do so—for it is most unwise and wasteful—but simply because the Secretary of State can borrow there without the sanction of Parliament. To avoid a debate in the Commons, and for no other reason whatever, we put out loan

after loan in India, where there is little or no competition for the stock, and have literally wasted millions by doing so. Now, financial reform in India means the abandonment of this sin finally. The Indian Debt should be consolidated into two great stocks, after the model of our own Three per Cents., to be known as the Public Debt of India and the Public Works Debt of India. Their terms should be as well known as those of English Consols; and if we would really administer Indian finance wisely, we should gradually give an English guarantee to the debt, under which we might eventually reduce the interest to  $3\frac{1}{4}$  or  $3\frac{1}{2}$  per cent., to the plain, manifest advantage of both countries. The arguments for the guarantee are irresistible, and though I cannot burden this memorandum with them, I wish to place on record that I have stated them over and over again during the last twenty-two years, and that I have never seen the shadow of a reason for withholding a guarantee which, instead of costing England anything, would materially lessen her responsibilities. Had Lord Derby but been strong enough to propose and establish the guarantee in 1858, when he named the subject to the House, with the expression of his own conviction that it ought not to be withheld, there would have been no Public Debt proper to-day, in India at all.

#### LOAN OPERATIONS.

The want of skill with which the ordinary loan operations of the Government have been conducted in the last twenty-five years in Calcutta, is next to incredible. There is no extravagance in my affirming that a junior clerk on £100 a-year in any London bank, would be expected by his employers to show greater financial aptitudes than the whole list of our Accountants-General have shown in the last twenty-five years. Such a statement must necessarily seem rude and offensive, but it is necessary to speak uncompromisingly upon the subject. A return to Parliament, truthfully describing the various loan operations of the Government of India since the year 1854, would make Indian finance a by-word upon every bourse in Europe. The financiers about Lord Dalhousie in 1854, conceived that their cash balances were strong enough to enable them to convert their Five per Cent. Rupee Stocks into Fours. The suggestion was a wise and legitimate one, and the operation was successful. The conversion was made, and the new Four per Cents., which were largely held by the merchants and banks of the Presidency towns, were quoted at about 3 per cent. discount, or 97. The stock answered the same purpose in India that Consols

do in London, being largely held and made use of for temporary purposes by the moneyed classes of the country. But the conversion was hardly made, than the Government found itself under the necessity of borrowing several millions for public works. There was nothing wrong in their having converted the Five per Cents. into Fours, or their borrowing anew at 5 per. cent., if the terms offered justified the rate. But there was not a man in the whole Government of India, with the slightest knowledge of the way in which such an operation required to be conducted. Instead of announcing that the Government wished to borrow three or four millions, and *inviting tenders for the amount either in a four per cent. or five per cent. stock*, they took the preposterous step of advertising that the Government wanted several millions of money, and that the Treasury would issue promissory notes bearing 5 per cent. interest to all persons willing to lend to the State *at par, at that rate*. Thus, while thirty millions (if I remember rightly) of their Four per Cent. promissory notes were in the hands of the public, and being quoted at 97, they positively came forward to compete with the holders of this stock, and offered the general public their *Five per Cent. Notes at par*. The effect of the announcement, of course, was to send down the whole of the Four per Cent. Stocks from 97, at which they were standing, to 80 at a stroke. Every holder of Fours was virtually swindled out of 17 to 20 per cent. of his property in the fund. Not only was the new loan opened *at par and at 5 per cent.*, but so ineffably stupid were the men who had the conduct of the operation that they *kept the loan open for years*, as if for the very purpose of perpetuating the depression. Intense indignation was, of course, expressed in all the Presidency cities in commercial and banking circles; but the bureaucracy that rules India thinks it scorn to be taught anything by outsiders. Not only was this Five per Cent. Stock kept steadily on offer at par, but when the Mutiny broke out, in 1857, and the Treasury was on the verge of bankruptcy, attempt after attempt was made to obtain money upon open loans offered in the same way at  $5\frac{1}{2}$ , 6, and  $6\frac{1}{2}$  per cent., with all kinds of absurd attractions to recommend them to public favour. The offering of promissory notes carrying 6 and  $6\frac{1}{2}$  per cent. interest *at par to all comers*, sent the Four per Cents. at last down to 57, while the fall was attributed to the shock which the Mutiny had given to the public credit. This is the official legend on the subject to this hour. So stupid and inept were the finance officials in Calcutta who had the management of these matters in their hands, and so inadequate their supervision by Leadenhall Street and by Downing Street, that long after I had pointed out the



preposterous folly of this "open loan" system, it was still carried on down to the arrival of the late Mr. Wilson in Calcutta. There was not an official in the Government of India that knew how to negotiate a public loan, by advertising its terms and inviting tenders for the Stock. The only way these financial experts could think of was to announce that the Government was willing to borrow at 5 per cent. at par, whatever the public might offer. When 5 per cent. would not draw, they offered  $5\frac{1}{2}$ , 6, and at last  $6\frac{1}{2}$  per cent., and even offered to take *half* payment in Fours and Fives, that they might get the other half in *cash*. The story is of course incredible, but it is absolutely true; and so persistent is this stupidity, and its scorn of all outward enlightenment, that Sir John Strachey actually put the Transfer Loan of 1878-79 upon the Calcutta market two years ago, in the same way, the error not being corrected until I called attention to it in the press. It is the simple truth that we have managed these loan operations on behalf of India, in a way that is a scandal to us as a mercantile people, the waste attending them being incalculable.

When we turn to the loan operations of the Home Government upon the London market, we find them open to heavy criticism. Thus, in borrowing money in the British market for the use of India, since the time of the Mutiny, Minister after Minister, from Sir Charles Wood downwards, has offered 5 per cent. for it, while giving to the lenders the same facilities for their dividends as those possessed by the holders of Three per Cent. Consols. These loans were professedly borrowed on the security of the Indian revenues only, but if that security is not unquestionably good, Ministers who are entrusted with the custody of the national credit ought not to have given their sanction to them at all; while, if they are perfectly safe, then by giving them the full benefit of the British credit already practically pledged to them, we might have indefinitely improved the terms of issue. Thus, Mr. Gladstone and Sir Charles Wood borrowed £8,000,000 sterling in the name of India, in 1861, at 5 per cent. The direct effect was to depress Consols heavily, at very serious loss to many in London, while the premium upon these £8,000,000 of Indian Fives ran up to £700,000 within a year; showing, of course, that nearly 10 per cent. had been sacrificed in negotiating the loan. Our Rothschilds, and other money-lenders, may approve operations of this wasteful order, but no one who feels at all rightly on the subject of our responsibilities towards the people of India can do so. It would not be difficult for me to show that the wastefulness which has marked our every financial operation on behalf of India since the Mutiny, has very sensibly influenced the present

state of the Indian Exchequer. I have spoken unpleasant truth, I am aware, but I do not feel at liberty to keep it back. An exact history of the loans we have opened in behalf of India in the last twenty-five years, would be a very humiliating, but very instructive, story.

#### THE OPIUM REVENUE AND SILVER DIFFICULTY.

I come next to speak of the opium revenue, and the exchange difficulty, or silver question. In view of the agitation that is raised in this country against the former, and the fact that the revenue depends upon our military command of the whole seaboard of India, it would, perhaps, be desirable to take it out of the Indian accounts altogether, and to treat it as a special revenue of the Crown, to be applied *pro tanto* to the liquidation of what are called the Home charges of the Government of India. It is our military command of the entire seaboard of India, and that only, that enables us to levy upon the people of China the weighty tribute we impose upon them by what is virtually an export duty upon the drug. Thus before the annexation of Sindh, we were never able to levy a duty of more than Rs. 160 a chest upon the opium grown in Malwa. It was possible to avoid our "pass" fee or transit fee, by sending the opium across the Sindh desert south of the Runn, to the Indus for shipment, *via* Tatta or Kurrachee to China. When the conquest of Sindh gave Kurrachee into our hands, we were able gradually to raise the fee upon Malwa opium from Rs. 160 to Rs. 600 the chest. Now that we hold the entire seaboard, we prevent a chest of opium leaving any port of India until it has paid us a very heavy export duty, levied on the western side as a transit duty, and on the Calcutta side in the shape of a monopoly profit, obtained by the State in selling the drug at auction. The people of India contribute little to the duty, and the revenue is, therefore, almost as strictly a part of the national income of this kingdom as the receipts of the London Custom House. I have for many years pointed out that this revenue might fairly be regarded as a set-off *pro tanto* against the "Home charges" we exact from India, amounting to about £16,000,000 a-year. Some of these charges are equitable, others are very unjust; and the amount is so vast, while the exaction is so invidious, that I think it would perhaps be wise to place the opium revenue (about £6,000,000 sterling a-year) against (1) the home military expenditure on Indian account, and (2) the interest on the English debt which figure so largely in the charges. The people of this country will then understand that the opium question is one of English

"Ways and Means," and not Indian. My own dislike of the agitation got up against the opium revenue, I confess frankly, rests largely upon the fact that it is *India* that will be called upon to fill up the gulf in the finances, which the consciences of men like Lord Shaftesbury insist upon our opening. If the opium revenue is to be given up, it is the people of this country that must find a substitute for it; and I should be glad to see the revenue we derive therefrom cease to figure in the Indian Balance-sheet altogether, as it is only our military command, as a nation, of the seaboard, that makes it possible for us to obtain this revenue at all.

As to the suggestion that the Government should withdraw from the growth and manufacture of the drug, and content itself with the levy of an excise duty upon the produce of Patna and Benares, as upon that of Malwa, there are strong reasons against its adoption. There is room to fear that while the cultivation of the poppy and the consumption of opium in India itself would be largely stimulated by the change, the revenue would be diminished, while its moral aspect would remain the same. If any change is made, I have sometimes thought that it should be in the other direction altogether, and the "monopoly" system adopted on the Bombay side in negotiation with the Native States in which the opium is grown. It would certainly simplify the Indian accounts a good deal, if opium were struck out of them altogether, and the revenue derived therefrom directly applied to the liquidation of such of the Home charges as seem very indefensible in the eyes of most students of Indian finance. Thus the opium revenue would nearly suffice to liquidate the following Home charges altogether:—

Salaries of the Secretary of State, Members of Council,	£
India Office, Museum, and other Home establishments	230,000
Superannuation, and retired Civil and Military allowances	1,250,000
Home Military charges, effective and non-effective ... ..	3,000,000
Interest on the English debt ... ..	2,400,000

I think it most desirable for the character of our rule that these charges should disappear from the Indian accounts almost in mass, and the opium revenue might with the utmost propriety be devoted to their liquidation. It is many years since I first expressed my conviction that it is the opium revenue only that has saved India from absolute ruin, under our continuous exaction of these charges from its miserable people. By a happy accident, our rule has secured this revenue to our Indian subjects, and I think we may fairly regard it as a set-off against demands that we make upon their industry, that would otherwise be most indefensible. My own views upon this point have ever been the same as those of the late

Sir George Wingate, and I cannot express them better, than in the words used by him in 1858 :—

The Indian tribute, whether weighed in the scales of justice, or viewed in the light of our own true interest, will be found to be at variance with humanity, with common sense, and with the received maxims of economical science. It would be true wisdom, then, to provide for the future payment of such of the Home charges of the Indian Government as really form a tribute out of the Imperial Exchequer. These charges would probably be found to be the dividends on East India Stock; interest on Home Debt; the salaries of officers and establishments, and cost of buildings connected with the Home Department of the Indian Government; furlough, and retired pay to members of the Indian Military and Civil Services when at home; charges of all descriptions paid in this country connected with British troops serving in India, except for the purchase of stores to be sent to India, and a portion of the cost of transporting troops to and from India. In regard to the last item, it would seem to be a fair and most convenient arrangement for the British Government to pay the cost of chartering ships, &c., for the transport of troops to India, and for the Indian Government to bear the cost of sending them home again. In fine, the tribute is made up of such items of charge, connected with the Government of India, as are spent in this country and for which India receives no material equivalent in any form. In defining the future financial relations of India and Great Britain, it would seem to be a most just and equitable arrangement to require each country to furnish that portion of the total cost of government which is expended within its own limits and goes to the support of its own industry. Upon this principle, British troops actually serving in India would not have to be supported by this country, as in the case of the Colonies, but would be paid by India; and only such officers and men of Indian regiments as might happen to be at home would be paid from the British Exchequer. What appears to be most earnestly required, in the present disastrous condition of Indian finances, is the ascertaining the various items of the Home charges which may properly be viewed as a tribute paid by India to this country, as well as their total amount since the commencement to the present century, and to report upon the probable effect of this tribute on the condition of India, and the best means of adjusting the financial relations of India and Great Britain for the future, so as to secure the greatest amount of advantage to both countries.

The opium revenue had not risen to its present vast amount at the time when Sir George Wingate thus wrote, nor does it seem to have occurred to him, that we might honestly plead this revenue as an offset against charges which I agree with him in holding "ought, upon every principle of justice and economical science, to be borne by ourselves." I think it would be true statesmanship to avow courageously, and without reserve, our right to, and responsibility for the opium revenue; to nurse it, and administer it with the utmost care; and to treat it boldly as an Imperial revenue immediately applicable to the Home charges that are incident to our military supremacy and civil rule over India. I have ever felt extremely jealous of the national honour in the matter of these Home charges. Their history, which I have in former years traced in detail and at

great length, does not bear looking into; and were the administration of the Indian finances to-day in my own hand, I should, I think, advise the nation, for its own character, and because of the general effects of our rule upon the people, to strike down, in the way I have now suggested, the Home charges to the following simple demands :—

Interest on English Capital sunk in the Guaranteed and State Railways, in Telegraphs, Irrigation, and other	£
Public Works (Estimate) ... ..	6,500,000
Stores: Civil, Military, and Public Works Accounts...	1,500,000
Miscellaneous Expenses ... ..	500,000

In other words, I would make our demand upon the revenues of India simply an equitable claim thereon, for interest upon the capital we have lent to its people for the construction of public works; for the military and other stores we have annually to supply her with; and for such miscellaneous items of expenditure as are plainly incurred on their account and for their well-being. I would throw the rest of the Home charges, invidious in their nature and doubtfully just in their exaction, upon the revenue which our military supremacy over the country enables us to exact as a by no means unhealthy tribute from the people of China.

The Indian Treasury would receive this tribute simply in trust for the English Crown, and the Home charges would sink at once from £16,000,000 to about £9,500,000 a-year, not a word of carping complaint against them being henceforward possible. The Home Government, instead of having to finance drafts to the enormous amount of £16,000,000 a-year on account of India, would find the amount reduced to little more than half that sum; while a syndicate of the Exchange Banks might undertake with advantage the remittance of the opium revenue independently, regulating their operations in China as well as India thereby.

I ought not to leave this part of the subject without noticing the thoroughly healthy effect which the transfer of this revenue and these charges to the Home account would exercise. It would lead at once to the conversion of the loans contracted in England on Indian account into a stock resembling Consols. The loans, as they appear in the accounts of 1877-78, which are the latest I have while writing, are entered as follows (p. 23) :—

*Interest on Loans contracted in England.*

East India Bonds	£219,868
India Debentures	344,000
India Five per Cent. Stock	866,000
India Four per Cent. Stock	1,023,000

or about £2,500,000 a-year. Now, if these loans were treated as an English liability, instead of being allowed to run on at 4 to (I believe) 10 per cent. (in the case of the East India Bonds), we should very quickly see the interest reduced to £2,000,000 a-year; and the same economy would soon be applied to the other heads of expenditure, aggregating between them £4,500,000.

We should see a wise economy introduced for the first time into the expenditure of the India Office for salaries and establishments, into the superannuation and pension lists, and the Home military expenditure. With this outlay being charged to English account, there would be a watchful control over every item, where there is now really none. The opium revenue would, I believe, soon be found more than enough to defray the whole; while economy of expenditure, upon the one hand, with an intelligent administration of the revenue on the other, would very speedily lead, I believe, to a large surplus from this special branch of the Imperial income. It is the most patent defect of our whole system of Indian finance at this moment, that there is no effective check thereon of any kind whatever. There is no Parliament to scan the estimates, and no public opinion to make war upon extravagance; and the result is that the Indian scale of charges in all branches of the administration is a monstrous scandal.

To make this paper a complete expression of my views, I shall specify before closing some suggestions which I have frequently made in India, but the discussion of which is impossible in this paper :—

I. English methods of taxation to be abandoned altogether, and new revenues sought by ways and means, suggested by the circumstances of the people, *e.g.* :—

- (a.) A marriage certificate tax.
- (b.) Succession or Nuzzerana duties.
- (c.) Readjustment of tributes from the Native States.
- (d.) State life assurance.

I wish it were possible for me to discuss each of the suggestions here made. Instead of seeking fresh revenue in English methods, we need original statesmanship in devising Indian "ways and means." Thus, I am reasonably sure that we could make a marriage certificate tax thoroughly successful; while the whole field of life assurance is inviting State entrance upon it. There are no vested interests in India, in the way of existing Companies, to be bought up; while the vast body of annuitants and pensioners upon the State furnish the very circumstances wanted for initiating a system of assurance. I would, therefore, recast the whole system

of civil and military pensions, and base them upon the principle of individual assurance throughout. I have long been convinced that there would be no great difficulty in establishing a State system of life assurance in India, that would within twenty years yield an enormous revenue to the State. And as life assurance was undertaken by the State, so should fire insurance be made the business of the municipalities, the profits going in the one case to the State, in the other to the municipality. The field is entirely open, while we are mischievously allowing vested interests to grow up, that we shall by-and-by have to redeem at heavy cost. I feel reasonably sure that within a very few years we might obtain revenues from life and fire assurance, from marriage and succession taxes, of large amount, with the willing consent of the people.

- II. Expansion of the currency system by the issue of one-rupee notes. Silver is so inconvenient, from its bulk and weight that one-rupee notes would be an enormous convenience; and, as there never could be "a run" with such notes, we might issue them to almost any extent, making them convertible on demand at every treasury in the country.

I believe we could dispense with £20,000,000 of the present metallic currency of India within ten years by the issue of One-Rupee notes. The people, upon finding that they could always turn them into silver at the nearest treasury, would soon hoard notes instead of silver, because of the greater ease and security of such hoards. Such notes would be an enormous convenience to all classes, while we could afford to make their imitation too costly to be attempted.

- III. I would greatly extend the Savings' banks of India by offering much higher rates of interest than we now do upon the deposits therein. While the village banker allows 8 per cent. to depositors, it is idle to suppose that the people will deposit anything with the savings' banks that allow but four or five. I would allow a high interest, to make the banks popular with the people, until familiarity with them had done its work; when we might reduce the interest gradually.

- IV. The rupee should be brought back to its proper value as the standard, either by—

- (a.) Stopping the coinage, except on State account;
- (b.) A sliding scale of seignorage;
- (c.) An import duty upon silver; or
- (d.) Buying up the abnormal supply that Germany is casting upon the market.

The apathy which tolerates the present state of the silver question is to myself amazing. I know every word, I believe, that has

been written upon the subject, and I affirm, without reserve, that it is simply the discreditable ignorance of English statesmen upon currency matters that has made their long indifference to the subject possible. The generation that shall come after us will read the history of this silver difficulty with amazement at the folly that tolerated its continuance for a day. The least we can do, if we refuse to do anything else, is—

- V. To pay off the Indian Rupee Debt while silver is 15 to 20 per cent. below its normal price.

If we are under no moral obligation, as I contend positively we are, to bring the standard of value back to its normal pitch, then let us, at least, seize the opportunity of the fall to pay off our liabilities in the metal. I cannot discuss the point here, but have thrashed it out in India over and over again. It is administrative incapacity that holds us where we now are, smitten with a paralysis that allows us neither to go forward nor backward.

- VI. Stringent review of the salaries and allowances of all departments of the administration alike.

The abolition of all sinecures, a close revision of all salaries, and the gradual institution of Native agency for English throughout the country, would largely lessen our civil expenditure. As to the army, our expenditure thereon is an outrage and scandal. Every one knows that we keep up three separate armies in India, merely for the sake of trebling the staff appointments and commands. An honest review of our army expenditure, with a settled determination to reduce it from seventeen to twelve millions a year, would, as a matter of course, ensure the reduction. We are not honest, not in earnest, and so have allowed the expenditure to rise from ten or eleven to seventeen millions upon an army little more than half its former strength.

- VII. A broad and statesmanlike review of all the possibilities of our position, and the instant establishment of a State department of Agriculture to deal with the vital questions of the soil and food supplies of the people.

This subject is of such importance that I shall recur to it before the close of my paper.

#### THE SILVER DIFFICULTY.

The loss brought upon the revenues of India in the last four years and a half (January 1876, to July 1880) by the fall in the price of



silver has been so enormous, while it was so obviously the duty of the State to have prevented it, and the means of its prevention were so simple, that I have long felt it very difficult to write upon the subject dispassionately. The cause of the fall was discernible enough from the first, and is now admitted by every one. It was not that the silver mines of the world had suddenly yielded more silver than its wants could absorb. The extravagant estimates as to the future of the Californian mines that found their way into the French reviews towards the close of 1875 had something, no doubt, to do with the state of the silver market in the year 1876; but it has long been admitted that the true cause of the fall was the letting loose upon the London market of a large supply of the metal from the German currency. The supply was not only casual, but it reached the market in an unusual way, and not in the normal way of trade with the mining districts of the world.

From the very month when the evil first disclosed its magnitude (January, 1876), I pointed out in Calcutta the remedies that were at our command. Egotism is not always vanity, and I affirm boldly that if the dealing with the silver question had been in my own hands, there would never have been a silver difficulty at all. I wrote in the *Calcutta Statesman* in January, 1876:—

We may profit heavily by the exceptional stock of silver Germany is throwing upon the market, if we have but the courage to buy it for ourselves. The causes of its depreciation are patent and ephemeral. By failing to discern this, we are simply impoverishing all interests in the country, public and private alike. The exporter (1876) is getting less than the normal value of his shipments, and the State less than the normal value of its revenues; while by financing the Empire through so exceptional a state of matters, we may enrich each indefinitely. The true policy of the Home Government at this moment is to take advantage of the exceptional stock of silver for sale in the European market, to send it to India, in anticipation of the wants of the Public Works Department, and in redemption of the 5½ per cent. loan (£10,500,000) that matures in 1879, which is now quoted at 105 to 106 in the Calcutta market. The simple fact is that the position offers just one of those opportunities by which the statesman makes a reputation. All that is wanted is clear insight, and the courage that springs from the alliance of conscious integrity therewith. The continuance of the home drawings, in the present position of the bullion market, is simply suicidal. Advantage should be taken of the opportunity to supply ourselves with all the silver that is offering at these rates, and to invest such part of the supply as we do not immediately require in the redemption of the 5½ per cent. stock to issue again at 4, as our public works' necessities arise. Drain the Treasury balances and the Presidency bank as dry as you can, and compel the Exchange Bank to bring out silver too, when you will give an indefinite stimulus to trade; and take up the money you require for your next five years' public works in an abnormally cheap market.

*That was the simple and the effective remedy that I suggested in*

January, 1876. Germany was letting loose upon the market the very silver that was urgently needed by the Government of India. We had a silver loan of ten and a half millions falling due, and we needed five to ten millions sterling more every year for public works. Twelve months ago, I made a private appeal to the bankers and merchants of Calcutta, whether there would have been any silver difficulty at all, if the Government had bought up the exceptional supply of silver that Germany was letting loose upon us, at the rate of ten millions a-year. The unanimous answer was that, if the Government had but bought up but *five* millions a-year, it would have been sufficient to prevent the fall in price altogether. And it would. And this simple remedy was in the hands of the *Executive* Government. There was no need to call for permanent *legislative* reform. We saw the price of the metal ruinously depreciated by an abnormal supply cast upon the market. The Government of India had instant, urgent need of the excess supply. It had a silver loan of ten and a-half millions to pay off almost immediately, and wanted five to ten millions a-year for public works. The people were starving from famine—starving by the million—and the Government had not the common sense to buy up this silver as it was cast upon the market. It preferred to go on selling Council bills in competition with this cheap silver, until their price fell, in July, to 1s. 6½d. per rupee. That which should have been the salvation of India became a crushing loss to both countries. The people, who have perished by millions, might have been saved alive by pouring this silver into India, and the Manchester trade and the Indian revenues saved the losses that have crushed both in a common ruin. And *this* was but one of the simple remedies I pointed out from the very first. It was not a legislative reform, but a purely *executive* act of commonplace wisdom that I asked for; but there was no one in the Government that could be made to see that the danger, seized by the strong hand of common sense, would have disappeared. And so the fall in silver, which *should* have been made an occasion of immense enrichment to the Government and trade of both countries, was allowed, under the unspeakable Ministry of Lord Beaconsfield, to destroy both. Had the government been in my own hands, I would have made this fall in silver the direct, immediate cause of a large accession of wealth to both countries; and I care not who calls the statement egotism.

#### CIVIL SERVICE AND ARMY.

It would swell this paper out of all proportions, if I were to attempt to do more than indicate very briefly the various

changes that the circumstances of the country and the condition of the people necessitate.

I. In the first place, then, our administration is altogether too costly for a poor country like India. We have ever administered it, and are doing so to this hour, upon the false assumption that it is so wealthy a country that it can afford, as a matter of course, to pay all branches of the public service upon a scale unknown in any other country. The cost of our comparatively small Indian army—for it consists but of 180,000 men (of whom 120,000 are Sepoys, upon seven or eight rupees a-month), and is now upon its peace footing—is between £17,000,000 and £18,000,000 a-year. It is enough to state the simple fact. It is a gigantic and cruel wrong to India that this comparatively small force of 180,000 men is made to cost its people the very same amount for which Germany maintains nearly a million of armed men. Close inquiry would, I believe, show that every man of the 60,000 English soldiers with which we garrison India is positively made to cost its miserable people £200 a-year upon the average. So unjust, so scandalous an abuse of power is surely without a parallel in history. The old East India Company kept up its splendid army of 320,000 men upon £10,000,000 or £11,000,000 sterling a-year; while the direct government of the Crown lays a burden of £17,000,000 upon the people for an army of but 180,000. I cannot do more than simply state the fact. In the same way we have a Civil administration of Englishmen over India, who are paid upon a scale unknown in any other country, and out of all proportion to the ability of the people to pay such salaries. I express my unhesitating conviction that the time has come when we ought either to recast Civil salaries in India altogether, or largely diminish the number of Englishmen in State employ. It is the latter step that I believe ought to be taken, and I have a somewhat strong opinion as to the way of taking it. Our profession that we admit the Native youth of India to compete for the public service, upon the same terms as our own youth, is simply untrue. It is mere profession, and nothing more. In the Proclamation of 1st November, 1858, Her Majesty assured the people solemnly, that all distinctions of race, colour, and creed were abolished, and that the people of India should thenceforward be as eligible for high office in the country as the people of England, if they would but qualify themselves for such office. Having made the proclamation, we proceeded to declare that there was but one door open for all who would enter. We declared the door open to all the youth of the Empire, and challenged the world to admire the impartiality of the arrangement. "Force your way in by the door,

"shoulder to shoulder with English youth, and the highest offices "in your own land are open to you." But how deadly becomes the hypocrisy when, as all men see, the door has been made inaccessible to Native youth! The door is open, no doubt, but to reach it, a Native youth, at the tender age of fourteen or fifteen years, must leave his father's house and home, and travel half across the globe to gain it, and there maintain himself amongst strangers, waiting at the door for three, four, or five years for the merest chance of success. Now, suppose for a moment that, instead of opening the door in London, we were to close *that* door and open the competitive door in Calcutta; how many English homes would send their sons out to try their chance of entrance? The subject is so painful, and to myself so humiliating, that I do not like to write about it. We are for ever adjuring Native gentlemen to fit themselves for the service of their country, and for ever telling them that the door has been thrown open to them under our magnanimous rule; when, as the whole world knows, we have shut it fast against them with bolts and bars that nothing can force.

It is replied that the Government has opened *two* doors of entrance to the service for the Native, while there is but one for the Englishman. Practically it is not so. Of what use is it to profess to have opened the door of *nomination* to the people, when for seven years on end no one is nominated? The competitive door is practically closed to Native youth; but then we have rectified it by opening the door of nomination to them, although we admit no one by that door! We should do one thing or other. Either make the conditions of the competition fair, or admit Native youth to the service by nomination. We dare not conceal from ourselves the insincerity with which we are acting. If the competitive door were as easy of access to Native youth as to our own, they would find their way into the service in large and possibly embarrassing numbers. And it is the knowledge of this, that has led to change after change in the conditions, for the very purpose of making the door more difficult to Native youth. Practically, we have closed it altogether, by the alterations of three years ago. As to the door of nomination, I am satisfied that inquiry would show that ten Englishmen have been admitted by that door, into one or other of those branches of the public service the patronage of which is reserved by the Government—to one Native. Is it really impossible for us to deal with the question honestly? If we fear that by placing Native youth on the same footing as our own at the competitive entrance, they would succeed in such numbers as to embarrass us—why not say so plainly, and fix a limit to the proportion of Native youth that we think we

can properly admit? What I cannot forgive, is that we abound in protestations that have not an honest word in them. Do we really mean what we say—that the Crown has resolved that the public service shall be open to every race, creed, and colour in the empire, without favour or partiality of any kind? We are always saying so. Well, having said it, let us fulfil it. Instead of this, we make the conditions of entrance impracticable for Native youth altogether. Would it not be better to say frankly to the people: “Gentlemen,—If you wish your sons to take part in the public service of your country, I am sorry to tell you that Her Majesty’s Ministers have deemed it necessary to restrict their entrance thereto to such small numbers, as will practically exclude them altogether. It would be improper to conceal from you the fact that we do not wish you to take any prominent part in the service of your country, nor your sons either. We have therefore made it impossible for you and for them to do so, because we do not think you morally qualified to hold positions of influence or emolument in the country; and you had better make up your minds to your exclusion therefrom. Such of you as are sufficiently Spartan in mood to send your boys at fourteen years of age to Europe, and have £2,000 or £3,000 to spare for maintaining and educating them there, know that they will have a chance of competing at seventeen or eighteen years with the English youth; and if your confidence in their abilities is as well founded as you think, no one can blame you for letting them try their chance. But London is a bad place for boys at that tender age, without friends and amongst strangers; and as the chance of their success is remote after all, I can only advise you, as a friend, to keep your boys at home and your money in your pocket, and to reconcile yourselves, for some generations longer, to be ruled entirely by foreigners in all the higher administrative posts.” Now this is what we *practically* say to the people, but what we lack the sincerity to say openly. And we then disingenuously charge upon their want of qualifications, our own interested provisions to exclude them from the service.

As a fact, the people are qualified to fill many of the positions we now reserve for English youth, particularly in the judicial service; and the reform which commends itself to my own mind is a radical one. It is, I think, a false and erroneous notion altogether to propose introducing Native youth to the service of their country through the door of the competitive examinations in London. The principle of competition may be regarded as, I suppose, established, however; but instead of inviting Native youth to compete in London for entrance into the highly-paid and exclusive foreign service by

which we administer India, I would establish a competitive Civil Service for Indian youth in India itself. I would not expressly exclude Native youth from the competition in London, but would have a separate and distinct Civil Service in India for their admission in such numbers as the State requires. The *Indian Civil Service* should be distinct, I say, from the *Anglo-Indian Service*, the strength of the latter being slowly but steadily diminished. What we want is a Civil Service as efficient as the present, but paid on a much smaller scale; and I am satisfied that the time has come when we may create such a service. We cannot suppose that we are going to make India a preserve for English youth for all time. We *must* pay Englishmen in India on a scale much higher than it is at all necessary to pay Native gentlemen. We have meanwhile the repeated assurance of the High Court Judges of Calcutta that our native moonsiffs and subordinate judges administer justice more satisfactorily than our own civilian judges, who receive from three to six and eight times their pay. I would establish, then, a distinct native Civil Service in India itself, to be entered by the youth of India by the competitive door. The old order of things cannot last, and statesmanship is required to inaugurate a new order, taking advantage of the higher education we have introduced by our colleges and Universities to obtain the men we require for it. If residence in England is deemed essential to qualify Native youths for such service, then let the residence follow upon their successful competition in India. I do not attempt, for manifest reasons, to elaborate any scheme; I simply say that our administration of India is on altogether too costly a scale, and that our military and civil expenditure alike admit of enormous reduction, if we are in earnest in undertaking the work.

II. I doubt exceedingly whether we shall ever be able to economise our military expenditure in India, while we maintain the complete identity which now exists between the Home and Indian Forces. I am quite aware of the difficulties in the way of change. The amalgamation of the forces, as it was called, upon the assumption of direct rule by the Crown, has brought upon us to their fullest extent, the tide of evils which the lamented Outram and others foresaw. We have an army out of all proportion more costly than the old local forces of the East India Company, while its officers have lost all feeling of identity with the country, in which they now pass an unwilling and perfunctory service. Here, again, it is statesmanship of the highest order that is needed to surmount the difficulties of which interested and hasty action in the past has proved the parent. I simply indicate the evil, and state my

belief that its solution is to be sought in the rehabilitation of what has been destroyed, and in the fusion of the forces now maintained by the Native States with our own. We shall have to create a local army of some kind, and to officer it with native gentlemen holding a real commission from the Crown. To suppose that we can for ever exclude the Natives of India from all positions of influence and emolument under the Crown, either in the civil or military branches of the administration, and that the people of India are ever to be governed as though they were children, and in a state of non-age, is impossible. We have to choose between drifting and leading, and our strongly pronounced tendency is to "drift," no man can say whither. I simply indicate problems that exist, and that will have to be solved; and that every public man who concerns himself with the affairs of India should keep constantly before his mind.

#### *SPECIAL REFORMS IN THE ACCOUNTS.*

I may now sum up the special reforms in the accounts that, in my own opinion, should be at once initiated, or preparations for which entered upon, without delay.

- I. The opening of a Public Works Ledger, with the entry therein of the whole expenditure upon such works, except those required for the ordinary civil and military administration of the country.
- II. The institution of an Annual Budget of Public Works Expenditure and Revenue, kept wholly distinct from the ordinary Administrative accounts of the year.
- III. The establishment of real and not delusive Provincial Balance-sheets of Revenue and Expenditure, showing the amount which each province contributes to the Imperial burdens, after defraying its own local administrative expenses.
- IV. The recasting of the Annual Administrative Accounts, excluding therefrom (1) all Public Works Expenditure and Revenue that does not arise from the ordinary administration of the country, and (2) all revenues and expenditure of a local or provincial order.
- V. The accounts to be made out in Indian and not in sterling currency, that the exchange difficulty may be reduced to its simplest form.

I regard the first four of these reforms as essential. There can be neither just nor wise taxation in India, until each province is made to pay its own ordinary administrative expenses and furnish its proper share to the Imperial burdens. To enable the provinces to do this, they must be allowed to tax themselves in such ways as their economic circumstances suggest. It is absurd for a great

central Government, presiding at Calcutta over a dozen nationalities differing so radically as the provinces of India, attempting to tax them upon uniform methods. What is wanted is a complete decentralization of the finances of the country, the Imperial balance-sheet concerning itself simply with the great branches of Imperial administration only:—peace and war, the public debt, the army, the postal and telegraphic services, the great lines of railway, the Native States, the Home charges, relations with the mother country, &c. There would be no real difficulty in accomplishing these reforms if the work were entrusted to men who were really in earnest about it. It would be idle to refer it to the departments at Calcutta. No bureaucracy ever willingly divests itself of power, and so long as the Secretaries of the Government of India alone are consulted, there will be not one, but fifty “lions in the way.” As we can hope for neither wise nor just taxation under the present centralized system, nor a just apportionment of the great Imperial burdens between the provinces, so will there never be a clear understanding of Indian finance until the vast expenditure that is being made upon public works for the improvement of our great estate in the land is separated once for all from the accounts of ordinary revenue and the current administrative charges of the Empire. I have persistently urged these reforms upon the Government for more than twenty years, with an ever-growing conviction of their necessity. Had we but adopted them when the Crown assumed the direct administration of affairs, there would have been no uncertainty to-day in any quarter, as to our true financial position, while we should have cut up by the roots all occasion for the arbitrary and unwise taxation imposed by the central Government upon the people. Each province of the Empire would have known its precise liabilities, and would long since have felt its way to just and enlightened methods of taxing its people according to their peculiar circumstances and condition. The longer the work is delayed, the more troublesome will it become, while it will have to be done at last of pure necessity.

#### CONCLUSION.

I cannot too earnestly reiterate that the difficulty with which we have to deal in India is only mocked by describing it as one of “ways and means” to meet the expenditure of the Government, or as a question of improved book-keeping. The problem we have to deal with is the redemption of a hundred and twenty millions of agriculturists from a ruin that has been brought upon them by ourselves.



The nation is living in a fool's paradise as to the condition of India and the blessings of British rule. Our rule has reduced the vast mass of the agricultural population to abject wretchedness. We have to deal with an exhausted soil, exhausted food stores, and an exhausted population. The very highest statesmanship will be required for their redemption, in the discernment and application of original measures adequate to their need. I believe it to be quite idle to hope that the perfunctory machinery of administration that has brought about this state of matters will ever deal effectually with it. I would impress the best part of that machinery into a new organization altogether—an organization administered by men who are innocent of complicity in the past. I would reverse much of our present action altogether. Thus I would try with care and intelligence the system of taking the land revenue in *kind*. I would have a carefully framed usury law, and experimental legislation of a very fearless kind, with the simple proviso that it should be experimental, and confined at first to a pergunnah only, here and there in the various provinces. I would cease the "impossible" effort to administer India directly, as we are now doing, by a foreign agency that has not a sympathy in common with the people.

I would steadily contract the number of appointments to the Anglo-Indian Civil Service, and establish a new and distinct Civil Service, to be raised in India itself from Native youth of all races and classes. I would give the new organization power to enlist special talent wherever it showed itself in the existing Services, covenanted, uncovenanted, and military.

I would narrow the jurisdiction of the present Civil Courts, and rebuild *experimentally* the old *punchayet* system of administering rural justice. We must, I am persuaded, rebuild much that we have destroyed, and, instead of abolishing Native rule, extend its borders wherever it is successful, as in the Nizam's country, Travancore, Putteallah. Our whole system is false, exotic, and sickly, begotten of a selfishness too blind to discern the natural, the inevitable tendency of its course.

As to finance: I would begin at once to show the same intelligence, the same careful economy in every monetary arrangement we make for India, that we show in every operation of our own Treasury. There should be no more wasteful borrowing in India, where there is nothing to be borrowed, no more timid withholding of an Imperial guarantee that is already pledged to the last shilling of the nation's resources, no more vacillation and uncertainty as to our expenditure upon public works and the way to meet the outlay. I would fulfil the moral duty we

have neglected for the last four years and a-half, and bring the standard (not silver, be it remarked) back to its proper value, when the price of silver would follow it as surely as the morning does the night.

I would cover India with a network of communications, as the only means now left us, to rescue her provinces from the periodic starvation that must otherwise follow upon every failure of harvests. As to works of irrigation, I would follow where our predecessors led, and, instead of constructing gigantic canals upon English ideas, would see that the hundreds of thousands of wells and tanks and reservoirs that we found throughout the country, are repaired and re-excavated, and preserved for all time, where we have permitted them to fall into ruin.

In a word, I would proceed upon this great and simple fact, that the State is the great landlord of India, and that as the tenantry have been ruined by our past neglect and mistakes, we must show unselfish courage, and sustained and patient effort, to redeem the past. The new organization I call for should be a real Department of Agriculture, instead of the ridiculous show and sham of a thing set up ten years ago, the fate of which was certain from the first. Everything will depend upon the administrative heads. They must be men who have their eyes open to the present state of matters, and are endowed with courage and insight to deal with it. The Department must be set free at the outset, from the rule of the bureaucracy. Instead of receiving orders, it must be empowered to give orders, and to compel assistance and co-operation. If possible, I would have no Indian Civilian at, or even near, the head of the Department, which should correspond direct with the Secretary of State for India. I do not mean that we should set up an *imperium in imperio* in India, but I do mean that the problem we have to deal with is of an order that Indian Civilians are not likely to accomplish; and that, as the work must be experimental and tentative in its initiation, we should get original outside "power," thoroughly discerning what has to be done, and that we should permit no interference of the bureaucracy therewith. Let the Department stand or fall, by its success or failure. I am reasonably sure that if I had been allowed at any time these ten years past to take up a *pergunnah* in Oudh, with Native agency selected by myself, to apply thereto as an experiment the measures I have suggested in vain to the Government, I could redeem its people from their present wretchedness. And what

might be done in one pergunnah, could be done eventually for a whole province. But then, we must have moral earnestness in place of a perfunctory discharge of routine duties, and generous readiness to avail ourselves of the assistance of the non-official merchant, the trader, the native banker, the native gentleman, and native educated youth.

With a vast territory in such a condition as that of the provinces of British India, I believe it would be true wisdom to take distinguished Native administrators like Sir Salar Jung (Hyderabad), Sir Madhava Row (Baroda), Derwan Raghunath Rao (Indore), Dewa Peishcar Rama Rao (Travancore), and Mr. Gourishanker, of Bhownagar, and place them in independent positions over territory carved out of our own distressed provinces for the purpose. The one pervading conviction of my own mind, it will be seen, is this, that we never can rule India successfully, as we are now attempting to rule it, by a body of foreigners, who have not a sympathy in common with the people, and whose interest in their work is every year becoming more perfunctory and ephemeral. We are drifting in India we know not where. There is no real guidance of affairs whatever, while the current is plainly taking us into a region of rocks and whirlpools that we ought to know *must* wreck us.

## THE FAMINE REPORT.

THE Report of the Indian Famine Commission is at last issued, and the Commissioners substantiate the truth of every charge, made by this journal in India, against Lord Lytton's administration. For the first time in modern history, the calamity of famine was surmounted in India in 1873-4, by Earl Northbrook's determination that the people should not die of hunger if the Government could save them alive. We had pressed this resolution upon the Government with the utmost earnestness in the terrible famine in Rajpootana in 1863-9, but in vain. Sir John Strachey's counsels, which were the embodiment of the old "Civilian" tradition that our great danger in such calamities was the "doing too much" for the people, were allowed to prevail, in spite of the most indignant remonstrances. The result was that a million and a quarter of people died of hunger in the villages, or by the wayside. We had for years pointed out that the only spirit in which we could hope to encounter famine with success, was by meeting it with the same resolution with which we enter upon war. It had ever seemed to us the most terrible scandal of civilization that, while ready to plunge into war upon almost any cause, and frequently without cause at all, and reckless whether they spent a hundred millions or five hundred in the work of human destruction, the modern Governments of the world—our own in India foremost amongst them—professed to regard it as extravagant and impossible to talk of spending five or ten millions in famine, to save the starving millions of the poor from the last horrors of a calamity the anguish of which can never be pictured. It will be the lasting monument of Earl Northbrook's fame that he was the very first statesman in modern history, to accept and act upon the principle that, in famine as in war, THE STATE CONDONES EVERYTHING BUT FAILURE. Sir George Campbell had held this principle for years, with the clearness of insight, tenacity, and power which, in spite of his so-called parliamentary failure, mark him out at this moment to the seeing eye, as the one statesman India has produced in modern days, who should be made Viceroy of that

Empire in its present truly terrible condition. And Sir George Campbell was at Earl Northbrook's right hand in the famine of 1873. Earl Northbrook made but one mistake, and as it was an important one, we are compelled to notice it, though with reluctance. He did not see what Sir George Campbell saw clearly;—that, as India can never be relieved in time of famine by the import of food from abroad, the export of food from the country should be instantly suspended when famine looms upon the land. Unwilling to interfere with the export trade, Lord Northbrook attempted to import, and did import, nearly half a million tons of rice from Burmah, while permitting the export of rice from Bengal to go on unchecked. It was this error, and this alone, that made his relief measures cost the large sum of six or seven millions sterling. Had the export of rice from Calcutta been suspended, as Sir George Campbell earnestly advised in October and November, 1873, the course of events showed clearly that the people would have been carried through the calamity of that year, at a cost of but £2,000,000 sterling, without a death from starvation, and almost without suffering amongst them. It was Lord Northbrook's one mistake. We should pass it over in silence, but that it is necessary, in the treatment of Indian famines in the future, to discern clearly that it was this one mistake which made his splendid administration so costly as to give the occasion which Civilians like Sir John Strachey wanted to justify their reverting to the policy of allowing the people to pull through these calamities as they can, the moment Lord Northbrook's back was turned,

The miserable charlatan in Lord Northbrook's Council, Sir Richard Temple, who, as Sir George Campbell's successor, contrived to cover the Viceroy's grand and simple statesmanship with ridicule by the wild extravagance with which he travestied it, was ready, instantly upon Lord Northbrook's departure, to be the instrument, under Lord Lytton, of carrying out Sir John Strachey's Civilian views, with a vigour and cruelty that are declared by the Commissioners to have resulted in the death of more than five millions of people. We tell the people of England that the men who starved these millions to death, and another million still, according to Mr. Caird's estimate, in the North-west a year later are Sir Richard Temple and Sir John Strachey, and with Lord Lytton, they should be made to answer at the bar of Parliament for the two great crimes of his unspeakable administration. The deep cloud of shame which rests upon our rule of India, since Lord Northbrook left its shores, has been spread over it as a pall by these men. Every remonstrance with their course was laughed to scorn by them in India, as we saw them simultaneously plunge into their

buccaneering war against the miserable Afghan people, reckless of shedding their blood in torrents, though at the cost of a public debt that no man can measure. The same men were solemnly decreeing amongst them simultaneously, that Lord Northbrook's resolution to save our own people alive in famine, was Quixotic nonsense. And now, at the close of their course, Mr. Caird tells us, as one of the official Commissioners, that "if the people of this vast metropolis, with the millions in its neighbourhood, were all melted away by a lingering death, even this would not exceed in numbers the loss of India." Mr. Caird has far underrated, and wisely, the real mortality. And yet some one advised the University of Oxford to call Sir Richard Temple up the other day, that they might confer an honorary degree upon him! Sir John Strachey has been once more decorated by the Crown; and the Viceroy becomes Earl Lytton by the gracious favour of the Throne. Afghanistan, meanwhile, is a huge, confused theatre of devastation, fire, and massacre. The wells of India are choked with the skeletons of the famished dead, hurried into them for decency by the passer-by, while the bones of unburied millions lie bleaching on the parched and scorching plains. No word-painting can adequately pourtray what our rule of India has been in the last four years—the rule that culminated in the wickedness of this Afghan War. And we have a responsible Government, we are told.

## MINISTERIAL RESPONSIBILITY.

WE said in our last issue that if the nation permit the fall of the Beaconsfield Cabinet to close the last six years' chapter of our history, without an effort to make its leaders responsible for the legacy of shame and embarrassment they have bequeathed to us, it would be idle to expect any real sense of accountability to the people from the Executive. A few months ago, the most thoughtful minds in the country viewed with indignation and alarm the defiant course of the ex-Ministers. Relying upon a parliamentary majority that gloried in its shame, and that the Earl of Beaconsfield expected would last out his lifetime, he had the nation literally under his feet; and, in spite of the earnest and continued protests of the intellect and conscience of the country, used the powers in his hands in contemptuous defiance of both, down to the very last moment. What earnest man amongst us has forgotten the long course of deception practised by the ex-Ministers upon the country? And if upon the fall of a Cabinet such as this, its accountability to the nation is to be confined to its simple removal from office, and the substitution of a new Ministry in its place, the degradation of political life amongst us has become complete. For sound reasons, we have adopted the constitutional maxim that "the king can do no wrong," but the sense of responsibility has become so dead amongst our public men, that the fiction is now practically assumed to include the Ministers as well as the King. Without openly saying so, the Minister claims the same immunity as the Crown itself.

We advise the nation very earnestly not to permit the Earl of Beaconsfield to escape on this plea, the just punishment of his crime. The total shipwreck which his Cabinet has made of the finances of England and India alike, calls for full exposition at the hands of his successor, and if Mr. Gladstone, from false delicacy, shrinks from preferring the indictment, independent members of the new House should relieve him of the task. Enormous as are the national losses which the Earl of Beaconsfield has entailed upon us, they are subordinate in our own eyes altogether, to the

guilt into which he contrived to plunge us by this Afghan war. We might with perfect truthfulness add the Zulu war also, for it was simply the manifest uneasiness with which the nation regarded the Afghan war, that made the Earl of Beaconsfield profess to wash his hands of the former. There can be no doubt in any discerning mind, that Sir Bartle Frere's course was an exact expression of the spirit of the instructions he was acting under. Had there been any real repugnance to his course, he would have been summarily recalled from the Cape in disgrace. We said in a former issue, that it is difficult for the publicist who desires to influence opinion healthfully, to know whether to speak or keep silence in this important crisis of the nation's affairs. Everyone remembers that the so-called censure of the High Commissioner that was sent out to the Cape was accompanied by assurances of sympathy, if not approval, from a higher personage than the Premier, while the influence which the Earl of Beaconsfield has swayed at Court has been almost ostentatiously displayed. And yet no Minister in modern days has fallen from power under so stern a sentence of reprobation by the country.

The conduct, both of the ex-Minister and of the leading instruments of his policy, is regarded by the masses of the nation with indignant resentment. The intellect and conscience of the people hold their course to have been criminal, while anything like a full exposition of its obliquity, and of the losses and embarrassment in which it has involved us, would stir public indignation to a depth as unusual in modern times, as the conduct against which it is directed. And now observe the position into which political life amongst us has drifted. On both sides of the House then, it seems at present to be taken for granted that the removal of this man from power, by the verdict of the elections, is a sufficient punishment for his crime, the only punishment indeed which the Constitution, it is assumed, recognizes. It has therefore, come at last to this—that a Minister may abuse the Executive powers entrusted to him by the Constitution, to betray the country, by systematic concealment and falsehood, into war upon an unoffending people, upon his own personal responsibility. That either Parliament or the Privy Council should be made aware of the true circumstances of the quarrel, that the nation may decide the momentous issue of peace or war in the exercise of its own intelligence and conscience upon the facts, has been cynically laughed to scorn by the high prerogative gentleman, who tells us that these are matters for "sovereigns and statesmen" to debate, and not the people; unless indeed, the passions of the mob have to be excited to the right ministerial pitch, by false and concocted



stories. If there were any excuse whatever for this Afghan War, we should not speak thus uncompromisingly about it: but there is absolutely none. The war was as deliberate a crime, as was ever perpetrated by a strong against a weak power. And in view of the ruin into which it has plunged the finances of India, and the shame and cruelty in which it has involved the national arms, it is monstrous to pretend that the mere removal of such a Cabinet from office, is the proper and constitutional punishment for their offence. It is no punishment at all, as every one may see for himself; for instead of the main actors in the business—the men through whose active complicity at Simlah and in this country, the crime was committed—being brought to the bar of the country, there to answer for it publicly, we have seen the falling Minister advise the Crown to decorate them all round. Lord Lytton, the very worst Viceroy that has ever gone to India, is raised to an earldom, as his share of the reward; while the knot of men around him who urged him into the crime, and the Secretaries and officials who concocted the telegrams that made the War unavoidable, have all alike been decorated for their share in the business. There is a baseness in thus drawing the Throne into complicity with these proceedings, and making it cast its shadow over these men, as a shield against the righteous indignation of an awakened people, that moves us very deeply. The Minister sees his fall coming, through the emphatic verdict of the constituencies, and at once proceeds to cover with a shower of honours the men that ought to be prosecuted by the Commons, for their active complicity in, and furtherance of, his crime. It is not thus that the country will always be governed; nor do we despair of an organized effort in the next Session to vindicate the national character that has been trampled in the dust, by the prostitution of these honours. If ever men deserved impeachment in modern times, it is the Earl of Beaconsfield, and his cynical ally the Marquis; and by permitting them to escape with impunity, the nation is inviting a repetition of their crime. We owe it to our character as a just and humane people, that we should wash our hands publicly of all complicity with a course which the mere politician will advise us to forget and condone. It is not so that an heroic people will act towards leaders who have betrayed it into the shame and shipwreck which the Earl of Beaconsfield and his colleagues have brought upon the nation.

It was matter of common remark at the late elections, that the indignation of the constituencies was awakened not so much by the persistent neglect with which every question of domestic policy had

been treated by the Ministry, nor by the embarrassments into which they had brought the finances of the country, and the load of debt they had accumulated, but by the conviction that their course towards other nations had been one of essential immorality, and full of dishonour to us as a people. There was no disposition anywhere, to exaggerate the share which their misgovernment had contributed to the long depression of trade in the country. There was, on the contrary, a generous willingness to ascribe largely their failure in finance, to circumstances over which they had no control. The simple, straightforward character of Sir Stafford Northcote, and the unobtrusive labours of Mr. Cross as Home Secretary, and Mr. Smith as head of the Admiralty, had made a widespread and favourable impression upon the country. It was a profound sense of the immoral character of the proceedings of Earl Beaconsfield and his ally the Marquis of Salisbury, that so deeply offended the constituencies, and at last so thoroughly awakened the national conscience. It was seen and recognised everywhere, that they had tricked and deceived the nation systematically in their foreign policy, and had used the majority at their command in the Commons, to establish new and dangerous precedents as to the treaty-making and war-making powers in their hands as the Executive, by unconstitutional doctrines as to the prerogative of the Crown. They had degraded Parliament into a mere court of record or bed of justice, for registering the Imperial decrees of the Cabinet. There was a general and uneasy feeling that the national liberties of the country were in danger from the known unscrupulousness of a Minister, whose sinister career had culminated in his placing himself on the very steps of the Throne, there to suggest counsels which had brought its favourites in earlier times to the scaffold. There were specific acts of the Ministry, or to speak more correctly of the two great Tory leaders in the Lords, that were never absent from the public mind, and it is for these specific acts that we advise the impeachment of these two noblemen. If in the consciousness of returning power, the nation deems a step of this extreme order unnecessary, it should petition Parliament to present an Address to the Crown, praying for the removal of the Earl of Beaconsfield and the Marquis of Salisbury from Her Majesty's Privy Council, setting forth therein the grounds on which the Address is framed. In Africa and in India, in Afghanistan, Syria, Asia Minor, in Cyprus and in Egypt, the two ex-Ministers have claimed for the Crown a prerogative so unconstitutional, and from the peculiar mode of its exercise, so dangerous, that they deserve impeachment; for they

made wars and contracted engagements of the most formidable character, without even the form of consulting either Parliament or the Privy Council in the way prescribed by the Constitution of the Kingdom. Their treason—for ugly as the word is, it is treason with which we charge them—their treason was deliberately concealed, by the grossest false statements in Parliament as to what they were doing, while they impudently relied upon their majority in both Houses to see them safely through. Who can forget that at the very time when they had concluded a formal secret treaty with Russia, and another secret convention with Turkey, binding responsibilities of the most extraordinary nature upon the shoulders of the country, without giving either the Parliament or nation the least intimation of what they were doing—they had the hardihood to assure the House that the former treaty had no existence whatever, being wholly “unauthentic,” as Lord Salisbury told the Lords, when its every letter had been produced and published: while as to Afghanistan a course of ministerial falsehood without parallel was resorted to, to conceal from Parliament the quarrel they were fastening upon the Ameer to provoke him into hostilities by their insults, and finally to persuade the nation that war had been forced upon them by the truculence and haughty insolence of himself and his officers. If conduct of this fatal character is to be condoned by the free people of this country, and the Crown prostituted to shower honours and decorations upon the instruments of such courses—it will not be long before Englishmen, who are determined that the national honour shall not be dragged through the dirt in this unheard-of way, will begin to inquire seriously whether the very forms of Monarchy ought not to be abolished from our midst. We may point the finger at American institutions if we please, but there is no such chapter of shame in the history of the great Republic to this day. It is a duty incumbent upon the new Parliament that now sits at St. Stephen's, to bring the actors in this business to formal account. Executive responsibility has no existence in England, if the course of the ex-Ministry is really to be forgotten, while the nation is still involved in the bloodshed, embarrassment, and dishonour which these men have brought upon us by their conduct. Every one now knows that we owe the state of matters in Afghanistan, and the total shipwreck of the Indian Exchequer to the determination with which the Earl of Beaconsfield and the Marquis of Salisbury established personal Government over the nation, by abusing the prerogative of the Crown; and they should be made to answer for their course. We are not, be it remem-

bered, preferring new and strange charges against them. We are simply insisting that the charges formally made against them in the last Parliament by Lords Selborne and Sherbrooke, by Mr. Gladstone and Lord Hartington, shall be investigated, and not mischievously consigned to oblivion, under the plea of its being inadvisable to stir up party feeling in the country. The crime of the late Ministry has compromised the future of India hopelessly, and will yet produce deep embarrassment in this country. If Parliament does not move in the matter before rising, the Autumn vacation should be devoted to an awakening of the country to the necessity of some such course as we suggest. The effect of condoning such proceedings upon the Indian Bureaucracy is simply fatal. It is seldom that the people of England have any chance of knowing what the character of their administration really is. The veil has now been partially lifted, and we see the extent to which the Indian departments at Simlah will betray the national trust without scruple, counting confidently upon rewards as certain for their subserviency. There was not a man apparently in the whole Government of India who had the courage to oppose the Ministerial course. They knew on which side their interest lay, and unless the nation takes this question of Executive responsibility into its own hands, and resolves that the Crown shall not be permitted to prostitute its functions as the fountain of honour, as it has been made to do by the Earl of Beaconsfield, we may look, sooner or later, for a great cataclysm as the close of our rule in India. The heads of the Impérial Indian Bureaucracy are so far removed from the influence of public opinion, while their proceedings are so shrouded from the public gaze, that there is not a safeguard of any kind for the purity of their administration, beyond that which the general character of "Englishmen" furnishes as a guarantee. The natural result is that the sense of accountability is unknown in their bureaus. We admit gladly how much high-mindedness is sometimes found amongst them; but there is a persistent determination, as might have been expected, to ignore all outside opinion upon their course, and to govern at their own will; and, when a Lord Lytton is at their head, we find them to a man the ready instruments for an Afghan War. The nation must not permit the present crime to pass away without teaching the Executive of both countries that though "the King can do no wrong," his *Ministers* may, and that they can be punished for their betrayal of the nation.

## HOME AND FOREIGN AFFAIRS.

THE final collapse of the project for erecting a statue of the Imperial Prince within the walls of Westminster Abbey reveals the profound gulf which divides the England of to-day from the England of last year. That scheme may be said to have marked the Nadir of England's degradation. A lower depth was hardly conceivable. The degradation, of course, consisted not in the proposal itself, but in the state of feeling of which it was an evidence. It is worth while to recal once more what were the experiences of that dreary time, the circumstances which raised the present Government to power. The Zulu War was felt to be the most humiliating episode in the history of the British Empire. In its origin, the wickedness and cowardice of the war are not surpassed by any known to historians; in its conduct, it was marked by a ferocity and barbarism that would have disgraced the Kaffirs themselves; while the incidents were such as to profoundly discredit the capacity of our officers and the courage and discipline of our soldiers;—altogether, it was a war which any self-respecting nation would have mourned over in sackcloth and ashes. It is impossible to recal the facts without the deepest shame. The men returning from this unequal struggle with naked savages were received as heroes victorious in some great achievement. They were feasted at banquets; they were presented with swords; triumphal arches were raised in their honour; and the recipients of these honours swaggered about, and eulogised their own heroic feats, as if the butchery of a betrayed and friendly people was a matter which no patriotic British citizen could refuse to rejoice at. And in the midst of it all came the death of this young Prince. Now this young gentleman had gone out to Zululand avowedly for no other purpose but to train his 'prentice hand, by the slaughter of Zulus, for the slaughter of his own countrymen at some future period. He is killed while engaged in this laudable occupation; and forthwith a great cry is raised that the martyr to Jingoism should be interred in Westminster Abbey. There was a beautiful fitness in the whole proceeding. If Jingo was henceforth to be our national god, there could be no question that the young Prince had fallen while giving a practical exemplification of his principles; and Dean Stanley, as a dignitary of the Establishment set up for the worship of the national god, was quite right in throwing open the doors of Westminster Abbey to the proto-martyr—the self-immolated victim—of Jingoism. Dean Stanley, it would appear from his latest utterance on the subject, remains unconverted to this day. He has admitted the remains of many eminent Englishmen within the Abbey of which he is the custodian, but to no act of his does he look back with such heartfelt satisfaction as his attempt to introduce the effigy of the Imperial Prince amid the memorials of the nation's illustrious dead. To him, the exclusion of this effigy is dictated by a spirit similar to that which disinterred Cromwell from his last resting place.

Happily, the nation at large has returned to sanity, and some small respect for the Ten Commandments; and the majority on Mr. Briggs' resolution is the result of their recovery. There was in the success of that resolution a purport of wider significance than merely the desire to rescue Westminster Abbey from the desecration with which it was menaced. We have now got in England, it seems, the "principle of continuity," which is invoked as a sufficient reason for rectifying no error that has been committed, for redressing no wrong that has been done. In the name of this ridiculous fiction Westminster Abbey, it seems, would have been desecrated, and a substantial insult offered to the French Republic, if the Liberal majority in the Commons had misapprehended the meaning of the Election as much as their leaders have done. The General Election meant nothing less than this—that a majority of the nation repudiated with anger and disgust the acts which had been done in its name. No matter at what cost, it demanded an immediate breach in that continuity. And unless the Government open their eyes to this undoubted fact, they will find, despite their enormous majority, that their tenure of power will be brief.

In the conduct of their Foreign Policy, the conduct of the Government has been marked by signal and inexplicable weakness. Their predecessors had left three complications for their successors to bring into order: the complication in Africa, the complication in Afghanistan, and the complication in South-eastern Europe. Now of these three, the process of extrication from the first two, was simple and obvious. And it was, moreover, manifestly of the first importance to the Government that they should be clear of these, before they proceeded to deal with the third. For in South-eastern Europe, the work they had to do was difficult in the extreme, and might, not improbably, lead to developments requiring, in order to meet them, the undivided strength of the Empire. It might, therefore, have been reasonably expected that before entangling themselves in the labyrinths of the Eastern Question—or, at least, simultaneously with it—the new Government would have adopted the simple and obvious method of putting an end to the nation's difficulties in Africa and Afghanistan. The simple and obvious method of getting out of our Cape difficulties was the recal and censure of the unhappy man who, as High Commissioner, has stained the honour of the nation. The simple and obvious method out of our Afghan difficulties was a frank acknowledgment to the Afghan people of the wrong we had done them by this war, and the expression of our readiness to leave the country the moment their Sirdars could agree amongst themselves as to the chieftain whom they wished to place upon the vacant Munud, with the intimation of a generous desire to give them such assistance as they might reasonably expect from us for the re-establishment of settled order in the country. There is not a doubt that such was the policy expected of the Government; there cannot be a doubt that the majority of the nation would have hailed it with enthusiasm. But, my good friends, where then would have been our famous "principle of continuity"—the very sheet-anchor of the Constitution, and the source of the nation's greatness? It would have perished—vanished into the limbo of extinct superstitions such as the "balance of power," "passive obedience," the "divine right of kings," &c. A prospect so appalling naturally struck panic into the official mind, and the obvious and simple methods were discarded, with the results we now see.

In our issue of last month we demonstrated the grievous outrage perpetrated on the honour and conscience of the nation by the retention of Sir Bartle Frere

in his position at the Cape. By condoning the crimes he had committed, they gave him every encouragement to persevere in a similar line of conduct. His policy was not unknown. It had been set forth by him at great length in his despatches. It had met with the cordial approval of the Cape Government, over which our Colonial Secretary has no control whatever. That policy was to disarm, at all risks, the Native races, beginning with the Basutos. Not only was this determination known to the Colonial Office when the present Government came into power, but its probable consequences had been accurately foreseen by Lord Kimberley. We are quite willing to admit that a war with the Basutos will be as hateful to Ministers as to ourselves, but it is this very fact which renders their supineness so culpable and so utterly inexplicable. Over Mr. Sprigg's proceedings Lord Kimberley had no control, but over those of Sir Bartle Frere he had; and the obvious and most effective check to the rapacious policy which is forcing the Basutos into an attitude of hostility, would have been the prompt recal and degradation of Sir Bartle Frere. The idlest of all possible acts was to send orders to an official notorious for his disregard of orders. The consequences of this strange leniency the nation is now awaiting with painful uneasiness. As was to be expected, Sir Bartle Frere and Mr. Sprigg treat the plaintive remonstrances of Lord Kimberley with the contempt which was ensured at their hands. They have persisted in their confiscation of the lands of Moirosi; they have persisted in their policy of disarming the Basutos. It is true that Lord Kimberley has declared that if a war is the result of these high-handed and aggressive courses, the Cape Colonists will have to do their own fighting, without assistance from British troops. But what care Sir Bartle Frere and Mr. Sprigg for impotent declarations such as these? They know, and Lord Kimberley knows, that they will not be acted upon; that, so long as the connection exists between Great Britain and the Cape, we shall hold ourselves bound to see the Colonists safely through any war, no matter what its origin may have been. It is the assurance of this which emboldened the Colonists in their dealings with the Native races. On Great Britain, not on them, falls the losses, the degradation, and the dishonour of the cruel butcheries which are rendered necessary by these acts of rapacity. Seldom, if ever, has a Government had an opportunity of branding acts like these with the nation's displeasure, and a war in Basutoland appears likely to be the first-fruits of their failure. It is unnecessary to point out how vastly the difficulties of the Government will be enhanced if troubles break out in Southern Africa simultaneously with troubles in South-eastern Europe and Afghanistan.

A leading Calcutta journal thus summarises the results of Lord Lytton's administration: "What we wish to notice is that the traditional public spirit which characterized all the departments of the Indian administration, seems to have departed. The greatest demoralization prevails in all official quarters. Never were public servants more submissive, more tied to routine . . . than they are now. Never were they also more dissatisfied with the Government and more distrustful of one another. Their initiative, essential in a large country where there are so few pioneers of civilization, is a tradition of the past. Their intercourse with the Natives meets with a chillier response than ever, for the Natives have learned the hollowness of professions which can never again have the same convincing power. For this and far more Lord Lytton's reign is to be held responsible. It seemed to do nothing, whether great or small, without an intrigue leading up to

it, a *coup de theatre*, and a smash. The simplest affairs were confidential in a country where there cannot be too much openness and interchange and correction of opinion. The consequence was that the subterfuges, suppressions, and garblings of State papers pervaded official correspondence generally. The watch over the opinions expressed by officials, the un-English growth of a detective political police, the *café chantant* style of the Simlah Court, the patronage to which intrigue and vice was the avenue, the false glitter, the broken pledges, the prurient Bohemianism, did the rest, and, by robbing public servants of all liberty, encouraged them to seek for consolation in licence, and for advancement in prostitution of all manliness to their superiors, and in suppression of those below them."

We ask our readers to weigh well the meaning of this indictment. There is not a shade of exaggeration in it. Such, in sober, literal truth, was the state of our administration when the new Government assumed office. The war in Afghanistan was but one expression of a system that was an embodied negation of justice, honesty, and truth. The policy that was needed for India—the policy that, like some powerful tonic, would have infused immediate vigour and health throughout the debauched and enervated members of the administrative body—was a policy appealing for its justification to the moral sanctions of an enlightened conscience. Such a policy it was which might, and ought to, have been adopted in dealing with Afghanistan. The nation, through its representative, the Viceroy of India, should have frankly acknowledged that it had done the Afghans a wrong, and directed that its armies be withdrawn, with the least delay possible, within the limits of the old frontier. It should have declined to entangle itself in any engagements with Afghanistan except such as were, in the first instance, proposed by the Afghans themselves. Had such a policy been adopted, our troops might ere this have been back in India, and the exhausting drain on the revenues of India would have ceased. More than this, such a policy would have convinced the people of India that we are not the contemptible hypocrites which, with perfect justice, they consider us to be: while it was the only policy that had a chance of mitigating the animosity and disarming the suspicions of the deeply-injured Afghans. This was our true policy when regarded from a moral standpoint; and if we test it by the maxims of expediency, we shall find that in this, as in all cases, the highest morality includes that which is most expedient. The alleged motive which took us to Afghanistan was the fear of a Russian attack upon India. We know now that the fear was feigned, and that we went because the besotted and incapable men who forced on the war deemed that the conquest of the country would be a cheap and easy undertaking. We find now that it is an undertaking beyond the financial and military strength of our Indian Empire. Every motive, therefore, counsels an absolute evacuation of the country. It is of the supremest importance that we should withdraw, never again to be entangled amid the swarms of mountain hornets who have made us pay so dearly for coming among them. We shall, with more or less of grumbling, pay our share of the costs of this "buccaneering expedition," and then try to forget all about it. But it will not be so in India. The memory of this war has been branded into the hearts of our Native subjects by sufferings that the imagination fails to realize. They have perished by tens of thousands—the food snatched from their dying lips, as a contribution to the expenses of the war. Recruiting for the Native Army has ceased. For the first time in the history of British India the Government has had to offer a bounty for recruits, but has almost, wholly failed to obtain any. With such facts before us, it is obvious that



no more mischievous "settlement" could be made than one which will lead to a third war in Afghanistan. We spend months in hunting about for that impossible creature, an Ameer of Cabul who shall also be a "staunch friend to the British." We seem incapable of coming to a decision whether we ought to withdraw from Kandahar or whether we ought to remain. For us to select an Ameer of Cabul, or identify ourselves with any particular claimant, is to render him impossible; the Ministry alone have failed to detect this. Three years of Lord Beaconsfield's policy were found to be as destructive of those material interests it was especially supposed to foster, as it was revolting to conscientious men. But it taught the nation the great fact that national righteousness and national prosperity are inseparably one. It was in the confident hope that Mr. Gladstone and his colleagues would give effect to this principle in their foreign policy that a majority of the nation hailed their accession to office with such loud acclaim. That hope has been largely frustrated. In Africa, we have chosen to retain Sir Bartle Frere as the representative of the English nation, and the result is that already we all but have a second Kaffir War upon our hands. In Afghanistan, we have shrunk in craven fear from acknowledging, either by word or deed, that wrong has been done, and the consequence is that we are powerless to undo the wrong—that there also are sowing the seeds of another and another war.

"Once to every man and nation comes the moment to decide  
'In the strife of Truth with Falsehood for the good or evil side."

Such a moment came to this great British people at the last General Election; and the decision given was no flinching one. *Urat justitia ruat cælum*. That decision has been intercepted and stayed by the action of the Government. No men were ever granted such an opportunity for raising a nation's political life to a higher and purer level, and it is a bitter thing to know that even such men as the heads of the present Cabinet lacked the courage and the faith to avail themselves of it.

P.S.—The foregoing was written, as our readers will perceive, before the disastrous news from Kandahar had come to demonstrate the evils of a procrastinating policy. It is too early to attempt to estimate the consequences of this defeat. But the political horizon in India was never blacker than it is at present. One thing, however, is certain. Out of all this evil, good cannot fail to come, if it succeed in compelling the mind and heart of the British nation to take heed of their duties towards the 200,000,000 of human beings so strangely committed to their care.



# The Statesman.

No. II.—JULY, 1880.

## Correspondence.

### THE OPIUM QUESTION.

TO THE EDITOR OF "THE STATESMAN."

SIR,—There is one point on which I find we are at one on the Opium question; viz., that it is a question for the solution of which the people of this country, and not India, are responsible. In fact it has been so, ever since 1858; and has been shown to be so still more of recent years. I think that is about the only point on which we are agreed.

I entirely demur to your proposition, that it must be discussed along with the policy to be followed with "intoxicants." I hold the two have an analogy, but am far from conceding that they are identical in their nature. There may be an abuse of the one, while there may be a use of it also—a legitimate use. I consider (from a careful perusal of much evidence) that all consumption of the other may be held to be abuse; of course, I do not refer to the use of opium as an article of the pharmacopoeia. You will be prepared to find after this, that I entirely differ from you in your belief as to the comparative results of the consumption of opium and intoxicants; and that, as I have said, after much study of the subject, and after perusing much evidence—(I find, among the latest, that our present Ambassador—surely no mean authority—is at one with me.) As to practical measures, I freely admit there is the greatest difficulty. "*Hic labor hoc opus est.*" I need not enter on that here; but I may point out to you that it is one thing to 'prohibit the foreigner using Indian opium, by refusing to supply it,' as you say, and quite another to allow him to use his freedom by admitting it free, taxing it, or prohibiting it, as he may feel disposed, instead of compelling him by force of arms to admit it at a duty prescribed by us. That is a branch of the practical question totally distinct from the Indian fiscal one. Without entering on the general question of the proper policy of a nation in regard to the internal regulation of the use of intoxicants, I surely may take it for granted that

that is quite a different matter from its interference with the internal regulations of another nation?

Let me point out to you that our present policy is that of prohibition of growth or manufacture over the whole of India, licenses being the exception; *only*, the present prohibition is for the sake of *revenue*, but prohibition it is; while many people say, "Would you prohibit the cultivator from making the most of his ground?"

M.

[*Reply by the Editor.*]

SIR,—I am glad that you recognise so fully that if the Opium revenue is to be given up, it is the people of this country who must decide the question and find a substitute for it. For myself, I think that the revenue we derive from opium should cease to figure in the Indian Balance Sheet altogether. It is our military command, as a nation, of the entire sea-board of India, that makes it possible for us to obtain this revenue at all. Holding the sea-board, we prevent a chest of opium leaving any port until it has paid a very heavy export duty, levied on the western side of India as a transit duty, and on the Calcutta side in the shape of a monopoly profit, obtained by the State in selling the drug at auction. The people of India contribute little to the duty, and the revenue is as strictly a part of the national income of this kingdom, as the receipts of the London Custom House.

I have for many years pointed out, that this revenue may fairly be regarded as a set-off *pro tanto* against the "home charges" we exact from India, amounting to about £16,000,000 sterling a year. Some of these charges are equitable: others are very unjust; and the amount is so vast, while the exaction is so invidious, that I think it would be true statesmanship to place the opium Revenue (about £6,000,000 sterling a year) against the Home military expenditure on Indian account and the interest on the English debt, which figure so largely in the charges. The people of this country will then understand that this opium revenue question is one of English "Ways and Means," and not Indian. My dislike of the agitation got up against the Opium Revenue, I confess frankly, rests largely upon the knowledge I have that it is *India* that will be called upon to fill up the gulf in the finances, which the consciences of men like yourself insist upon our opening; in other words, the danger is that India will be defrauded, to appease the conscience of you sinners. For *you* are the guilty parties in the business, if there is guilt in it at all, which I greatly doubt; while you take it for granted, that in foregoing the profit of your sin, India must make it up to you, in some other way. Now *this* will be opposed by me to the death. If your conscience is uneasy at the profit we are deriving from this trade (for it is your trade) then give it up, but do not ask the wretched people of India to indemnify you for the loss. If you do, the hypocrisy and cruelty will be alike gigantic. To England £6,000,000 a year are little, with capital so plentiful that you cannot get 2 or 3 per cent. for it all round. To India £6,000,000 a year of nett loss means ruin. Capital is so scarce in India that interest commonly ranges from 80 to 60 per cent. per annum, and to make India bear the loss of abolishing our "guilty" profit (if it is guilty) means confiscating, in the most fraudulent and cruel manner, her resources to satisfy our misgivings that the trade is immoral. If it be immoral, the trade and the profits alike are ours, and in letting the trade go, we must make up the profit in some other way

ourselves, or go without it. I speak thus earnestly and plainly, because of the inequitable charges we have ever used our empire in India to enforce upon the industry of her people. The story is a very cruel one, and Englishmen almost to a man, refuse to open their ears to it.

Let us have a discussion of the matter in these columns by all means, and now that I have told you frankly what are the special grounds of my dislike to your agitation, I ask you to tell me in return, whether, in the event of my agreeing with you to demand the abolition of the opium revenue, you will honestly support my demand that England shall abolish it at her own cost, adding £200,000,000 sterling to her debt for the purpose, for *that* is what it really means. England will have to raise in some way or other, a new revenue altogether of £6,000,000 a year, equivalent to the interest upon nearly £200,000,000 of fresh debt. Tell me then frankly, are you prepared to join me in putting this demand clearly before the country, as the price it must pay for abolishing the *nation's* sin, as you hold it to be?

I am quite ready to believe it possible that your special reading upon the subject may have led you to form a more correct opinion than my own, as to the extent of the evils that the consumption of opium entails upon the Chinese people. All I can say is that, having read everything that has come in my way on the subject for twenty or twenty-five years, my impression has long been that the evils which result from the use of alcoholic drinks in this Kingdom, are out of all proportion greater than the evils resulting from the consumption of opium in China both in *nature and degree*. If I am wrong, and you can set me right, I shall be obliged to you. I need hardly remind you that it is vehemently contended by medical experts, that there can be no legitimate use of alcoholic drinks that is not medicinal, and medicinal only. I cannot, therefore, allow that the case against opium differs therefrom in the very least. Who is to decide where the use is medicinal and therefore legitimate, or needless and therefore an abuse?

We must have clear, strong, manifest, and logical grounds to go upon, in making this crusade, involving the vast national sacrifice that it does; or we shall justly be regarded as fanatical, and the authors of an ill-considered agitation. You will see from the style of this letter—which is far longer than I intended it to be—that I am not satisfied either with the cause or the reasons of this agitation. It is easy to reproach others with lending themselves to immoral gains—as that poor popularity-hunting creature, Sir Bartle Frere does in this matter. It is a very different thing to look “responsibilities” and facts, fully and fairly in the face. We cannot ask the overburdened industries of this country to make this enormous sacrifice to conscience, with a doubtful case to go upon. It must be made clear to every honest mind, that the Revenue is an immoral one to begin with; and (2) that to give it up, means that *England* shall raise £6,000,000 more revenue every year to compensate the loss.

For myself I am not at all satisfied that the gain is an immoral one, while I have a sure instinct that if you should even succeed in persuading the people of England that it is so, you will only commit a gigantic fraud upon the people of *India*, to appease the misgivings of your consciences, towards the people of *China*. I have no mind for a crusade of *that* order, nor have you, I am sure. Only let us understand everything clearly at the outset. Let me know precisely what your demands are; the evidence you have of the evils that you say are so overwhelming; and the way in which you propose to make the abolition of the revenue possible to practical statesmanship.—Believe me, yours faithfully,

R. K. K.

## EFFECT OF TREES UPON THE RAINFALL.

TO THE EDITOR OF "THE STATESMAN."

SIR,—So far back as 1840, Dr. Edward Balfour, brother of General Sir G. Balfour, M.P., afterwards Surgeon-General of the Madras Army, (still living) drew the attention of the Indian Government to the influence exercised by trees on the salubrity and productiveness of India. Dr. Balfour pointed out that the bareness of the Bellary district was a chief cause of its aridity, and recommended arboriculture on a great scale, to be carried on by Government. Thirty-eight years have passed since then, and in a recent memorandum, written by him in London, and circulated to all the district officers in India, he shows by statistical tables and recorded facts that while the total annual rainfall in India, has not diminished, or become more uncertain, the soil has been more and more denuded of trees and shrubs, and exposed to the sun's rays. In 1859, the Madras Conservator of Forests reported on the many thousands of trees felled in the neighbourhood of the lines of railway. In Bombay between 1846 and 1859 the price of timber rose from Rs. 9 to Rs. 24 per ton, in consequence of the demand for railways.

B.

[The subject is of great importance, and is well understood to be so by the Forest Department created of late years in India. More might perhaps be done in the way of planting by our district officers.—ED. S.]

## IRRIGATION IN INDIA.

TO THE EDITOR OF "THE STATESMAN."

SIR,—On reading your irrigation article on the deposit of salt on the soil, the idea occurs to me of deep soil ploughing which, according to Baron Liebig would renovate the soil anywhere, supposing it to want breaking up in order to receive air and moisture. With coal and steam power it seems to me that at a small comparative cost, large tracts could be brought back to condition that would pay if the work were undertaken by the State, or at least on a sufficiently large scale. That the natives of India when acting by themselves, only "scratch the soil," is no reason why they should do so under European direction and control. A loose soil will hold and retain water as a sponge, and as to the *Reh* surface, it would be driven down a foot deep, by sub-soil ploughing. Railways give carriage for the requisite implements, or rough tramways might help in such a solution of the difficulty.

WM. RIDDLE, C.E.

130, Brixton Road.

[What India really wants, and has ever wanted, is an Agricultural Department administered by practical and scientific men.—ED. S.]

## THE WAR AND THE NATIVE INDIAN PRESS.

[The following letter comes to us from one of the ablest civilians in India.—En. 8.]

TO THE EDITOR OF "THE STATESMAN."

SIR,—You are still protesting against the Afghan War. There can be little doubt that warfare with a half-savage enemy, tends to brutalize our soldiers. Not long ago, I met a man who had returned from Cabul, where he had witnessed all the fighting during Christmas week. His words were so remarkable, that they fixed themselves in my mind, and I believe I can quote them still with substantial accuracy. He said: "Our soldiers were every bit as brutal as the Afghans. I mean the Sikhs and Goorkhas. After the fighting on the 23rd, I saw the Sikhs and Goorkhas killing the Afghan wounded. This was when the fighting was all over and done. They regularly skirmished up to the wounded Afghans, and killed them as they lay on the ground. I saw one Afghan keep two Sikhs and a Goorkha at bay as he lay there, for nearly a quarter of an hour, before they finished him. This was in the presence of — Well, in the presence of officers very high in command. I thought it was a shame, and said so, but they refused to interfere." These are the words of an honourable man, and I have not the slightest doubt as to their truth.

It seems to be believed, or some people wish it to be believed, in England, that the Afghans who oppose us are merely a faction, while the opposite faction are our friends. It is difficult to speak with confidence as to the genuine likings and dislikings of a wild Asiatic race; but if this view be correct, either a very sudden change must have come over the temper of the Afghans, or our officers who have returned from the front, must have all made the same mistake in judging the national disposition. I have seen many of these officers from Candahar and Cabul, and the invariable answer given by them to all questions as to Afghan feeling towards us, is that Afghans of all sorts and clans, hate us very cordially indeed. As one officer put it: "The common ground on which all Afghans meet, is detestation of the foreigner." Possibly some chiefs or clans may consent to work with us for a time, to gain their private ends; but they will be our natural enemies for all that.

The more I see of the Native Press, the more I am astonished at the assertion of the *Times* that a new era of loyalty has been introduced by the Press Act. You remember, of course, Mr. Lethbridge's letter to the *Times*, quoting extensively from vernacular newspapers, and showing that dozens of passages of the most approved sentiments could be culled from their columns. Do you know that these selections represented only one side of Native opinion? The less commendable side was carefully ignored. I happen to know as a fact, that Mr. Lethbridge, if he had wished to do so, could have collected a series of passages from the same Press, all written after the Act, and all expressive of anything but what it is the fashion to call loyalty. Perhaps it would be unfair to name newspapers, but the fact is, that in spite of the Press Act, the "disloyal" papers remain as "disloyal" as they dare. They are less outspoken; though even in this respect the change is not so great as the *Times* seems to believe; but the spirit is just the same as before. It may be an

advantage to have repressed their outspokenness; but it is misleading and foolish to assert that the Act has changed "disloyalty" into "loyalty." This refers to vernacular papers published in *British India*. If you want to have a fair notion of the spirit and tone of the Native Press outside the pale of the Act, the newspapers of the Nizam's dominions will do very well as an example. They are more strongly condemnatory of the Afghan War, and the policy which led to it, and of the whole present policy of England towards Mussulman States, than anything I have ever read in the Vernacular Press up to the present time. Of course Hyderabad is a focus of Mohammedanism, but that does not weaken the force of the argument that it is a great mistake to suppose that by shutting the mouths of Vernacular newspapers you can transform their spirit.

### THE FALSE ESTIMATES.

[The following letter was addressed to us from Calcutta, before the Budget statement had been made, and we publish it to show how exactly the outside public in India understood what was going on.—ED. S.]

DEAR SIR,—It is expected that the Budget statement will be made in Council, on Friday next. It was announced some time ago, that it would be presented this season, at an earlier date than usual. A very large surplus is expected; enough, indeed, to pay for the *acknowledged* expenses of the Afghan War. I need hardly explain to *you*, why I use the word "acknowledged." The amount of the surplus is so incredibly large, that I forbear to mention it. But I am quite prepared for the announcement that the Government are able without borrowing, to pay the amount, for they will not at present admit that a large expenditure has been incurred in Afghanistan, although they have surplus revenue to cover it. That the Budget statement will be ingenious, follows from the fact that it will be written by Sir John Strachey; that it will be disingenuous is, I fear, an equally necessary consequence of the character of the Government, and the necessity they are under of hoodwinking public opinion in England.

Calcutta, 18th February, 1880.

R.

## EDITORIAL NOTES.

MR. BRADLAUGH is an atheist, and owns that he is so. Unhappily a great many men are so in these days, and amongst them men of eminence in the world of literature and science. Nor is that all. How many men in Parliament, we ask, with deep seriousness, really believe in God? Practically, the many are atheists everywhere. "The fool hath said in his heart, there is no God." The tenor of a man's life is the only proof we have, or can have, whether he "believes" or not. Mr. Bradlaugh's offence is, not that he is an atheist, but that he has paraded his atheism where the many seek to hide it both from themselves and from the world. Allow that Mr. Bradlaugh's atheism is vulgar, obtrusive, and offensive, he is nevertheless a better man, and more qualified to sit in the House, than the many within its walls, attesting their belief in God, whose course therein shows the hypocrisy of their profession. Show us the man of unselfish, guileless life, the man of right tempers towards his fellow-men, and let his errors be what they may—We will show you the right man to represent his fellow-men in Parliament.

It is characteristic of the Horse Guards administration of the Army, that at this late hour, when the artillery of all the Continental armies is breech-loading, our own military authorities profess still to be unable to determine whether we should adopt the same principle or not. Had Lord Beaconsfield involved the nation in war with Russia, the very first engagement would have shown at how terrible a disadvantage our troops were sent into the field. In our insular conceit, we stood by the muzzle-loading rifle until the superiority of the breech-loader had been established in action, over and over again. Even the Danish War, in which the Prussian needle-gun played so conspicuous a part, failed to awaken the Horse Guards to the necessity of a change. And so is it to-day with our field guns. Let war break out to-morrow, and we shall send our artillery-men into the field, under the cruel, if it should not prove even fatal, disadvantage of the muzzle-loader. The practical objections to the breech-loader in connection with the fusée, were, we believe long since overcome, and the apathy which tolerates the inferiority of the antiquated principle we have adopted, is incomprehensible, except that the personal bravery of our troops is ever counted upon to make up all deficiencies in our material of war. We tried hard in India to awaken attention to the subject, but in vain; while we are told at this hour, that "it is understood that the authorities connected with the War Office are giving careful consideration at the present time to the question of breech-loading guns, and that designs for heavy guns on this principle are in course of preparation, to be submitted to the Committee on Ordnance." There is no doubt on the Continent, we are assured, as to the immense superiority of



the breech-loader in the field, and this conviction, if we are not mistaken, is general amongst our own artillery officers. In our insular pride, we shall wait until some calamity befall us, and then want to hang everybody all round. Now is the time to hang the men who cannot see the importance of settling at once and for good, the all-important question with which the Horse Guards has been trifling for the last ten years.

THE view taken by Indian officials generally, of the responsibility of a seat in the Supreme Council of India, or a Secretaryship to the Government of India, is too narrow for the national safety. Thus General Strachey was holding the portfolio of Finance in the Viceroy's Council at Calcutta, when the first false assurance as to the state of the Indian Revenues was made to the Parliament summoned at the close of 1877, to hear the Ministerial explanation of the causes of the war. The resources of India were declared to promise a surplus of £1,750,000 upon the year. The Ministry gave the assurance, beyond doubt, upon the strength of some statement or other, telegraphed to them from the Viceroy in Council. It was admitted almost instantly upon the spot, to be untrue; and we commented upon it in the *Calcutta Statesman* (December, 1877) as follows:—

So far from there being any surplus, it is necessary to stop all public works in execution, without an instant's delay, to enable the Government to go on at all. Those who know General Strachey personally, will want no assurance from us that he has had nothing to do with the scandalous deception thus practised upon the House. The question is: What ought General Strachey in these circumstances, to do? Ought he to suffer the false statement to be published without contradiction, simply from loyalty to the Government; or to protest against the deception, and place his resignation in Lord Lytton's hands? For ourselves, we cannot doubt what he ought to do. By permitting such statements as have of late been sent to England from Simla to go uncontradicted, the Secretaries and Council implicated therein are acting precisely in the same way as the Directors of the City of Glasgow Bank. They may be loyal to the Viceroy, but it is a loyalty that means utter disloyalty to the country. Lord Lytton ought to be left, face to face, alone with the country, by the resignation of his colleagues and Secretaries. We know well how extreme this statement will seem to many; but if we are ever to see purity and integrity in public life, and the dominion of conscience asserted over it, it will be brought about only by individual heroism raising the general standard of morality amongst us. So long as our chief public servants permit their names to be associated with administration of such an order as that which governs us, it is idle to suppose that there will be any higher *morale* lower down in the official scale.

It is a charity full of evil to the nation, that would lead us at this hour to accept such excuses as those now put forward by General Strachey in the XIXth. Century for these false estimates. It was he himself who permitted the first of these false statements to be telegraphed to this country; and we very earnestly hope that Parliament will order a rigid inquiry into the history of the whole. We remonstrated in India till we were tired of doing so; and came home at last in despair of the Indian government.

THE Famine Commission Report still stays in the India Office. The cause of the delay is, we suppose, an open secret. The official members of the Commission are bent upon whitewashing Sir John Strachey's administration of the

Madras, Mysore, Bombay, and North West famines during the years 1877 and 1878, while the non-official members, with Mr. Caird at their head, refuse to do so. If the story of the people's sufferings during these years is faithfully told, the English public will understand fully *why* the *STATESMAN* is published in London. The whole policy of Earl Northbrook towards this terrible calamity, was changed by his successor, Lord Lytton, under the guidance of Sir John Strachey; and the former, or traditional policy, reverted to. The great principles upon which Earl Northbrook and Sir George Campbell had acted in the Behar famine encountering the calamity successfully thereby for the first time in modern history, were repudiated, Sir John Strachey finding in Sir Richard Temple a ready instrument for setting up anew a system under which the people had ever perished by the million in these calamities. Every effort will now be made to persuade the public that there was no breach of continuity in what was done, but that Earl Northbrook's policy was consistently carried through. It should be enough to awaken suspicion, that while Lord Northbrook carried the people through an unprecedented failure of harvests in Behar and Bengal, almost without a death from starvation, Sir John Strachey, Sir Richard Temple, and Sir George Couper were permitted, under Lord Lytton, so to administer matters that the people died of hunger literally by millions, and in the case of the North West provinces, without a finger being moved to help them. In this last case, indeed, peremptory orders were issued that there should be no famine; and the cruel orders were acted upon. An immense expenditure was frittered away in Southern and Western India by sheer administrative incapacity—and every effort will now be made to conceal the fact from the public. It shall not be concealed if we can prevent it.

We endorse every word of the following appeal made to the nation, in the last number of the *Diplomatic Fly Sheets*, issued a few weeks ago :

We do not appeal to the factions: they are incorrigible. We appeal to those who, not having got into the miserable grooves which enslave all who consider themselves political men, are capable of feeling indignation at the deeds which are now disgracing our country in the eyes of the world. What you have to do is to require of your public men, what you require of private men—obedience to the Laws; and you have to punish their disobedience according to Law.

You have then—

1. To restore the authority of the Privy Council by instituting a Committee (like the Judicial Committee) not belonging to the faction in place, without whose prior knowledge no foreign matter, whether War or Treaty, shall be initiated.
2. To revive the section in the Act of Settlement which requires that the advice given in the Privy Council shall be recorded.
3. To enforce this by the impeachment of every Minister who acts without the prior knowledge and consent of the Council, no excuse being admitted on the grounds of secret good reasons locked up by the Minister in his own breast.

There will never be any real Executive responsibility to the nation, until reforms of this order are carried. If ever men deserved impeachment, it is the leaders of the late Ministry for their concealment, or mis-statement, of facts that it was essential for Parliament to know truly. A year or two ago, Professor Newman's paper, in the *Nineteenth Century*, on the irresponsibility of Ministers in the matter of declaring war, made a momentary impression upon the country. The whole system of SECRET DIPLOMACY is a tradition we have inherited from days when princes made war at their pleasure. If the nation

desires peace, it will have to insist upon this diplomacy being abolished altogether, as it has been in America, where any member of the Senate can go into the Foreign Office, and demand every despatch that has been received, or issued by the Government within fourteen days of its receipt or despatch. It has become proverbial that diplomacy is the art of lying, and the parent of it is the traditional secrecy in which international relations are conducted by Lord Beaconsfield's "Sovereigns and Statesmen." The nation has to teach its public men that it is the will of a free people, that rules England; and that they know how to punish men who violate the constitutional safeguards they have inherited from their fathers.

THE difficulties of Mr. Gladstone's position, should make the Radical party very careful not to weaken his hands. Thus it is not Mr. Gladstone, we suspect, who is keeping Sir Bartle Frere at the Cape, or who has sent Sir Pomeroy Colley, to Natal. It is a very difficult matter for men who are in earnest in this great constitutional crisis, and would see the nation safely through it, to determine whether to speak or to keep silence. Every influence that can embarrass Mr. Gladstone's administration, and bring discredit upon it, will be used for the purpose, and much discretion must be shewn by the leaders of the Liberal party outside the Cabinet, if they would not play into the hands of the men, from whose abominable misrule the country has but just escaped. Thus it is very trying to observe how the Crown has been made to throw its *regis* over men who ought to be made to answer at the bar of the Country, for the crime of the Afghan War. The chief subordinate actor in the business was the man who has now gone to govern Natal, and who from plain Colonel Colley was elevated into Sir Pomeroy, for no other service whatever than that of assisting the Viceroy in a crime, the cost of which no one can estimate, and the guilt of which we feel so keenly. While the nation permits its Ministerial Executive, after proceedings such as these, to take shelter under the shadow of the Throne, and to cover themselves and their instruments with honours and decorations, it is idle to talk of "responsible" Government. The nation has retained the shadow and name of the thing, but has lost its substance. There was no one in the service of the Crown fit to govern Natal, we presume, but Sir Pomeroy Colley. The Liberal party will, we trust, know how to deal with these scandals at the right moment. Meanwhile, we want Mr. Gladstone where he is; and we must make sacrifices, to keep him there.

## IMPEACHMENT OF THE EX-MINISTERS.

If the new Parliament permit either Lord Beaconsfield or Lord Salisbury, the leaders of the late Ministry, to escape indictment for their encroachments upon the public liberties, they will show themselves insensible in a very fatal manner to the perils we have escaped, almost by a miracle of influence upon the public mind. Had the Constituencies been so unfortunate as to have returned a small Liberal majority only, Lords Beaconsfield and Salisbury would have laughed such a majority to scorn. The cynical defiance of constitutional usage with which the two Tory leaders carried on the government of this country towards the last, was watched with ever-deepening anxiety by many, who may probably think that, the danger being passed, it were better not to enlarge upon the peril which the nation has escaped. We are unable to agree with them. The conduct of these two noblemen has been of an order so dangerous and so agreeable to certain influential classes, that the first duty of the great assembly that now meets at St. Stephen's seems to ourselves to be to review their course with the most scrupulous attention. For ourselves, we watched carefully and with ever-increasing uneasiness, the use made by these men of their power as Ministers, virtually to subvert the constitution of the country. They reckoned to the very last upon a new lease of power to debauch, as they hoped effectually, the conscience of the nation, and to change the character of our institutions altogether. That they miscalculated their power and the character of the people, is no palliation of their course. No man of any clear insight into their conduct, can doubt the rôle that would have been played by them, had the Elections gone against them but by a small majority. Retirement from office and power would have been the very last thought that would have occurred to either of them; they would have defied any such majority with scorn, and held the threat of a dissolution over the House, again and again, strong in the approval of the Court, the Peers, and a host of Metropolitan newspapers,

whose business for years past, has been to possess the mind of all classes with false conceptions of the nation's interests and duties. The Premier who had the nation under his feet, and the cynical ally he found in his old enemy, the Marquis, were equal to a good deal more than the country, we fear, suspected, and it was the overwhelming majority against them, and that only, that made them resign office. "The king can do no wrong," says the legal axiom; and hence it follows "that somebody must be responsible for his measures, if they be contrary to law or injurious to the country's welfare. Ministers here [in England] are not responsible *quâ* ministers, that is, *quâ* officials (as such they are responsible to the Crown); but they are responsible to Parliament and the people, or the country, as 'advisers of the Crown.'" Such was the *dictum* of the late Prince Consort, in a private letter on the Constitution recorded in the Fifth Volume of his Life (p. 260) by Mr. Martin. Now it was repeatedly charged upon the late Ministry, that certain of their executive measures were not merely injurious to the country, but directly contrary to law. These charges were either true or false: unjustifiable and factious, or warranted by the facts and necessary. They were preferred by the very highest authorities—by Mr. Gladstone and Lord Selborne. We believe them to have been true charges, and we ask, therefore, with deep seriousness, whether inquiry is not to be made into the illegalities of which Lord Beaconsfield's Ministry was, over and over again, accused in the late Parliament. The nation will be very ill-advised if it permits these charges to pass into oblivion. While the late Parliament lasted, the Minister felt perfectly at ease under the charges that were preferred by the Opposition. But to-day those charges must be answered, and answered with the seriousness which their nature demands. Is it true, or false, that in his executive conduct the Minister violated the laws which the Constitution of this country prescribes for the safeguard of the public liberties? If he did violate those laws, the new Parliament is bound to indict him for the offence. For ourselves, we have too deep a sense of the perils which the nation has escaped, to permit these charges to be forgotten. "Every transgression of the law is in law a crime; the constitution of a State is the State's fundamental law, upon which all other laws rest. Now if the State imposes punishment upon murder, theft, perjury, . . . why should it be in the power of any one to assume that the transgression of the State's fundamental law is to go unpunished, and the transgressors to find protection in the mere will of the Sovereign?" Thus, again, did

the late Prince Consort write, just before his lamented and untimely death. We have had Sovereigns upon the English throne, in modern history, who have attempted unconstitutionally to impose their "mere will" upon the statesmen they have chosen as their Ministers; but no excuse of this kind can be pleaded under a Sovereign, of whom Lord Palmerston wrote: "As to the Queen, her steady adherence to, and studious observance of, the principles and practice of the Constitution, have, during the whole of her reign, been appreciated and admired by men of all political parties." If Earl Beaconsfield and his colleague, Lord Salisbury, violated constitutional law, as they were repeatedly charged with doing, the crime cannot be charged upon the Sovereign. It is emphatically for their own crime, that they are challenged to answer. The high prerogative doctrines with which the ex-Minister secretly strove to familiarize the country, were doctrines of his own suggestion, from first to last. The cutting short of his sinister career, by the verdict of the constituencies, has for its logical sequence, a Parliamentary inquiry into the unconstitutional conduct charged upon him as Minister; and if through mistaken delicacy, Parliament shrink from the investigation which the public safety demands of it, the nation will have to take the matter into its own hands. For we can have no security that a man of the same cynical daring may not by-and-by successfully attempt what Lord Beaconsfield hoped to accomplish, if we permit him to escape indictment for the crime that we believe was truthfully charged upon him. The incidents are fresh in all minds, and we shall probably attempt in another issue of this Review to state them with precision and exactitude. One of the great reforms that has to be carried in this and in India, is the transformation of the present purely nominal responsibility of the Executive, into actual accountability to the nation for their conduct. We instance the course of our India officials at Simlah, who betrayed the nation in October and November 1878, into sanctioning the war against Sheré Ali by the utterly false statements they telegraphed to this country. The deception practised upon the country, took its first active form in England, by the Marquis of Salisbury, in reply to the interpellations of the Duke of Argyll and Earl Northbrook as to our rumoured change of relations with the Ameer, daring to tell the Peers, in the most circumstantial and express forms that language could take, that "no change of relations whatever" had taken place with the Prince. At the very time that he gave these assurances, he had the facts of the Peshawur Conference fully before him. He knew that the most threatening and indecent

language had been held towards the Ameer; knew that Lord Lytton had broken off all diplomatic relations with him, by withdrawing our Native Minister from his Court; and that we were already at potential war with the man. And does the nation, or does Parliament, really think that this conduct should be condoned? If it is condoned, and Parliament decline to make the Minister accountable for the crime of which he was guilty, it is idle to talk of the Executive being responsible to the nation, in any true sense whatever. It is not "the King" only that "can do no wrong," when the legal fiction is made to protect the Minister also. The nation is vitally interested in finding out who the men were that betrayed us into the guilt of this new outrage upon the people of Afghanistan. Almost from the day of his arrival in India, Lord Lytton set himself to propagate the belief, that the late unhappy Ameer, Shere Ali, was engaged in a course of intrigue with Russia against ourselves, and had long been so. The statement was as absolutely false as human invention could be. *Shere Ali had never intrigued against us, either with Russia or any other power.* Moody and discontented, more from disease and from the difficulties of his position than from any other cause, he wished to have as few relations as possible with Russia on the one hand, and with ourselves on the other. He feared us both, while his people hated us, with but too good cause, and Lord Lytton determined to find a cause of war against them. No one can possibly read the story of the Peshawur Conference, as told by the late Government itself, without the deepest sense of shame. As there were no real intrigues to be produced, [we pause for a moment to ask, what has become of those Russian papers that General Roberts was declared but three months ago to have found in Cabul, but that it was not convenient in public interests to produce?]  
—as there were no real intrigues, Lord Lytton imagined them. Every one remembers, we should think, his story of the Candahar mule driver. And he had willing assistants in the Indian Foreign Office in the business; while Her Majesty has been made to decorate the actors all round. And are these men now to escape, to parade the badges of their complicity in the crime that has been committed? The whole Indian Foreign Office at Simla should be degraded in a body, for it was in this bureau that the false statements were concocted to persuade the people of England that this most guilty war, was a just, righteous, and necessary one.

If the vulgar trickery is to succeed, by which Lord Beaconsfield has thrown theegis of the Crown over these offenders, forestalling their condemnation by the country,—to talk of the

accountability of the Executive to the nation that appoints them, is a simple farce. Instead of being elevated to an Earldom, Lord Lytton should be indicted by the Commons, with the active instruments of his guilt. There was no ignorance in what these men did: they knew well the wrong they were counselling; and it is monstrous that in this free country, a Minister should be permitted to defy the opinion of every well-informed man as to the true deserts of these men. It is a betrayal of the Crown and nation that the instruments of this policy have all been decorated and rewarded, when every man of them, upon fair trial before the country, would be sentenced to punishment and degradation. These may be Radical sentiments, but they are sentiments upon which the nation will insist, ere long, upon being governed. We punish the indigent, ignorant, transgressor of the law, in the interests of what we call society, while we gloze over the conduct of offenders who are of sufficient eminence to be above the enforcement of the law. Radical legislation will put an end to these courses, and the sooner it does so, the better. We have determined to deliver our own souls from participation in the indifference shown to the surpassing guilt by which the late Ministry committed the nation to this Afghan war, with all its cruelties and devastations.

There is this vital difference between the sin of Lord Melbourne's Ministry in 1838 and the crime of this Tory Government, that in the former case, the intervention of Russia at Cabul was honestly believ'd to be a menace and a danger. If it were possible to suppose that Lord Beaconsfield honestly believed the Ameer of Cabul to be intriguing with Russia against us, his conduct would present itself in a different light altogether, from that which now beats so fiercely upon it. He and his instruments knew well that the unfortunate Shere Ali had *not* intrigued against us, while they used every artifice to persuade the nation that he had, and kept up the deception to the very last. Who has forgotten, we say, that only three months ago they lent themselves, in Parliament itself, to the propagation of the story that General Roberts had made a great "find" of papers at Cabul, implicating the Ameer's Government in a long course of intrigue against us? They would have given a king's ransom for such a discovery, useless as it would have been, except as a *post facto* justification of their course. They were challenged by ourselves and others, to produce the papers; when the House of Commons was assured in the usual fashion that the "public interests" forbade their production. It is because the Ministry systematically deceived Parliament in this way, that we insist upon their indictment, now that there is no longer a profi-



gate majority in the House, to stand between them and the indignation of a people whom they have betrayed into the greatest crime which a strong nation can commit against a weak one. If the nation condone conduct of this nature, it will not deserve to be governed by a worthier class of statesmen. We have shed the blood of a brave and unoffending people in torrents, by the deadly superiority of the arms of precision with which our forces are supplied; and the Ministerial device of throwing the shadow of the Crown over the instruments of their crime, by advising Her Majesty to decorate them all with honours, simply adds to the guilt of their course. The nation should insist upon a parliamentary enquiry, and if the Executive is found guilty of the crimes wherewith they are charged, should refuse to allow these prostituted honours to stand between them and the punishment of their crime. It is purely mischievous to talk of responsible Government, if conduct such as these men are charged with, is to be condoned by conventional usage. It is to the earnest men in Parliament that we look to enforce a higher morality than men in office, whether Whig or Tory, are, we fear, likely to approve. We are living in times when conventionalism must be made to give place to the demand of the people to be governed righteously, and in the fear of God. We should not write thus, but that for two years we made every effort in India that it was possible to make, to arrest the course which we saw plainly was being pursued. Every possible entreaty was addressed to our officials, to remember that they were "making history," and that their conduct would come, sooner or later, under review by the nation they were betraying. They knew well, as well as we all now know, the true character of what they were doing; but they thought the Earl of Beaconsfield all powerful, and counted upon his "unspeakable majority" enduring for all time. They have outraged the national honour, and involved us in the shedding of innocent blood; and we ask that inquisition may be now made for it, that it may not be found in the skirts of the nation. If we deliberately condone the conduct of our Executive, we become participators in their crime.

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## THE BEACONSFIELD CABINET AND ITS PROJECTS.

IN spite of the efforts that were made to conceal from public knowledge that the late Ministry contemplated, in October 1876, sending a vast army of English and Native troops to Baghdad, to maintain the Turkish hold upon Armenia, the rumour leaked out of the India Office, and although unnoticed or unknown in this country, was communicated to the Indian public by the London correspondent of an Indian paper, with an intimation that Lord Lytton had avowed his determination to resign if the expedition were forced upon him. The rumour was perfectly true. The Turkish forces in Armenia, which it was hoped would amount to 100,000 regulars and 95,000 irregulars consisting of Kurds, Arabs, and Circassians, were to be commanded by English officers: an army corps of 30,000 British soldiers was to be sent to Trebizond, from England; while two army corps of the same strength each, consisting in all of 45,000 sepoys and 15,000 British troops, were to sail from Bombay to Baghdad. And this wild scheme was so far advanced, that elaborate instructions were drawn out for the route of the Indian Contingent from Baghdad to Erzeroum. Now in the course of the military memoir by Colonel Macgregor, which gave detailed instructions for every march, we stumble almost at the outset upon the following paragraph.

The people of the country would be difficult to deal with. The Armenians are said to have been so oppressed that they would perhaps not be very likely to enter very heartily into any operations which had for their object the maintenance of their oppressors. But if they could be assured of present protection, and future improvement of their position, they would doubtless assist in the end. The Koords are all robbers, &c.

Thus there was no pretence of our not knowing what we were about to do by this enterprise. We were to place 90,000 British troops at the disposal of the Porte, to enable him to maintain a rule, that we knew was an infamy for its oppressions. We were to send English soldiers and Indian sepoys with artillery

and all the other implements of war, to shoot, mow down, and destroy the miserable Christian subjects of the Porte, if they opposed our march, as they naturally would: and English officers were to be placed at the head of some 95,000 Arabs, Kurds, Circassians or any other banditti that we could enrol under the English flag, to rivet Turkish fetters upon Armenia. We were to perpetuate Turkish rule wherever it existed, because we thought it *to our interest* that these races should be kept in bondage to the power that claimed rights of conquest over them. Are we wrong for exposing such counsels? If ever a Minister deserved impeachment for the contemplation of a great crime against his country, it is Lord Beaconsfield. Every effort will, of course, be made to keep from the knowledge of the country, and of Europe, what he really designed. The last remnant of his project was the acceptance of Cyprus, as a bribe for guaranteeing the rule of the Kurd and Circassian over the miserable people whom, eighteen months before, we were going to shoot down and bayonet, with the same end in view. If this Baghdad expedition had left the shores of India, it would never have returned. It is a curious and noticeable fact in the military memoir by Colonel Macgregor that was to guide the expedition, that the writer sets out by showing at length the impossibility of a Russian army starting from Tiflis or Armenia, to accomplish the very same march *down* the Tigris to Baghdad, that the expedition from India was to pursue *up* the same river. Colonel Macgregor pointed out therein, that a Russian army so advancing would have the immense advantage of being regarded as deliverers; and yet in view of the danger and difficulties of the route, he pronounces judgment upon such an enterprise on the part of Russia, as follows:—

The course has the advantage that it lies within friendly territory to within 100 miles of its objective (Baghdad), but the disadvantage of a line of operations 900 miles in length, through a poor country, would render such an undertaking *sheer madness*.

Let the reader observe that this is the identical route by which the Russian forces at Kars are now held to menace us. We are constantly being told in these days, that Armenia is a *third gate* to India, in addition to the two former ones of Herat and Constantinople; and yet here is the judgment of a great military strategist of our own, upon the possibility of a Russian advance from Armenia towards the Gulf. "*Such an undertaking*," he says, "*would be sheer madness*," although the intervening country were friendly the whole way, to within 100 miles of the Russian objective at Baghdad. What are we to say as to the state of any man's mind, who having

written thus at page 4 of his Memoir, deliberately proceeds, a few pages further on, to insist that *we* could enter upon a precisely similar enterprise upwards, through a hostile country, that it would be sheer madness for the Russians to attempt downwards, through a friendly one. It was rational and practicable for us, to send 60,000 troops by sea to Baghdad, thence to march 900 miles up the valley of the Tigris through a hostile country to Armenia, but "sheer madness" for Russia to attempt a similar expedition down the valley, although her armies started from a base of organized resources, and the country through which they marched were friendly to her. Now this is the righteous *dementia* that waits upon moral obliquity. If this insane enterprise had been attempted, the expedition would either have been destroyed, or brought back to India in as wrecked and hopeless a state as our worst enemies could have desired. We say advisedly, that if the secret projects of Lord Beaconsfield were fairly disclosed to the nation, it would stand aghast at the dangers which it has escaped. And is it not monstrous, that counsels of this order should go on secretly in the Cabinet, while not one word of them is communicated to the country? The occupation of Cyprus, happily, is what the wild schemes of our Asian Mystery at last dwindled down to. It is easy to see that his colleagues as a body stood aloof from them, humouring them to a certain point, and then, under the dominion of strong Anglo-Saxon common-sense, and common morality, refusing to go further. His colleagues do not seem to have been unwilling to go certain lengths with him, perhaps with an amused surprise at the coruscations of his pyrotechnic statesmanship. "Empress of India—Delhi Assemblage—Chief Mahomedan Power of the world—defiance of the Czar—astonished Europe—enthusiastic Jingoism—7,000 sepoys in the Mediterranean—great acrobatic performance at Berlin"—and fall of the curtain upon Cyprus! Is there no national humiliation in it all?

But Colonel Macgregor declares that we have falsely attributed to the Ministry, what was a purely private memoir of his own, drawn up by him as a soldier who takes an interest in his profession, and who, in passing down the valley of the Tigris, simply did what he does always when visiting foreign lands. It would seem that the untruthfulness of the Ministry has infected its followers. Colonel Macgregor's statement is not only falsified by the whole style and tenor of the memoir, which are strictly those of an official report, but by the account given of it in the House of Commons by Mr. Stanhope, in reply to the interpellation of Mr. Grant Duff. Colonel Macgregor overlooked the possibility of a

Ministerial version of the affair contradicting his own; and that we may do him no injustice, we publish what he says once more:—

TO THE EDITOR OF "THE STATESMAN."

Sir,—I have just seen your article, dated 17th January, and entitled "The Expedition to Baghdad—Colonel Macgregor's Memorandum," in which you are good enough to assume that because taking advantage of my journey through Armenia in 1876, I chose to prepare a "Memorandum on Armenia as a Theatre of War," therefore a campaign in that country against Russia was actually contemplated by Her Majesty's Ministers! With your views or your belief I have nothing to do, but you will perhaps do me the favour to give me that same publicity to this letter as you have to the article in question. My statement then is, I was not ordered to proceed through Armenia in 1876; I was not ordered to prepare any such Memorandum; and I did undertake what you are pleased to call "this laborious task" of my "own option, and for my own amusement." Whether you believe it or not is quite a matter of no moment to me, for the above is the "truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth." There is one other point to which I may perhaps call your attention—viz., that my Memorandum "is entitled "On Armenia as a Theatre of War." It is clear, therefore, that it does not necessarily recommend the plan of operations sketched. What it does attempt is to show that, if aid were wanted from India for a campaign in Armenia, how the Baghdad route to that province could best be utilised. As a matter of fact, I did not recommend its adoption. You proclaim your inability to believe that, unless I had been ordered to write the "Memorandum" I would "neither have been at the pains to study, in all its difficult details, the topography of the country, therefore you will, I presume, be utterly unable to comprehend the following statement, which nevertheless I have no hesitation in making—viz.: It has been my invariable custom, whenever travelling in countries which may become a theatre of war in which British armies might be engaged, always to be "at the pains to study in all its difficult details, the topography of the country" I am visiting. I have submitted many such "Memoranda" as the one you now try to make capital of; scores of other officers have done likewise: and I trust both they and I will continue to do so, whenever we think our so doing may, however remotely, be of some advantage to Her Majesty's Service.—Yours faithfully,

Cabul, February 20, 1880.

C. M. MACGREGOR.

Now, on the very day that Colonel Macgregor was penning this letter at Cabul, the *Times* laid before its readers, the Ministerial version of the matter in the House of Commons but the night before, that version being in *verbatim* accord with "Hansard's Report," which runs thus:—

Mr. Grant Duff asked the Chancellor of the Exchequer a question as to a report having been made to the Government of India by Lieut.-Colonel Macgregor a few days before the assembling of the Constantinople Conference in December, 1876, in which, among other things, a plan was sketched for the despatch of 30,000 British troops and of 60,000 Indian troops to Armenia; whether there would be any objection to lay the report upon the table, the said report having already been printed in the STATESMAN newspaper; whether

any document as hostile to this country as to Russia had been found at Cabul or elsewhere (cries of "Hear, hear," from the Opposition benches, met by expressions of disapproval from the Ministerial benches;) and, if so, whether there would be any objection to lay it also before the House.

The Chancellor of the Exchequer:—I never saw or heard of the document (Hear, and laughter) to which the hon. gentleman refers, until his question was put on the paper. I believe my hon. friend, the Under-Secretary for India, has some information which he can give to the House on the subject. (Hear.)

Mr. E. Stanhope:—Colonel Macgregor, on returning to India in 1876, went through Western Beloochistan with the knowledge of the Secretary of State and of his Council in London. The object was the extension of our geographical knowledge in Beloochistan and in Persia, and his instructions were to proceed to India "by way of the Karun river and Beloochistan," in company with Captain Lockwood. The route selected by Colonel Macgregor was *via* Constantinople and Armenia, and on the 10th of November, 1876, in a letter to the India Office, dated from Erzeroum, he said, "I am writing a note on what I saw, which I will send you in case it might be any use to the Government at home." This note was subsequently received, and was ordered to be confidentially printed at the India Office. It never had any official character whatever, and has not been recorded in any department of the India Office. It appears to be the same as that printed in the *STATESMAN* of January 17, 1880, but how that newspaper obtained a copy of it we do not know. The note is of a confidential character, and it is clearly not one to be presented to Parliament. It is of precisely the same class as the papers stored in the Intelligence department of all armies, which are obviously treated as confidential. (Cheers.) Colonel Macgregor is now Chief of the Staff to Sir F. Roberts at Cabul. I am not aware that there were any large military preparations in the Punjab in 1876. Certain precautions were taken in consequence of the attitude of the Ameer Shere Ali and of some of the border tribes. (Cheers.)

That Sir Stafford Northcote knew nothing of the project, is what we might have ourselves affirmed; for that he was not admitted to the intimate counsels of Earl Beaconsfield and the Marquis, became so obvious in the later years of the Ministry, as to be subject of common remark in the newspapers.

Without the least consciousness of what the admission involved, he told the House, amidst the cheers and laughter of its members, that *he* had never heard of the Mission and Memoir of Colonel Macgregor, until his attention was called to the "document" that had appeared in the *STATESMAN*. We have no doubt that he spoke truly. It would be easy to show from other utterances of Sir Stafford in the House, that he was never admitted to the secret counsels of the Premier, while his ignorance of what was debated therein made him a most useful colleague for honestly hoodwinking and misleading the House, of which he was the professed Leader. So well known does the fact seem to have been, that his

naive confession of ignorance was received, we are told, with cheers and "laughter." Remembering what the project was, what must the House have been that could make such an admission a cause of merriment?

And now for a comparison between Colonel Macgregor's account of his Mission, and Mr. Stanhope's version of it in the House of Commons. It would have been an act of kindness to Colonel Macgregor to have suppressed his letter, and but that the interests involved in the matter are of such importance to the nation, we might have done so. Mr. Stanhope affirms that the memoir was of "a confidential character," of the "same class as the papers stored in the Intelligence Department of *all* armies" [We did not know before that the Indian Office was the headquarters of the army.—Ed.] :—and, what is fatal to Colonel Macgregor's letter, he adds—that direct official "instructions" were given to him, as to the route by which he was to proceed to India. It was to insult public intelligence, with Colonel Macgregor's Memoir in its hands, for Mr. Stanhope to affirm that the object of the tour was the extension of our "geographical knowledge" in those regions. There is not a word of "geographical" character in the Memoir. Colonel Macgregor himself comes nearer the truth in this respect, and speaks of it as the "topography of the country." As a fact, no one could possibly read the Memoir and its Appendix without seeing at once that it was a secret and confidential report upon the practicability of a Ministerial project for sending a vast army from India to the help of the Turk, to enable him to maintain his rule over a people who would necessarily, says Colonel Macgregor, be hostile to us because of the oppressions we were rivetting upon them. If it were worth while to dissect Mr. Stanhope's account of this "geographical" mission to "the Karun River and Western Belochistan," *about which there is not one word* in the Memoir, we might show how the same taint of untruthfulness clings to the Ministry, and its subordinates and agents. Parliament should bring every one of the men implicated in the mad and guilty enterprise before it, for inquiry into the facts. It is proof enough of the importance of the Memoir that the moment it appeared in the columns of the STATESMAN in Calcutta, Lord Lytton telegraphed from Simla to every newspaper in India that his Government "knew nothing whatever of such a project," while he simultaneously cut the STATESMAN off from the receipt of all official intelligence, for what he called "breach of confidence" in publishing it. We ought to have published it long before we did. Now this expedition to Baghdad was the first of

the secret projects of Lord Beaconsfield, into which we say there should be a Parliamentary inquiry.

We now lift the curtain upon another. Some of our readers may remember a remarkable letter that appeared in the *Times*, on the 5th of May, 1877 from Mr. Carlyle, beginning as follows:—

A rumour everywhere prevails that our miraculous Premier, in spite of his Queen's proclamation of neutrality, intends under cover of "care for British interests," to send the English fleet to the Baltic, or do some other feat which shall compel Russia to declare war against England. Latterly the rumour has shifted from the Baltic, and become still more sinister, on the Eastern side of the scene, where a feat is contemplated that will force not Russia only, but all Europe to declare war against us; this latter I have come to know as an indisputable fact.

"These things," said Mr. Carlyle, in closing his letter, "I write not on hearsay, but on accurate knowledge."

The feat that Mr. Carlyle referred to was, there can be little doubt, the seizure of Egypt, which was confidently rumoured to be contemplated by the Ministry. Now the time has come when the nation expects to know what the projects of the late Ministry really were, and Parliament must not disappoint its legitimate demand to be informed of the dangers it has escaped.

Mr. Carlyle tells us that it was not on hearsay, that he warned the nation that it was in imminent danger of an insane enterprise on the part of the miraculous Premier.

Once more. Everyone will remember that when Lord Derby seceded from the Cabinet in March 1878, Lord Beaconsfield so worded his account of its cause, as to leave the impression upon the House of Lords that the noble Lord had retired because the Army Reserves had been called out. Poor blundering Sir Stafford distinctly assured the Commons that this, and nothing else, was the cause of his retirement. The Premier counted upon the forbearance of his ex-colleague to allow this version of the matter to pass unchallenged. Ministers were under no obligation to tell the country the precise grounds of Lord Derby's retirement, and Lord Beaconsfield was discreet enough to confine himself to a suggestion only of the falsehood, suppressing the real cause of Lord Derby's withdrawal, while Sir Stafford Northcote, in complete ignorance of the cause, assured the Commons that "to prevent any exaggerated opinion as to what might have been the cause . . . it was right and proper that he should state the particular ground upon which the step had been taken—namely, the calling out of "the Reserves." Lord Derby wished to maintain silence, and



did so for some time; but the newspapers were repeating the story all over the country, and at last, and wisely, he deemed it necessary to give the country an inkling of the fact, that Lord Beaconsfield had deceived it, and had been contemplating measures very much in advance of the calling out of the Reserves. On the 8th of April he said, in the House of Lords:—

I have been referred to by my noble friend at the head of the Government, and by newspaper writers and others, as having resigned office in consequence of the calling out of the Reserves. Now, I feel bound to tell your Lordships, that whatever I may have thought of that step, it was not the sole, nor indeed, the principal reason for the difference that unfortunately arose between my colleagues and myself. What the other reasons are I cannot divulge until the propositions of the Government from which I dissented are made known.

Lord Derby's resignation created a profound sensation everywhere. All that *he* could do, without violating the conventional usage that closed his lips, he did to intimate to the country that the Minister was bent upon courses that to himself seemed so dangerous that he dared not be an accomplice therein. Under ordinary circumstances, a statement of this kind would have led to determined and resolute interpellations in both Houses, as to what the projects of the Cabinet really were. But the circumstances were far from ordinary. A daring and unscrupulous Minister, of transcendent ability, was in power, with a majority behind him in both Houses unspeakable for its shameless subserviency to his leading. The Court, the Aristocracy, the Clubs, the great Metropolitan newspapers, and the streets were his infatuated followers. The nation lay bound at his feet; and so, although he was thus openly charged before the Peers with having deceived them and deceived the country, and with keeping back from public knowledge the projects that were the real cause of his ex-colleague's secession, it was impossible to do anything effectual in either House to compel their disclosure. And it was not until months afterwards, when further forbearance on the part of Lord Derby was no longer required by conventional usage, that the country learned what the proposals really were that drove him from the Cabinet. Lord Beaconsfield it seems had proposed to his colleagues that they should fit out "a secret naval expedition from England, and, with or without the consent of the Sultan, seize upon and occupy the island of Cyprus, together with a point on the Syrian coast," as a counterpoise to the successes which Russia had achieved by the war.

Here was "the Asian Mystery" fully disclosed. As Lord Derby foresaw, a step of this order would have been the signal

for letting loose the vultures who were watching the common prey, and would have instantly lighted up a general war. The passion with which Lord Salisbury assailed the Earl of Derby when this disclosure was made, was proof enough of the truth of what Lord Derby affirmed. And we want to know what Parliament, now no longer under the feet of this Ministry, intends to do in these matters. A close inquiry by Parliament into the projects to which Earl Beaconsfield strove to commit the nation, would show the enormous dangers from which the country has had the most narrow escape, through the power which the Executive possesses of concealing therefrom what its course and counsels really are. Who amongst us entertains any real doubt that Sir Bartle Frere was secretly upheld in his course throughout the Zulu War, by the Premier himself? What is wanted, to extinguish both him and the system of which he has been the final culmination and efflorescence, is — Light. Let us have the full light of day turned upon the Ministerial projects of the last three years. The most determined efforts will, of course, be made to perpetuate the darkness which conveniently hides the whole from the nation; but the time has come when the “New Downing Street,” foreseen from of old, must be called into being from the ashes of the old. Lord Beaconsfield’s overthrow will form an almost dramatic occasion for pronouncing sentence of death upon the system, and hurrying the foul thing out of sight underground. If Parliament permit it to survive these disclosures, it will disappoint every just expectation of the nation. It will be an injustice to the conductors of this Review, if their insistence upon the necessity of a Parliamentary inquiry into these matters, is attributed to party feeling. We affirm truthfully that we do not know what party feeling means.

In addition to these frustrated projects, we have seen the nation betrayed into two cowardly wars which have carried devastation into the villages and homes of two unoffending peoples, shedding their blood like water where they have attempted to resist our arms. And we demand that inquisition be made for this blood, that it may not be found in our own skirts. There is far too little concern amongst us as to the savage proceedings that have been going on for the last twenty months in Afghanistan, and the attempt to evade inquiry into the cause and origin of these proceedings, on the plea that it will stir up party strife amongst us, must be discountenanced. When the Earl of Beaconsfield, as Mr. Disraeli, told the electors of Buckinghamshire, six or seven years ago, with respect to the Ashantee War, that “when our

"honour was vindicated, it would be the duty of Parliament to inquire by what means we were led into a costly and destructive contest, *which neither Parliament nor the country had ever sanctioned*, and of the necessity or justice of which, in its origin, they had not been made aware," he was but fulfilling his duty as leader of the Opposition. Upon his accession to office a few months afterwards, instead of impugning the policy of his predecessors, he vindicated and justified the war, having, we are bound to presume, satisfied himself that it was unavoidable. He did a great dis-service to the country at the same time, by failing to direct Parliamentary attention to the fact—that the war had been entered upon without the sanction of Parliament and the country. Are his successors now going to imitate his example?

There are few Englishmen, we fear, who have sufficiently reflected that under Lord Beaconsfield we have been made to do as a nation towards others what we should have regarded as the basest and most guilty conduct if practised against ourselves. At the end of a long Parliamentary career, spent in what he called "educating" his party, during which it is impossible for the biographer to lay his hand upon a single great and wise measure which he can claim to have conceived or carried—we saw him at last unexpectedly invested with a power, that was for six long years practically irresponsible, through the support of a Parliamentary majority without parallel in English history for its subserviency to the Minister. The great "educator" to which this majority submitted, promised them as their reward the continued maintenance of privileges that in the secret of his heart he must know to be inconsistent with the well-being of the people, but that will never be surrendered while human ingenuity or perverted talent can urge a plea on their behalf. From the day Mr. Disraeli entered Parliament, his real character was clearly enough discerned. The transcendent abilities he has shown have been frustrate for every purpose of good. Determined to plant himself in the position which he saw the gifted Peel lay as a sacrifice upon the altar of his country, the cold glassy eyes of this man on the Opposition Bench were watching the martyr with a concentrated attention, that made them keen to detect the slightest chance of intensifying each throb of his sufferings. There was profound malignity in these attacks, and it was other and worse than the personal malignity for which deep provocation sometimes pleads in mitigation. Mr. Disraeli simply made himself the mouthpiece of a body of clients, whose standing counsel he hoped to become, as his reward. And he has played this rôle throughout his career.

He was never anything in the House of Commons, but an advocate pure and simple,

To prove by reason, in reason's despite,  
That right is wrong and wrong is right,  
That white is black and black is white.

The time, we believe, is coming when men of his character will be warned off the portals of the new Downing Street with indignant hand :

Thou art a lawyer : draw not nigh ;  
Go, carry to some other place  
The hardness of thy coward eye,  
The falsehood of thy sallow face.

No one will suppose that with a Lord Selborne as English Chancellor, we intend any reflection upon the great profession of which he is the head. But there are lawyers of a different stamp from Roundell Palmer, and Lord Beaconsfield's political career may be described in a word as that of the brilliant and unscrupulous advocate of every selfish interest in the land. It is this devotion that has been the secret at once of his success and of his failure. He has been an advocate, and nothing more, unscrupulous as to the merits of his case, or the evidence by which it was to be supported. It is Mr. Disraeli's reproach that at a period when lawyers have somewhat decayed in political importance, they never stood so high in the moral estimation of the country. There is an ever-increasing number of lawyers in our Courts who recognize that it is the advocate's duty first of all to be the servant of justice, and not the champion of wrong ; and that if once convinced beyond doubt that he is engaged on the side of fraud or oppression, he is bound to refuse to continue his aid to such a cause, and that no circumstances will justify him in seeking victory for his client by unscrupulous devices. And if this be so in our Courts of law, where individual interests only are concerned, what judgment must we pass upon the great "advocate" in the Council of the nation, who has never known what "scruple" meant in his course, although the interests of an entire people were in the balance. And now, as Minister, he has betrayed us as a nation into crime so deep that we cannot recall it but with shame and remorse. The financial embarrassment in which he has involved us, would alone constitute sufficient ground for appealing to Her Majesty to remove his name from the Privy Council. It is impossible as yet to estimate with any approach to accuracy, the enormous financial losses which his

Administration has entailed upon the national industry; the difficulty is to state their approximate amount, without shocking the reader by the seeming extravagance of the estimate. We shall certainly not get to the end of the Afghan War under a cost of thirty millions sterling. It is only a false prudence, perhaps, that prevents our estimating it at a very much higher figure. The cost of the first Afghan war was long concealed from the nation, but was finally found to have reached the sum of £20,000,000 sterling. Suffice it to say, that our own inquiries into the matter long afterwards, showed that the last traces of that war did not disappear from the accounts until the amount had doubled that estimate, and reached the enormous sum of £40,000,000. Even then no account was taken by us of the Mutiny, of which it was one occasion. And to-day, when we look attentively at the general unsettlement of everything, not only upon the frontier, but throughout India, which the levity of Lord Lytton, in the prosecution of Lord Beaconsfield's instructions has brought upon us, it is our conviction that twenty millions twice told, will not bring the Indian Exchequer back into the position in which Earl Northbrook handed it to his successor.

Passing to the Zulu War, we are in the same doubt as to what our involvements really are, for it is idle to attach the smallest weight to Sir Stafford Northcote's assurances. His estimates have been a reproach to us as the greatest commercial country in the world. No one knows to this hour, the full cost of the paltry Abyssinian War. Fourteen millions of actual outlay have been admitted, but the estimate takes no account of the expense at which the native troops were replaced in their former state, nor of the costly material of war sacrificed in the expedition. War means the outlay of much money. This is the immediate pecuniary sacrifice; but where is the money estimate of the massacre at Isandhwala? Or of the sacrifice of human life throughout the Afghan War?

Every soldier, every camp-follower, who has perished in this miserable and savage war, represents an indefinite money cost to the nation, but no account of it is ever taken in what we call the Estimates. The arsenals are depleted, and the strength of the establishments brought down to zero, to be gradually replenished by time, but there is no tracing of the cost in the estimates.

The Ministry bring 7,000 Sepoys to Malta and Cyprus, and then hurry them back to India to escape destruction, and the estimates profess that the cost was £750,000. If we multiply it by three or four, we should be nearer the true sum. The six

millions vote, the four millions thrown into the Suez Canal, and the eight Millions deficit bequeathed as a legacy to the present Ministry in the Home accounts, are hardly worth speaking of, when we take a broad review of the disorganization and ruin that are widespread over the Empire. The thoughtless many do not discern the extent of the wreck: and are ready to total up on their fingers, simply the millions that are seen to have been engulfed under their eyes. We shall attempt no estimate of the losses which the national industries and its commerce have sustained, from the uncertainty of years whether it was to be peace or war. No body of experts could possibly sum up the real cost of the proceedings we are noticing. All that can be affirmed is, that the loss which the nation will have to suffer from the conduct of the late Minister abroad, defies calculation. We may see its effects everywhere. And now comes the all-important question: In what cause has this loss been incurred, and for what ends has the future been thus compromised? If the cause had been that of country, freedom, right, or of justice, we should have not one word to say. Is it so? Is it not, on the other hand, patent to every one that the cause which has involved us in so much suffering, and so much loss and embarrassment, has been a cause identified with evil throughout.

## THE OFFICIAL CANCER IN INDIA.

BUT that General Richard Strachey is himself directly implicated in the discredit that attaches itself to the Indian Finance Department, for the Estimates with which it has amused the Home public, during the last eighteen months, as to the probable cost of the Afghan war, we should deal gently with his apology for his brother in the last number of the *Nineteenth Century*. But General Strachey was himself in charge of the Indian Finance Department, during Sir John's visit to England eighteen months or two years ago, when the first of these false statements was telegraphed from India, and he was too prominent a member of the Viceregal *entourage*, during the inception and early prosecution of this war, for us to regard him as other than a mere accomplice therein. We are obliged, therefore, to regard the apology as a defence rather of the Strachey Brothers, than as a simple fraternal effort to mitigate the censure which the thrice-repeated effort of the Indian Government to mislead the English public as to the cost of this war, calls for. General Strachey has forgotten, we say, that this four millions deficit, at last disclosed to the nation when concealment had become impossible, was not the first but the third experiment of the same kind upon English credulity, by the same parties, and within the brief space of eighteen months. In December, 1877, the Parliament that had been called together to hear the Ministerial explanation of the causes which had forced them to declare war, without consulting either the representatives of the people or the Privy Council, was amused with the pretence that the Indian estimates showed an unexpected and happy surplus upon the year, of £1,750,000. As we said in our last issue, the statement was received in India with amazement, since everyone *knew* that it must be false. The assurance was given for no other purpose whatever, than to reconcile the nation to a war that was unpopular from the first, the more so that up to the time of this assurance, it had been contended

with general approval, that the people of India, already suffering from heavy special taxation on account of famine, ought not to be required to defray its cost. Both in the Press and in every utterance of our public men, up to that time, it had been generously and righteously assumed that the cost of the war would be defrayed by this country. Its declaration therefore excited no enthusiasm whatever; and the war was regarded as a misfortune that was perhaps inevitable. The series of Ministerial mis-statements and Viceregal messages telegraphed from Simla, had failed to convince the nation that it was absolutely so; and to lessen the unpopularity into which it was falling, the Ministry did not hesitate to assure the Parliament that there was a large unexpected surplus in the Indian accounts, and that the people of India would, as a matter of course, defray its cost. The statement deceived no one in India, but was received there with derision. No sooner had Parliament separated, than it was publicly announced that "an error had been committed." The same disgraceful farce was re-enacted in the April following, when Sir John Strachey told an amazed Indian audience that the cost of the war up to that time had been £620,000.

The estimate was absurd; but the Tory phalanx at the back of the Ministry would have accepted Sir John Strachey's statement, if he had told us that the war had produced a surplus of six millions instead of an outlay of £600,000. And now, when the estimates from this doubly-tainted source, for the *third* time are found to be four millions wrong, General Richard Strachey comes forward with an explanation of *how* it all arises, that is simply contemptible.

It is "an act of extreme presumption," he tells us, to "judge unfavourably" any such "temporary failure," of the Indian Finance Department. There is "an important difference," he says, between the English and French systems" of account. There *is*, except when a Tory Ministry has the treasury in its hands; and *then* there is practically no difference at all. General Strachey's excuse is threefold:—(1) The Finance Department in India takes account of "audited" expenditure only; (2) There are so many local treasuries in India, that it is difficult for the central financial authority to tell the actual expenditure therefrom, up to any given date; and (3), It has been expenditure of an emergent and exceptional order, that is to say, war expenditure, which has betrayed Sir John Strachey into his last error. Not one word is there about the two former errors. The hollowness of all these pretences is manifest enough, without a word of comment upon



them. Sir John Strachey *knew*, we presume, as well as his brother, that it was the "audited" expenditure only with which he was dealing, and that it was therefore altogether misleading. As to the local treasuries in India, there is not one of them that is not in telegraphic communication with the Central office. Sir John did not want to know the expenditure, and so shut his eyes to it, knowing how interested the authors of the war were, in concealing the depletion that was going on. He could have ascertained in twenty-four hours, everything that was necessary to be known if he had chosen: he did not want to know.

As to the third and final excuse, that it was expenditure of an "emergent" order, Sir John did not know *that* fact, we suppose. Is it really a discovery that war means heavy, prompt, and what men call reckless expenditure? And is it really an excuse for Sir John Strachey, that knowing he was dealing with "audited" expenditure only; knowing that he could ascertain the exact rate of expenditure that was going on at every treasury in the Punjab, hour by hour, if he chose; and knowing finally that it was *war* expenditure, and therefore "reckless," he preferred to make no inquiry about it? The simple fact is, that neither the Viceroy nor the Ministry wanted the expenditure to be known, and so it was concealed, as we long since divined and pointed out, upon the pretext that the real expenditure had not been "audited." But General Strachey does not hesitate to lay the blame on others. He would like to acquit everybody all round; but rather than the Financial department should come to grief, he will make a scapegoat of the Military. No one, he says, is really to blame; but if any department, it is the Military Accounts Department, over which the Financial exercises only a "general supervision." We shall be curious to see the reply of the Military Department to this statement. Meanwhile, we content ourselves with assuring the reader that the strict dependence to which the Military, and every other department in India is reduced to the Financial department, invests the attempt to throw the blame of these misleading estimates upon the shoulders of others, with a very disagreeable aspect. Before any reply can arrive from India, the charge will be forgotten, and the public must refuse to entertain the suggestion which General Strachey makes. He says cautiously that the control of "the Financial member of Council *would appear to be limited.*" He does not *know*, although he himself held the portfolio of Finance for months. It would not do to charge the Military Accounts Department distinctly with the blame; and the apology proceeds to denounce with scorn,

the notion of "a conspiracy in India, to frame what has been described as a falsified Budget," General Strachey being confident that "the officers of the Military department, who prepared the estimates, and those of the Financial department who accepted them, are among the ablest and most trustworthy public servants in India. I must, therefore," he adds, "seek elsewhere for the cause than in culpable negligence, incapacity, or artful dishonesty." There was no "conspiracy," we suppose, in October, 1877, at Simla, to deceive the people of this country as to the necessity of the war. Who was it then, that telegraphed the Ali-Musjid incident; and who the character of Shere Ali's reception of, and reply to, the Viceregal requirement that he should receive an armed Mission? Instead of "conspiracy" being unknown in official circles in India, its Government is continually engaged in conspiring to deceive the people of this country, as to its conduct of affairs therein. Was there no conspiracy in 1878 to shield Sir George Couper from the effect of his orders that there should be no famine in the North West provinces, resulting, as Mr. Caird tells us, in the death of 1,250,000 people? To describe Imperial officialism in India correctly, is to declare it to be one long conspiracy to conceal from the nation, the true character of its administration and the results. The nation is under profound delusion as to what British rule has done for India, owing to the incessant, but half-unconscious eye-wash applied to everything. You may write, over the administration of every Imperial department in India, the fatal legend, *False with the consciousness of being sincere.*

## II.

Mr. Laing, in the same number of the *Nineteenth Century*, describes exactly what the evil is. Some of our readers will remember that Mr. Laing succeeded the late Mr. Wilson as Finance Minister at Calcutta in 1860; and his name will ever be held in memory by the people, for his fearless and uncompromising declaration that India had too long "been the milch cow" of the mother country. Mr. Laing's brief administration is the single hour of sunshine in Indian finance, that we are able to recall. We have never known the precise cause of his resignation, but his retirement became the signal for the establishment of a new era in Indian finance, that may be correctly described as the Book-keeping period. The art of accountantship, or book-keeping, of

estimate and audit, has been brought very nearly to perfection; but as to statesmanship in Indian finance, there has been none since Mr. Laing resigned its portfolio, with a single exception or two. Mr. Laing has described correctly enough what is meant by "conspiracy" to conceal the real expenditure upon this war. He says:—

Having been a good deal behind the scenes in these matters, I have some idea how they are managed. I do not for a moment suppose that Lord Lytton sent for Sir John Strachey, and the heads of the Military Departments, and said to them, in as many words, "You must cook the accounts;" but I have no doubt [nor have we.—Ed.] it was thoroughly understood from top to bottom of all the Departments, that the Government was extremely anxious to show low estimates of the cost of the war, and that to furnish disagreeable figures was not precisely the way to stand well with the highest authority. (Page 1,072.)

Mr. Laing could not have described more exactly than he has done in these few lines, the system that pervades *all* departments whatever in India. It has been our invidious task for years, to call attention incessantly to the practical untruthfulness that pervades every administrative report intended for English eyes. Short of actual falsehood, these reports suggest so much that is misleading and untrue, that they move the indignation of well-informed non-official observers very deeply. A subtle virus of falsehood pervades them all. No one can ever trust, for instance, statements that emanate from the Foreign Office at Simla as to its relations with the Native Princes, where the Government, or the officials in that department, are concerned in suppressing the truth. The nation had full proof of this, if it cared to open its eyes, in those telegrams, which we have already referred to, that came from Simla, in October and November, 1877, as to Shere Ali's reception of our native Envoy who preceded the armed Mission, his reply to the Viceroyal letter, and the incident at Ali-Musjid. The practice fairly culminated in those telegrams; but the disease is of long standing, and nothing but sharp surgery will ever cure the cancer in its present development.

### III.

A few months later, the Home Department, under Sir John Strachey's own special administration, fairly electrified us by the publication of an official letter to Sir George Couper, the late Governor of the North-West Provinces, complimenting him upon the convincing statement of facts in which he had shown "the

forethought and humanity, exercised by him in the recent crisis of the famine in those Provinces." Now when that letter was issued, every man who was party to it, from Sir John Strachey downwards, knew well that so far from any "forethought or humanity" having been shown in the crisis, Sir George Couper had not been content with simply doing nothing and ignoring the condition of the dying people, *but had secretly issued orders, with Sir John Strachey's knowledge, if not under his direction, that nothing was to be done.* Every effort was, of course, made to conceal the fact from public knowledge, until the exposure became so complete by the publication of the "orders," that even official hardihood could reply no longer, but took refuge in silence, hoping that the matter would blow over. It shall not blow over, if we can prevent it; for if India is to be preserved to us, very sharp surgery, we say, will have to be applied to the disease which has eaten all sincerity and truthfulness out of the administration. What Sir George Couper, with the full knowledge of Sir John Strachey, and as is generally believed, under his orders, did was really this : (1) He issued stringent orders, secretly, to the district officers that they were to discourage relief works in every possible way. The order was as follows :—

Please discourage relief works in every possible way. It may be, however, that when agricultural operations are over, some of the people may want work. This, however, except on works for which there is budget provision, should only be given if the collector is satisfied that without it the people would actually starve. Their distress is not a sufficient reason for opening a relief work; and, if a relief work be started, task work should be rigorously exacted, and the people put on the barest subsistence wage; so that we may be satisfied that if any other kind of work were procurable elsewhere, they would resort to it.

\* So stringently were these abominable orders enforced, that the district officers had to close their eyes to the agonies of the dying people. (2) Having himself reported to Sir John Strachey (in a letter long since published in India) that if he exacted the Land revenue, the exaction would complete the ruin of the cultivators, he was nevertheless ordered to exact it, and did so ruthlessly. (3) He turned a deaf ear to every remonstrance from his district officers representing the condition of the people, and then affirmed that no such remonstrances had ever reached him. Now it so happened that one of these officers died but a few months afterwards, and we have now before us, while we write, a letter written by this gentleman, Mr. J. B. Maconochie, the district officer

of Sultanpar, on the 27th November, 1877, to a brother officer in the North West, and here is what he says :—

I have tried to stave off collecting, but have received peremptory orders to begin. This will be the last straw on the back of the unfortunate Sultanpur zemindars; who, without a hope of anything from *Kharif* (rain crops), will be compelled to stump up. A more suicidal policy I cannot conceive. I have done what I could to open the Commissioner's and Lieutenant-Governor's eyes to the state of the place, but without avail. I have nothing for it but to carry out the orders of Government, which mean simple ruin. What the result will be, I hardly care to think of.

Mr. Caird told us in the *Times*, a few weeks ago, what the result was. We ourselves estimated the deaths from starvation that ensued on this abominable conduct, at nearly half a million, but Mr. Caird, who has the advantage of all the official papers, tells us that a million and a quarter of the people perished. The sufferings of the wretched people can never be told; they cannot even faintly be imagined, while not one word about this North West famine has ever been heard in England. There are no poor laws in India, and the exaction of the land revenue wrung from the ryots the last means they had of affording help to the starving labourer. When it was all over, it came out that Sir George Couper had spent just £57,000 in six months, upon what, by a mockery, he called "relief works."

Our point, let the reader observe, however, is not this terrible neglect of the people, but the daring untruthfulness of the subsequent official assurances of the Home Department, that Sir George Couper had shown great "foresight" and "humanity" in his efforts to save the people alive. He had done nothing; he had been ordered to do nothing, but to ignore the condition of the people. The Government had had famine in Bengal, famine in Bombay, famine in Madras, famine in Mysore, and would positively have no more of it. And when this fatal resolution ended in a horrible mortality, the "officials" at Simla came forward with an "eye-wash" despatch assuring the people of England that all was well, and that the Government had done everything in its power to save the people alive. We pledge our reputation as publicists, to establish every word of these charges, before any Committee that Parliament may appoint to inquire into them. What is really wanted in all these Departments is, the formal arraignment at the bar of the House, of the men against whom these charges lie. Until Parliament has the resolution to call the heads of these departments—the Foreign, the Home, and the Finance Departments—to its Bar, for examination, compelling them to produce their

*semi-official* letters, as well as the *eye-wash* despatches intended for the public, it will never have a correct idea of what Indian Government means in these days, of the state into which it has degenerated. The late misrepresentations as to the state of the Indian Finances, is but symptomatic of a disease that is widespread in all the departments—the Simla Foreign Office first of all. It is not too much to say that Parliament *never* hears the real truth upon any subject, in which the reputation of our Indian officials is concerned. “False with the consciousness of being sincere” is the mildest and most charitable judgment we can pass upon them all. Let Parliament continue to suffer it, and it is not financial only, but universal administrative collapse, moral as well as material bankruptcy, in which the Indian Bureaucracy will engulf the Empire.

## MR. GLADSTONE AND SIR BARTLE FRERE.

THE Government, we have been told, greatly regret the blunder of which they were guilty, when they abstained from inflicting upon Sir Bartle Frere the punishment he so richly deserved. The worst part, however, of that blunder was the speech which Mr. Gladstone delivered in attempting to defend it, and the eulogy on Sir Bartle Frere which he went out of his way to pronounce. The author of the Zulu War, he declared to be "an able, honourable, and distinguished man." "No man," he added, as if stating an axiom, "I think will dispute his title in all these respects." And certainly in the House of Commons nobody did. In that august assembly, such laudatory epithets are bandied to and fro without much, if any, regard for their true meaning. They are intended to be understood in a "Pickwickian" sense; and an "able, honourable, and distinguished man" is simply anybody whom, for purposes of debate, an official personage finds it convenient to describe as such. At the same time, in the name of truth and national morality, we must record our protest against such epithets being associated with such a man as Sir Bartle Frere. Distinguished he certainly is—in a sense. He is distinguished from all other men of this generation, in that he is steeped from head to foot in the blood he has unrighteously caused to be shed. Distinguished he is, from all other men of this generation, because he is the author of as cruel, cowardly and unprovoked a war as ever blighted the honour of a nation. But wherein, we should like to know, has this man displayed his ability; wherein has he exhibited his honour? Why, it is known to all men that this war against the Zulus was due to his inability to estimate the forces against which he would have to contend. And when, as a first consequence of his incapacity, a British force was slaughtered at Isandula, Mr. Gladstone's "honourable man," sought to account for the disaster, by traducing the reputation of the brave men who had fallen. It would be interesting to know if, when Mr. Gladstone pronounced this eulogy on Sir Bartle Frere, he had read the History of the Zulu War which has recently

been published by Miss Colenso.\* The story therein told is shocking, almost beyond belief; and it seems to us impossible for any one of ordinary humanity to read it, without regarding Sir Bartle Frere with feelings precisely the reverse of those with which Mr. Gladstone declares himself to be animated. A brief epitome of the sad and dishonourable story, we are about to transfer to these pages, in the hope that we may thereby induce our readers to study the facts in detail, as they are set forth by Miss Colenso. She is an admirable exponent of what she has to tell, admirable both in arrangement and perspicuity of style. Though feeling deeply the nature of the incidents she is called upon to describe, she wastes no words in idle denunciations. Miss Colenso has had the discernment to perceive that the facts were sufficient to "plead trumpet tongued" against "the able and honourable" gentleman, whom it has strangely pleased Mr. Gladstone to eulogise.

In estimating the wisdom and humanity of Sir Bartle Frere, the first important fact we have to bear in mind is, that until his ill-omened arrival at the Cape, the Zulus, and the colonists of Natal had, for the space of twenty years, lived side by side in perfect peace and quietness. "The tranquillity of our border," writes Miss Colenso, "had been a matter of pride as compared to the disturbed and uncertain boundaries between Zululand and the Transvaal. The mere fact of the utterly unprotected condition of the frontier farmers on *our* border, and the entire absence of anything like precaution, evinced by the common practice of building houses of the most combustible description, is a proof that the colonists felt no real alarm concerning the Zulus, until the idea was suggested to them by those in authority over them." This, however, was not the only nor the strongest proof of the trust and friendliness with which the Zulu king and his people regarded their English neighbours. During the twenty years in which so complete a quiet reigned along the border of Natal, the Boers of the Transvaal had along their frontier been persistently encroaching upon the rights and possessions of the Zulus. That they had done so without warrant of any kind, we know beyond a doubt, from the report of the English Commission appointed to inquire into the matter. The result was a feeling of soreness and exasperation in the minds of the Zulus against the Dutch settlers of the Transvaal. Unchecked, that feeling would have expressed

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\* "History of the Zulu War and its Origin." By Frances E. Colenso. Chapman and Hall, Piccadilly, 1880.



itself in a war against the Boers, in which there cannot be a doubt that the Dutch Republic would have been annihilated. But so great was the confidence felt by the Zulu ruler in British good faith and equity, that at the request of the Governor of Natal, he made no attempt to right by force the wrongs his people had endured. For fifteen years he patiently waited for justice to be done to him and his people, through the good offices of the Governor of Natal; and when Sir Bartle Frere arrived at the Cape, he was still waiting, with confidence unabated by the long delays he had had to endure. In less than two years after his arrival, Sir Bartle Frere had changed all this; and a ruthless war was being waged by us against the very people who, for twenty years, had been our staunch friends. Assuming that Sir Bartle Frere acted in good faith throughout, this fact alone would stamp him as a man of very unusual incapacity. That he is as signally incapable as "able Indian administrators" generally are, there can be no question. But in this Zulu War, his incapacity was accompanied by a want of truthfulness not a whit less remarkable. The War was a direct product of Lord Carnarvon's scheme of confederation. Sir Bartle Frere attacked the Zulus because he considered that so long as their power remained unbroken, the Confederation of our Cape Colonies could not be brought to a successful conclusion. But the war is itself linked on to another piece of knavery, without some account of which, its origin is not intelligible. We mean the annexation of the Transvaal. For the Boers of the Transvaal, it is impossible for a humane man to feel any sympathy. That we had a right to interfere, and insist upon their treating the natives among whom they lived with greater equity and humanity, is not to be denied; but we had no right to gain admittance to their territories under a false pretence, and then, equally under false pretences, to deprive them of their independence and convert them into subjects of the British Crown. This, however, is precisely what was done by Sir Theophilus Shepstone, with, we presume, the cognizance and approval of the Earl of Carnarvon. Sir Theophilus, we need not inform our readers, is, like Sir Bartle Frere, an eminently "able, honourable, and distinguished personage." He went up to Pretoria, the Dutch capital, at the commencement of 1877, with a commission in his pocket, which appointed him Commissioner of the Transvaal, and authorized him to annex that territory to the dominions of Her Majesty. But Sir Theophilus, like the able and honourable gentleman he is, said nothing about this Commission. Far different was the business which took him to Pretoria. That

was a business of peace and reconciliation. It was to bring about such arrangements, as should, in future, protect the natives from the tyranny of the Boers. As soon, however, as he had reached Pretoria, he threw off his benevolent disguise, produced his commission, and stood revealed in his veritable character—as a robber—“‘convey’ the wise it call”—who did his business in the name of Her Majesty the Queen.

Now, the excellent Theophilus had been properly cautioned in his Commission that he was on no account to rob the Boers of their independence, unless they were quite willing to be despoiled. But of what use is it to be a “distinguished and honourable man” if one is to be restrained by the same peddling scruples which are deemed obligatory by people who lay no special claim to these high-sounding adjectives. Sir Theophilus disregarded that portion of his Commission which required him to obtain the consent of the Boers, before he proceeded to despoil them of their independence. He made his appeal direct to *force majeure*, and annexed the Transvaal. That done there arose a new difficulty. Outside of the circle of officialism, there exists, in this benighted land of ours, an unreasonable dislike to robbery, whether done on a small or a large scale. A very considerable number of people can see nothing either “able” or “honourable” in the forcible appropriation of other people’s property. Consequently it became necessary to do something or other, whereby the Boers should be reconciled to the new position in which they so unexpectedly found themselves; and this necessity it was which brought on the Zulu War. The pretext on which Sir Theophilus Shepstone had obtained ingress to the Transvaal, was to mediate between the Boers and the Kaffir Tribes with which they were at feud; but more especially with Sikukuni and his people. The origin of this feud is well-known. It is thus related by Miss Colenso:—

“The objects of the Boers in their attacks upon their native neighbours appear to have been two-fold—the acquisition of territory, and that of children to be brought up as slaves. The *Cape Argus*, of December 12, 1876, remarks:—‘Through the whole course of this Republic’s existence, it has acted in contravention of the Sand River Treaty; and slavery has occurred not only here and there in isolated cases, but, as an unbroken practice, has been one of the peculiar institutions of the country, mixed up with all its social and political life. It has been at the root of most of its wars. . . . The Boers have not only fallen upon unsuspecting kraals, simply for the purpose of obtaining the women and children and cattle, but they have carried on a traffic through natives, who

have kidnapped the children of their weaker neighbours, and sold them to the white man. Again, the Boers have sold and exchanged their victims amongst themselves. Waggon-loads of slaves have been conveyed from one end of the country to the other for sale, and that with the cognizance, and for the direct advantage, of the highest officials of the land. . . . The circumstances connected with some of these kidnapping excursions are appalling, and the barbarities practised by cruel masters upon some of these defenceless creatures during the course of their servitude, are scarcely less horrible than those reported from Turkey, although they are spread over a course of years instead of being compressed within a few weeks.' This passage is taken from a letter to *The Argus*. . . . which, with other accompanying letters from the same source, gives an account of Boer atrocities too horrible for repetition (C. 1776). A single instance may be mentioned, which, however shocking, is less appalling than others, but perhaps shows more plainly than anything else could do what the natives knew the life of a slave in the Transvaal would be. The information is given by a Boer. 'In 1864,' he says, 'the Swazies accompanied the Boers against Males (a native chief.) The Boers did nothing but stand by and witness the fearful massacre. The men and women were also murdered. One poor woman sat clutching her baby of eight days old. The Swazies stabbed her through her body, and when she found that she could not live, she wrung her baby's neck with her own hands to save it from future misery. On the return of that commando, the children who became too weary to continue the journey, were killed on the road. The survivors were sold as slaves to the farmers.' Out of this state of things, eventually proceeded the war between the Boers and Sikukuni." (Pp. 117-19.) Now, the ostensible pretext given for Sir T. Shepstone's journey to Pretoria was a philanthropic desire on the part of the British Government to put an end to "this state of things." Sir Theophilus made his appearance upon the scene as the protector of Sikukuni against the cruelty of the Boers. But, when he had treacherously despoiled the Boers of their independence, he found himself compelled to silence their clamours by gratifying their hatred against that Chief. Miss Colenso writes:

It was some time before the Transvaalers recovered from the stunning effects of the blow by which they had been deprived of their liberties, and meanwhile the new Government made rapid advances, and vigorous attempts at winning popularity amongst the people. Sir T. Shepstone hastened to fill up every office under him with his own men, although there were great flourishes of trumpets concerning preserving the rights of the people to the greatest extent possible, and keeping the original men in office wherever practicable. The first stroke by

which popularity was aimed at was that of remitting the war taxes levied upon the white population (though unpaid) to meet the expenses of the war with Sikukuni. It became apparent at this point what an empty sham was our proposed protection of Sikukuni, and how little the oppression under which he and his people suffered had really called forth our interference. Sir T. Shepstone, while remitting, as stated, the tax upon the Boers, insisted upon the payment in full of the fine in cattle levied by them upon Sikukuni's people. *So sternly did he carry out the very oppressions which he came to put an end to, that a portion of the cattle paid towards the fine (two thousand head, a large number in the reduced and impoverished state of the people) were sent back, by his orders, on the grounds that they were too small, and in poor condition, with the accompanying message that better ones must be sent in their place.*

It is clear from the foregoing that the excellent Theophilus was a lieutenant worthy to serve under the "able and honourable" Sir Bartle. For the peculiar kind of work which was required at their hands, the late Government cannot be refused the credit of having shown remarkable discernment in the choice of its agents. We know the final results of these knaveries so far as the luckless Sikukuni and his people were concerned. We made war upon them with those very Swazies as our allies, whose employment by the Dutch was one of our pretexts for depriving the latter of their freedom; and who, under the British Flag, perpetuated precisely the same atrocities which they had been wont to perpetrate in the service of the Boers. This was the first consequence of the annexation of the Transvaal. The second was the war with the Zulus, —a piece of iniquity for which Sir Bartle Frere is solely responsible, and compared with which the performances of Sir Theophilus Shepstone, admirable at these indubitably are from an immoral point of view, dwindle into insignificance.

When the Transvaal was annexed in the "able and honourable" fashion just described, the relations between Natal and Zululand were of a very friendly kind. Sir T. Shepstone appears at that time to have had some misgiving lest the Boers should offer an armed resistance to the proclamation despoiling them of their liberty. And, if Mr. John Dunn is to be believed, Sir T. Shepstone "sent word to Cethswayo that he was being hemmed in, and the king was to hold himself in readiness to come to his assistance." At any rate, while Sir T. Shepstone was accomplishing the appropriation of the Transvaal, a Zulu army, "manifestly in our support," appeared on the borders of the Dutch territory, and retired as soon as Sir T. Shepstone's shabby work was held to be finished. To Cethswayo and his people, our annexation of the Transvaal was a matter of great satisfaction. In the boundary disputes between them and the Boers, Sir T. Shepstone had always been in favour of their claims. And "they thought" (so Miss Colenso tells us)

"that now at last, after years of patient waiting, and painful repression of angry feelings at the desire of the Natal Government, they were to receive their reward in a just acknowledgment of the claims which Sir T. Shepstone had so long supported, and which he was now in a position to affirm." These poor savages had yet to learn the acts which (so-called) "honourable" Englishmen are capable of committing without even loss of reputation. Sir T. Shepstone had cast Sikukuni and his people to the Dutch farmers of the Transvaal, as one might cast a bone to a sulky dog. The Dutch dog, in this instance, had worried his bone, and remained as sulky as ever. He demanded fresh victims, and the excellent Theophilus was not slack to provide him with them. Six months after the annexation of the Transvaal, Sir Theophilus discovered that the opinions which he had hitherto held and expressed on the boundary disputes were entirely erroneous. Up to that period he had, according to his own statement, supposed "that the rights of the Transvaal to land on the Zulu border had very slender foundation," but he then "learned for the first time, what has since been proved by evidence the most incontrovertible, overwhelming, and clear, that this boundary line had been formally and mutually agreed upon, and had been formally ratified by the giving and receiving of tokens of thanks, and that the beacons had been built up in the presence of the President and members of the Executive Council of the Republic, in presence of Commissioners from both Panda and Cethswayo, and that the spot on which every beacon was to stand was indicated by the Zulu Commissioners themselves placing the first stones on it. I shall shortly transmit to your Lordship (the Secretary of State for the Colonies) the further evidence on the subject that has been furnished to me."

If Sir Theophilus really made the above astounding statement in good faith, it would show that his intelligence is as weak and faulty as his morals:—a man, in short, who ought to be dismissed from any position of trust with the utmost despatch. The evidence so "incontrovertible, overwhelming, and clear," proved utterly worthless when examined into by the Boundary Commission appointed for this purpose by Sir Bartle Frere; and a decision was given altogether in favour of the Zulus. Sir Bartle Frere, however, was deceived by the assurances of Sir T. Shepstone. The latter wanted a war with the Zulus, in order to conceal his own lawless proceedings in the Transvaal; the former was eager to secure any pretext for breaking up the Zulu power, because it stood in the way of the Colonial Confederation scheme, which it was his ambition to carry out *per fas aut nefas*.

Sir Bartle Frere, accordingly, sanctioned the appointment of a Commission to settle these Boundary disputes, because he thought the decision would go in favour of the Boers, and anticipated (to quote his own official language) that while "the Zulu King, like many other military despots, would be willing to accept an intervention which might give him what he desires without fighting for it, he would not accept with equal readiness any decision adverse to his own claims." It was therefore, a grievous disappointment to Sir Bartle Frere, when the Boundary Commission rejected Sir Theophilus Shepstone's "overwhelming evidence," and in utter despair apparently, of manufacturing any more reasonable *casus belli*, he was driven to find it in the theology of the Old Testament. "The Boers," he wrote, "had forces 'of their own, and every right of conquest; but *they had also what they sincerely believed to be a higher title, in the old commands they found in parts of their Bible to exterminate the Gentiles and take their lands in possession.* We may freely admit 'that they misinterpreted the text, and were utterly mistaken in its application. But *they had at least a sincere belief in the Divine authority for what they did, and therefore a far higher title than the Zulus could claim for all they acquired.*'"

Quite truly did Sir W. Harcourt declare that the man who could write such rubbish as this, was not fit to hold the office of a parish beadle. That the late Government should retain him in office, is not much to be wondered at. They had endured Lord Lytton's "iron pots" and "earthen pipkin," and Sir Bartle's theology was hardly more absurd than the figurative harangues of the "specially gifted" Viceroy. The late Government, moreover, despite of its brag and bluster, was a feebly-willed Government; and, whether in Constantinople, in Calcutta, or at the Cape, its subordinates took it, as it were, by the ear, and hauled it hither and thither, whithersoever they pleased, in a fashion at once ludicrous and humiliating. But that Mr. Gladstone and his colleagues should affront their followers, and risk the success of their African policy by keeping the author of this theological rubbish in a post of responsibility:—this is a mystery past finding out.

It is, however, in the six months between the award of the Boundary Commission and the actual commencement of war, that Sir Bartle Frere exhibits that peculiar kind of ability and that excess of honourable sentiment which cause the eulogies of Mr. Gladstone to sound so strangely to our ears. No Englishman, who is honourable and truthful in the ordinary way, can read without much wincing the negotiations between Lord Lytton and the

Ameer Shere Ali, but Lord Lytton, when compared with Sir Bartle Frere, is "as moonlight is to sunlight, and as water is to wine." It is, unhappily, impossible in a brief article like this to show the persistent untruthfulness and unwearied malignity, with which Sir Bartle Frere hunted this poor Zulu king to destruction. The story is scattered through the pages of some twenty blue-books. The despatches of Sir Bartle Frere constitute a sort of autobiography, in which, as a portrait grows upon the artist's canvas, Mr. Gladstone's "able and honourable man" takes shape before us by a gradual process of self-revelation. The total effect is obtained by the multitude of these self-manifestations, nor is it possible, in the absence of these, to convey to the reader any adequate impression of what that total effect is. We must content ourselves with the broad outlines; but these will, we think, be found to constitute a sufficiently repellent picture. The Report of the British Commissioners appointed to inquire into the Boundary disputes between the Boers and the Zulus is dated 20th June, 1878. It is, to all intents and purposes, an award in favour of the Zulus on all the matters under discussion. At this time there was no pretence even of any ill feeling between the Zulus and the Colonists of Natal; and if Sir Bartle Frere had promulgated and carried out the award, as soon as it was placed in his hands to do so, the Zulu War would not, in all probability, have occurred. But a Zulu War, Sir Bartle Frere was determined to have, and he had counted on the award of the Boundary Commission to furnish him with a pretext for declaring it. So early as May 7, 1878, we find him writing in the following terms to Sir H. Bulwer:—

"The details given in your despatch under reply seem to me to leave no doubt of the *unfriendly and hostile intentions of the Zulu chief*, and his determination to submit to no abatement of his *extreme demands*. . . . Nor do I see any reasonable ground for hoping that any possible concessions to the Zulu demands will render our frontier more secure against *further unjust aggressions* by the Zulu chief and his allies."

This extract reveals the candid and equitable spirit in which this "honourable man" came to the consideration of the matter. He takes upon himself to decide the matters in dispute. The demands of the Zulu king are "extreme." If conceded, they will lead to "further unjust aggressions" and so on. But Sir Bartle Frere finds comfort because there is "little room for hoping that Cetshwayo has now any other intention than to obtain and hold by force what he has claimed; and unless there are good grounds for doubting this con-

clusion, we ought to be prepared to defend the just rights of Her Majesty's subjects. "The just rights of Her Majesty's subjects" are the claims of those Boers whom the excellent Theophilus had treacherously despoiled of their independence a few weeks previously. The foregoing extracts reveal beyond a doubt the object which Sir Bartle Frere had in view in nominating a Boundary Commission. It was to obtain a *casus belli* against the Zulus. He felt his prey slipping from between his fingers when the award of that Commission was laid before him. So what did this just and honourable personage do? He concealed the award of his own Boundary Commission for the space of six months. This interval he utilised in maturing his preparations for the massacre of an unoffending people. He moved up troops into Natal; he applied to the Home Government for reinforcements, which, unhappily, he succeeded in obtaining. He sent spies into the land. He made Cethswayo the object of the grossest calumnies. He sought in every way to stimulate both the fears and the aggressive spirit of the Colonists, who are always ready for a war provided the mother country will defray the expenses and supply the victims who are to be slaughtered. The alarm and agitation occasioned in Zululand by these menacing preparations, the "honourable" Sir Bartle pretended to regard as a proof of aggressive designs on the part of the Zulu King. And when, at length, his preparations were complete, he struck the blow. The publication of the Boundary Award was accompanied by an *ultimatum*, which declared war against the Zulu King if, within thirty days, he failed to accomplish that which it was impossible to accomplish within the specified time. We mean, of course, the disbandment of his army. The other pretexts on which war was declared were fabrications which exhibit the untruthfulness of Sir Bartle Frere's character, but are of no importance otherwise. Even Sir Bartle Frere would not have considered them *per se*, a sufficient ground of war: nor would an immediate acquiescence in them have saved Cethswayo and his people. No. What was required of Cethswayo was that within thirty days he should convert his "army of celibate manslayers" (as Sir Bartle Frere falsely described the Zulu regiments) into peaceful domestic characters, and as he failed to accomplish this impossibility, Sir Bartle Frere invaded his possessions with an army of British "manslayers"—only partially celibate. The humane and honourable Sir Bartle Frere then assumed the congenial rôle of Captain Sword—

● "He burned and he wasted, he spouted his fires  
On babes at the bosom and bed-rid sires."

Ten thousand Zulus lay slaughtered on the soil they had



gallantly striven to defend before this bloody business was considered to be complete. Thousands of old men, women, and children perished of cold and hunger. Prisoners were butchered in cold blood by our native allies. Fire, pillage, and devastation, marked the track of the British troops wherever they went. But what matter? What reason have we to be indignant? We have Mr. Gladstone's assurance that the ruthless homicide, who is responsible for all, is an "able, honourable, and distinguished personage," and that to demand his dismissal from the office he has so deeply disgraced, is to allow sentiment to get the better of our reason.

In their action in this matter, Mr. Gladstone and his colleagues have committed an outrage upon the conscience and honour of the nation, as difficult to account for as it is impossible to defend. They have slain, as it were, by a single blow, the moral enthusiasm which bore them into power. But, indirectly, it may be, that they have rendered the nation a service by the indefensible clemency which they have extended to Sir Bartle Frere. By so doing, they have, we can hardly doubt, compelled many thinking minds to reflect seriously on the nature of the ties which connect the parent country with her colonies; and out of such reflections it is abundantly possible that very important results may proceed. Upwards of fifteen years ago, Mr. Goldwin Smith discussed this subject in a series of letters addressed to the editor of the *Daily News*. He was assailed with very little argument, but with an abundance of invective. And anyone who peruses these letters will not wonder at this treatment. His arguments are unassailable, but most disagreeable to that large class of people who confound national greatness with extension of territory; and these people, in consequence, had no resource left to them except that on abusing the author of the arguments which moved them to wrath. The Zulu war, it seems to us, with its hideous pillaging, burning, and massacres, has added incalculably to the weight of what he then urged.

Mr. Goldwin Smith's argument, briefly stated, amounted to this. Our Colonial Empire was built up under the pressure of an artificial commercial system. The nations of Europe having fenced themselves about with barriers of protective duties, international trading was a business encumbered with grievous lets and hindrances. We therefore set about establishing Colonies in various parts of the world in order to open out markets for the sale of British commodities. It may be questioned if, at any time, the trade thus obtained at all compensated for the enormous waste

of blood and treasure involved in first establishing and then retaining these Colonies. But, at any rate, the theory of a Colonial Empire rested at that time upon an intelligible basis. That basis has now disappeared. Whatever trade we carry on with our Colonies, we should carry on if they became independent to-morrow, because it is a trade dependent, not upon the connection, but upon human wants and interests, which are unaffected by political changes. We have surrendered, as involving an impossibility, the attempt to govern our Colonies directly. We have given them independent representative institutions, and the use they have made of these institutions has been to enact protective duties against the importation of British goods. What then, apart from the pabulum they afford to a vulgar and ignorant pride and ostentation, are the advantages which the British nation derives from its Colonial possessions? Clearly none. The single privilege which we enjoy in regard to them, is the privilege of wasting our blood and treasure in sanguinary wars for which the colonists are responsible. It is easy to denounce a man who urges such unpalatable truths as these; but it is, we apprehend, impossible to find a flaw in his logic. As regards the Cape Colonies, his position can be strengthened by several important considerations. There we have a small British population begirt about with a native population vastly superior in numbers. The Englishman, whenever he establishes himself on a land peopled by what he calls "an inferior race," regards the "inferior race" as interlopers, whom he has an undoubted right to extirpate if they are troublesome or obstructive. No more brutal wars are recorded in history than those which the Cape Colonists have waged against the Kaffirs; and the most savage and unprovoked of them all has been the war projected and manufactured by Sir Bartle Frere. Now these wars, one and all, were directly produced by the connection between the Colonists and the mother country. Is anyone innocent enough to suppose that Sir Bartle Frere—despite his sanguinary propensities—would have declared war against the Zulus—nay, would have been permitted by the Colonists to do so, had not both he and they been fortified by the knowledge that they had the resources of the British Empire behind them. But for this knowledge, the long peace which had existed between the Zulus and the Natal Colonists would never have been broken. The Colonists are far too keenly alive to their own interests to expend their manhood and the fruits of their industry in such dubious and costly enterprises. But they have no objection

to a vicarious sacrifice on the part of the mother country. As regards the Cape, therefore, the British nation stands in this pitiful predicament. It is absolutely destitute of power either to control or modify the internal legislation of the Colony. A small European community, because it has the British Empire at its back, wields in that part of the globe, unlimited and irresponsible power over millions of uncivilised races. When the violence, the rapacity, or the terrors of these Colonists, have resulted in a war between them and the native population, our shameful and humiliating business it is to slaughter back these natives into a state of acquiescence to colonial oppression. How long, we ask, is the nation, prepared to acquiesce in this state of things? The rewards and the eulogies which have been bestowed upon Sir Bartle Frere and Sir Theophilus Shepstone for all the evil they have wrought, will indubitably raise up imitators to sedulously walk in their footsteps. The Colonial Office is a broken reed to lean upon. The present writer, a short while ago, accompanied a deputation from the Aborigines Protection Society, which waited upon Lord Kimberley concerning the state of affairs in South Africa. He can never forget the utterances of Lord Kimberley upon that occasion. They were those of helplessness personified. The sole official duty which devolves upon the Colonial Secretary is plaintively to entreat the Cape Colonists to manufacture wars, and the duty is discharged under a depressing conviction that, in the manufacture of wars, the Colonists will pay no heed to his entreaties. As regards the Cape, there are, in fact, only one of two courses open to the nation if it is not prepared to be a mere tool in the hands of homicidal High Commissioners and aggressive panic-stricken Colonists. Either the affairs of the native population must be superintended and administered by officers appointed from home, and directly responsible to the British Government—an arrangement fraught with practical difficulties—or we must withdraw our troops from South Africa, and take our stand upon the policy that henceforth the Colonists shall fight their battles for themselves—an arrangement almost equivalent to a severance of the connection between Great Britain and the Cape.

In addition to this Zulu War, we now know that we owe the Afghan War to the counsels secretly submitted by Sir Bartle Frere, as Vice-President of the Indian Council, in what he called a "confidential" letter to Sir John Kaye, in 1874, that the Ministry should adopt a course towards the Ameer so morally detestable, as to deserve the severest handling that the publicist

can give it. The Ruler of Herat, as Sir Bartle Frere calls him, was the Ameer's refractory son, Yakoob Khan, who had more than once resisted his father's authority, and who, shortly after the date of Sir Bartle's letter, was recalled to Cabul, and placed under arrest. Now these are Sir Bartle Frere's words:—

With regard to the present state of affairs at Herat, I would immediately depute from the Persian side, an intelligent and scientific military officer, with three or four good assistants acquainted with all arms of the service, and if the Ruler of Herat [the Ameer's son] could be induced to receive them, I would establish them there permanently. This, no doubt, in the present state of affairs, would give umbrage to the Ameer of Cabul; but I would let him clearly understand that we could not sit by, while he quarrelled with the ablest and most popular of his relations, and possibly successors.

Sir Bartle Frere thus declared that were he sitting in the Viceregal chair of the Indian Empire, he would enter Afghanistan by the back-door, and open an intrigue with one of the Ameer's provincial governors, although this governor was the Ameer's own son, and a pretender to the succession. It mattered not that his pretensions had been rejected by his father, with the counsel and consent of the chieftains of the State. These of course were mere Afghan crotchets. We had to look after British interests, and Yakoob Khan, opposed to his father, would be a convenient instrument for our intrigues. Yakoob Khan was thus to become the English candidate for the throne, Sir Bartle Frere recommending that he should be encouraged and assisted to rebel against his father, break up the Afghan State, and seize upon one of its provinces, as a separate principality, under British protection. And this is the "morality," of the counsels that have involved us in the Afghan war. Instead of being permitted to remain at the Cape, Sir Bartle Frere ought to be declared incompetent for service under the Crown, in any position whatever. When his appointment to the Cape was first announced, we reviewed his later Indian career at length, and warned the nation that it was courting a catastrophe to send a man of Sir Bartle Frere's character there. We little suspected at the time, that it was he who was the secret instigator of Lord Lytton's attitude towards the Ameer; and that the nation would owe to him at the end of his career, an Afghan as well as a Zulu war.

## PARLIAMENTARY REFORM.—II.

## RE-DISTRIBUTION OF SEATS.

OLD custom breeds many benefits, and antiquity compels the reverence of all; but he who would impede with them that necessary evolution, which is a law of human existence, mistakes the meaning of history, and goes far to place both in abeyance. The wandering fire of revolution rises from the stagnant marshes of man's history, and in the dark dwellings of despotism thrives the spirit of anarchy. The growth of every nation has afforded us examples, and not few are the instances in current European events, which give patent proof thereof. Progress is the development of order; where ceaseless development proceeds without check, there its imprisoned force, which is revolution, and the explosion of that force, which is anarchy, are spread harmlessly over their natural courses, and the curses of an irrational restraint are the blessings of a rational expansion. Reverence itself loses life when it degenerates into a servile attachment, and a lively love of the past will ever lead us to bestow a faithful affection on the future. Nor is any one country less subject to these sociological axioms than any other, either by the nature of its people or the course of its growth. England herself must bow to them, and the old glory of her past find its only life in the ever new glory of her future. He, therefore, who fondly imagines that those institutions, which have gathered their forms from the influences of many ages and the brain-struggles of many races and many generations concentrated in his particular country, would for ever serve the same purposes of satisfying the feelings and promoting the happiness of the people if they preserved the same form, is either ignorant of history and blind to philosophical principles, or the dupe of a narrow pride and a pernicious prejudice. Far as the roots of her constitution may be spread in the past, England is not exempt from the great law of evolution; firmly established as her political existence may seem, it is yet not so firm that she can defy the decay of stagnation, and rest thankful and glorious in complete achievement.

The limited monarchy of to-day has been evolved from the despotism of Tudors and Stuarts, and had the Cavaliers but recognised the dynamic laws of their existence, they might have saved the blood of their countrymen and the head of their king. The dynamic law must operate. Suspend its operation for a time, it will take compensation in rapidity and in violence attendant on such speed. It would be well if those who refuse to "watch what main currents draw the years," would bear in mind those eternal words of one who actually saw the compensatory energy of the great law: "Methinks," says Milton, "I see in my mind a noble and puissant nation rousing herself like a strong man after sleep, and shaking her invincible locks; methinks I see her as an eagle renewing her mighty youth, and kindling her undazzled eyes at the full mid-day beam, purging and unscaling her long-abused sight at the fountain itself of heavenly radiance, while the whole noise of timorous and flocking birds, with those also that love the twilight, flutter about, amazed at what she means, and in their envious gabble would prognosticate a year of sects and schisms." Let those who would leave things as they are ponder these words in the light of events; they will realise, then, perhaps, how truly a liberal and active spirit of progressive change is the sole condition on which order itself can prevail against anarchy and decay.

It is in this spirit that we approach the question of the Redistribution of Seats, a question entangled in all the meshes of hoary antiquity, of the civic and rural life of long-buried generations, of the traditions of mighty and noble families. We are fully aware of all the strength of the common human feelings, which were at the time of the great Reform Bill, and will again be, brought to bear upon the question. Enfranchisement is nothing less than the creation of a new political individual, and human nature is not yet in any extensive manner so wisely altruistic that any body of men will resign that privilege of individualism without a struggle. Political individuality is prized quite apart from its powers and purposes, and only a national declaration to the effect that no local feelings can be allowed to interfere with the due regulation of the Constitution will succeed gradually in producing a due subordination. It may be said in contradiction of this estimation of the value set by constituencies on their franchise, that the "Christian Club" of electors sold New Shoreham, that Sudbury advertised itself for sale, and that hundreds of boroughs acquiesced for generations in such disposals of their seats by the proprietors as they could doubtless have prevented; but be it observed that these facts only prove the indifference.

to the kind of representative when in competition with a lower human motive, and that they do not show that those constituencies were ready to suffer a total loss of their political individuality. If any minister would, for party purposes, have attempted to extinguish for ever for a money compensation the franchise of places, it is greatly to be doubted whether he could have succeeded. This, then, is the strongest element to be contended with in the discussion of the question. There are some who might say that the sense of patronage or even proprietorship, which still exists very strongly among many of the great families with regard to various seats, mostly small constituencies, is the most difficult point in the question. It is certainly a very difficult point; but the pressure exerted by individual families, however great it may be directly in the Legislature, can never eventually be so difficult to overcome as the resistance of the whole bodies of constituencies outside the Legislature. If not, the feudal system would have survived to this day in fact as well as in the feelings of a few families. Next to these individual feelings comes the reverent regard for the old seats, the names of which have been connected with the Legislature possibly for six centuries. If a new era has arrived, if the discovery of a new continent and the development of the industrial principle have carried the once remote and barbarous Northern Counties and Midland far beyond the historic little villages, which saw the original Parliaments formed, it does nevertheless seem hard that the little places should have to resign a historic existence. One can imagine the seven burgage tenants of Old Sarum, looking on the ruins of a greatness scarce known to Tudor times, thinking of the Great Council of 1086 and the first impeachment in 1095, filled with a spirit of grand indignation that their ancient franchise, given by the first Edward, should be taken away to some commercial upstart. But all such feelings must yield, if the claims of more important principles can be established. These it is now necessary to investigate.

Certain premises, which are radical elements in the theory of the Constitution, must be kept clearly in mind. They may be stated in the following form:

1. The House of Commons is the Representation of the People in Parliament.

2. The Representation should be a complete representation of the whole People, not of a section only, as of the Electors, or of Tax-payers.

3. The Representation should be equal—that is, no one part of

the People should have a larger share of representation than any other part.

When it is said that these principles are of the theory of the Constitution, it is not intended that they are historically so, but that they have been made so by the consensus of statesmen and philosophers through advancing generations. Historically, Sir Erskine May's statement requires, perhaps, little reservation. "The representative system had never aimed at theoretical perfection. But its general design was to assemble representatives from the places best able to contribute aids and subsidies for the service of the Crown. This design would naturally have allotted members to counties, cities, and boroughs in proportion to their population, wealth, and prosperity; and though rudely carried into effect, it formed the basis of representation in early times." No better instance could be given of the manner in which the theory of a constitution grows, and is not created at any one time. It suited the purposes of the Tudors and Stuarts to continue the Representation on 'this basis, but a higher ideal thereof had worked itself into the minds of men. Cromwell recognised it, disfranchised a large number of small boroughs, gave more members to the counties, and enfranchised Manchester, Leeds, and Halifax. This was in 1653. The corrupt despotism of the Hanoverian line, helped by the great ability of several powerful statesmen in succession, and further by a certain re-action produced by revolution abroad, delayed further progress in the approximation of the constitution to a higher ideal for 180 years.

It is not a little remarkable that the reform, which is now being advocated, is no very ideal one, but one chiefly of a very plain and almost mathematical nature. That it is not entirely of a mathematical nature is due to considerations which are not to be wholly rejected. But before entering on these considerations, which form rather a modification in the method to be adopted for attaining the end, than a reason opposed to the end, it will be well to consider some important consequences of the premises stated above. First, in order to gain a true idea of the meaning of representation of the people, it is necessary to remember that it is only a method adopted almost within historic times, as a remedy for the impossibility or great difficulty which popular government would labour under if individual reference were attempted. With this idea in mind, it is curious to see that Mr. Hare, in his treatise, lays



stress on the point that representation should be not of interests but opinions. Clearly it should be of all that makes a man. Identity of interest and conformity of sentiment were defined by Mr. Pitt to be the great essentials of the "representation." It may seem rather a matter of mere verbiage, but it is of extreme importance that representatives should be considered to present a true mirror of the feelings and thoughts of all that section of the people which they represent. It should be observed for the satisfaction of those who uphold individualism, that this does not exclude the representative's own opinions, which he has full right to present as well. It is, perhaps, scarcely conceivable to us, in these days of corrupt influences and immoral political ambitions, that a man might faithfully learn and present ideas dissimilar to his own, and be trusted by constituents to do so.

The next important deduction is that the whole people is to be represented. This point will be more fully treated in discussing the Representation of Minorities. But it is here necessary to mention that neither electors, nor owners of property, nor any sections have a predominant right to be represented. And, be it observed, this is not a point in the extension of the suffrage. It is simply an assertion that, whether elected by a portion or the whole of his constituency, a representative should be held to represent the whole and every part of it equally. If this be admitted, it is clear that not the number of electors, nor the value of the assessments, but population pure and simple must be taken as the basis of representation. The system of Mr. Hare, if ever adopted, would not be interfered with by this admission. It is only the size of the constituency which is concerned. For if the body to be represented is too large, it is always less likely that it will be wholly represented. Nothing could be more vicious, nothing does at the present time more harm, than the notion that all a member must think of are his electors. Nor is an assumption that property should be the basis of representation less pernicious. If the House of Commons is only to be a mirror of opinions, there would be reason in making such portions of the community, as seem most likely to form a valuable body of opinion, the sole objects of its reflection. But if it is truly to be the mirror of the people's whole life, the picture of its whole interests, the trumpet of its needs, the voice of its distress, then must its members be allotted in such a manner as will best enable them to reflect their portions of the people. On this ground the poor man has as much claim as the rich man; nay, he may have more, since the rich man is better able, through many various channels, to bring his opinions and his interests to the light. To

many it will seem utterly superfluous to make this statement, but anyone who will but recollect and analyse the evidences around us, will see that a very opposite spirit permeates our political constitution. It is a further strong argument in favour of this view, that those who, with Mr. Mill, look forward to such results of national education, as may give all men a judicial capacity worthy of the suffrage will be consoled for the intervening incapacity, if they feel that all men alike are to be considered in the distribution of the franchise. The welfare of a nation is the welfare of all its parts, and it is surely time that all ideas of one part existing solely for the sake of another, take final leave of their position in the heads of thinking men. As surely as no man would now think of making it a political axiom that the people is merely to subserve the interests of kings and nobles, so surely in the future will no man think that excellence of education or tenure of the purse is the limit of the reflecting functions of a true representative legislature. As well might one affect to ignore the crime and other troublesome facts of the existence of the people as a whole. These force themselves on the attention, perhaps the unwilling attention, of many who would otherwise neglect even them, and, indeed, in latter days, such efforts as the Factory Acts and the Artisans Dwelling Act are evidence that the needs of the whole people are being more widely reflected. But those needs are too vast to be properly known, much less treated in our present imperfect state of representations, and though individual labours outside the Legislature are continually doing much to disclose them, we hear perpetual complaints around us that members of vast constituencies, where the needs are greatest, are simply powerless to fulfil the claims on their brains and time. And this leads us on to the principle contained in the third premiss aforesaid, that representation should be equally divided among all.

Whatever argument any one can invent in favour of the present division of representation, no one, most assuredly, can contend that it is based upon any consistent set of principles. Electors might very reasonably be expected to know something of the origin of it, yet not one in a hundred does. It may, indeed, be within the common experience of many readers of this essay to have heard no unimportant leaders of local politics attempt the most ludicrous elucidation of the perfection of the system, with a most sublime disregard of statistics. Nor are historians fully acquainted with all that can be unearthed from dusty records, able to offer a more rational defence of the system. They may write enthusiastically, like Mr. Freeman, about

the glorious growth of our Constitution to more and more perfect freedom; they may show, by the very manner and title of their writings, that the whole People, and not the Aristocracy, not the King, have begun to be the object of history and the subject of all government; but they certainly cannot discover in the distribution of the representative power any operation of justice, philosophy, or statesmanship. This may be held to be a strong, nay an arrogant assertion, but it is made in the firm belief that but a very few figures, taken in their true meaning, justify it. Made before the Reform Bill of 1832, no man with his eyes open to facts which were common scandal, would have denied it. Made since, it is likely to arouse some indignation among many, who have doubtless no greater admiration for that great step in progress, and the authors thereof, than the writer. It is necessary to remember that great and novel, and fraught with vast changes as that measure was, it was so more because change had been delayed for a century, than for any other reason. No half-measure was adequate when so much wrong had been accumulated without remedy. Lord Russell himself, in the graphic introduction to his Essay on the English Constitution, telling the story of the first draft of the Great Bill, says: "I was deeply impressed with the conviction of Lord Grey, that none but a large measure would be a safe measure; that to nibble at disfranchisement and cramp reform, by pedantic adherence to existing rights would be to deceive expectation, to whet appetite, and to bring on that revolution which it was our object to avert." The gist of this sentence is that reform had been delayed till the force of change was become revolutionary, and that the fear of its outburst was the cause of the largeness of the measure. It was, in spite of that largeness, not a radical measure. There were so many patent and gross vices in the existing system, as the corruption of boroughs, absurd over-representation, and influence of the aristocracy, that they in themselves formed sufficient subject for a vast measure, without any attempt whatever to attend to the less patent defects. In fine, the Great Reform Bill may be said to have been rather a measure for the remedy of gross evils, which would wait no longer for remedy, than a measure which sought to re-construct representation on any principle of equality. There is another very interesting sentence in the same introduction of Lord Russell's, which is well worth quotation here. "Thus," he says, "if the due weight and influence of property could be maintained by preserving the representation of a proportion of the small boroughs with an improved franchise, it is desirable rather to build on the old founda-

tions than to indulge our fancy or our conceit in choosing a new site and erecting on new soil—perhaps on sand—an edifice entirely different from all which had hitherto existed.” Indisputable as is the axiom here stated, it is not a little curious that the influence of property should be made the excuse for the existence of small boroughs. The representation of property is surely a part of the question of the extension of suffrage, and should in no way be allowed to interfere with an axiom, which is at least equal to that stated by Lord Russell, the axiom which requires that representation should be equal. Even a century ago, Mr. Pitt made equality a primary principle. The sentence only shows the compromise to which Lord Russell’s difficult position drove him; and when men compromise it is not objectionable that they should find at least some good in their compromises. In another place in the essay, a similar excuse is found, when he quotes the reason so much paraded by his Tory opponents in favour of pocket-boroughs, that such men as Chatham rose through them—as a reason not without force. It is presumed that everyone will concur, but the consideration is whether it is of force sufficient to extrude the great axiom of equality. The great Reform Bill was, then, after all but a step out of abuses and interested despotism towards an as yet unformulated freedom. But with all its compromise, it was a vast step. An appreciation of the one will only induce a more true and reverent appreciation of the other, and, what is more, will induce a rightful desire to make more steps in the same direction. What, then, is our present duty, the duty of the whole party of progress? It is clearly to aim at that equality of representation which may conduce to a full knowledge of the life and needs of the whole nation, and to a full attention to them in that body to which the sovereign people entrusts its government. How far we are from such equality will best be realised by a consideration of the table annexed to this article, showing the average of population represented by each member in each county. It may be objected that the assumption of the county as a basis is arbitrary, but the reply is obvious that there must be some arbitrary basis for the calculation, that the division of the country into counties is so long established that it is never likely to be altered, that it is founded largely on topographical grounds which form natural divisions of the occupations of the inhabitants, and that it is at least as good as any other basis. Nor must one omit to observe that by making the averages on the large basis of the whole counties a vast number

of very monstrous, and certainly the most monstrous, inequalities are obscured. For instance, Westbury, with 6,396 inhabitants, returns one member, while Wednesbury, with 116,809, also returns one member. The smaller Irish boroughs are not instanced for modifying reasons which will be noticed hereafter. This particular instance is a very typical one, and will serve to illustrate many considerations which it was said above removed the question of the Distribution of Seats from the domain of mere arithmetic. The first consideration is that the occupation of one portion of the people may be such, and so entirely similar, as to make its interests and opinions far less varied than those of another equally numerous portion, whose occupations are of a different and a more various nature. This consideration forms a modification, not easily exaggerated in importance or in difficulty, of the important principle, that numbers are evidence of variety of needs. So important is this modification, and so much do facts seem to point to it, that it would perhaps seem better to assume at once, were it not for other re-active circumstances, that the needs of a population are in proportion to its density, and the variety of its opinions in proportion to the intellectual pressure apparently admitted to be the result of that density. In this aspect, the case above quoted becomes truly remarkable. In themselves, of course, the claims of the two towns are ludicrously beyond comparison. One must take them, however, as part of their counties. It will be found that Staffordshire is represented altogether by nineteen members, and has a population of 858,326, giving an average of 45,175 persons to each member, and that Wiltshire is represented altogether by fifteen members, and has a population of 257,177, giving an average of 17,145 persons to each member; that is, nearly three times as many people are represented by each member in Staffordshire as in Wiltshire. The next question is, whether the nature of the less populous county justifies this. Now the facts are that Staffordshire contains the activity of many and various manufactures, while Wiltshire is a quiet agricultural county, with but a poor and lagging manufacture of silk and cloth. Moreover, the amounts of rateable value in the two counties are as two to one, being in Staffordshire £3,037,959, and in Wiltshire £1,457,447. There is every reason, therefore, for a large and full representation of the one which has at present only about one-third the representatives of the other. Another point to be noticed, is that the interests and opinions of widespread agricultural populations are very little varied. It is an indisputable fact that country people have less

intellectual independence, as they have also fewer urgent needs than the populations of manufacturing districts. A very little observation will convince anyone of this fact, and a very little actual experience thereof establish it beyond subversion. Agricultural counties should, therefore, be rather less than more fully reflected in the legislature than the active commercial counties. It will have been observed that no notice has been taken of the common idea of a conflict between the interests of town and country, of agriculture and commerce, of county and borough. Knowledge of the connection of all interests, has grown much too wide for this to be a real difficulty in the Distribution of Seats. For, however much the claims of town and country may occasionally come into conflict on small details of legislation, it is quite clear that every commercial man recognises the importance of good tillage and the full encouragement of agriculture, knowing well the effects of a bad harvest; and it is not less clear that agriculturists have begun adequately to recognise how much their welfare depends on the development of manufactures and commerce, which benefit them as consumers more than they can ever injure them in detail as competitors. But even if this difficulty have any ground, it has, at least, been recognised by the Legislature that it is not to be considered good. This is best expressed in a sentence in Mr. Hare's book on "Representation," written now a quarter of a century ago. "The annexation," he writes, "of several agricultural parishes to a borough in their centre, as in the case of Shaftesbury, would seem to be a recognition of the fact that the alleged distinction between the interests of the borough and the county electors is but imaginary; for if any real distinction existed, injury would have been done to one or the other."

Proceeding upon this assumption, the annexed table may be considered a fair picture of the representation of the people of England and Wales. It will perhaps not be as astonishing to many people of a reforming tendency, as they might have expected to find it. The very glaring inequalities, which could be shown to exist if we took every seat and county into separate consideration, are in it much mitigated. But wrong as these inequalities may be, it is the object of this article rather to promote a full measure of remedy on a broad basis, than to satisfy individual grievances. It is of far more importance that the whole population of the country should be represented in due proportions, than that particular constituencies should have their representation more equalized with reference to certain others, but without any reference to a real general standard. For, if the general equalization be attained, it is of comparatively

little importance that some places composing the larger divisions be still represented disproportionately in relation to each other. That is, taking the distinction between town and country to be imaginary as far as interests are concerned, the point to be aimed at is an equal distribution of seats to each county in proportion to the claim of its inhabitants, the division of those seats within the county itself being a secondary matter, however important in itself, and however necessary a part of the same measure which proposes the primary redistribution. There is, of course, no doubt whatever that a measure might be framed dealing satisfactorily with both requirements, allotting to each county its due number of members, and to each place in each county again, a due proportion of the county members. Whether the present system of county representation wholly separate from borough representation should be retained is a question of no very real practical importance, provided that the county members have a due relative part of the population consigned to their care. In regard for old custom and strong prejudices, it would probably be advisable not to attack this old arrangement.

Our present space will not allow of a detailed discussion of the facts upon which a practical measure must be based. A few of the necessary considerations have been suggested above. Besides internal facts, the great external facts of Scotch and Irish representation come in to complicate the same problem, and import with them several different and very grave conditions. Indeed, the mathematical nature of the problem is at once very largely modified by the relation between the three—we might almost say four, adding the Welsh—nationalities of the United Kingdom. It has been held sufficient at present to treat England and Wales, and to show in plain figures how much in them the axiom of equality is violated. If Scotland and Ireland were added to the table, without an accompanying commentary on the remarkable inequality between the three kingdoms, the result would probably be that inconsiderate and harmful indignation which is so often displayed by Englishmen in the treatment of Scotch, and more especially Irish, affairs. Indeed, so complicated would the problem become by these two elements, that it is a question whether a Reform Bill dealing with the English (and perhaps Welsh) representation only would not be sufficient for a first effort. In any case, the annexed table shows a plain and urgent necessity for some change. Nor is the necessity less, if the number of electors, or the assessments be taken as a basis. Numbers of instances like that above cited of Staffordshire and Wiltshire,

## PARLIAMENTARY REFORM STATISTICS.

N.B.—Electorals are given in hundreds, Populations in thousands.

County.	No. of Electors.	Electors per Member	Population of County.	Number of Boro's.	Population of Boro's.	County Membra.	Boro. Membra.	Total Population.	Total Membra.	Pop. per Member
Bedfordshire .....	87	22	129	1	17	2	2	146	4	34
Berkshire .....	150	19	134	4	62	3	5	196	8	24
Buckinghamshire .....	145	18	120	4	55	3	5	175	8	22
Cambridgehire .....	141	28	152	1	34	3	2	186	5	37
Cheshire .....	521	37	349	5	212	6	8	561	14	40
Cornwall .....	251	19	296	7	66	4	9	362	13	28
Cumberland .....	203	25	163	3	57	4	4	220	8	27
Derbyshire .....	295	37	318	1	61	6	2	370	8	47
Devonshire .....	460	27	393	6	208	6	11	601	17	35
Dorsetshire .....	140	14	143	6	52	3	7	195	10	19
Durham .....	592	45	375	7	310	4	9	685	13	53
Essex .....	247	24	426	3	40	6	4	466	10	46
Gloucester .....	582	45	251	6	283	4	9	534	13	41
Hants .....	437	27	319	8	225	5	11	544	16	34
Herefordshire .....	125	21	101	2	24	3	3	125	6	21
Hertfordshire .....	103	26	184	1	8	3	1	192	4	48
Huntingdon .....	46	15	55	1	8	2	1	63	3	21
Kent .....	712	34	480	9	368	6	15	848	21	40
Lancaster .....	2,671	83	1,161	14	1,658	8	24	2,819	32	88
Leicester .....	289	48	174	1	95	4	2	269	6	45
Lincoln .....	437	31	344	5	92	6	8	436	14	31
Middlesex .....	2,174	120	276	7	2,263	2	18	2,539	18	141
Monmouth .....	115	38	156	1	39	2	1	195	3	65
Norfolk .....	357	35	394	2	44	6	4	438	10	43
Northampton .....	199	25	180	2	63	4	4	243	8	30
Northumberland .....	292	29	175	4	211	4	6	386	10	38
Nottingham .....	344	34	171	3	148	4	6	319	10	32
Oxford .....	156	22	125	3	52	3	4	177	7	25
Rutland .....	20	10	22	0	0	2	0	22	2	11
Salop .....	227	22	190	4	58	4	6	248	10	24
Somerset .....	336	30	356	3	107	6	5	463	11	42
Stafford .....	1,006	53	321	8	537	6	13	858	19	45
Suffolk .....	226	25	284	3	64	4	5	348	9	38
Surrey .....	874	79	487	3	604	6	5	1,091	11	99
Sussex .....	366	24	199	8	218	4	11	417	15	28
Warwick .....	721	65	231	3	403	4	7	634	11	58
Westmoreland .....	69	23	51	1	14	2	1	65	3	22
Wilts .....	239	15	152	9	105	4	11	257	15	17
Worcester .....	399	36	214	6	124	4	7	338	11	30
York—E. Riding .....	300	75	139	1	129	2	2	268	4	67
N. Riding .....	431	36	186	8	107	2	10	293	12	24
W. Riding .....	1,875	85	929	10	945	6	16	1,874	22	85
WALES—										
Anglesey .....	50	25	37	1	14	1	1	51	2	25
Brecknock .....	45	22	51	1	9	1	1	60	2	30
Cardigan .....	63	31.	62	1	11	1	1	73	2	36
Carmarthen .....	112	37	89	1	26	2	1	115	3	38
Carnarvon .....	87	43	78	1	28	1	1	106	2	53
Denbigh .....	102	34	84	1	21	2	1	105	3	35
Flint .....	71	35	52	1	24	1	1	76	2	38
Glamorgan .....	363	60	162	3	235	2	4	397	6	66
Merioneth .....	33	33	46	0	0	1	0	46	1	46
Montgomery .....	75	37	48	1	19	1	1	67	2	33
Pembroke .....	92	30	57	2	35	1	2	92	3	30
Radnor .....	30	15	18	1	7	1	1	25	2	12



might be cited. Dorsetshire and Herefordshire, two counties almost wholly agricultural, with few varied interests, with populations by no means highly enlightened, have one member for 19,000 and 21,000 respectively of their population. In the county adjoining Herefordshire, Monmouthshire, each member represents 65,000. What reason can possibly be assigned for this difference? Monmouthshire has a large trade and manufactures in iron, tin, and coal. The quiet little Rutland has two members for its 22,000 inhabitants—*i.e.*, 11,000 per member. Surrey, which is almost a part of the Metropolis, with varied and intense interests, and the active body of opinion due to its contiguity with that centre has one member for every 99,000. Huntingdonshire, with scarcely an interest beyond agriculture, has a member for every 21,000. The great territory of the West Riding has one for every 85,000; and Lancashire, on whose opinions England has been said to depend, has, in spite of the Reform Bills, not acquired for herself a better representation than one member for every 88,000. If it be inquired how these gross inequalities are produced, it will be seen in the table that it is due to the existence of a large number of small boroughs in small and unimportant counties. Wiltshire has nine boroughs, of which the total population is only 105,000, and which return eleven members. Compare with this the fact that the four largest boroughs of Lancashire return ten members for a population of 1,110,000. Dorsetshire again has six boroughs, with a total population of 52,000, returning seven members; the North Riding, eight boroughs, of 107,000, with ten members; Sussex, eight boroughs, of 218,000, with 11 members. Further figures are unnecessary to prove that it is high time again to adopt the course taken in 1831. Lord Russell saw then that the first step to be taken was a proper reduction of the small boroughs. Since that date the minimum of 2,000 adopted then has by no means continued to represent a fair standard of claim to representation, the increase of the population of England and Wales having been from 13,000,000 in 1831, to 22,000,000 in 1871.

What standard should now be adopted, or how the existing rights of insignificant places, which rightly honour and jealously guard their franchise, may be preserved without interfering with an equal Re-distribution of seats, must be considered in a future article. Whatever be the difficulties to be overcome, it is perfectly clear that some measure is necessary for the entire reformation of a system which, whether the assessments of property, the number of electors, or the whole population be taken as a standard, is in

almost every quarter of the kingdom utterly unequal and irrational. There will come a time, if it is not come already, when the existence of this irrational system will not be tolerated among an enlightened people, when the petty precedents and prejudices of small places, with small minorities of inhabitants and patrons of powerful grandeur, will have to yield, as they yielded in 1832, not to any theory of perfection, but to the common notions of common sense and common fairness.

## RESTITUTION OF THE BERAR PROVINCES.

ABOUT the year 1851 the policy in the ascendant at Calcutta was that of "getting rid of intervening Principalities." Every Native State was considered merely "an exceptional jurisdiction," as in the United Kingdom had been the Palatinates of Chester and Lancaster, and the hereditary chieftainships in the Scottish Highlands. The ruling maxim declared that "the existence of so many Sovereignties and Chiefships, interspersed with our own territory, was in many ways inimical to good government, and to the welfare and prosperity of the people;" and that, "on every fair occasion, their number ought to be diminished." The plan of reforming the allied and protected States, advocated by some old officers of the school of Sir John Malcolm and Mountstuart Elphinstone, was put aside as retrogressive and ridiculous. Native States could not be reformed—they were incorrigible—and even if they could, the task would not be a politic or profitable one for us to undertake. The two great Mussulman States, Hyderabad and Oude, were marked down for annexation, and the process of undermining them, as the Blue Books tell us, was only delayed by the wars in the Punjaub and Burmah. When the time for business came, Oude was annexed; Hyderabad was pushed on the road to ruin; and Lord Dalhousie waited for "the crash."

Sir William Sleeman, the Resident at Lucknow, had pledged his great reputation for the reform of Oude. General James Stuart Fraser, the accomplished Resident at Hyderabad, declared that the administrative reform of the Nizam's Dominions was perfectly practicable. The proposals of these two distinguished officers were discouraged in every way, except by honest argument. There was a conspiracy of silence against them; both of them felt it, and both of them retired before it.

"Lord Dalhousie and I," said Sir William Sleeman, "have different views, I fear. If he wishes anything that I do not think right and honest, I resign, and leave it to be done by others. I desire a strict adherence to solemn engagements, whether made with white faces or black. We have no right to annex or con-

fiscate Oude; we have a right under the Treaty of 1837, to take the management of it, but not to appropriate its revenues to ourselves. We can do this with honour to our Government and benefit to the people. To confiscate would be dishonest and dishonourable.\* To Lord Dalhousie himself he wrote as follows:—"Proofs enough of bad government and neglected duties were given in my diary. The duty of remedying the evils, and carrying out your lordship's views in Oude, *whatever they may be*, must now devolve on another."†

General Fraser, at Hyderabad, had similar misgivings. In December, 1852, having for a long time vainly pressed upon Lord Dalhousie measures for administrative reform in the Nizam's Dominions, without eliciting any reply, the General remarked, one evening, at his own dinner table, that "for all the use he had been in the fifteen years he had passed at the Hyderabad Residency, he need not have been sent there at all." The remark appeared in one of the Madras newspapers a few days after it fell from his lips. It was greedily caught up at Calcutta. The General did not palter with his sense of honour or duty when a reference was made to him on the subject; and in January, 1853, he resigned.

Two questions may now be asked. Was reform practicable in Hyderabad? Was Oude incorrigible? The latest answer to the second of these questions comes to us from a gentleman whose eight years of official duty in the "Garden of India" have borne fruit in a lucid and conscientious work, replete with valuable facts and deductive reasoning that testify alike to his capacity and his candour. Referring to opinions expressed in a book that was published in 1868, Mr. Irwin, of the Bengal Civil Service, acknowledges it to have been demonstrated that "the Treaty of 1837 had never been abrogated as a whole; that its provisions for administration by British officers on behalf of the King still held good, and should have been acted on; and that reform, without annexation, was practicable, and should have been aimed at."‡

As to the question whether administrative reform in Hyderabad was practicable, or not,—*solvitur ambulando*. Reforms in the administration of the Nizam's Dominions were commenced by the

\* Sleeman's "Oude," Vol. I., pp. 21, 22.

† Ibid., Vol. II., p. 423.

‡ "The Garden of India: Chapters on Oudh Affairs." By H. C. Irwin, B.A., Oxon., B.C.S. (W. H. Allen and Co., 1880), p. 177.

eminent statesman still at the helm in Hyderabad, the Nawab Salar Jung, almost immediately after the severe trial to which that State was, as we shall see, subjected in 1853. Rapid improvements, attested even more by fiscal, economic, and social statistics than by the reports of successive British Residents, were made down to the year 1877, since which time the worst spirit of Anglo-Indian officialism seems to have been roused against the Nawab Salar Jung, and to have encouraged and organised obstruction against him with no imaginable object but his personal discomfiture, and with no possible result but public scandal and mischief. The charges here suggested are serious, and shall be fully authenticated. In the meantime, as the cause of offence on the part of the Nawab Salar Jung has been a persistent appeal for the restitution of the Berar Provinces, it will be as well to commence by explaining what that appeal was, and on what grounds it was based.

It is a fact worthy of attention, and calling for sympathy, that all the difficulties of the Hyderabad State that are so easily stigmatised as grievances, can be traced to the double refusal of Lord Dalhousie to respond to the call of two British Residents,—the call of General Fraser for help in his plan of reform, the call of General Low, on behalf of the Nizam, for relief from an extravagant establishment.

In 1851, according to the Blue Book of 1854, Lord Dalhousie was urged by General J. S. Fraser, with all the weight of fifteen years' experience at the Hyderabad Residency, to undertake effectual measures for reforming the administration of the Nizam's Dominions. The Resident had suggested this policy "on many recent occasions,"—for the first time, as we learn from another authentic source, in February 1850,\* a year before the Governor-General took any notice of it. Lord Dalhousie recorded his entire disapproval of the Resident's plan, and, moreover, pronounced a general reprobation upon suggestions such as those made by General Fraser, declaring them to proceed, "in too many instances, not from sentiments of enlarged benevolence, but from the promptings of ambitious greed."† The despatch drafted, after the Governor-General's instructions, in the language of this Minute, did not, however, contain this condemnatory sentence, and negatived the Resident's proposal without any explanation. It will be seen from the following letter that it was only by accidentally coming across a quotation from the Blue Book that General Fraser, after his retirement, became informed

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\* "Our Faithful Ally, the Nizam." By Capt. Hastings Fraser (Smith & Elder), 1865, p. 286.

† Papers "Nizam" (418 of 1854), p. 38.]

of the virtuous, but misdirected indignation with which his proposal had been received.

TWICKENHAM PARK,  
15th August, 1868.

DEAR SIR,—I have had the pleasure to receive your note, and accept with thankfulness the copy of your work on Indian Policy.\* I have no doubt I shall be greatly interested in it, as I have already been with your former works on the subject of India. I shall now only notice an observation that I see on the 73rd page of your book, which has some reference to myself.

It is quite true that I submitted to Lord Dalhousie the suggestion therein alluded to, with regard to a proposal for our assuming the entire but temporary management of the Nizam's country. His Lordship dissented from this without giving me any special reasons for doing so, and I now learn for the first time from your book what his reasons were. One of them appears to have been that the Nizam's assent to such a proposal would never have been voluntarily given, coupled with an insinuation that such suggestions as that I had made proceeded "in too many instances from the promptings of ambitious greed."

With regard to the first of those objections, I had much better means of judging how far my suggestion would have been adopted by the Nizam than Lord Dalhousie possessed; and if I had not been thoroughly sure of the ground on which I stood, and of the strong probability of success, the suggestion never would have been made. The Nizam was on very friendly terms with me, and the Dewan owed his office entirely and exclusively to myself, and would not, I was persuaded, in any way counteract my wishes. Under these circumstances, there was no sufficient reason to doubt our obtaining the Nizam's consent, until his friendly feelings were alienated, if not from myself, at least from the British Government, by the harsh and imperious language in which Lord Dalhousie thought proper to address his Highness in a direct despatch.

As to Lord Dalhousie's remark about "ambitious greed," I had, at all events, not contemplated any prolonged exercise of the functions of sovereignty at Hyderabad, such as we have exercised in Mysore for thirty years, since I intended in our agreement with the Nizam on this subject, that the tenure of our control over his country should positively be limited to the maximum of five years, within which period I felt quite assured that the Nizam's debt to us would be repaid, and such administrative reforms effected as would then enable us to divest ourselves of our temporary power, without any probability of a recurrence of those evils from which we should have rescued the Nizam, and especially from what he so much dreaded and abhorred, the loss, perhaps to be permanent, of Berar, the finest part of his dominions.

Various evils existed in the Nizam's country, which I had long most strongly urged the Supreme Government to insist upon having repressed by more energy and determination on the part of the Nizam than he was willing to exert, but I was persistently baffled in these attempts by Lord Dalhousie. His real motives for this conduct I never could divine, and I could only attribute it to his imperious and self-willed temper, which even in matters of mere opinion and suggestion could bear no rival near its throne.

Excuse the lengthened egotism of this note. I sensibly feel the injustice of that imputation which would fix upon me the glaring fault, I may say crime,

\* "Retrospects and Prospects of Indian Policy." Trübner and Co. 1868.

of having been actuated by base, sordid and dishonourable motives in the conduct and discharge of a public duty.—Most truly yours,

J. S. FRASER.

The real causes of General Fraser's retirement in 1853 are now clear enough. The "real motive" of Lord Dalhousie's "conduct," in having "persistently baffled" the Resident's attempts to introduce reforms into the Nizam's administration, was not dislike to "a system of subversive interference," but disbelief at once in the progressive capabilities of an Indian State, and in any advantage to be reaped for the Paramount Power, even if such capabilities could be discovered and cultivated.\* Under the double delusion—false morally, and practically falsified—that the British Government was not interested in the reform of a protected State, unless it could be made financially profitable; and that the conversion of protected States into British Provinces would be financially profitable, Lord Dalhousie not only held back from promoting reform, but refused the Hyderabad State a measure of relief from certain extortionate charges for what was then called "the Nizam's Army," afterwards the Hyderabad Contingent, which were completely under his own control, and could have been greatly diminished almost by a stroke of the pen.

"The Nizam's Army," as it stood in 1848, was about the most preposterous example of our national nepotism that then existed, perhaps that ever has existed, in India. There is nothing quite so bad now. It was a positive *reductio ad absurdum* of an Anglo-Indian establishment. It consisted, in round numbers, of five regiments of cavalry, six batteries of artillery, and six infantry battalions; altogether about 8,000 men. This force was divided into five brigades—divisions, as they were termed—each commanded by a Brigadier, with a salary of £2,500 a year, assisted in his arduous duties by a Brigade-Major and one or two more staff officers. There was a headquarter staff, consisting of a Military Secretary, Commissary of Ordnance, and Superintending Surgeon. The annual pay of the officers attached to this Force, about ninety in number, amounted to about £110,000, giving them each an average salary of £1,200 a year. The entire charges of this Force were stated to be about 40 lakhs of rupees, or nearly £400,000 per annum, in a report from Colonel Low, the officiating Resident, dated 20th July, 1848. Colonel Low, who was

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\* Papers, "Nizam" (418 of 1854), p. 38; Papers, "Kerowlee," 1855, p. 9; "Punjab Papers" (1849), p. 663.

then new to the place, declared it was "grievous to reflect" upon "that the pressing pecuniary difficulties of the Nizam's Government," were brought upon it by "our annual demand for the pay of the Force," and that it was "really painful to mention all these facts and circumstances." Colonel Low considered it his "imperative duty" to recommend that "immediate steps should be taken to reduce the expenses of the Contingent to a sum not exceeding twenty lakhs of rupees per annum at the utmost,"\* to reduce the expenses, in short, to one half of what they were at the time of his recommendation.

Lord Dalhousie "on the 7th of October, 1848, expressed the opinion that the British Government commits no injustice, and practises no extortion, in requiring that the Contingent Force, maintained by virtue of treaty," (which will be shown to be an untrue assertion,) "be kept up by the Nizam, and that his Lordship does not consider that we are called on in justice to reduce a man of that Force." The Governor-General did, indeed, in that same Minute of 7th October, 1848, express an intention of "diminishing the unnecessary expenses of the Staff as vacancies might occur," but he only talked about it. The patronage was not to be resigned so easily. Lord Dalhousie continued to fill up "vacancies on the Staff for several years, after making that profession, while the alleged debt, which was afterwards to form the pretext for territorial sequestration, was growing.† He appointed for example, his own aide-de-camp, Captain William Mayne, to be one of the "Brigadiers commanding Divisions" in the Hyderabad Contingent, with a salary of £2,500 a-year, payable by the Nizam, in December, 1851. The debt summed up against the Hyderabad State in 1851, when a large sum was paid off, and again in 1853, had accumulated solely in consequence of Lord Dalhousie having refused in 1848, in spite of the earnest appeal of Colonel Low, and, the expressed wishes of the Home Government, "to reduce a man" of the Contingent.

This Hyderabad Contingent, or Nizam's Army, as it was commonly called until about 1851, grew into the monstrous form it ultimately assumed out of several bodies of the Nizam's irregular troops taken in hand by the Resident on various occasions between 1807 and 1819, while we were at war, in alliance with the Nizam, and "reformed" under the command of English adventurers, not in the service of the East India Company. This Force, raised in

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\* Papers "Nizam" (234 of 1859) p. 8.

† Papers "Nizam" (234 of 1859) pp. 8, 9.



time of war, was, by the Resident's importunate and over-bearing influence, and the corrupt subserviency of the Nizam's Minister, maintained on the same footing in time of peace, at first without any direct sanction from Calcutta, which was, however, more decidedly extended, as the valuable patronage was gradually appropriated by the Governor-General. The "Nizam's Army" was turned into a great relief to our resources, and "a fertile source of patronage," affording by its commands and staff appointments, rewards for our meritorious officers.\* Originally a Resident's plaything and job, a joint concern of Mr. Russell, the Resident and Rajah Chundoo Loll, it became by degrees an instrument of torture for the Nizam, a shield for his faithless Minister.

Rajah Chundoo Loll was upheld at the head of the Hyderabad administration by irresistible British power for more than thirty years, not in accordance with the judgment or wishes of the Nizam, not for the advantage of the people of that Prince's dominions, but for the promotion of what were asserted by the great majority of our Residents, our Secretaries, and our Councillors, to be British interests, and which certainly were the interests of a great many English officers—to oblige the Hyderabad State to sustain from its revenues this Contingent Force, which no treaty recognised or justified. Thus we find the Governor-General, the Marquis of Hastings, expressing as follows his determination with reference to the Contingent:—

"It is perfectly true that those troops are, in fact, more ours than those of the Sovereign by whom they are maintained. Now would it be consonant to wisdom, or to the trust reposed in us by the Honourable Company, that we should sacrifice such a security to a casuistical point of equity?" And further on in the same Minute he says that it would be "impolitic to let an over-refinement cause our open abrogation of such an inexpensive addition to our strength."†

The "casuistical point of equity" and "over-refinement," to which Lord Hastings refused to sacrifice our "inexpensive" gains, would have been more properly called ordinary justice and common honesty. The "inexpensive addition to our strength" was very expensive to the Nizam. All the pecuniary difficulties of the Hyderabad State, all its differences with the British Government, "the perpetual wrestle with the Dewan," as Lord Dalhousie described it, "which transforms the British Resident by turns into an importunate creditor and a bailiff in

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\* Papers "Nizam" (234 of 1859), p. 4.

† "Hyderabad Papers," 1824, pp. 31, 32.

execution,"\*—arose out of the Contingent. And, somehow or other, every crisis in the long financial agony of the Nizam, became an occasion of triumph and profit for his British ally, who, having imposed the burden for his own benefit, would grant no measure of relief except for a price. In 1823, the financial embarrassments of the Hyderabad State, arising chiefly out of the enormous claims of the house of William Palmer and Co., closely connected with the Residency, on account of the Contingent, so nearly approached bankruptcy, that the Nizam had to submit to what he considered the deep humiliation of relinquishing in perpetuity, for a sum of ready money equal to about sixteen years' purchase, the annual tribute for the Northern Circars due by the East India Company. This was at once a good pecuniary bargain and a political advance. By that payment the East India Company was emancipated from the legal relation of vassal to the Nizam.†

In 1853 came the crowning affliction on the Hyderabad State caused by "this incubus," as it was called by Sir Frederick Currie, one of Lord Dalhousie's Councillors. In that year the Nizam was compelled to resign the administration of some of his richest provinces into the hands of English officers, in order to provide for the regular payment of the Force which he had been improperly told by Lord Dalhousie he was bound by treaty to maintain, and for the liquidation of a debt always disputed by him, and officially acknowledged since not to have been owing. Sufficient light was not thrown upon this case of the Nizam's Berar Provinces by the partial communication of the papers to Parliament in 1854, which were calculated to persuade most readers that there really was a large balance against the Nizam; that the Hyderabad Contingent, for whose pay the debt had been incurred, was most valuable to the Nizam, and much valued by him; that the sequestration of the Berars was the only available plan for securing the debt, and the plan most advantageous for the debtor; that this was a case of consent, and not, as it really was, a case of coercion. Every one of these notions may be gathered from the Blue Book of 1854; and every one of them can be shown to be false by the best official testimony. I shall prove, in the first place, that there

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\* Papers "Nizam" (418 of 1854), p. 98.

† This relation was indicated in the forms of correspondence, the Governor-General addressing the Nizam as "your petitioner," and the Nizam replying as "our royal self." On the accession of the present Nizam's grandfather, in 1829, the Governor-General stipulated for the alteration of a style that had become quite inappropriate.

was no balance against the Nizam; secondly, that the Hyderabad Contingent was very valuable to the British Government, but not to the Nizam; and thirdly, that there was no willing consent on the part of the Nizam, who was compelled to sign the new Treaty by threats of the most formidable description.

In 1853 there was no balance against the Nizam. "I have always been of opinion," wrote Colonel Davidson, Resident at Hyderabad in 1860, "that had the pecuniary demands of the two Governments been impartially dealt with, we had no just claim against the Nizam." "In 1853," he repeats, "we had little or no claim against the Nizam."\* In 1853 there was, in fact, a disputed balance-sheet. The balance of £430,000 which was demanded, was made out by debiting the Nizam with cash payments from our Treasury for the Hyderabad Contingent, while refusing to credit him with sums due by our Government on other accounts. Interest, first at 12 and afterwards at 6 per cent., on all our advances, formed nearly a quarter of the claim. The principal of the Nizam's counter-claim, without any calculation of interest, was more than the whole charge against him. At the time when the Nizam's Government was being pressed most severely for arrears on account of the Contingent, the Nawab Sooraj-ool-Moolk, then Minister, urged in a letter to the Resident, dated 19th August, 1851, that the *abkaree*, or excise revenue, of the towns of Secunderabad and Jaulna, amounting to about one lakh of rupees yearly, which the British Government had arbitrarily appropriated for forty-one years, should be transferred to the Nizam's credit as a set-off against the demand that was then being so strongly pressed. The unpublished despatches referring to this considerable and confessedly well-founded claim, appear to consist of the Resident's despatches to the Government of India, No. 166 of 2nd September, 1851, and No. 118 of 27th August, 1853.† But no set-off, or inquiry as to a set-off, was tolerated by Lord Dalhousie; although subsequently, under Lord Canning's Government, the *abkaree*, or excise revenue, of Secunderabad and Jaulna "was prospectively allowed to be a portion of the legitimate revenue of the Hyderabad State."‡

The Hyderabad Contingent was valuable to the British Government, not to the Nizam. The services which the British Government, under Article 3 of the Treaty of 1853, undertook to perform,

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\* Papers, "The Deccan" (338 of 1867), pp. 27, 28.

† See foot note to Colonel Davidson's letter to Government of India of 12th October, 1860. Papers, "The Deccan" (338 of 1867), p. 27.

‡ Papers, "The Deccan" (338 of 1867), p. 27.

by means of the Contingent, it was already bound, under Article 17 of the Treaty of 1800, to perform by means of the Subsidiary Force.\*

It is a simple fact that the British Government used the Contingent, separately paid for by the Nizam, as the chief weapon to perform those military duties which were obligatory on the Subsidiary Force; and it was in consequence of this that the Subsidiary Force was for many years considerably reduced in strength, affording a large pecuniary saving to the British Government. This fact, also, was noticed by Major Moore in his Minute of 7th November, 1853, already quoted. He observed that, relying upon the Contingent for preserving tranquillity in this State, the British Government had "disregarded its own engagements," and that "the number of troops" (the Subsidiary Force) "kept up" by the British Government "within the Hyderabad territory for the last thirty years" was "more than one-fourth less than the number for which it had contracted, and received payment in advance," under the Treaty of 1800.†

The Force, called until 1853 "the Nizam's Army," for which the Nizam up to that year had been expected to pay monthly in cash, and for which, under the Treaty of that year, he was compelled to provide [by a territorial assignment, had been maintained for thirty years, *with the corrupt connivance of the Nizam's Minister*, not for the benefit of the Hyderabad State, but for the benefit of the British Government. The fact that these troops were kept up solely for the relief of the British Government, was decently veiled so long as they were supposed to be the Nizam's troops. But by their conversion into a British Contingent, for which the Nizam was made to pay, the services to be performed by the British Subsidiary Force, under Article 17 of the Treaty of 1800, in return for a valuable equivalent, were openly shifted to the shoulders of the Nizam. The unauthorised imposition for so many years of our own burden on our weak ally, was revealed in the very words which authorised the imposition in the Treaty of 1853. In summing up the beneficial results of the new Treaty, as it appeared to him, to

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\* See the Dissents of General Caulfield, Major Moore, and Colonel Sykes, M.P., in the Court of Directors, "Papers, Nizam" (234 of 1859), pp. 5, 11, 13, 21. See also Lord Dalhousie's admissions, "Papers, Nizam" (418 of 1854), pp. 112, 151.

† Papers, "Nizam" (234 of 1859), pp. 4, 5. The saving to the British Government in thirty years, by this "disregard of its engagements," at the Nizam's expense, must have exceeded 2,000,000 sterling, or about four times the pecuniary claim brought against the Nizam in 1853.

both parties, Lord Dalhousie makes this very clear. "The Nizam," he said, "obtains by the Treaty a renewal of the obligations by which the British Government bound itself fifty years ago, to protect him against all external enemies and all internal dangers."\* What advantage to the Nizam could there be in a "renewal" of those obligations, if they had been fairly and continuously fulfilled? The very word "renewal" betrays a sense of some default, suspension, or evasion.

"On the other hand," continues the Governor-General, "the Government of India, for its part," "obtains a formal recognition of the Contingent Force, and its establishment upon a definite footing, as an auxiliary body of troops supplied by the British Government, and wholly under its authority, instead of being, as heretofore, a foreign force, nominally belonging to his Highness the Nizam. It obtains by the assignment of districts positive security for the payment of the Contingent Force and other charges."†

The advantage of what Lord Dalhousie calls a "formal recognition of the Contingent," and its being placed "on a definite footing," was even more distinctly acknowledged in a Minute by one of the Members of Council, Sir Frederick Currie. "I have always felt," he said, "the difficulty of the position in which we should be placed if the Nizam were to *fall back upon the Treaties*, and call upon us to explain by what authority, and on what grounds, we had organized in his name this costly army, and imposed this incubus upon the revenues of his State."‡

The Nizam gave no willing consent to this Treaty of 1853, whereby the "authority" for this "costly incubus," which Sir Frederick Currie saw was wanting, was given, and whereby his Highness also resigned the administration of some of his finest provinces, including Berar, into the hands of British officers. He was coerced into signing the Treaty. Against the account of advances made for the pay of the Contingent, the Hyderabad State desired to set, as I have just explained, an account of some of its legitimate revenue that had been collected and withheld for many years by the British Government. No plea of set-off was listened to, and a distress was put in, embittered by terms of menace and insult. Lord Dalhousie, in the process of enforcing this most inequitable pecuniary claim—most inequitable, even if the

\* Papers, "Nizam" (418 of 1854), pp. 151.

† Papers, "Nizam" (418 of 1854), p. 151.

‡ Papers, "Nizam" (418 of 1854), p. 141.

Nizam's large counter-claims were excluded—had written personally to the Nizam, on the 6th of June, 1851, telling him, quite erroneously, that the Hyderabad State was bound to maintain the Contingent "by the stipulations of existing Treaties;" reminding him that it was dangerous "to provoke the resentment of the British Government," "whose power can crush you at its will," and warning him that "the independence of his sovereignty" stood in "imminent danger." The Persian words, "*pāemāl kardan*," that were used in the letter to represent "crush you," mean "trample into dust." It would have been difficult to choose a phrase more insulting and more exasperating. In the same letter, the Nizam was advised to disband "those turbulent mercenaries the Arab soldiery," and to make a great effort for "the early liquidation of the accumulated debt." If the Nizam were unable to meet the call on his treasury, he must "forthwith make over" to the British Government certain frontier districts.\*

Thus the Governor-General's direct application to the Nizam, which was the origin and basis of all the subsequent proceedings, conveyed an assertion of Treaty rights as untruthful as it was absolute, and backed the inaccurate assertion by insult and intimidation. That erroneous assertion was never withdrawn by Lord Dalhousie, although he afterwards confidentially confessed its complete inaccuracy.

I have said that Lord Dalhousie erroneously represented to the Nizam that the Hyderabad State was bound to maintain the Contingent "by the stipulations of existing Treaties." That this representation was inaccurate can be proved from Lord Dalhousie's own mouth. In 1851, in his letter addressed personally to the Nizam, the Governor-General insists that "the efficient maintenance of the force is a duty imposed on the Government of Hyderabad by the stipulations of existing Treaties;" and again, that it is "necessary to fulfil the obligations of Treaties."† In 1853—having in the meanwhile, we may suppose, examined more carefully the documents bearing on the case—he arrived at a different result. "I have found myself forced," he says, "to the conclusion that the Government of India *has no right whatever, either by the spirit or by the letter of the Treaty of 1800*, to require the Nizam to maintain the Contingent in its present form." And again, in the same Minute he says: "I, for my part, can never consent, as an honest man, to instruct the Resident to reply, that the Contin-

\* Papers, "Nizam" (418 of 1854), pp. 40, 43.

† Papers, "Nizam Depts," (418 of 1854), p. 41.

gent has been maintained by the Nizam, from the end of the war in 1817 till now, because the Treaty of 1800 obliges his Highness so to maintain it. Neither the words nor the intention of the Treaty can be held to warrant such a construction of its obligations."\* But he had already forced "such a construction" upon the Nizam in terms of insult and menace. And although Lord Dalhousie felt himself called upon, "as an honest man," to place his altered opinion on record *in secret*, he did not feel himself called upon, "as an honest man," to give any hint of it to the Nizam at Hyderabad. In the course of the renewed pressure of 1853, the bold assertions and threatening language of 1851 were allowed to operate unchanged.

It was only under the influence of intimidation, produced by the announcement that military coercion, with all its manifest consequences, was imminent, that the Nizam consented to sign the Treaty of 1853. And yet in his despatches describing the negotiations of 1853, the Resident, Colonel Low, does not mention any menace of military coercion. In one of his Minutes on the subject, dated 30th March, 1853, Lord Dalhousie said, that in the event of the Nizam refusing to make the territorial assignment that was demanded, it would be necessary "to enter upon military occupation of those districts."† But there is no official record of any such menace having been used by the Resident, while the menace that was actually used, though not recorded, was one of a much more alarming nature. Not officially, not openly, but in a private and familiar note, the Nizam was informed that unless he at once consented to sign the new Treaty, orders would be given for the advance of British troops, not merely into the districts that were wanted, but also *into his capital*. In his despatch of the 19th of May, 1853, announcing that the Nizam had at last consented to sign the Treaty, Colonel Low mentions a note dated the 14th of that month, which was "sent in original to the Nizam by the Minister," when it was the Resident's object "to impress the mind of the Nizam with the belief that farther unnecessary delays in settling the matter, one way or other, would not be permitted."‡ A careful perusal of the private note (hitherto unpublished) to which the Resident thus briefly alludes, is, however, necessary in order to make its coercive efficacy fully intelligible. It is addressed by the Assistant

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\* Nizam's Debts (418 of 1854), pp. 100, 111.

† Papers, "Nizam," (418 of 154) p. 113.

‡ Papers, "Nizam," (415 of 1854) pp. 132, 133.

Resident, Captain Davidson (afterwards Colonel and Resident) to the Nizam's Minister, the Nawab Suraj-ool-Moolk, uncle of the present Minister, the Nawab Sir Salar Jang. It runs thus :—

MY DEAR NAWAB,—I believe the Resident requires your attendance this evening, to inform you his negotiations with the Nizam are at an end, and he applies to the Governor-General to move troops by to-day's post.

His Highness asked for four months' delay, which was refused, not even in that time positively stipulating to pay the troops. Had he, however, done so, this would have been refused, as contrary to the instructions of the Governor-General.

His Highness next offered to place forty lakhs of talooks\* in the hands of Shums-ool-Oomra for the pay of the Contingent. The Resident said, No, as he could not be assured that there would be no interference on the part of his Highness's Government, or his other officers; but if the talooks were made over to the Resident and Shums-ool-Oomra, or any other officer of the Hyderabad Government as Commissioners—they to have the entire management and control of these districts, only furnishing accounts yearly to his Highness—he would refer the propositions to Calcutta, but without the slightest expectation that the Governor-General would agree to it.

His Highness has refused to agree to the above, and therefore he has lost a chance of obtaining a remission of what was disagreeable to his ideas of dignity. The terms first proposed are now renewed, and with an unfriendly feeling that would, in my opinion, drive matters to extremities. Indeed, I have a letter from my nephew at Poona, mentioning that the 78th Highlanders and H.M.'s 86th Regiment, have received orders to be in readiness to march on Hyderabad. Don't suppose military operations will be confined to the Districts; and if you are a friend of his Highness, beg of him to save himself and his dignity by complying at once with what the Governor-General will most assuredly compel him to accede to.

(Signed) . CUTH. DAVIDSON.

*Hyderabad, May 14th, 1853.*

The meaning of "military operations" not being "confined to the Districts," was that the city of Hyderabad would be occupied by British troops. Then the Nizam and his advisers saw that he had before him the choice of signing the treaty or being dethroned. They understood perfectly, and so did the Resident, that it must come to that. Hence, Captain Davidson's warning that only "by complying at once" can the Nizam "save himself and his dignity." The Nizam's Government was not as strong in 1853, nor was Hyderabad as orderly, as they have become during the twenty years' administration of the Nawab Salar Jung. Without counting the armed men in a fortified city of 200,000 inhabitants, where almost every man was armed, Hyderabad was full of those



"turbulent mercenaries"—a very much over-abused class—whom our Government, as they, of course, were well aware, was urging the Nizam to disband. They knew that military occupation meant not only the loss of their bread, but the loss of their hard-earned savings. For the Arab soldiery—sober, steady men, whose great characteristics were faithfulness and thrift—were the greatest money-lenders in Hyderabad, and after their expulsion by British power they would obviously have had great difficulty in collecting their little accounts. Their leaders would certainly have taken every advantage of Mussulman fanaticism and general excitement to have one last despairing struggle before they submitted to the loss of their homes, and of all that they possessed. Although the city could not have resisted a British force for six hours, it would not have been occupied without a contest. The first shot fired from the walls, the first drop of blood shed, would in those days, so far as we can argue from the general tone and temper of Lord Dalhousie's administration, have cost the Nizam his throne. It would certainly have been worse than useless for him to plead that he could not control the unruly rabble of his capital. If, as might easily have been the case, a great number of the combatants had been proved to be in his own pay, his conduct would have been stigmatized as gross and infamous treachery. It would have gone hard with him.

Thanks to the good sense, patience, and prudence of the Hyderabad Court, the crisis was got over without any collision or any resistance to the mandate of our Government, which was, nevertheless, most repugnant to the Nizam's feelings, which he opposed as long as he could, and to which he only submitted at last, in the words of Colonel Davidson, when Resident at Hyderabad, under the influence of those "objurgations and threats,"\* the true nature and full extent of which are now, I believe, for the first time made public.

Although the Contingent was kept up on an excessively expensive scale, as every Governor-General and every Resident admitted;—although it was more valuable, both for service and patronage, to our Government than to that of Hyderabad; still it may be urged, as it has been, that the Nizam believed the force to be valuable to him; that he acquiesced in its maintenance, and objected to its disbandment. There are assumptions and suggestions to this effect scattered all through the Blue Books, all of which, however, are falsified and nullified

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\* Papers, "The Deccan" (368 of 1867), p. 26.

if we trace the growth of this "inexpensive addition to our strength," as the Marquis of Hastings called it, this "joint concern between Rajah Chundoo Loll and us," according to Lord Metcalfe, in which the Nizam was never allowed to have any part or voice. In a despatch dated the 26th of July, 1842, the Resident, General Fraser, warns our Government that "besides other evils which may arise," if the Nizam be allowed to feel that he is really independent, "we shall experience one of great magnitude, in a proposition on the part of his Highness for the disbandment of the Contingent, to which he is known to be averse, and of which neither the continued maintenance, nor the original organization, are provided by any existing Treaty."\*

We may be referred, however, to that alleged "expression of the Nizam's wishes," adduced with so much satisfaction by Lord Dalhousie in his minute of January 8th, 1852—a letter of the Dewan Sooraj-ool-Moolk to the Resident, dated 19th November, 1851, communicating the Nizam's orders for the reduction of certain troops, "exclusive of the Sarf-i-khass and the Contingent, which, in conformity with orders, are to remain fixed and determined as at present." This, according to Lord Dalhousie, represented the Nizam's "wishes," "formally stated," "without any solicitation."† That last word is quite true; there was nothing like "solicitation" on the part of Lord Dalhousie. There was no "solicitation" in his letter of the 6th June, 1851, when he told the Nizam that the Hyderabad State was bound to maintain the Contingent "by the stipulations of existing Treaties;" that it was "necessary to fulfil the obligations of Treaties;" that "the efficient maintenance" of this force was "essential" as "the main support on which depended the stability of his throne," reminding his Highness at the same time that it was "dangerous to provoke the resentment of the British Government," "whose power could crush him," and warning him that "the independence of his sovereignty was exposed to imminent danger."‡ This was not a "solicitation;" it was an irresistible command. His "wishes" were not consulted, it was "in conformity with orders" that the Nizam then, and throughout the subsequent coercive negotiations, made no dispute as to the maintenance of the Contingent.

It is very true that Lord Dalhousie, while withholding the

\* Papers, "Nizam" (234 of 1850), p. 7.

† Papers, "Nizam" (418 of 1854) p. 92.

‡ Papers, "Nizam" (418 of 1854), pp. 4, 43.

knowledge of his altered views, "as an honest man," regarding the Treaty obligations, had anticipated the possibility of the Nizam venturing to ask that the Contingent should be disbanded, and had told Colonel (afterwards General Sir John) Low, the Resident, what he was, in such a case, to say. Therefore, in confirmation of the Governor-General's erroneous but very efficacious declaration, the Resident warned the Nizam that if the Contingent were disbanded, he would "be deprived of support against the Arabs, Sikhs, Rohillas, and other unruly tribes scattered through his Highness's territory," and that the Subsidiary Force would "not perform all these duties hitherto discharged by the Contingent.\* Do you think," said Colonel Low to the Nizam, "that the Arabs and Rohillas, and Sikhs, and other plunderers, and many evil disposed men in your country would let you collect your revenues quietly, if they were not overawed by the presence in your territories of the Contingent?"† To give some body and weight to this argument, Lord Dalhousie made a distinction—totally unfounded and unwarranted under the terms of the Treaty of 1800, a figment entirely of his own ingenuity—between "occasions of importance" when the Subsidiary Force was to act, and duties of less moment which it was not bound to perform.‡ The Nizam was told that he was bound by treaty, which was untrue, to maintain the Contingent, and he was told, which was likewise untrue, that the duties performed by the Contingent were not such duties as devolved properly on the Subsidiary Force. Thus, the Nizam was given to understand, over and above Lord Dalhousie's intimidation, and irrespective of the military spur ultimately applied in Colonel Davidson's private note, that if he gave up the Contingent he would practically lose all military protection whatever, and all the benefits of the Treaty of 1800. The Nizam, therefore, did not venture to touch on the subject, further than to put the case hypothetically, when pressed hard by Colonel Low, in the words, "Suppose I were to declare that I don't want the Contingent at all."§ This unguarded exclamation, "in an angry tone of voice," was, as Colonel Low narrates, answered by him "instantly," with the announcement, that even disbandment would not obviate what the Nizam dreaded more than anything, the compulsory assignment of

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\* Papers, "Nizam" (418 of 1854), p. 112.

† Papers, "Nizam" (418 of 1854), p. 112.

‡ Papers, "Nizam" (418 of 1854), p. 112.

§ Papers, "Nizam" (418 of 1854) p. 126.

territory; while the Resident's previous discourses, following Lord Dalhousie's threatening diatribe, had convinced the Nizam that the choice by him of disbandment would be held as an abrogation of the general guaranty of complete protection under the Treaty of 1800. In a letter from the Government of India to the Resident at Hyderabad, dated 13th of February, 1867, in reply to an argument submitted by Nawab Salar Jung, as Minister of Hyderabad, drawn from the compulsion to which the Nizam had been subjected, it is asserted that the British Government gave his Highness "the option either to see the Contingent disbanded, or to assign lands to cover its expenses," and that "of the two alternatives, he voluntarily elected the assignment of lands."\*

But this is all wrong. The Nizam was allowed no such option. In any case the assignment of lands was made indispensable. The alternative offered him in 1853 was either to disband the Contingent and to assign lands for "some years" during the reduction, or to maintain the Contingent, and to assign lands "merely for a time," for its maintenance. Colonel Low told the Nizam that in reducing the Contingent, and providing for the soldiers who had been "disciplined and commanded by British officers," "some years might elapse," and that "we must still have command temporarily of districts for their regular payment."† This was, indeed, the very feature in the terms held out that Lord Dalhousie thought would be likely to induce the Nizam to accept the Treaty of 1853 in the form in which it was finally offered, without electing for the abolition of the Contingent. "I am not without hope," said the Governor-General, in his Minute of the 30th of March, 1853, "that the prospect of the loss of the Contingent Force, hitherto upheld under the countenance of the British Government, and the necessity of still making over districts temporarily into our hands, may induce his Highness to consent to the engagement into which we have proposed to him to enter."‡

Without a positive assurance that the districts were only to be made over "temporarily into our hands," not even the menace of military coercion would have induced the Nizam "to consent to the engagement." Lord Dalhousie's original design and primary object were to obtain the districts in full sovereignty, or in per-

\* Papers, "Cession of Berar" (29 of 1867), p. 20.

† Papers, "Nizam" (418 of 1854), p. 125.

‡ Papers, "Nizam" (418 of 1854), p. 113.

petual assignment ; \* but the aversion of the Nizam was found to be insurmountable. The termination of the struggle on this fundamental point is thus described by the British plenipotentiary, Colonel Low. " Finding that the Nizam's dislike to the word 'in perpetuity' was extreme, and fearing that the whole negotiation might fail if I insisted on that word, I announced that that was a part of the scheme which my Government had allowed me the liberty to alter if necessary ; and I announced formally that, if his Highness wished it, the districts might be made over merely for a time, to maintain the Contingent as long as he might require it."† This was the understanding on which the Nizam signed the Treaty of 1853. But for this understanding, "the whole negotiation," as Colonel Low saw, would have failed, and although coercion might have been applied by Lord Dalhousie at any stage of the transaction, it would not have been easy to give an aspect of equity or decency to it. To have taken military possession, without the sanction of a Treaty or Convention, without any declaration or ground of war, of provinces belonging to a protected and submissive ally, would have raised an odious political scandal, of which even Lord Dalhousie probably was by no means unaware. Such a lawless proceeding might, indeed, have been disguised and covered up by the smoke and fire of a collision provoked by the occupation of the capital city, as threatened in Colonel Davidson's private note. Whether any calculation or speculation of that nature entered into the programme of 1853 or not, we may give credit to Lord Dalhousie for having been very anxious to avoid violent measures. manifold considerations led the Indian Government of those days to give way before the Nizam's persistent contention that there should be nothing of "perpetuity" or "permanence" in the letter or spirit of the documents assigning his provinces to British administration as security for the pay of the Contingent. There can be no excuse for the Indian Government of these days assuming or asserting that there is an inherent character of "perpetuity" or "permanence" in documents from which that character was expressly excluded.

Not merely were all words implying "permanence" kept out of the notes and treaties of 1853 and 1860, but the Nizam Nasir-ood-Dowla in 1853, and his successor, the Nizam Afzul-ood-Dowla, in

\* Paragraphs 25, 28, 33, 41, of the Minute of 30th March, 1853 : Papers "Nizam" (418 of 1854), pp. 105, 107, 110.

†Papers "Nizam" (418 of 1854), p. 122.

1860, firmly objected to any forms or instruments of administration that might suggest permanence or impede restitution. One of the Nizam's districts assigned in 1853 could most conveniently have been made over to the Bombay Government, but "an arrangement of that description would have the appearance," the Minister said, "of such districts having been made over in perpetuity." "In consequence of these feelings on the part of the native Government," says Colonel Low, "I wrote the concluding part of the 6th Article in the following terms—'to the exclusive management of the British Resident for the time being at Hyderabad, and to such other officers, acting under his orders, as may, from time to time, be appointed by the Government of India, to the charge of those districts.' "\*"

Although strongly pressed by the British Government during the negotiation of the Treaty of 1860—whereby some of the Assigned Districts were restored to him, and the debt, never due, was wiped out—the Nizam was inflexibly opposed to any change in the peculiar tenure under which the Berar districts, still to be left under British management, were held and administered. The Government of India was desirous of placing them in charge of the Commissioner of Nagpore, but gave way "on the ground of an apprehension that the true and complete reservation of his Highness's sovereignty over the retained districts might, by his acceptance of that part of the proposal, become questionable."† The districts of Berar, therefore, were left in charge of the Resident at the Nizam's Court. The Government of India, during the negotiation of the new Treaty, emphatically declared in a letter to the Resident, dated the 5th of September, 1860, that it would "hold this territory, as it has hitherto held the whole of the Assigned Districts, not in sovereignty, but in trust for his Highness, so long as the Contingent is kept up and no longer," and that "the alienation of this portion of the dominions of his Highness is temporary only, and for a special purpose" (the pay of the Contingent) "conducive chiefly to the security of the Hyderabad State, and to the preservation of tranquillity throughout its limits,"‡—for which objects, as already shown, the British Force at Secunderabad had been provided and amply subsidised under

\* Papers, "Nizam" (418 of 1854), p. 135.

† Papers, "Hyderabad Assigned Districts" (338 of 1867), p. 35.

‡ Papers, "Hyderabad Assigned Districts" (338 of 1867), p. 20.

the Treaty of 1800. These Assigned Districts of Berar "will still form," it was said in the same despatch, "an integral part of the Nizam's Dominions and will be restored to his Highness entire, whenever it shall seem fit to the two Governments to terminate the engagement under which the Contingent is kept up."\*

"Serving and suffering," says Bishop Hall, "are the best tutors to Government." History tells us that a small and weak State is not necessarily ruined, or even subjected to permanent loss, by the oppression of a powerful neighbour or grasping Suzerain. Prussia released herself from feudalism, and learned to organise her strength and her intelligence, under the cruel pressure of French conquest. The rebuke and the stimulus came at a happy crisis, and enabled Stein and Scharnhorst to effect fiscal and administrative reforms, that might have occupied generations, in five years.

There can, of course, be no comparison, between the relation occupied by France under the Great Napoleon towards Prussia and the Confederation of the Rhine, and that of the British Government towards the allied and protected States of India. France, during the Napoleonic ascendancy, was a conquering Power, with no superiority of intellect or culture, with no apparent object but that of drawing as deeply as possible on the resources of every State under its domination. In India the British Government by the logic of facts, by common consent, and in a great measure by express compact, has acquired Imperial supremacy over all the Indian States, and holds, with general acquiescence, and great political advantage, the position of Teacher among Pupils. The lessons that our Government has given to the Native States, by precept, by example, by temporary management, and even by a supervision that may not have always been sufficiently tolerant, and by penalties not always equitable, have on the whole been beneficial. But it is one great qualification and duty of the Teacher to know when a lesson has been effectual, to recognise the progress that has been made by the Pupil, and to relax restraint that has ceased to be efficient because it has ceased to be just.

The administrative condition of the Hyderabad State was unquestionably most miserable in 1853 through our own conduct, and the severe mortification arising from the distraint on the Berar Provinces appears to have been most salutary. Almost immediately

\* Papers, "Hyderabad Assigned Districts" (1836 of 1867), p. 21.

after the execution of the Treaty of 1853, the Nizam's Minister, Sooraj-ool-Moolk, died, and was succeeded by his nephew, the Nawab Salar Jung, who at once entered upon a course of administrative reconstruction and regulation, that has produced beneficial results of the most remarkable nature. The efforts necessary to replace by economy and new resources the revenue lost by the assignment of these Provinces, and to provide for the higher class of public servants displaced by British administration, gave an extraordinary stimulus to reform in the Nizam's Dominions. On the restoration of the districts of Nuldroog and Raichore, under the Treaty of 1860, it was obviously the policy of the Nawab Salar Jung to justify that concession, and to strengthen the claim to a complete restoration, by proving that the restored Provinces would lose nothing by re-transfer to the rule of their own Sovereign. Proof to that effect has been amply furnished. If the Berar districts have prospered under British management, the territories left in charge of the Nizam's Government have prospered in at least an equal degree. Whether tested by the spontaneous growth of revenue, by orderly conduct and absence of crime among the inhabitants, and by the general evidence of their well-being and contentment, the Provinces administered by the Nawab Salar Jung have made quite as marked an advance as those under the Berar Commission, of which the British Resident at Hyderabad is the head. A great lesson has been learned; great progress has been made; and apart from all consideration of the original grounds of restraint, the time has clearly arrived for a generous and politic relaxation.

The Nizam, as we have seen, was persuaded to avoid the open scandal of compulsion in 1853, by an understanding, without which, as Colonel Low said, "the whole negotiation would have failed," that the district might be made over "merely for a time," "to maintain the Contingent as long as he might require it." "Some years" must elapse, Colonel Low told his Highness, before the provinces, the immediate possession of which Lord Dalhousie would not forego, could be released from sequestration, even if the Nizam insisted on the Contingent being broken up. In the same way, the Nizam knew very well that "some years" must elapse before the affairs of the Hyderabad State could be placed on so sound a footing as to enable him to say that he did not require the Contingent any longer, and to make any large payment, or offer any tangible security, in lieu of the districts, on account of the alleged debt of about half-a-million sterling. The situation, however, improved more rapidly than he had expected.



A very few years of enlightened, firm, and conscientious rule, not only sufficed "to avert the crash," and "to avert from the Nizam the fate which," according to Lord Dalhousie's benevolent anticipation, was pretty sure to "overtake him,"\* but sufficed to implant and spread abroad peaceful and orderly habits among every class of the population. By the year 1860, the internal condition of the Hyderabad territories had been very greatly changed for the better since Colonel Low reminded the Nizam of "the Arabs, Rohillas, Sikhs, and other evil-disposed men," who interfered with the quiet collection of the revenue. The country is no longer infested with any of those predatory bands. In the Annual Report of the Resident for 1869-70, the marvellous improvements effected even so far back as 1860 are thus described :—

"Not only was the public treasury full, but the annual income of the State exceeded the annual expenditure by about eight lakhs of rupees (£80,000), while the credit of the Government stood proportionately high. Owing chiefly to the abolition of the baneful system of former times, by which the collection of the revenue was farmed out to contractors, disturbances in the interior of the country had become rare. The Hyderabad Contingent had not fired a shot, except on its own parade-grounds, since the suppression of the mutinies."

If ever there was a time when the stability of the Nizam's Government, and the welfare of his people were mainly secured, as was pretended, by the Hyderabad Contingent, that time has gone by. Whatever doubt may have existed formerly, it is now manifest to all India that the Contingent is not of the slightest use to the Hyderabad State. By the coercive and arbitrary transactions of 1853 and 1860, that Force has been converted, without disguise, without excuse, and without palliation, into what it was, under the deceptive form of "the Nizam's Army," proclaimed to be by Lord Hastings, "an inexpensive addition to our military strength."

Relying on the understanding with Colonel Low that the districts were only made over "temporarily," "merely for a time, to maintain the Contingent as long as he might require it," the two successive Nizams and the co-Regent and Minister, during the minority of the reigning Prince, have made repeated applications for the restitution of the Berars, offering other securities of undoubted sufficiency, for the performance of any engagements, and the payment of any

charges, that might, after fair consideration, be imposed on the Hyderabad State. Those applications have not, it is understood, been graciously received, or even fairly met. And on that part of the subject, as already proposed, more will be said on a future occasion. The seizure of the Provinces was an act of high-handed violence, and their retention has become a scandal to the British name, which the nation must remove, since the Indian Bureaucracy never will.

## HOME AND FOREIGN AFFAIRS.

It was not to be supposed that a Government which was content to retain Sir Bartle Frere on the scene of his bloodshedding in South Africa, would have the courage to do the thing that is *right* in Afghanistan. And not having the courage to do that which is right (morally) they, as a matter of necessity, are doing that which is clearly wrong, on the lower ground of expediency. The fact is that, however good may be the intentions of Mr. Gladstone and his colleagues, they threaten to become barren of good fruit from an initial misunderstanding of their position. We speak, of course, with exclusive reference to foreign policy. That portion of the nation which placed our present Ministry in power, believed that we (*i.e.*, the British nation), had not merely errors to correct, but that gigantic wrongs had been done in our name which we were bound to acknowledge, and so far as was still possible, repair. The battle of the polls was fought out upon moral issues. So long as they were out of office, the members of the present Government were as emphatic in insisting upon this as any people in the country; no sooner are they clothed in the garments of officialism, than they seem to wish to ignore it. And why? Because to continue to acknowledge it, would be to pronounce an official condemnation upon the acts and policy of their predecessors. There are, of course, many (so-called) reasons which may be urged in favour of such conduct. It is in entire accordance with the etiquette of our constitutional system, and is, indeed, merely an expression of that poisonous insincerity which pervades the whole of our political life. But its effect, at the present moment, is almost to paralyze the action of the existing Government, as may be clearly seen in the case of Afghanistan. We may take it for granted that no people in the United Kingdom would be so glad to see "a strong, friendly, and independent Afghanistan" fashion itself out of the existing anarchy, as Mr. Gladstone and his colleagues. But there is only one way in which we can hope to regain the confidence and the friendship of the Afghans, and that is by frankly acknowledging that a wrong has been done to them. It is monstrous to suppose that we can carry fire and sword amid a brave and unoffending people, and, as soon as we find the work of devastation too expensive to be pursued any further, can soothe their just hatred, and recover their friendship by simply expressing a wish to do so. This, however, is the fatuous undertaking which the present Government is trying to accomplish, at a cost to the Empire of a million a month; because it dare not, even indirectly, pass judgment upon

the morality of the policy which, none the less, it desires to reverse. Nations resent injuries as individuals resent them; and who ever heard of an individual trusting one who had deeply injured him, but had never made confession of the wrong. It is quite possible that the Afghans would continue to distrust us, even if we had the courage to make public confession of the wrong we have done to them; but it is absolutely certain that, without such a confession, they must hate and distrust us for ever. Without such a confession the endeavour to set up a stable government in Afghanistan, is akin to squaring the circle, or any other fantastic and impossible endeavour. Surely even what Carlyle calls "an official personage having the honour to be," must have sufficient sense left in him to perceive that our *protégé*, whoever he be, must, by that very fact, become as odious to the Afghans as we are ourselves. Consequently it is impossible that he should remain in power for a single instant after our patronage is withdrawn. This remark is of special importance, in reference to what Lord Hartington recently said on the setting up of Candahar as an independent state. Though he himself objected to any such arrangement, he said he might be driven into an acquiescence in it, because "engagements which have been entered into, and to which the honour of the country is pledged, must be respected." How glibly do these official personages roll off such high sounding phrases, as "the honour of the country;" and what strange interpretations they attach to them. The "honour of the country," it would seem, is not tarnished when Sir Bartle Frere is allowed to remain in a position of official eminence. But the "honour of the country" may be tarnished, if we fail to dismember an independent state. The fact is, that here, as in the case of South Africa, the Government are desirous to do the thing that is right, but they are still more desirous not to breach the divinity which hedges in "official personages having the honour to be," by censuring the acts of their predecessors in office. When Lord Hartington used the phrase "honour of the country," what he really meant was this—"If we can retire from Candahar without seeming directly to censure our predecessors, we shall do so; if not, not." Now to erect Candahar into that ridiculous contradiction, an "independent state under British protection," is all one as to annex Afghanistan. The attempt, at least, to accomplish the latter will be deferred for a few years. For a creature set up by us to rule in Candahar, will have no more power, unborrowed from ourselves, than a creature set up by us in Cabul. Either we shall have to support him with a brigade of British troops, in which case he will be a ruler only in name, or he will instantly cease to exist. If ever a question needed to be examined in the dry light of facts, purged, as far as possible, from the discolouring haze of official verbiage, it is this question of the policy that shall be adopted in Afghanistan. The very existence of our Indian Empire depends upon it. The foundations of that Empire are already undermined, in consequence of the vast rapacity, the stupid arrogance, and the huge blunders which have marked our administration. A comparatively trifling error would now suffice to bring about a collapse. Certainly any policy requiring us to remain in Afghanistan would

do so; and yet, here we have Lord Hartington placidly informing the nation that the "honour of the country" may be pledged to execute the "happy despatch" upon itself, and if so, that the thing must of course be done. For those who know, from personal experience, the situation both in India and Afghanistan, it is impossible to read Lord Hartington's latest exposition of the policy of Government without impatience. There is nothing for us to do in Afghanistan, except to march out of it at the earliest possible date. Our operations in that country have divided it into three sections. The Turkestan provinces are ruled by Abd-al-Rahman Khan; the southern parts of Afghanistan by Eyoub Khan, from Herat; and all the country between Ghuznee and the Khyber Pass by the chiefs of the "great tribes," in the name of Musa Khan. Our business is, not to waste our strength in a fruitless attempt to unite those three kingdoms into one, but simply to acknowledge their existence, and fashion our policy accordingly. The bulk of our troops are at present quartered in the country of the "great tribes." It is with them that we are in contact; and it is with their chiefs that all arrangements should be made, because no arrangements can hold good in the country governed by them, which have not received their sanction and approval. Abd-al-Rahman Khan will never come to Cabul unless he is invited thither by the chiefs of the "great tribes," and they will never invite him, if he becomes the "English Amer." Abd-al-Rahman Khan is not so blind to his own interests as to exchange his present position in order to earn the fate of Shah Soojah. The fact is, that what the Government calls its policy, is as if a man, having thrust his hand into a nest of hornets, should hesitate to withdraw it until he can do so with dignity, and without having to confess that he was a fool for having thrust it in. Sooner or later he must withdraw it, and make confession of his folly as well; meanwhile he is being stung. Such precisely is our position in Afghanistan, but instead of withdrawing, the Government, with faces of unspeakable solemnity, is considering whether the "honour of the country" be not pledged to remain among the hornets for ever.

Far more satisfactory, however, is the action of the Government in South Eastern Europe. Even here, Lord Granville's eulogies on Sir H. Layard might well have been spared. What Lord Granville calls "the great ability and unwearied industry" of this gentleman have been devoted to purposes, and exercised after a fashion, which an immense majority of the nation has emphatically condemned. And it is hard to say for what purpose these eulogies are recorded except still further to chill the popular enthusiasm for the present Government. They are, in effect, an injury and an affront to those who have worked most assiduously to bring them back to power. What renders them the more exasperating is their unmeaningness. If there be one thing more than another which Sir H. Layard has demonstrated during his residence at Constantinople, it has been his signal inability to see facts which were patent to all the world around him. Even now, when events have compelled him to acknowledge the utter paralysis which has smitten the Turkish administration throughout the Ottoman dominions, he is incapable of seeing the logical consequence of his own arguments. His despatch on the internal state of the Turkish dominions gives the picture of an administration irredeemably corrupt and inefficient. There is no government at all, but simply murder, pillage, and famine. Any one bold enough to protest against these things is immediately exiled. The utmost exertions of the British Government have not sufficed to persuade the Sultan so much as to organise an efficient gendarmerie for a single province. But Sir Henry Layard still clings to,

the "integrity of the Ottoman Empire." On no account is Armenia, or any other province, to be emancipated from this system of murder, pillage, and famine. "What," says this astonishing Ambassador, "the Armenians are entitled to, and what we have the undoubted right to demand for them, is good government." Amazing discovery! The "great abilities and unwearied industry" of Sir H. Layard have actually brought him to this profound conclusion, that the Armenians are "entitled to good government." He announces it with as grand an air as if he had discovered a new planet. Unhappily, this sapient Ambassador appears to have exhausted his entire stock of wisdom in making it. Not a suggestion has he to offer as to how this "good government" is to be obtained, except that it must on no account be obtained by allowing the Armenians to govern themselves. A similar note runs through the whole of the despatch. The Turkish Government is incurably bad, but none of the populations which suffer from its badness are to be liberated from it. What they are entitled to is good government; and what we have an unquestionable right to demand for them is, good government. This is the sum and substance of Sir H. Layard's despatch; and, perhaps, we are doing Lord Granville an injustice when we charge him with eulogising the author of it. It may well be that he was ironical only when assuring Sir H. Layard that Her Majesty's Government "fully appreciated his great abilities and unwearied industry." It is, at any rate, a subject of rejoicing that this appreciation has not debarred them from relieving this profound political thinker of his ambassadorial functions. The Greek Frontier question we may now hope is in a fair way to be settled at no distant period, and also that Montenegro will be allowed peacefully to occupy the districts ceded to her by the Treaty of Berlin. But these will leave the "Eastern Question" as far off a settlement as ever; and the only settlement that will avail anything, is the deposition of the Sultan, and the dispersion of the ring of pashas. Turkish rule can never be reformed, for the very simple and sufficient reason that there is no one to undertake the work. How, for example, is it possible to reform a Sultan? Even Sir H. Layard has had to relinquish that task in despair, while a reformed Turkey, governed by an unreformed Sultan, is an impossibility—a contradiction in terms, like a round square. The use of all such pressure as Mr. Goschen is, we presume, directed to exert at Constantinople is, that it paves the way for the ultimate deposition of the Sultan. The pressure tends to increase in proportion to the resistance it encounters, until it resolves itself into a trial of strength—Europe on the one side, and the Sultan on the other. The belief that if Europe deposed the Sultan there would be a great outburst of Moslem fanaticism, is opposed to all the antecedents of Mohammedan history. Moslem fatalism resigns itself to an accomplished fact; it very rarely endeavours to struggle against it. There was no outburst of religious fury when the Mongols burned Baghdad, and slew the last of the Abbasides; neither will there be any when the last of the Ottoman Sultans is dismissed to the obscurity of private life. "In Syria," Sir H. Layard tells us, "detestation of Constantinople rule, and a determination to cast it off, appears to form a bond of union between the (Arab) Mussulmans and the Christians. . . . The state of Arabia, according to all accounts, is very critical, and a formidable insurrection against the Turkish Government may at any moment break out." "The only hope," writes Lord Granville to Mr. Goschen, "for the maintenance of the Turkish Empire lies in a thorough and searching reform of its administration, both at the capital and in the provinces." All this means, if it mean anything, that the populations under the rule of the Sultan will very shortly take the redress of their grievances into their own hands, quite undeterred by the sacred

character supposed to attach to the Commander of the Faithful. No one can doubt it. In fact, it is only the intervention of Europe which has saved the Sultans from the wrath of their subjects, over and over again during the past half century; and the deposition of the reigning Sovereign would excite no more tumult in his dominions than did the fall of the two sovereigns who preceded him. No measure short of this can do more than advance the "Eastern Question" a little nearer to this ultimate solution.

The South African question we have discussed elsewhere. We are convinced that the Government earnestly desire to protect the native population from the tyranny of the white man; and this it is which renders their conduct so inexplicable in retaining Sir Bartle Frere at the Cape. For no colonist has shown himself capable of such injustice and cruelty towards the native population, as this "honourable" man. The very first condition towards establishing a *modus vivendi* between the two races was, obviously, the recall and disgrace of this violent and incapable High Commissioner. The popular impression appears to be that Sir Bartle Frere achieved in India a great political reputation. The fact is, that Sir Bartle Frere left that country with a reputation completely ruined. His name is associated to his discredit, with some very disgraceful episodes in the history of our connection with India; and what these were, we shall probably relate to our readers in a subsequent issue.

Turning to Home Politics, the most important subject is, without doubt, the resolution of the House of Commons to prevent Mr. Bradlaugh from taking his seat as member for Northampton. This resolution will have the consequence of precipitating the discussion of a number of questions which would otherwise have slumbered undisturbed for an indefinite period. Remembering the achievements of the late Government in general, and of Sir Stafford Northcote in particular, there is no lack of effrontery in the Tories objecting to Mr. Bradlaugh on the ground that an atheist must be a man without principles. At any rate, in that case he cannot abandon them, as is the habit of these eminently Christian opponents of his. Their Christian consciences were not revolted by a policy which sought to retain millions of brother Christians in bondage to the Moslem. Their Christian consciences rested in undisturbed serenity while fire and sword were being carried through Afghanistan and the land of the Zulus, and millions of our Indian peasantry were perishing of hunger—victims to a Brummagem Imperialism, and the worship of Jingo. But a man who does not believe in "a divinity of some kind," is what they cannot endure. Camels they can swallow; but this extremely minute gnat chokes them. The matter, of course, cannot rest where it is at present. Mr. Bradlaugh's peculiarity is that he has promulgated, in an aggressive manner, opinions which, in a less aggressive fashion, are widely prevalent at the present day. Positivists, and Agnostics of all kinds, are, by this proceeding, excluded from the House of Commons, equally with Mr. Bradlaugh, if they are equally frank in the expression of their theological convictions. Clearly the House of Commons has no power to set up a disabling test of this kind. The House is not, as many of the speakers in these debates seem to imagine, a theological debating club which can enact its own conditions of admittance. It is an assembly of the representatives of the nation, and with the nation rests the power of selecting the men who shall be its representatives. The resolution of the House of Commons is, therefore, an extra legal interference with the liberty of a constituency in choosing men to represent it in Parliament. And we earnestly trust that as such it will be instantly and warmly resented by the country. Mr. Bradlaugh, the individual

disappears, and a principle of the very highest importance is at issue between the country and the House of Commons. It is simply ridiculous to affirm that all Christians are of necessity better men than Atheists. That Sir Stafford Northcote, for example, is a man of rigid and unbending principle and honesty, while Mr. Richard Congreve is not. No man in his senses would feel confidence in the character of another, merely because that other was ready to take the oath appointed for the members of the House of Commons. And as little would anyone feel distrust of a man because he declined to take the oath, on the ground that he was a Positivist or an Agnostic. A man's character must be judged by his actions, and not by his theory of the origin of existence. At the present moment, no men are preaching a high and pure morality with such extreme earnestness as the Positivists. These are facts so obvious that no rational person would dream of denying them. The gentlemen who have excluded Mr. Bradlaugh from his seat appear to think that *their* religious susceptibilities ought to be taken into account by the constituencies when making choice of their representatives. And if any constituency fails to take account of these susceptibilities, then, that they have a right to disfranchise that constituency. For this, virtually, is what has been done. Northampton is disfranchised because certain members of the House of Commons dislike Mr. Bradlaugh's theological opinions. Is the British nation prepared to submit to such an exhibition of arbitrary power as this?

The Indian Government has put in what it calls an explanation of the missing four millions, and a marvellously lame explanation it is. Of course all these high officials are able and honourable men. All high officials are. They never fall into error from lack of understanding, and they are never actuated by motives other than a single-minded desire for the public good. It is what Mr. Arnold would call "the power, not ourselves that makes for unrighteousness," which has to be credited with all their blunders. It is really pitiful to see how appearances go against the Indian Government in the matter of these four millions, and an uncharitable world will doubtless draw uncharitable constructions from them. For example, it was about the middle of March that Sir John Strachey became aware that he had spent four millions of money which did not appear in his Budget. Now the usual time for bringing in an Indian Budget is the end of March, and if Sir John Strachey had deferred the making of his Budget statement until the ordinary time, this astounding error, omission, or whatever term we choose to apply to it, would never have occurred. But for reasons inscrutable to the unofficial mind, the Budget statement was made a full month before the ordinary time. On the 24th of February Sir John Strachey declared that there was "no reason to suppose that the (war) estimates erred on the side of being too low;" and three weeks later he had to declare that the actual expenditure was so enormously in excess of the estimates that it was quite impossible to say how much the war would cost. Now what we are required to believe is, that this mis-estimate was the result of sheer unaccountable ill-luck; that Sir John's reputation as a man of ability and of strict official honesty are alike utterly unaffected by it. Had Lord Lytton and Sir John Strachey chosen to abide the termination of the financial year, the full truth would have been known to them; a month earlier, we are requested to believe, that it was quite natural that they should not even dimly surmise it. But this is not all. In the explanation of the Indian Government, we are told that about the 14th of March "unexpected charges" of large amount came pouring into the frontier treasuries, greatly to the bewilderment and consternation of the Financial Department. No light is thrown on the



nature of these "charges;" but, judging from our own feelings, it requires a faith capable of removing mountains to believe them to have been "unexpected." The costs of a military expedition, though vast in amount, are, so far as the civil treasures are concerned, included under a very few heads. These "charges" must have had reference either to arrears of pay for troops in the field, or to commissariat or transport expenditure, and the fact of their being due must have been known to the Military Department, and by it communicated to the financial authorities when preparing the estimates. The truth, of course, is, that Sir John Strachey's "Prosperity Budget" was manufactured for electioneering purposes, and if Lord Beaconsfield's Government had been retained in office, we should in all probability have heard nothing of these missing millions to this day.



# The Statesman.

No. 1.—JUNE, 1880.

## PREFATORY NOTE.

THE STATESMAN was discontinued as a weekly paper at the end of February last, partly because the cost of the journal was found to be heavier than Mr. Knight had estimated it would be, but mainly because his health did not permit him to endure the strain which it put upon him in that form. He now resumes the publication in the form of a Monthly Review, partly out of deference to many earnest requests that he would not abandon it altogether, but continue it in such form as his health might permit; and partly because of his own personal conviction of the necessity for some such journal in the Metropolitan Press.

THE STATESMAN has a distinct *raison d'être* for its existence, and is published not as a literary speculation, but for the enforcement of principles in the conduct of home and foreign affairs, and more particularly in the administration of our great Empire in India, that seem to him and his colleagues to have fallen fatally out of sight with many of the leading journals in this Metropolis.

It is matter of no surprise to its conductors that the general Elections have resulted in driving the Beaconsfield administration from power. Whether the proverbial advantage of distance gave them a clearer political insight than was general, or from other causes, they never for an instant believed that the *Times*, the *Daily Telegraph*, the *Pall Mall Gazette*, or *Vanity Fair*, reflected either the intellectual convictions, or the conscience of the country. They never hesitated, therefore, to avow in India their full belief that the first general Election would scatter the Tory phalanx to the winds.

THE STATESMAN was established in London to be a protest against that divorce between politics and morality which characterized the statesmanship of the late Ministry, and which, unhappily, received the sanction of so many influential newspapers in the Metropolis. In opposition to such views, we hold that a statesmanship which is not instinct with morality, is written in the dust; and that the support which was given to Lord Beaconsfield's Cabinet by the journals we have named, reflects the deepest dishonour upon them as exponents of public thought. The profound conviction of our own mind is, that it is "Righteousness that exalteth a nation;" and that a course which is morally

wrong, can never be politically right. How it has come about, we are not concerned with for the moment, but the fact is too obvious to be concealed that moral considerations have lost their hold altogether of many amongst us, with the open approval of some of our most influential newspapers. We should gladly have spared the *Standard* the association of its name with this reproach, but for an article in its columns some three weeks ago, in which we read as follows :—

Earl Granville or the Marquis of Hartington would experience no difficulty in honestly accepting any amount of legislation, or public compacts, bequeathed to them by Lord Beaconsfield. They have offered to the Conservative Government only an opposition that was reasonable, measured, and in conformity with Parliamentary traditions. Can any one truthfully say that of Mr. Gladstone? He has imported into a discussion, that ought to have been purely political, so-called morally-binding considerations, which, if he is to observe any show of consistency, he will find terribly embarrassing. No man can escape from the consequences of his own previous acts of inadvertence; and Mr. Gladstone will either have to descend from his pedestal of moral superiority, or to retain that eminence in comparative isolation.

But this embarrassment will not be experienced by the Liberal Party generally. Though they naturally have not refused to avail themselves of Mr. Gladstone's emotional methods of argument, the Liberal Party, it cannot be denied, are essentially politicians. They are a composite body, no doubt; but they share in common, a considerable amount of worldly shrewdness. The men who have triumphed at the present Election do not affect to be superfine moralists. They are men of the world, good, thorough-going partisans, who, having achieved a Party object, will strive to deal with affairs of State, according to the dictates of common sense. No one need be afraid that the Liberal Party, once in office, will start a fresh anti-Turkish crusade, will work themselves into a frenzy concerning the inalienable rights of the Slavs, or will preach edifying sermons upon the good works of Russia. They will get rid of all these encumbrances, as they pass from one side of the House to the other.

No one would have been surprised at finding writing of this order in the *Pall Mall Gazette*, but it is the *Standard* that thus tells us that the great questions that have agitated men's minds in the last four years, have been "purely political," and that Mr. Gladstone's mischievous error has been the importing of "so-called moral considerations" into their discussion. Lord Granville and the Marquis of Hartington, we are assured, understand well that such considerations are out of place in politics. In our relations, for instance, with other people, it is simply embarrassing and gratuitous, to hold any other view than that "greed of material gain and fear of material loss," as the *Pall Mall Gazette* tells us, are the only considerations that can be permitted to guide us. The unsophisticated conscience of every man bears testimony against doctrines so abhorrent. They have nevertheless been preached in this Metropolis with a cynical daring that has shocked the national mind very deeply, full proof of which we see in the result of these Elections. The heart of the country has ever silently repudiated them, and it is a great moral victory that the people have achieved over the unworthy counsels of a Press that strove to mislead them.

If the *Times* had but been true to the convictions it had expressed for twenty years on the Indian Frontier question, the nation might have been saved from the policy so fatally followed by the Ministry. As late as November, 1877, it counselled the nation, as it had done for years, to "dismiss the wild idea "that it is necessary for us to go forward to meet Russian conquests." On the "North-West of India we have one of the strongest frontier lines in the world, in "the shape of high mountains pierced by passes which could be held by a

"handful of men, and offering as a second line of defence, a great river. We should be guilty of extreme indiscretion if we were to leave such a frontier, and push forward either into Beloochistan or Afghanistan. Let the great mountain chain once be passed, and we should have to go further and further in search of an ever-vanishing boundary line."

We saw with deep anxiety the journal turn its back upon itself, as the policy of the Ministry was unfolded, abandoning without scruple the convictions that it had consistently expressed for years, to follow the *Daily Telegraph*, when it found the delusions of the people too strong, as it thought, to be dispelled. Such journalism is a reproach to the Metropolis, while we have seen the *Times* illustrate it systematically in the presence of popular delusions; and the *STATESMAN* is published as a protest—that such conduct is an offence against public morals.

[SUPPLEMENTARY NOTE.—Very ugly rumours are afloat in India, as to the disappearance of certain valuable jewels from "the Mysore Treasury," which has been in the custody of our officials during the minority of the Prince, who is now within a few months of coming of age. We direct the attention of the Secretary of State for India to the scandal, which is noticed at page 50 below. —ED. S.]

## Correspondence.

## THE EXPEDITION TO BAGHDAD.

[AMONGST the insane projects that were contemplated by Lord Beaconsfield for assisting the Turk in the late war, was, as we told our readers some months ago, the expedition of 60,000 troops from India to the Euphrates, for a march thence of 900 miles, from Baghdad to Erzeroum. And many military men had not the least conception of what such an expedition really meant. When we invaded Afghanistan in 1838, the total strength of the actual *army* of invasion was but 15,000 men. But the camp-followers, without whom the army could not have made a march, were 85,000. Colonel Macgregor, who advised the sending of 60,000 men to Baghdad, had not the faintest idea of what such an expedition meant. It meant the transport of well on to a quarter of a million of men. For every *soldier* going on a distant expedition of this kind, you must count upon several camp-followers to carry the *materiel* of the army; to provision and house the troops; to attend the baggage animals; to carry the commissariat and military stores, ordnance and ammunition; ambulances, hospitals, and medical stores; forage and provender for countless mules and camels. Then there are the water-carriers for the artillery and cavalry horses; syces, drivers, and a whole staff of electricians, with telegraph posts and wires, and God only knows what. The sending of a modern European army of any size upon a distant expedition by sea in these days, with the necessary complement of artillery and stores, and all the modern appliances of war, almost defies description. To organize such an expedition by land, with complete railway communications for the transport of everything, is a gigantic undertaking: to do it by sea, as our light-hearted Premier was dreaming, would be impossible to any Power except perhaps our own; and next to impossible to us, although we have half the marine of the world at our command. We feel positively aghast at the counsels that we know to have been debated by his Government. The trumpery expedition to Abyssinia ten years ago, against a mere savage, without a serviceable gun or a rifle, cost us well on to fifteen millions sterling, and required a fleet of 200 ships for its transport. We should have wanted 1,000 to 1,500 steamers for the expedition to Baghdad, that was seriously contemplated in 1877, while the cost of it would have bankrupted both countries. The truth is, such an expedition is physically impossible, under the modern conditions of war, and had it been attempted, it would have ended in overwhelming disaster. Our brilliant Premier was courting therein a national cataclysm, in which his own sinister career would have been engulfed. Colonel Macgregor has himself at last awakened apparently to the gigantic folly in which he was to have played so prominent a part; and,

stung by the exposure of the matter in our columns three months ago, and the notice called thereto in Parliament, now sends us the following letter.—*Ed. S.*]

TO THE EDITOR OF "THE STATESMAN."

Sir,—I have just seen your article, dated 17th January, and entitled, "The Expedition to Baghdad—Colonel Macgregor's Memorandum," in which you are good enough to assume that because taking advantage of my journey through Armenia in 1876, I chose to prepare a "Memorandum on Armenia as a Theatre of War," therefore a campaign in that country against Russia was actually contemplated by Her Majesty's Ministers. With your views or your belief I have nothing to do, but you will perhaps do me the favour to give the same publicity to this letter, as you have to the article in question. My statement then is, that I was not ordered to proceed through Armenia in 1876; I was not ordered to prepare any such Memorandum; and I did undertake what you are pleased to call "this laborious task" of my "own option, and for my own amusement." Whether you believe it or not is quite a matter of no moment to me, for the above is the "truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth." There is one other point to which I may perhaps call your attention—viz., that my "Memorandum" is entitled "On Armenia as a Theatre of War." It is clear, therefore, that it does not necessarily recommend the plan of operations sketched. What it does attempt is to show that, if aid were wanted from India for a campaign in Armenia, how the Baghdad route to that province could best be utilized. As a matter of fact, I did not recommend its adoption. You proclaim your inability to believe that, unless I had been ordered to write the "Memorandum" I would "not have been at the pains to study, in all its difficult details, the topography of the country, therefore you will, I presume, be utterly unable to comprehend the following statement, which nevertheless I have no hesitation in making—viz. : It has been my invariable custom, whenever travelling in countries which may become a theatre of war in which British armies might be engaged, always to be "at the pains to study in all its difficult details, the topography of the country" I am visiting. I have submitted many such "Memoranda" as the one you now try to make capital of; scores of other officers have done likewise; and I trust both they and I will continue to do so, whenever we think our so doing may, however remotely, be of some advantage to Her Majesty's Service.—Yours faithfully,

Cabul, February 20, 1880.

C. M. MACGREGOR.

[We have a very short and simple reply to make to Colonel Macgregor, namely, that his statements do not tally either with the explanations of the Memorandum given by Ministers themselves in Parliament, or with the Viceroy's intense resentment of its unexpected disclosure. The new Parliament will, we earnestly hope, give Colonel Macgregor an opportunity of explaining the discrepancies between his version of the Memorandum and the Ministerial account of it. We shall show these discrepancies at length, in our next issue.—*Ed. S.*]

## THE PRESS COMMISSIONER OF INDIA.

TO THE EDITOR OF "THE STATESMAN."

Sir,—Some months ago, an article appeared in the *Times*, professing to describe the nature of the functions performed by that really indescribable functionary, the Indian Press Commissioner. The public in this country then, for the first time, learned that the Press Commissioner's services to the English journals of India, were voluntary in their nature; that the necessary duties of his office—the duties for which he draws the pay of a Political Agent of the second class—were connected with the Vernacular Press, and the inference we were plainly intended to draw was that the Editors of English papers had no

claim of right to any communications from the Press Commissioner. What he or his master chose to send us, we must accept as a "gift horse"—not to be looked in the mouth; or we might reject it if we pleased. If, on the other hand, the Press Commissioner chose, for our sins, to stop our supply of official provender, we had no ground of complaint. If we urged that he was a public servant, paid out of the public purse to supply us with information, and act as our medium of communication with the Government, we were given to know that he was "the Vakil of the Native Press"—and *as such* paid out of the public purse—and that therefore we had no more claim upon his services, if he chose to withhold them, than, say, our contemporaries in England. You, who had so much to do with the first appointment of the Press Commissioner, know that his connection with the Vernacular Press was an afterthought, and that the post was really created in order to improve the relations between the Government and the Anglo-Indian Press. I suppose you have letters in your possession which would show that his connection with the Vernacular Press is really little other than nominal; and the statement to that effect made by Colonel Osborn in the *Contemporary Review*, although contradicted in the *Times* by Mr. Lethbridge, was substantially correct. I believe the truth is, that it was only when the Press Commissioner-ship—as it had hitherto been known—had become a by-word, not merely for its absurdity and uselessness (it might have been tolerated had it been simply laughable), but for the untrustworthiness (I use a mild word) of its *communiqués*; and when it was being covered with public ridicule, that it occurred to some one to re-establish its respectability, by giving forth that its real work was done in connection with the Vernacular Press. As very few Englishmen read, or can read, the Vernacular papers, a pretence of this kind could be put forward with little fear of contradiction. I think I may say, without hesitation, that nobody here believed that the Press Commissioner did any real work of the kind attributed to him. At the same time, for the reason I have mentioned, hardly any Englishman was in a position to expose, by the publication of facts, the assertions put forward in the *Times*.

I was curious to ascertain the truth as to his performance of the delicate and laborious duties ascribed to him in the *Times*, and accordingly addressed a circular to the Editors of Vernacular papers in Bengal, requesting them to answer the following questions:—

1. Does the Press Commissioner supply official information to your paper?
2. Have you ever applied for information from the Press Commissioner, and if so, what was the tenor of his reply?
3. Have you ever received any communication from the Press Commissioner?
4. Were you ever officially informed that the duties of the Press Commissioner were to superintend the working of the Vernacular Press Act, and to act as a medium of communication between the Vernacular Press and the Government?
5. Does the Press Commissioner regularly receive a copy of your paper?

I regret to say that from some Editors I have received no replies. Probably they were afraid that I might publish them, and that they would fall under the displeasure of the Government. But seventeen Editors of Vernacular papers in Bengal have sent me answers, and a summary of these

will throw some light on the relations that exist between the Press Commissioner and the Vernacular newspapers. I believe that the seventeen may be taken as fairly representative. Five of these reply to all the questions in the negative; thirteen answer the first question in the negative; eleven answer the second question in the negative. One applied, but was told that his paper had not been long enough established to be put on the Press Commissioner's list; another suggested, editorially, that the Press Commissioner *should supply the Vernacular papers as well as the English* with news, and he then received a letter from the Press Commissioner, advising him to apply to Government—which, however, he did not do; four applied (one of them three times), but received no answer. To the third question, the replies are various. Seven answer it in the negative. Four, as we have seen above, receive news, though one of them complains that the communications are very few, and another that they are useless. One received a copy of the Vernacular Press Act, with instructions to pay attention to it; and others were informed that they might send telegrams to the Press Commissioner at Press rates. All the seventeen answer the fourth question in the negative. Ten reply that the Press Commissioner receives copies of their papers.

I ought to state that these seventeen papers are not quite half of the Vernacular papers of Bengal; but they belong to all parts of the province, and I believe very fairly represent the Vernacular Press on this side of India. I did not write to any paper beyond this province, but I think I am justified in assuming that the Press Commissioner's relations with the Vernacular papers of Bengal are, at least, as intimate as his relations with the papers of other parts of India. You will probably agree with me in believing, that if his duties in connection with the Bengal Vernacular papers are little more than nominal, it is probable that even that little is wanting as regards Madras and Bombay.

I think I may, without breach of confidence, quote the following from a letter received along with the answers to my questions, from one of the Editors who have the privilege of receiving communications from the Press Commissioner. He says:—

We are treated with uniform courtesy when we make any communication through the Press Commissioner. But in other matters the tone of the Government is not encouraging. Last year I complained that reports, papers, &c., were not given to the Vernacular papers. Mr. — used his influence, and since that time I have received some reports, but not all. The Local Government does not even supply us with its Administrative Report. We can get reports from other Governments, but not from the Government of Bengal, though repeated applications have been made for the same.

I regret that the attitude of the present Government of Bengal towards the Native Press, especially the Vernacular portion of it, is decidedly hostile. In all divisional reports, special mention is made of Native journals. It is an almost invariable practice to say that they are either insignificant, having no influence with the people, or conducted by a set of 'agitators.' It seems as if the Government is resolved to draw a line of demarcation between the journalists and the community.

The writer has, I think, very happily expressed the truth in the last sentence.

I shall not intrude further on your space. If I have not made my subject sufficiently plain to your readers, you will be able to assist me in your editorial columns.

WILLIAM RIACH.

[Mr. Riach has given a truthful account of the matter; Mr. Lethbridge gave a very untruthful one.—Ed. S.]



## THE NEW FOUR MILLIONS DEFICIT.

THIS is not the first, but the third occasion, within eighteen months only, that Parliament has been deceived as to the true state of the Indian Finances. Upon Lord Lytton's declaration of War against Shere Ali, in November, 1877, Parliament, it will be remembered, was summoned for a short early session, to receive the Ministerial explanation of the causes which had necessitated the step. In spite of the false statements that had been propagated to persuade the nation of its justice and necessity, the war was from the first unpopular, the more so that both in Parliament and in the Press, the opinion had been generally advanced that its cost ought to be borne by this country, and not by India. It was known, moreover, that there would be a large deficit in the Home accounts, and to redeem the war as far as possible from public odium, Parliament was boldly assured by the Minister, that as a surplus of £1,750,000 was to be looked for in the Indian revenue, its cost might very fairly be charged thereto. This was early in December, 1877. The false statement was received in India with amazement. Everyone knew that it could not possibly be true. We commented upon it in the *Statesman*, at Calcutta, on December 20th, as follows:—

Never, we believe, before in our history has a course of deception been practised on the nation, like that which has induced it to sanction this war, and that still blinds it to its real character. Perhaps the most scandalous of all the frauds is the latest, by which Parliament has been made to believe that our revenues this year will show a legitimate surplus of 1½ millions, and will therefore suffice for the expenses of the present campaign.

We *knew* that the assurance must be false, and said so; and the ten days' session was no sooner over, than a telegram from India was published by the Ministry in all the London papers, declaring that an *error had been made*. Instead of a surplus of £1,750,000, there was certain to be a considerable deficit. The false statement having served its purpose, and Parliament having separated, it was thought safest to disavow the falsehood, and affirm

it to have been an "error." It was no error; it was part of the system of deception, by which the whole Government was being carried on; and it is a spurious and demoralizing charity that would hide the fact. Confiding in his "majority" to pull him through anything, the Minister was reckless what statements were made in Parliament. And so about four months afterwards, we had false statement No. 2 palmed upon the nation in the same way, by Sir John Strachey bringing forward his March Budget, and affirming therein that the cost of the War up to that date had been but £620,000. Again did India listen with amazement to a statement that everyone knew was false. The 60,000 camels alone, that were known to have perished, cost more than double the £620,000. The false assurance was again wanted for Parliament, and so it was boldly and defiantly given. The true expenditure was kept back, under the pretext, we suppose, that it had not been audited; while the Minister relied as before upon his exemplary majority in the House to pull him through anything. And for the third time, was the same abominable device resorted to just before dissolving Parliament. The Minister was afraid to go before the country, with an honest statement of the cost of the war. Instead of the now admitted deficit of four millions, we shall not get through this War under an outlay of £20,000,000 sterling. We ask our readers to remember the statement.

Now, we ask, What is Parliament going to do in face of these disclosures? The Indian Famine Fund, with the solemn pledges that hedged it about, to induce the people to submit to it, is lost and gone, swallowed up in the yawning gulf of our crime; the local treasuries and their balances have been confiscated to the same needs; the great decentralizing reforms of Earls Mayo and Northbrook have been scattered to the winds; the arsenals of the country have been depleted, and its military stores exhausted, in a savage and unprovoked war; every work of public improvement that could be arrested or postponed, has been violently stopped; while the Cash Balances have been drawn upon, until we can draw no more. And it has all been concealed from the nation, up to the moment when concealment is no longer possible. We ask with deep seriousness once more, what Parliament means to do. We charge the Government of Lord Beaconsfield, in terms as explicit as we can, with having betrayed us as a people into this war, by a long course of concealment and misrepresentation of facts, without parallel in our history; and with finally declaring the War without the knowledge or sanction either of Parliament or of the Privy Council, while filling the public

newspapers with telegraphic advices from the Viceroy of India, so untrue that it is impossible to recall them, even now, without amazement at their hardihood. Every device was resorted to, to betray the nation into the belief that the war was unavoidable, while Parliament was bribed to condone its declaration, without the usual Constitutional sanction, by the assurance that there was a large surplus in the Indian Revenues, and that the people of India could and would, as a matter of course, defray its cost. When the assurance reached India (December, 1877) we at once commented upon it as follows: "The deceptions practised upon Parliament by the present Cabinet, and the purpose with which this assurance is made, divest it, we are sorry to say, of all credibility. The statement has been sent from Simla, by the very men who concocted the Ali Musjid incident but yesterday, and declared the Ameer's reply to be one of 'insolent defiance' to us, to do our worst. It required a good deal of courage to telegraph *those* assurances; it requires none at all, to falsify the forecast of the revenues of the year. We cannot attach the weight of a feather to the statement, coming as it does from quarters so interested as the Ministry is, in propagating it. It will surprise no one in India, to find that on the 31st March next,—instead of a surplus, there is a heavy deficit in the accounts. But then, the statement was not intended for India, but for the purposes of this debate in Parliament. It would be most improper to write thus, but for the falsehoods that have been telegraphed from Simla in the last few weeks, and the systematic deception practised upon the country by the present Viceroy." The Accounts department in India is far too perfect, under the labour bestowed thereon in the last twenty years, by financiers of repute, to permit a reasonable thought that these re-iterated false statements, have been innocently made. They have been made, in every instance, by men who were relying upon the Tory phalanx in the late Parliament, to "see them through;" and the vital question now is, What does the new Parliament intend to do?

## MODERN EUPHUISM AND BAD FORM.

THERE is a want of earnestness in the ordinary political life of this country, that is rapidly becoming an anachronism, in the midst of the religious awakening that surrounds us. For the last two generations of years, everything like moral earnestness in the expression of men's convictions upon political subjects, has been banished by a sort of tacit agreement between the "superior persons," of the old Whig oligarchy on the one hand, and the Tory aristocracy on the other. To use the simple, earnest language of conviction upon any subject, is bad form and vulgarity, to which no "superior person" ever stoops. The disease was long since manifest in the Press, the leading journals priding themselves upon their command of a tone so neutral and colourless, as to have become an affectation almost as pronounced as the Euphuistic absurdities of the Stuart times. The language of deep, solemn conviction is to be found almost nowhere in the Press, and but rarely in the utterances of our public men and statesmen. We shall show exactly what we mean, by presenting to our reader in immediate contrast, the studiously colourless speech of Lord Hartington a week ago, at the Devonshire Club, with the simple and earnest utterances of Sir Arthur Hobhouse on the same occasion. In the Euphuistic style of the age, Lord Hartington spoke as follows:—

For months before the elections, during that struggle, which lasted, I may say, for years, it has been our duty to use every legitimate means in our power to excite the attention of the country to those principles which we were endeavouring to support, and to those defects in the policy of our opponents, which we were inviting the country to condemn. It was impossible with such a task as that set before us that we should not have to use very plain, and sometimes very strong language; and I have no doubt that in the course of the recent elections, although I hope that we have succeeded to a very great extent in avoiding personalities, there have been occasions upon which not only more excitement was engendered, and in which more excitement was felt, but in which more forcible language than necessary was used by advocates of our party. But, gentlemen, from the moment these great issues have been decided by the elections, we have all felt that the nature of our task was altogether changed. It was no longer necessary or expedient to endeavour to raise popular enthusiasm or to encourage popular excitement. All that

remained for us now to do was to turn, each to the best of his ability, to the best public advantage the decision which has been given, and use for the best purpose the power which has been placed in the hands of our party. And, therefore, I think we have all of us felt that, now that the issue is decided, we should best consult the interests of the country, the interests of our party, and our own feelings, by abstaining from any demonstration of exultation which would have the effect of irritating or of unnecessarily wounding the feelings of opponents against whom we have no personal grudge, and which could not in any way promote the true interests of our party.

Now we have a true respect for the speaker, but it would be a betrayal we think of the trust which journalism implies, were we to profess to approve this conventional way of dealing with an issue, in which it is no extravagance to say that the interests of a large proportion of the human race are involved. Without the least want of respect for Lord Hartington, we say firmly that we cannot conceive it possible for a leading Liberal statesman, at a juncture like the present, to adopt a style of language more to be regretted. We want no exacerbation of party feeling in the nation, still less the language of party triumph. What we want is adequate and just expression from Lord Hartington's lips, of those convictions concerning the course of the late Ministry, which he undoubtedly entertains in common with Sir Arthur Hobhouse, and to which that gentleman gave expression in reply to his Lordship's speech. Sir Arthur said :—

I believe I can lead both a happier life and a far more useful life out of Parliament than in it. I fought in this contest, because I had an overwhelming conviction of the evils worked to the country by the Beaconsfieldian rule, and because the time was one in which it behoved every man to be up and doing, and I fought here in the character of a candidate because I was told, rightly or wrongly, that by so doing I could best serve the cause I had at heart.

The time is at hand, we believe, when the nation will refuse to listen to political language, that has not the clear ring of conviction about it, so conspicuous in these simple words, and perhaps still more in those that followed :—

According to my observation, the things which have most stirred the mind of this nation during the past three years have been those of the honour of our public men—(cheers)—the authority of Parliament—(hear, hear)—the character of our nation for just and righteous dealing towards its neighbours. (Cheers.) I hope to be able to say that since Lord Beaconsfield was driven from office no Minister has tarnished his own honour, nor struck at the very roots of public confidence, by saying the thing that is not—(hear)—that when our Ministers make an assertion that assertion represents a fact—(hear, hear)—that Parliament has not had its due control over national affairs, eluded either by idle stories or by sudden surprises; that we are strong enough to see that even British interests are subordinated to the laws of right and wrong;.

that we are strong enough to redress the wrongs we have done to our weak neighbours, and that we are strong enough to bear on our borders the spectacle of a free nation—a nation free to work out its own destiny by its own modes, though it should be some centuries behind us in civilization, and though it may be so weak as to be at our mercy. And, speaking as one especially interested in India, in the presence of one specially interested in India—(cheers)—I hope to be able to say that we have governed India for the benefit of the Indians, that we have not spent their money in wars of ambition, that we have not used India as a card in our hand to play in some game of European brag—(hear, hear)—that we have not gambled with the happiness of the sixth of the human race, that we have not found it necessary to govern them by shutting their mouths or preventing them from owning a gun or a sword, that we have not created sacred famine funds which have been spent on other purposes even before they were collected, and which, before the year is out, have, as it is politely said, ceased to exist, and that our servants there have not at critical times sent us bogus budgets and bogus surpluses—(hear, hear)—in fact, that we have men who attend to acts rather than words; that we are governed, not by phrasemongers, but by statesmen—not by men who seek glory rather than duty, but by men who do their duty without boasting of sham work which tumbles to pieces even before it is completed. My lord, if we have not these things to say, it may go hard with us; but if we have them to say, then I say we shall win at the next Westminster election. (Loud cheers.)

It is a curious illustration of the extent of the disease that afflicts our speech in these days, that the *Standard* could not even bring itself to show its readers the "bad form" in which Sir Arthur really spoke. And so it reported him to have said, that "he had fought "in this contest because he had an overwhelming conviction that "the time had come when it behoved every man to be up and "doing, *in order to improve the condition of political affairs.*" The italics are ours; and the reader who would understand what this "euphuistic" language is designed to cover, should mark the words well. Sir Arthur felt himself, at sixty years of age, forced into political life, for the first time, by an overwhelming conviction of the evils worked to the country by "*Beaconsfieldian rule.*" In the language of Euphuism, this becomes a conviction that the time had come "*to improve the condition of political affairs.*"

Now having a deep conviction of the evils that are flowing from the general divorce there is in our political life, between the true inward thought of a man and the deceitful expression on his lips, we reiterate our earnest and solemn protest against it. For this departure from the true inward thought and conviction of the man, and the outward, untrue, false and misleading speech, by which he seeks to escape the conflict which the honest expression of his conviction would awaken, exercises a deadly reaction upon the man himself. "False speech," says the seer, "as "is inevitable when men long practise it, falsifies all things; the

"very thoughts or functions of speech and action become false. Ere long by the appointed curse of Heaven, a man's intellect ceases to be capable of distinguishing truth, when he permits himself to deal in speaking or acting what is false. Watch well the tongue, for out of it are the issues of life! . . . We have to assert that human speech is not true! that it is false to a degree rarely witnessed in this world till lately. Such a subtle virus of falsity in the very essence of it, as far excels all open lying, or other kinds of falsity: *false with the consciousness of being sincere*. Such a curse never fell on men before." It is the curse under which political life has been suffering for many years past; the curse which has become the doom of leading journals of this Metropolis, and that has made it impossible for them to see, when they fain would have done so. It is impossible to account for the great misleading of the nation, for a generation of years past, on any other hypothesis. How, otherwise, is it possible to account for the willing misleading of the nation in the American Civil War, for example, where we saw the great body of orderly, considerate men, men affecting the name of good and pious in all the influential circles of the country, deliberately persuade themselves that the false was the true thing? And so has it been in this Metropolis, throughout the unspeakable rule from which the nation is but just escaping as from a long nightmare. Look at the efforts which the *Standard* has made in the last fortnight, to impress the public mind with the false belief that Continental opinion, as a whole, has confirmed its own angry estimate of the character and probable effects of Mr. Gladstone's letter to Count Karolyi. The journal has laboured, day after day, to fill the minds of its readers with the belief that the letter is generally regarded on the Continent as the abject effusion which itself declared it to be, and as calculated to produce the mischief which its own columns forecast. As a fact, the letter has been received generally on the Continent, as a fresh proof of the high personal character of Mr. Gladstone, while it has had a distinctly reassuring effect upon the European Cabinets. This is the fact as opposed to the untruth; and it is painful beyond expression to find a journal that generally strives to look at things as they really are, erring in this way. The incident leads us to remark what cannot fail to have struck the constant readers of the *Standard*, we should think, equally with ourselves — viz., that the paper is very badly served by its "correspondents" in the great continental Capitals. There is a very marked contrast between the

candour and truthfulness that as a rule assert their sway in the Editorial columns of the paper, and the almost indecent defiance of both, on the part of its foreign correspondents. We do not say that the *Standard* is the only offender against public morals in this respect, for it is not; but we think it is the chief, and we should very quickly make a change in our own staff, if we found ourselves systematically betrayed by any part of it in the same fashion. It cannot be too earnestly insisted upon, that journalism implies a public trust, and carries with it, whether we will or no, responsibilities of a moral order. Every journalist is under an implied pledge to his readers, that he will tell them the very truth of things as he apprehends it. If he err as to facts, it must be honest, unconscious error into which he has fallen, and not the twisting and distortion of matters to suit a purpose or cause he has in hand. Journalism of any other order is an offence against morals, and the just abhorrence of upright minds. Tried by this standard, what in the judgment of the widest charity must be the verdict we pass upon the conduct of many of the so-called leading journals of this Metropolis? No man, nor any association of men, taking upon themselves the task of journalism, can evade the responsibilities which belong of necessity thereto. For journalism is an "apostleship," for which no man can show a "vocation," who is not "the born soldier of truth and order"—a man of nobleness, a man of courage, rectitude, pious strength; and who, because he is loyal to the Eternal Laws, has true *discernment* to lead his fellow-men. In the head there can be no clear vision, while the heart and sympathies of a man are wrong; and it is the perverted sympathies of our publicists, nine times out of ten, that disqualify them for the task they have assumed, without any real "vocation" for its sacred work.



## THE POLICY IN AFGHANISTAN.

IN the Afghan War of 1838, almost immediately after the destruction of General Elphinstone's Force in the passes of the Khoord Kabul, there was a change of Ministry at home. Lord Palmerston resigned office, and Sir Robert Peel and the Duke of Wellington reigned in his stead. The change was a most providential one. None could charge the Duke with indifference to the honour of the Empire; none could venture to question the validity of his judgment on the military situation; and he determined that, at all costs, we must withdraw our troops from Afghanistan, and resume the position we had occupied before Lord Auckland's invasion, and which we ought never to have abandoned. The Duke, with his unerring military sagacity, detected at once that a military occupation of Afghanistan was beyond our strength; and perceiving this, he had the courage to act upon his convictions with promptitude. I wish that one could think that among the Liberal leaders of to-day there was the same insight and the same courage. But having read all that they have said or spoken on the subject, it is clear to me that they have failed to appreciate the magnitude of the peril in which we are involved, unless we withdraw altogether from Afghanistan. The peril is not an immediate one, neither is it remote—but it is as certain as death. If we remain within the boundaries of Afghanistan, we shall be driven on by the force of circumstances to occupy the whole country; and such an occupation will occasion so great and continuous a strain upon the resources of our Indian Empire, that in thirty years it would be broken to pieces. The military burden laid upon the people of India is already a crushing one; but a gradual annexation of Afghanistan will enlarge it incalculably, while it will effectually put an end to the progress of internal development. If we are determined to retain either a part or the whole of Afghanistan, the only way in which we can avert the imposition of additional burdens upon the people of India is by taking them upon ourselves. Afghanistan must be constituted a province under the British Crown, and the cost of its administration defrayed by the British Exchequer. But even

then we should not diminish materially the danger to our Indian Empire. That danger is that by the possession of Afghanistan our frontier will become conterminous with that of a great military power existing beyond it. This is the greatest danger to which we can be exposed in India; and it is so for this reason.

In speaking of what we call "our" Indian Empire, we generally overlook the two hundred millions of human beings who are its natural and rightful possessors, and to whom, one day, that Empire will have to be restored. Our Indian Empire has been won by the sword, and is, to this day, retained by the sword. It will be argued that we govern the country better than the people would govern it for themselves. The supposition is more than doubtful; but assuming it to be true, if there be any one confiding enough to suppose that this "good government" suffices to atone for the original defect in our title, I would ask him to place himself in the position of a native of India. Suppose England to be overrun by the French, and ourselves excluded from all participation in the political business of the country. Would any Englishman be consoled by the knowledge that the French administered the country better than we did? He would not admit the fact, to begin with; and it would be no consolation to him if he did admit it. He would feel it to be far better to be execrably ruled by an Englishman, than ruled excellently well by a foreign despot. There is a great deal of human nature in the natives of India, and this is precisely their feeling. They acquiesce in our rule because they lack the power to deliver themselves, but they have no love for it. We might, in truth, as reasonably expect grapes from thorns, as love to be engendered by such a rule as that we have set up in India. British rule in India is nothing more than this—that a huge horde of British officials collect the taxes, imprison and hang the natives, according to the provisions of the Criminal Procedure Code, and are heavily paid for doing so. Between these officials and the natives of the country there exist no relations either domestic or social. The British officer, so far as the people are concerned, is a piece of official machinery, and he is nothing more.

Half ignorant, he turns an easy wheel  
Which sets sharp racks at work to pinch and peel.

So is it with the bulk of the inhabitants; the lot of the able and aspiring few is infinitely harder to bear. There is, to my thinking, a very pathetic story revealed in the following extract from an old report of the Punjab Government on the aristocracy

of that province, and it is a story that could be told in every province of British India :—

“Once accustomed to rule provinces, they found themselves, on the advent of British rule, reduced to nonentity ; and in the cities, where, perhaps, they had been accustomed to receive the homage of the inhabitants as they passed through the streets, they now found themselves passed by in silence, if not unfrequently treated by the Government officials with contempt.”

The consequence of all this is, that British rule in India subsists in peace simply because there is near to it nothing sufficiently strong to question its supremacy. The neighbourhood of a military power would supply this factor, and the result would be inevitable. The neighbourhood of Russia would cause the British Russophobist to be more quarrelsome than ever ; and as soon as we were involved in a war with Russia in Europe, the whole of British India, from Herat to Calcutta, would rise in insurrection. Our native soldiers would combine with the insurgents ; a Russian division would be despatched to assist the insurrection in Afghanistan ; and our Indian Empire would either be torn from us altogether, or have to be recovered at a cost of blood and treasure compared with which the campaigns of the Indian Mutiny would dwindle into insignificance.

But why, it may be asked, shall we be compelled to occupy the whole of Afghanistan if we annex or garrison certain places within it ? For this reason : Except under a ruler of signal governing capacity—such as was our old and faithful ally, Shere Ali, so pitilessly and with such cowardice hunted to his grave—Afghanistan is hardly ever free from internal disturbances. But while we occupied our old frontier, these internal disturbances could not ruffle our serenity, because between us and Afghanistan proper was interposed a belt of independent mountain tribes. We were under no compulsion to side with any of the numerous aspirants to power, and in consequence, also, to become the enemies of none. Whatever government was set up in Afghanistan, we were free to enter at once into friendly relations with it, having no seemingly unfriendly acts to explain away, and no suspicions to remove. But if once we pass beyond this belt of tribes, and establish ourselves in the heart of Afghanistan, this attitude of impartial neutrality is rendered impossible. We must take a side. The attempts which are at present being made to patch up a settlement in Afghanistan, exhibit an imbecility which could hardly have been expected even from the Government of Lord Lytton. But what are their salient features ? Candahar is to be formed into a separate principality, and placed under a Sirdar

*friendly to the British.* The northern parts of Afghanistan are to remain independent, if there can be found to govern them a Sirdar who shall be both "a staunch friend of the English, and capable of keeping the country quiet." So Mr. Lepel Griffin is reported to have explained to a few insignificant Malikis who assembled at Cabul to receive this supremely silly exposition of Imperial policy. An Afghan Sirdar, who is "a staunch friend of the English," after what we have perpetrated in that country, will always be "incapable of keeping order," because he must be a base and spiritless traitor. But assuming that we could discover one such man, what we need to discover is not one, but a whole series. For should there be any break in the series, no alternative will be left but again to make an avenging march to Cabul, at a cost of several millions sterling, and henceforth to govern the country for ourselves. A ruler of Cabul not a "staunch friend of the English," is, however, only one of the causes that will force us on to an entire annexation of Afghanistan. A more potent cause by far is the British Russophobic. By long brooding over one idea, the Russophobic has brought himself to that state that it is impossible for the Russian Government in Central Asia to move a detachment of Cossacks without exciting his alarm. In every exploring expedition he sees preparations for a future invasion of India. Added to this is his hallucination on the subject of Herat. He has selected as "the key" of India a city which, from India, is altogether inaccessible, but which he is for ever calling on us to defend. If Herat, so he tells us, once passes into the power of Russia, there will be nothing for the British to do in India except to embark in their ships and quit the country. I have not his actual words before me, but I have a lively recollection of Sir Henry Rawlinson declaring that rather than allow Russia to obtain Herat, he would place in jeopardy the very existence of British rule in India. Now any such settlement of Afghanistan as is shadowed forth in the recent proceedings at Cabul, will be no more than a concession to these Russophobicists—a concession they will accept, but will not be satisfied with. What they will then agitate for is no secret. Sir Henry Rawlinson proclaimed it to the world immediately after the Treaty of Gundamuk. My readers will remember that shortly after that Treaty was signed, the Russians despatched an expedition against the Tekke Turcomans. The Tekkes being pitiless man-stealers, and the greatest ruffians in Central Asia, such an expedition demanded, and ought to have obtained, the approval of every honest man. But Sir Henry could see nothing

but "Herat" in it. There was not a possibility, even had it been successful, of the Russians arriving at Herat for at least a score of years. Sir Henry admitted himself that there was no present peril of this "key" falling into the possession of the enemy; so he went further a-field. Far in the wilds of Central Asia, remote from public view, he discovered a place called Abiverd. This spot was naturally fertile, but it had been desolated and all but depopulated by the depredations of the Tekkes. Sir Henry Rawlinson could not but acknowledge that if it were incorporated in the Russian dominions it would vastly benefit by the change. But then the Russians would be so much nearer Herat; and rather than allow this, Sir Henry Rawlinson called upon a patriotic Government to make of the occupation of this hapless Abiverd a *casus belli* against Russia. These were his words: "Russia herself must not be left in any uncertainty as to our intentions. She must be made to understand . . . *that she will not be permitted unopposed to establish herself in strength . . . even at Abiverd*, nor to commence intrigues against the British power in India. She might indeed be warned that, if necessary, we were prepared in self-defence to support the Turcomans—with whom she has no legitimate quarrel—with arms or money, or even to turn the tables on her, by encouraging the efforts of the Uzbeks to recover their liberty. . . . *It would be almost fatuity at such a moment to withdraw our garrison from Candahar. . . . Yacoub Khan might be made to see that it is as much for his interest as our own to hold an efficient body of troops in such a position that, on the approach of danger, . . . they might with military celerity occupy Herat as an auxiliary garrison.*"

This passage shows the amount of moderation we have to expect from the Russophobists. Candahar is of no value to them in itself. They value it merely as a convenient place of arms from which to advance upon Herat, as soon as the Russians get to Abiverd. For, in the perverted strategy of these gentlemen, the difficulties of an invasion of India are diminished as the distance is increased which divides our frontier from that of the invader; they increase as that distance diminishes, until, when actual contiguity is obtained, they become, it would seem, insuperable. Thus, whether we have regard to the force of circumstance, or to the wishes and designs of those to whom any partial occupation of Afghanistan would be a concession, we find that by the holding of Candahar we should be committing ourselves to a policy which, at no distant date, would compel us to attempt the military occupation of all Afghanistan. To do this, we should require at

the least forty thousand men (one half of which would have to be British soldiers), in addition to the garrison of India, properly so called. For, as I have pointed out elsewhere, our standing army in India is merely a garrison for the purpose of preserving British supremacy in India itself. Its strength is fixed with a view to this purpose only, and the contingency of attack from without has not been taken into consideration. The army of Afghanistan would have to be an army wholly independent of our Indian garrison, and having its equipment and munitions in such a perfect state that it would need to look for no assistance from India.

Now let us try to discover the purpose for which we are asked to incur this enormous burden of danger and expense. I set aside all moral considerations. I will treat as non-existent such questions as, for example, this: By what right do we deprive these Afghans of their independence, and compel them to become subjects of the British Crown? To my thinking, such questions are decisive against the expediency of this aggressive policy. Our rapacious proceedings in Afghanistan have weakened the loyalty and kindled the distrust of all the Princes throughout India who have anything which, some day or other, it might be profitable for us to seize upon. When that day arrives, they feel that they can expect no better treatment than that which was meted out to the loyal and luckless Shere Ali. And the germs of disaffection we have thus planted within our Empire will engender a degree and extent of feebleness that the most cunningly-contrived "scientific frontier" would be unable to check or avert. If no other reason than this could be assigned for withdrawing from Afghanistan, and restoring to the Afghans their former independence, this alone would, in my judgment, more than justify a policy of retrogression. The plea, however, which was held to justify this war was a dread of Russian designs upon India. So urgent was this danger represented to be, that it was held to over-rule all objections drawn from moral sources. Self-preservation being a primary law of nature, we were justified in trampling down Shere Ali without remorse or compunction, because the act was essential to the continuance of our own existence. Now is there any reasonable ground for crediting the Russian Government with a desire to expel us from India? To me it is a cause of wonder that we English should attribute such a purpose to any nation under the sun. Every European nation is, as it is, altogether overweighted with the burden of perplexities, internal and external, which it cannot shake off—which tends constantly to enlarge as the years pass by. That politician would, it

seems to me, be as great a madman as ever was confined in Bedlam who cherished the design of adding to his nation's anxieties the onerous and unprofitable responsibility involved in the possession of India. What advantages do we derive from India which at all repay us for the torrents of British blood which have been poured out on those sun-parched plains—for all the crimes that we have committed in India, for all the sorrow and heartbreak which this man-devouring possession has brought to thousands upon thousands of British firesides? The burden is ours, and we must stagger along with it as best we may; but it is the perfection of perverse folly to imagine that other nations envy us the burden beneath which our back is bowed. Least of all is Russia likely to take so false a view of the things that belong to her peace and prosperity. Her Government knows by experience the wear and tear on a nation's strength and resources which are occasioned by such dependencies as an Indian Empire. Her statesmen know only too well how such acquisitions enormously increase the vulnerability of an empire, without bringing to it any corresponding advantage. I am myself convinced that Russia would not accept of India if it were offered her as a free gift: to suppose that she would ever attempt to wrest it from us by force, is to credit her governing men with a degree of political insanity altogether without warrant from anything we know of their history. Assuming, however, that the Russian Government does cherish such a purpose, there are two ways in which the Russians in Asia may, conceivably, attempt to overthrow British rule in India—by secret intrigue, or by open attack. It must be obvious to all rational persons that a British occupation of Afghanistan, by the discontent and secret hostility it would create among the Afghans, would be equivalent to giving Russia a field for the successful practice of secret intrigue. If we do not wish to convert the whole Afghan nation into Russian agents conspiring for the overthrow of the British Government, we cannot too speedily evacuate the country, and resume the old frontier line as it existed before the war. There remains the alternative of open attack. Does the occupation of Candahar strengthen the defensive capacity of the Indian Frontier, or is it merely greatly to weaken that frontier? These questions suggest another. What are the facts that we have learned by the experience of the present war? The first and most important fact is the absolutely impregnable character of all the approaches to India. There can be no doubt that Lord Lytton declared war against Shere Ali in entire ignorance of the difficulties he would have to encounter. He and his military adviser, Sir

G. Pomeroy Colley, looked forward to an easy military promenade, a flourish of trumpets, a lavish distribution of stars and ribbons, and then all would be over. But what has been our actual experience? When war was declared against Shere Ali, Afghanistan was invaded from three different points. One column, under the command of General Sir S. Browne, advanced through the Khyber Pass up to Jellalabad. A second, under command of General Roberts, marched into the Kurram Valley. These operations, however, were only subsidiary. They were intended to divert the attention of the enemy from the main operation of the campaign—the advance of General Stewart's force from Sukkur on the Indus to Candahar. The intention here was not merely to occupy Candahar, but, if possible, to advance as far as Herat. For such an operation General Stewart had everything in his favour. The troops under his command numbered only 14,000 men—a force, it is needless to point out, which would be ludicrously insufficient to attempt the conquest of India; the winter was exceptionally mild; resistance on the part of the enemy there was virtually none; but so great was the difficulty of the march, so scanty the supply of forage and water, that 20,000 camels perished between Sukkur and Candahar. What was the consequence? When General Stewart arrived at Candahar, his troops found themselves in the midst of a country which could not furnish supplies for so large a force. Their own transport train having been destroyed in the act of getting to Candahar, there remained no means for obtaining supplies from India. A further advance upon Herat was, of course, out of the question; and, in truth, if two-thirds of General Stewart's troops had not been immediately withdrawn to India, the force would have reached Candahar only to starve. This withdrawal reduced the troops who held Candahar to a slender garrison of 4,000 men; and these, from want of transport, were as good as nailed to the spot on which they were encamped. They could not have marched, in a body, for fifty miles in any direction. Here, then, we had a complete demonstration that British India was absolutely secure from external attack *viâ* Candahar. We had shown that we could not move so small a force as 14,000 men along half the distance which an invading army would have to traverse without completely destroying its efficiency. And the results of the campaign were thus summed up by the military correspondent of the *Pioneer*—the official organ of the Indian Government: "Candahar is acknowledged to be a mistake, and it is hoped that a British army will never again be despatched in that direction; it is a mere waste of men, money, and means, and an



unsuitable line for attack or defence. The Kurram Valley route is next to impracticable; and to make a good road suitable for the advance of a sufficiently powerful and fully-equipped force on that line, would cost a mint of money. In fact, both routes must give way to the old and long-established route, *viâ* the Khyber, which leads direct to Cabul, and starts from a well-supplied base at Peshawur."

Subsequent experiences have abundantly justified this correspondent's estimate of the value of the Kurram route. The occupation of the Kurram Valley was a very striking example of that superfluity of foolishness which marked the foreign policy of Lord Beaconsfield and his colleagues. This valley is a mere *cul-de-sac*, entered from British territory by a narrow pass, and egress from which there is none at all for six months of the year. During the summer, however, it is possible to march to Cabul over the summit of the Shuter Gurdan; and it was by this route that General Roberts marched to avenge the massacre of Major Cavagnari and his escort. So difficult was the route, that it took him six weeks to cover a distance of seventy miles; his line of communication was cut the instant he had passed the Shuter Gurdan; and by the time he reached the Afghan capital, his baggage animals had almost all of them perished from fatigue and want of food. Since then the Kurram Valley has been nothing but a trap, in which we have shut up eight thousand regular soldiers, who, for all useful purposes, are as completely lost to India as if they had been put into a bottle and tightly corked. This, however, is by no means the worst consequence of the insensate occupation of the Kurram Valley. The valley is most unhealthy; the service in it extremely severe; and the regiments holding it have been scourged with pneumonia and other fatal diseases. In less than six weeks, the 13th Native Infantry lost no less than ninety men from pneumonia; and it is only one of the regiments which have been rendered non-effective from the ravages of this terrible disease. A similar fate has befallen the 14th Native Infantry, the 39th N.I., and the 2nd N.I.\*

The reader will, however, perceive that the *Pioneer's* correspondent makes an exception in favour of the route *viâ* the Khyber. This he terms the "old and long-established route." This has a "well-supplied base at Peshawur," and this, he considers, is the proper route whence to conquer Afghanistan. Well, since the closing of the road over the Shuter Gurdan we have been operating along this "old and long-established

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\* *Vide* private letter, published in *Daily News*, April 10.

route." At this moment we hold the line between Cabul and the Khyber with a force of 25,000 men, and at a vast expenditure in money. And what are the results? I quote from the military correspondent of the *Standard*: "The opinion is general that reinforcements are required, and all seem now convinced that Candahar is the proper base from which to influence Afghanistan." Was there ever more excellent fooling than this? or is it possible to imagine more convincing testimony to the impregnable character of all the approaches to India? First we try the Candahar route, and find it utterly "unsuitable for either attack or defence;" then we try the Kurram Valley route, and find it to be "next to impracticable;" and, lastly, we operate through the Khyber Pass, and find that so immeasurably the most difficult of the three, that "all are now convinced" that the only way to conquer Afghanistan is by way of Candahar, which we have already found to be quite "unsuitable" for this or any other purpose! The situation at present is briefly this. Along the Khyber route to Cabul we have 25,000 men; in the Kurram Valley we have about 8,000 more; and, independently of the force under Sir Donald Stewart, we have about 20,000 additional troops holding the line between Sukkur and Candahar. It is pitiful to think of the doom impending over these brave soldiers if they are not all withdrawn to India in the course of the present month. The excessive cold of an Afghanistan winter will then have been succeeded by a heat only a little less intolerable; and cholera and typhoid fever will carry on the work of destruction, which pneumonia has been busy with through all the winter. Few of my readers will have forgotten the sufferings endured by the troops under General Browne, as they withdrew, during the summer of 1879, from Jellalabad to India. Cholera followed them all along the march—a pitiless enemy which they were powerless to shake off, and upwards of 200 men perished in nine days. The troops then were only few in number. Cholera assailing the masses of men whom we have at this moment holding the communications between Cabul and Peshawur would be incalculably more destructive. Hardly less fatal will be the return of hot weather to the troops in the Sind Desert, at Quetta, and in the Pisheen Valley. It ought to be remembered that Sukkur, the base of our operations on the Candahar side, was formerly a military station, which we abandoned on account of its unhealthiness. Quetta, also, is one of the sickliest places in Hindostan, scourged at all times by a cruel and wasting fever, and subject to severe cholera epidemics. To crown all, we know

beyond a doubt that recruiting for the native army is absolutely at a stand-still. The accounts which have been spread through India of the sufferings and hardships to be endured in Afghanistan, have struck such terrors in the minds of our native subjects that they refuse to enlist in our regiments. In other words, sickness, exposure, and fighting, are every day thinning down our army, while the supply that should replenish its ranks has abruptly stopped. As was insisted upon again and again before the war began, the Afghans have merely to decline to come to terms in order to compel us, at no distant period, to evacuate the country from sheer inability to sustain the cost of remaining in it. We have, therefore, no choice; we cannot remain in the country, however much we may desire to do so; we may delay the evacuation a few months, but to evacuate it sooner or later—giving up Candahar and the Kurram Valley—we shall be compelled; and the only question which remains to be answered is, how this evacuation can be managed with the least discredit and material injury. There is one way, and only one way. Lord Lytton must be made the scape-goat of his own nefarious policy. A Proclamation should be issued to the people of India and Afghanistan, in which the British Government shall formally repudiate the policy and the acts of Lord Lytton in regard to Shere Ali; shall declare that the invasion of Afghanistan was undertaken without the consent and approval of the British nation, which therefore now restores to the Afghans the independence of which Lord Lytton had deprived them; and directs that the British troops withdraw within the boundaries of the British Empire. As for the future government of Afghanistan, it cannot be too often dinned into the ears of our ruling men that the only help we can give towards its constitution is by holding entirely aloof. Any government which is set up under our patronage will be knocked down immediately our patronage is withdrawn. Having reduced Afghanistan to anarchy, it is, of course, with pain that we shall withdraw without having accomplished aught to deliver it from the turmoil into which we have plunged it. But there is no alternative before us. A madman's hand has destroyed the structure, in a single month, which required forty years of patient labour to build up; and we are powerless to raise it anew from the dust. That work we must leave to others who are better fitted to accomplish it. Pusillanimous and even cruel as it may seem to withdraw without lending a helping hand, we must not shrink from the disgrace and humiliation. It is the only reparation we can make to both the Afghans and our own native subjects for the injuries which Lord

Lytton has done to them. In October of last year, immediately after the intelligence was received in this country of the massacre of Major Cavagnari and his comrades, I wrote as follows in the *Contemporary Review*, and all that has happened since appears to me to testify to the necessity of the policy I then insisted upon: "There remains the policy of withdrawal; . . . either Ministers must acknowledge an error that is now patent to all the world, or India must be saddled with the heavy costs and incalculable risks of an annexation of Afghanistan. These risks, it must be remembered, are not transitory, but enduring; and if we accept them we must be prepared for a doom of absolute effacement in the politics of Europe. . . . When we retired from Afghanistan in 1842, we frankly confessed the mistake we had committed, and I am not aware that any evil resulted from the confession. The wrongs that we had done left behind them a legacy of evil; but not the confession of those wrongs. And so it is now. The frontier policy of Lord Lytton has ruined our reputation for justice, truthfulness, and generosity; and the stain of that policy must cling to us for ever. We shall not conceal or efface it by laying a crushing burden upon our native subjects, and upon future generations of Englishmen, in order to evade the humiliation of a confession. But we shall make what reparation is still in our power when, in the interests of both, we refuse to annex Afghanistan."

[NOTE.—We refer the reader, for a later notice of this important subject, to our review below of Home and Foreign Affairs.—ED. S.]

## PARTY SPIRIT AND INDIAN PROGRESS.

"INDIA must never be made the sport of party." This phrase, familiar in the mouths of men of weight and mark, in and out of place, is nothing but a conventional cry, the suggestion of executive functionaries and permanent officials, by which fair discussion is deprecated, open inquiry evaded, and responsibility nullified. This catchword is only a baser version of Lord Beaconsfield's audacious demand. The serene supremacy in lofty international regions, undisturbed by "the harebrained chatter of irresponsible frivolity," that he claims for "sovereigns and statesmen," is claimed by the front benches for executive dignitaries in London and Calcutta. Apart from all considerations of personal honour and emolument, no one views with complacency the reversal, the formal reproof, or even the adverse criticism of his acts or judgments. Administrations die hard, and without contrition. The gravest of judges quarrel with courts of appeal. Each Provincial Government would place a limit on Imperial interference. Viceroy and Councillors have more than once written home to warn the Secretary of State that if some particular decision of their conclave should be disallowed, the very foundations of British power in India would be upset. It would be well, however, if the doctrine, so convenient and so congenial to men in authority, that authority must never be shaken, but must always be supported, were to commend itself to the unofficial mind rather as a general rule of practice than as an absolute dogma—a general rule subject to many exceptions, and especially to Parliamentary censure. It may be a counsel of perfection, but then there is no perfection. Authority ought to be shaken when it has been unduly assumed. Authority ought not to be supported when it has gone wrong. The fantastic tricks of the last five years tend surely to suggest that our executive officers, at home and abroad, should be dressed in a very brief and limited authority, while their plans are unconfirmed and unsanctioned by national knowledge and approval.

The official cant about authority is a personal and a professional cry, not a true maxim of statesmanship. Executive authority does not suffer, any more than judicial authority, when justice is done on appeal. When appeals are made hopeless by indolence or prejudice, then is authority brought into contempt. Close observation, and real supervision by Parliament and the nation are far more urgently required for Indian than for foreign affairs. If diplomacy were to be let alone for a year or two by its practitioners and by its detractors, the Empire might survive, and not even suffer; but the Indian question is vital, and ever before us—national rather than international. And yet official voices from the Council Chamber and the front benches have warned the profane vulgar off the Indian field with even more of unanimity and rigour than they have off the Continent of Europe. Terrible consequences are always predicted, if “the spirit of party” should permit a political appeal from India to be judged on its merits in either House of Parliament. Secretaries of State are nominally responsible, but must never be called to account. Secrecy and autocracy are virtually claimed as their essential attributes. Unless all claims of that nature are sternly set aside, and a just measure of real responsibility to Parliament exacted, the constitutional supervision of Indian and foreign affairs will never be more than an empty name and a deceptive nullity.

Constitutional Government is nothing but a system of checks on autocracy, mystery and unadvised undertakings; and the official hierarchy instinctively struggles against it from a dislike to the previous debate that may disclose dubious plans, and the subsequent debate that may expose undeniable failures. When we are warned that “Constitutional Government is on its trial,” it is always in the hope that some inquiry may be stifled, that some piece of executive mismanagement may be quietly covered up, or silently condoned. The Governors of dependencies and heads of departments, with the same self-sufficient weakness, have a tendency to break loose from consultative control. Both the Viceroy and the Secretary of State for India have been entrusted with power to overrule their Councillors, and even to act without their advice, in cases of sudden danger or great public emergency. It is right that provision should thus be made for prompt and decisive action, but the nature of an emergency should be more strictly defined. If every instance in which this arbitrary prerogative has been exercised within the last twenty years were to be carefully investigated with reference to its origin and results, I believe it would plainly appear, not that

the Viceroy or the Secretary of State was invariably wrong, but that in not one of these cases was there any emergency to be met or immediate danger to be overcome, and that in every instance publicity and open discussion would have been highly beneficial. Nor am I aware of any great national interest that has ever suffered, or of any great political problem that has ever been complicated, by Parliamentary treatment. Neither modern history nor contemporary experience tells me of any great question of home or foreign, or Indian politics that has been prejudiced by frank disclosure, or by serious discussion. Accidental publicity may mortify a person, but cannot injure the people or the State. The Marvin exposure damaged Lord Salisbury, the more so after he had fruitlessly denounced it as unauthentic, but it hurt no British interest. Can anyone point out any critical moment when full intelligence of the wondrous combinations of our Ministry, Sir Henry Layard, Sir Bartle Frere, or Lord Lytton, would have been otherwise than advantageous to the Empire? We are more likely to stumble in the dark than in the light of day. If a Minister keeps behind a screen, it is not, in general, because he is writing a talismanic despatch that is to save the State; it is because he has clumsily spilt the ink all over the place, and wants to hide the stains on his linen. A national crisis is very rare, and does not call for secrecy, but for popular sympathy and support. Ministerial messes are common enough, and would probably be less frequent if they had to be wiped up in public.

The cry that India must not be made the sport of party, really means that every important Indian question must be kept out of Parliament, must be exempt from unofficial strictures. It really asserts that the two hundred and fifty millions of Indians in the British provinces and the protected States may be righteously and safely confided, without Parliamentary or national control, to the covenanted and uncovenanted mercies of alien officials. It means that statesmen are not to decide on the merits of an Indian question, but only to take into respectful consideration the high merits of the Bengal Civil Service. It leads to Indian affairs being debated on no principle and to no purpose. The powers that be are upheld, but not morally strengthened. The haughtiness of tribe and office is never moderated. No one of the dominant or of the suppliant race can have been either convinced, conciliated, or edified by the incidents of Indian appeals to Parliament within the last ten years. There is no lesson to be found in them,

except a frequent repetition of the old bad lesson, that the decrees of our great functionaries ought to be indefeasible.

It has been said that neither the House of Commons nor the House of Lords is a good tribunal for the consideration of such appeals. It may be so—that is a matter which we are not going to decide. But, in the first place, there is no other tribunal; in the second place, no tribunal whatever would be acceptable to the Executive Power. Ministers do not object so much to the Court, as to there being any appeal at all. Strike high, strike low, you cannot please the official hierarchy. From top to bottom, they all prefer to stand well together, apart from the outer world. Every head of a department objects to any one but himself awarding praise or blame to any one of his subordinates. Not party, but Parliament is to be silenced. For more than a century, a growing inclination has been manifested by Ministers, without distinction of party, to prevent Parliament from acting as a court of revision and censure over executive proceedings. There was a protest of this description, remarkable for its apparent disinterestedness, made by Sir Robert Peel on the 1st March, 1843, in the debate on Roebuck's motion for an inquiry into the causes of the first Afghan War—a motion supported by Mr. Disraeli, Sir Robert Harry Inglis, Mr. Joseph Hume, and Lord John Manners, and a minority of seventy-five members from both sides of the House. Sir Robert Peel, then Prime Minister, declared that if such a motion were to be carried, "it would end in transferring the Executive Government from the Crown to the House of Commons;" and concluded by "entreating the House not to permit the just prerogatives of the Crown to be transferred to a Committee of the House of Commons." Sir Robert Peel urged, also, that "the power of a Government should never be employed against their predecessors in office to obtain a censure upon their past policy for mere party considerations"—certainly not "for mere party considerations," that every one may admit—"or to promote an inquiry into the policy and justice of public measures which were undertaken by them while they held the reins of Government, except"—and this exception covers all my demand—"with a view to the reform of administrative defects or abuses."\*

Without impugning in the least the generous feelings and sense of public duty that animated Sir Robert Peel, we must not

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\* "Hansard," Vol. lxxii. pp. 184, 187.



shut our eyes to the natural bias of his official position. The demands he made in the speech I have quoted were somewhat extensive. He claimed "the just prerogatives of the Crown" for the Executive Government, but deprecated all inquiry by the great National Council into the exercise of those prerogatives. On behalf of all executive functionaries, himself included, nominally responsible to Parliament, he claimed practical irresponsibility. Neither Mr. Roebuck, nor Mr. Disraeli, nor any speaker in that debate—nor, indeed, any one at all to my knowledge—had ever asked, as Sir Robert Peel rhetorically assumed, that "the prerogatives of the Crown should be transferred to the House of Commons." No such proposal is likely to be made now. But it seems necessary to remind even Liberal statesmen who have been under the temptations of office, that the British Constitution—that unwritten code of usage and precedent that has the force of law as much as the common law of England—although giving great initiative and executive power to the Ministers of the Crown, through the Royal prerogative, has not conferred upon them absolute power, untempered by the supervision and advice, and in extreme cases by the censure, of the great National Council. The restrictions and obligations by which the Executive Government is bound, may be imperfect—may not be as clearly defined as they should be—but, if so, there is all the more reason for their being vigilantly preserved from violation and evasion.

It has been attempted to elevate Sir Robert Peel's doctrine, which Lord Palmerston on subsequent occasions, and with special reference to foreign affairs, cordially accepted, into a settled precedent, almost into a constitutional dogma. The doctrine appears to me to be dangerously unsound. It is not retrogressive, because it is novel. We may go very far back in the constitutional annals of our country, and yet find constant evidence of that Parliamentary spirit of inquiry into foreign affairs, and into the executive proceedings of the Crown, which our nineteenth century place-men seem united to resist. In the first page of Clarendon's "History of the Rebellion," the following passage occurs:—"King James in the end of March, 1625, died, leaving His Majesty, that now is, engaged in a war with Spain; but unprovided with money to manage it, *though it was undertaken with the consent and advice of Parliament.*" In 1677 supplies were refused to King Charles II. by the House of Commons, "*until His Majesty's alliances were made known.*" These two facts may serve to remind us that before the great struggle of prerogative and privilege began, and even during the reaction that followed the restoration of Monarchy,

the consent of Parliament in the conduct of foreign affairs was carefully sought ; and that the controlling power of the Commons over the issues of peace and war was asserted long before the Revolution, and in some degree secured by their holding the national purse. Hardly, however, had that controlling and inquisitorial power of Parliament been formally recorded in the Bill of Rights, than its direct application began to be found gradually more difficult in consequence of a series of economical, fiscal, and social changes. During the Tudor and Stuart period, the days of occasional effort and intermittent enterprise passed away ; trade and industry were immensely developed. Nations were organized on a permanent footing for production, traffic and defence. No sooner had the Revolution decided the supremacy of Parliament over prerogative, than a standing army, in spite of the letter of the law, and the form of an annual vote, became a national institution. The existence of great fixed establishments, a settled system of revenue, and the new machinery of credit, placed the Executive Government in such a condition of constant readiness and working order, that the obligation of the Crown not to enter on a negotiation or enterprise, without having made sure beforehand of the approval and support of Parliament—plain enough, as Clarendon tells us, in the reign of James I.—came to be less obvious in principle, because less pressing in practice. To compensate for this loss of direct control, both Houses of Parliament learned by degrees to assert and apply their inquisitorial power by motions, resolutions, and questions, without resorting to the extreme measure of stopping or suspending supplies. Within the last century, therefore, the Executive Power has not been impeded in its constant efforts to have its own way by any want of material resources, but has been impelled to shroud its dubious plans in mystery, and to screen its failures from observation, by avoiding occasions of debate, and evading inconvenient questions. The inquisitorial functions of Parliament, have not, I venture to urge, been guarded with sufficient jealousy within the present generation, and as the consequence and climax of this negligence, they were assailed and altogether set at nought by the Government of Lord Beaconsfield. The custom of putting questions to Ministers on every sort of subject has become so familiar, and ordinarily so commonplace an incident in Parliamentary procedure, that there is danger of our losing sight of the degree in which our liberties and our national interests may depend on the rigorous and serious maintenance of

this right of interpellation. The scrupulous accuracy and sincerity of Ministerial answers to questions that are put in Parliament, is the sole safeguard of the nation against being dragged against its will into rash engagements and iniquitous enterprises. About the most flagrant violation of that constitutional safeguard perpetrated by the late Ministry, occurred in connection with Indian affairs; and the Empire is suffering heavy loss and running a great risk at this moment that, but for a disingenuous answer given by Lord Salisbury in the House of Lords on the 15th of June, 1877, might have been averted. The incident must not be overlooked in the remedial and corrective measures undertaken by the new Parliament. If Lord Salisbury, the responsible Minister for India, had not given those assurances in the House of Lords, which hoodwinked Lord Northbrook and Lord Granville, those two noble lords distinctly intimated, on the 5th of December, 1878, that there would have been concerted action in both Houses, in the form of a resolution or motion which could scarcely have failed in extracting some disclosure of the facts—the withdrawal of the British Agent from Cabul, for example—that were sedulously kept in the background, and which would have proved that the suspicious treated by Lord Salisbury as “too absurd to be seriously entertained,” were only too well founded.

Lord Salisbury contrived for the time to baffle constitutional inquiry, and to evade Parliamentary control. If he can also contrive to escape Parliamentary censure, which, except by ministerial connivance, ought to be a difficult feat for him, he will then have made a very successful inroad on the principles of Constitutional Government. But there must be no such connivance. Even Sir Robert Peel’s charitable counsels cannot be made to apply to this case. No party considerations can be shown to prompt the condemnation of such an abuse of executive power, while to condone would be to confirm it. That would be a bad beginning for a Liberal Ministry.

Extreme as is this case, unparalleled in method and in manner, it is, after all, only a special manifestation of self-sufficient and self-willed officialism, striving against being called to account for executive plans and procedure, and bent on confining Parliament to legislative work. What the nation has now to dread most—what some of our independent and unpledged representatives alone can guard against—is the fellow-feeling and brotherly forbearance of the official benches.

After the electoral revolution that has taken place, ample

explanations and serious discussion in Parliament as to foreign and Indian affairs can hardly be postponed very long. The natural anxieties of our own people at home, and of administrations and nationalities abroad, must be relieved, enlightened, and set at rest. The opportunity that will then be afforded of re-asserting and re-establishing the Imperial functions of Parliament ought not to be thrown away. The contagion of the last six years has tainted and weakened some vital parts of the body politic, and unless a sufficiently numerous party in the new House of Commons can be awakened to a stronger sense of the inevitable official malady than the incoming Ministers, inoculated by their several "Offices," and slightly elated by power, are likely to feel, a thorough cure may soon be made more difficult and distant than ever. With regard to foreign, colonial, and Indian affairs, the spirit of party is too weak instead of being too strong. When we are warned not to make India the sport of party, and not to press for information as to dealings with Continental States, the real objection is to national supervision, not to factious interference. Yet the nation ought to know something, before it is too late, as to the burdens laid upon it and the engagements contracted or broken in its name. Under the Tudors and Stuarts, the House of Commons managed to have a voice in such matters. What is really wanted for the present distress is a new constitutional party to enforce Parliamentary control and to exact Ministerial responsibility.

The nation must no longer be deprived of all voice in the supreme guardianship of its own honour and interests by the pretentious mysteries of diplomacy. What have they ever been worth to the commonwealth? Without going into details, or denying that confidential communications may often be necessary, the broad statement may be safely made that overtures of national importance are not of the hair-trigger description, liable to go off at one puff of popular breath. All the most effectual negotiations and great pacificating settlements of the world have taken place almost in public. And let us suppose that those masterpieces of diplomatic art, those mighty achievements of the Beaconsfield Ministry—the Salisbury-Schouvaloff Agreement, the Anglo-Turkish Convention, and the Treaty of Gundamuk—had been made public, and had been discussed, clause by clause, in Parliament, and in the daily journals, before instead of after their conclusion and ratification, what harm would have been done? I am not now speculating on the happy chance that light and air might have turned these conceptions of darkness into abortions; but assuming that they were beneficial to all concerned, why should they

have been concocted in secret? Could perfect secrecy have made them more effective or less ephemeral?

The most absolutely private and confidential compact between two States that has been made within the experience of the present generation, was, I suppose, the Peace of Villafranca in 1859. It was concluded in a personal conference between two Emperors, each one at the head of a great army. Within a month—before the fair copy could be signed at Zurich, before Garibaldi and his thousand men had made the Kingdom of Italy—the compact of the two Emperors had become waste-paper, without a shot being fired. Louis Napoleon and Francis Joseph had left the people of Italy out of their calculations. The Afghan people were forgotten when the Treaty of Gundamak was made. The people of Great Britain and Ireland were not consulted as to the Anglo-Turkish Convention.

Long before the assumption of the Imperial title by the Queen in 1877, the supremacy of Great Britain had been so practically established in India, that organized resistance by any allied State would have been treated not as war, but as treason. Our negotiations with Indian Princes and our treatment of their claims, have become as arbitrary, one-sided, and exclusively official as our dealings with the inhabitants of the provinces under our direct rule. Popular opinion and sentiment are held of no account. Consequently, there is an administrative structure in British India, but no solid government. English opinion on Indian topics has been equally despised and neglected. Parliamentary inquiry and intervention have been declared to be dangerous. Every movement has been official. In Indian politics, for something like half a century, the people of India have been entirely set aside, but not more so than the people of the United Kingdom. The English people were not consulted, either in the constituencies or through their elected representatives, as to the systematic policy of converting Native States into British Provinces, that was only checked in 1857, after an unrestrained course of ten years, by a destructive and bloody rebellion. The annexation of the friendly and faithful States of Sattara, Jhansi, Nagpore, and Oude was only made known to the Imperial Parliament as a series of accomplished facts. It would have been too late then to reverse them; nothing less than a concerted party attack would have brought even the semblance of censure on Lord Dalhousie and on the Liberal Ministry that had instructed and encouraged him in his policy of pure officialism—the rapacious policy of refraining from local reform, and

insisting on centralised uniformity, destroying friendly States and making disaffected provinces. The Civil and Military services, whose voices were heard and whose views were accepted, hailed the policy of annexation as the perfection of wisdom, because it brought them promotion, patronage, and the glorification of their craft, creed, and race. The doomed States were themselves almost inarticulate; and although the best men in India—such men as Sir Henry Lawrence, Sir George Clerk, Sir William Sleeman, and Sir John Low—saw through the plausible iniquity, and the transcendent mischief that was being perpetrated, they were not in the ascendant, they were in a small minority, and could hardly obtain a hearing. They were generally denounced as superannuated or sentimental Orientalists, who hated enlightenment, and preferred the Natives to their own fellow-countrymen. The few good men in both Houses of Parliament and in the Court of Directors, who took the part of the allied and protected States, spoke to deaf ears and empty benches.

The opponents of annexation were the true reformers. Those who opposed annexation invariably aimed at administrative reform, and the limitation of princely prerogative, while the acquisitive school avoided reform and maintained personal rule. Their process requiring that all treaties should be slighted, they completely overlooked—they were obliged to do so—the vast power of intervention and supervision placed in our hands by those treaties, which, if judiciously exercised, could, in every instance, have prevented or cured all misgovernment without destroying the Native Principality.

The important protected State of Mysore, with a population of four millions and an annual revenue of a million sterling, had been in 1856, for nearly twenty-five years, administered by a British Commissioner, the authority of the Maharajah being entirely superseded by virtue of one of those treaties, providing for temporary management in case of misrule, which Lord Dalhousie declined to enforce for the benefit of either Oude or Nagpore. He refused to reform a disorderly State; he refused to restore a reformed State. In a Minute dated the 16th of January, 1856, just before his retirement, Lord Dalhousie left on record, as a legacy of counsel for Lord Canning, a statement of his desire and design to incorporate Mysore with the British dominions, on the death of the reigning Rajah.

The sequestration of Mysore, in 1831, was declared to have taken place under the Subsidiary Treaty of 1799, but was not

really justified by the terms of that Treaty, or by the circumstances of the time. This was candidly acknowledged within three years by Lord William Bentinck, the Governor-General who had been misled by erroneous local reports into taking that extreme step. He wrote, as follows, in a despatch to the Secret Committee of the Court of Directors, dated the 14th of April, 1834 :—

“By the adoption of the arrangement which I advocate”—a new Treaty and a partial restoration—“certain doubts will be removed which I cannot help entertaining, both as to the legality and the justice, according to a strict interpretation, of the course that has been pursued. The Treaty warrants an assumption of the country with a view to secure the payment of our Subsidy. The assumption was actually made on account of the Rajah’s misgovernment. The Subsidy does not appear to have been in any immediate jeopardy. Again, the Treaty authorises us to assume such *part* or *parts* of the country as may be necessary to render the funds which we claim efficient and available. The whole has been assumed, although a part would unquestionably have sufficed for the purpose specified in the Treaty.”

The truth is that the case in favour of the Rajah, and against the hasty assumption of his country, is much stronger than would appear from Lord William Bentinck’s frank acknowledgment. He says that the Subsidy was not “in immediate jeopardy”; but he was not then aware of the fact that *it had never been in arrears for a day*. In his letter to the Maharajah, dated the 7th of September, 1831, announcing his intention of assuming the management of Mysore, he had, on the strength of highly-coloured semi-official reports from Madras, unverified by accounts, written these words: “The Subsidy due to the British Government has not been paid monthly according to the Treaty of 6th July, 1799.” But, in fact, it had been paid monthly. At the time the management was assumed, there were no arrears due, and the subsidy had been paid *in advance* for several months. The sequestration of the Mysore State, and complete supersession of the Maharajah, were not effected in accordance with the Subsidiary Treaty, but in contradiction to its provisions. Both the legal and the moral justification originally advanced by Lord William Bentinck, breaks down on careful examination. Within two years from the sequestration of Mysore, Lord William Bentinck himself, after a personal visit to that country, became convinced that he had been deceived and misled. He found that the unqualified denunciations, which had induced him to shelve the Rajah, were by no means corroborated by the detailed infor-

mation laid before him by the Special Committee of Inquiry. He acknowledged his error, and he regretted it to the last hour of his life. After his return to England, he repeatedly declared that the supersession of the Rajah of Mysore was almost the only incident in his Indian administration that he looked back upon with sorrow. Immediately after his own local investigation, he sent the despatch to the Home Government dated 14th of April, 1834, already quoted here, in which he recommended the Rajah's restoration to a more limited sphere of power, and in which he testifies warmly to His Highness's personal capabilities; declares him to be "in the highest degree intelligent and sensible;" mentions the universal description of his character as "the reverse of tyrannical or cruel;" and expresses a belief that "he will make a good ruler in future." But the Maharajah was never to rule his country again. That one critical chance was lost, because the Court of Directors, in their letter (No. 45, of the 25th of September, 1835) in reply to the Governor-General's proposal, objected entirely to tarnish the prospective reinstatement of a Prince who "had ever been," as they observe, "the attached friend of the British Government," by even that limited project of partition recommended by Lord William Bentinck. They objected to the division of a State, the separate integrity of which was guaranteed by the Treaty with the Nizam. The doctrines of annexation were not yet in vogue.

Both Lord William Bentinck, the Governor-General who assumed the management of Mysore, and the Home Authorities, who sanctioned it, agreed in considering it as a temporary measure only, to remain in force, "until," in the words of a despatch from the Court of Directors, dated 28th March, 1836, "the arrangements for good Government shall have been so firmly established as to be secure from future disturbance."

From 1834 to the day of his death in 1868, the Rajah never ceased to claim his restoration; three Governors-General—Lord William Bentinck, Sir Charles Metcalfe, and Lord Hardinge—admitted that his abrupt supersession was inconsiderate, unduly severe, and of doubtful legality; and down to the year 1856, neither the Supreme Government nor the Home Authorities had ever contested his claim, or had placed on record any expressed or implied intention of permanently retaining the management of Mysore; they postponed the re-instatement only to a more convenient season, when an orderly administration for the country should have been effectually established. But how was it to be decided when "the arrangements for good Govern-



ment had been so firmly established as to be secure from future disturbance?" This was a question which the Rajah himself very naturally asked, as reported by the Resident at Mysore in a despatch, dated the 5th of May, 1836. "Were the reports of the officers employed in the Commission to be the guide to the Government, the reports of those whose employment would be lost by the re-transfer of the country?" The officers of the Commission, in gradually increasing numbers, had settled themselves down very comfortably with their large salaries in the fine climate of Mysore, and such a self-denying ordinance was hardly to be expected from them. The great improvements effected by General Cubbon's excellent administration could have been imposed upon the Maharajah's Government under the terms of the Treaty with equal precision, greater advantage, and at much less cost; but still there was no doubt about the improvements. The Mutual Advantage Society, of which the centre is at Calcutta, had its corresponding branch at Bangalore. Every day added to their reluctance to part with the management of so rich and thriving a province, and to break up the system of their own construction, under which it had so signally prospered. The reluctance was defensible, if not justifiable; but the real difficulty, however disguised, was the patronage. General Cubbon began his work with four English Assistants, and gradually raised the number to thirty; while offices and departments were progressively multiplied after his retirement, so that in 1866, when the aged Maharajah was making his last stand against annexation, there were ninety-five English gentlemen quartered on Mysore, drawing salaries therefrom to the amount of £100,000 per annum. The same process had been going on all over India. We were enamoured with our own achievements, but the deficit was permanent. In the hope of restoring a financial equilibrium, the short-sighted policy of internal acquisitions began to be entertained both at Calcutta and at home. The Rajah of Mysore had no son, and in 1847 he was in his fifty-fifth year. That valuable field of patronage now began to be regarded, though in a furtive fashion, as Mysore the rich reversion. In February, 1848, Lord Dalhousie arrived in India to turn these vague predilections into a pre-determined policy. What were his reflections on Mysore in the full tide of his territorial acquisitions may be easily conceived. In one of his Minutes, dated the 16th January, 1856, reviewing General Cubbon's Administration Report for the preceding official year, he resorted to the doubly fallacious pretext by which several "protected" States had been already destroyed,

and said: "The Treaty under which Lord Wellesley raised the Rajah, while yet a child, to the musnud, and the Treaty which was subsequently concluded with himself, were both silent as to heirs and successors. No mention is made of them; the Treaty is exclusively a personal one." Lord Dalhousie was not in the habit of taking legal opinions as to his annexations and resumpti<sup>o</sup>ns, otherwise any jurist would have told him, first, that "a treaty of perpetual friendship and alliance," to be "binding as long as the sun and moon endure," could not be a personal treaty, and that the words "heirs and successors" were quite superfluous to make sovereignty hereditary; and, secondly, that "personal" treaties are not necessarily, or even usually, good only for one life, but are more frequently made, as in the case of the Treaty of 1849 between the Princes of Hohenzollern and the King of Prussia, with a view to hereditary permanence. The Minute concluded with these words:—"I trust, therefore, that when the decease of the present Rajah shall come to pass, without son or grandson, or legitimate male heir of any description, the Territory of Mysore, which will then have lapsed to the British Government, will be resumed, and that the good work, which has been so well begun, will be completed." Thus was the allied and tributary State of Mysore *secretly* marked down for annexation. Thenceforth the true obstacle to restoration was not the Rajah's alleged incompetence, not the impossibility of securing good government, but an aversion to relax our grasp, to relinquish the advantages of administrative possession, and the prospective reversion. And but for the Rebellion of 1857, and a change of Ministry in 1867, the Mysore State would undoubtedly have become a province of the Madras Presidency.

Before the end of 1857 a very general conviction had seized hold on the public mind that the acquisitive proceedings of Lord Dalhousie during the previous ten years had been greatly conducive to the rebellion that was then raging, and that our success in subduing it, and the circumscription of its limits, were due in a great measure to the influence of some of those despised Native States which had happened to escape annexation. A revulsion took place in favour of the Indian Princes, who were felt to have manifested, in return for injury and contempt, and under circumstances of extreme trial, not merely good will and good faith, but power and capacity for which their best friends had hardly given them credit. The feeling was not confined to the general public; it extended to our statesmen, both in and out of office, and is clearly enough indicated in the speeches

and publications of the day and in the dealings of the Executive Government.

This incidental turn of the public mind was not strong enough to concentrate permanent attention on Indian affairs, or to stem the recurring tide of official prejudice and interest, and but for a potent reinforcement would probably have died away when military triumph and measures of pacification had for the time removed alarm and restored routine. Party spirit came to the rescue. The small body of independent Indian reformers had succeeded happily, in 1854, in invoking party spirit so far as to administer a check to Lord Dalhousie, by a threatened motion in the House of Commons against the annexation of Kerowlee, which would have been the first encroachment on the States of Rajpootana, and would probably have turned the scale in favour of rebellion three years later, in that important region of India. More fully instructed, better fortified by facts, and backed by opinion out of doors, the spirit of party would evidently have led the Conservative Opposition, after the catastrophe of 1857, to go more deeply into the Indian question, and to take up a more decided and hostile attitude against Lord Dalhousie's policy of annexation, which had run its entire course under a Liberal Government. Mr. Disraeli's utterances in Parliament, the *Press* evening journal, under his influence, and the Oude despatches, which led to Lord Ellenborough's retirement the next year, give a fair notion of the line of attack that would have been taken up. But unfortunately, as it seems to me, this party movement was prematurely cut short in February, 1858, by what are called the responsibilities of office. Lord Ellenborough's blundering Oude despatches probably did good rather than harm, containing, as they did, a very unofficial confession of wrong having been done, and having a few sympathetic words for popular convictions and sentiments. Anything that betrays a human heart and a moral sense at the back of our hard, political system, must have a healthy influence in India, warning and correcting, be it ever so little, the self-complacent host of officials, relieving the monotony of discontent and despair among the most thoughtful of the Indian population. That very element of uncertainty and variability in the action of the Executive, which has been pointed out as one of the evils of representative Government, is really its great merit. Perfection and infallibility are not to be looked for in human institutions. Too long a tenure of office inoculates statesmen with the characteristic malady of permanent functionaries. They become impatient of

discussion, and intolerant of publicity. Party spirit breaks in upon this, and government by party periodically brings fresher and younger minds to bear upon great problems. The Minister who has just emerged from Opposition is likely to be comparatively free from prejudice and formality, to be unfettered by old pledges and attachments. A Minister might naturally be expected to regard with more severe discrimination the decrees of a Governor or Viceroy belonging to the other side, than he would those of one appointed by his own leader, and with whom he was on terms of personal intimacy. A Conservative Government came very seasonably into office at that critical stage in the great Indian rebellion, when some faults of the past and of recent date, which their predecessors had committed, could be corrected, and when some new principles could be declared which were hardly compatible with the policy which their predecessors had been pursuing. In January, 1858, the Viceroy, Lord Canning, had published a decree for the confiscation of Dhar, a small State in Central India. On the 11th of June in that same year, the new President of the Board of Control, soon afterwards the Secretary of State, Lord Stanley, stated in the House of Commons that it was the intention of Her Majesty's Government "to disallow the policy of annexation as regards the territory of Dhar, and that the present occupation of that territory was provisional only."\* The complete rejection both of their doctrine and their method in this instance was very much taken to heart by the functionaries at Calcutta. It was protested against there as a great blow to authority, and the conduct of some persons in connection with it, was considered as quite unpardonable. The Maharajah Holkar of Indore was made to suffer, and has been made to suffer ever since, on account of the frank and generous part he was known to have taken in communication with the late Mr. John Dickinson, for the protection of his neighbour, the infant Rajah of Dhar. Lord Stanley, now the Earl of Derby, had placed him "high on the list of those Princes who had distinguished themselves by acts of fidelity and friendship to the British Government," and who were to be "rewarded by territorial grants."† Lord Elphinstone, the Governor of Bombay, wrote in July, 1857:—"If he (Holkar) had been ill-disposed towards us, the whole country would have risen. All the

\* "Hansard," vol. 2nd, of 1857-58, p. 574; and see "Dhar Papers" (200 of 1859), p. 5.

† "Lords' Return, Honours and Rewards for Princes of India" (77 of 1860), p. 7 and p. 32.

smaller Chiefs seem to take their cue from him." And he wrote to Holkar himself :—"The endeavours which your Highness's Government has made in suppressing rebellion and punishing the mutinous troops, will not be forgotten by the British Government." The promise that Holkar was to receive a territorial reward "in due proportion," according to the terms of a letter from Lord Canning, "to the Nizam and Scindia," was communicated to the Maharajah, and his Ministers, in the Indore Durbar, by the British Agent, Sir Robert Hamilton, in March, 1859. But in June, 1859, Lord Stanley was no longer Secretary of State; a Liberal Government was reinstalled in office; Lord Elphinstone died in 1860; the official influences, checked for a brief space, prevailed once more; and although the little State of Dhar was preserved from extinction, the functionaries at Calcutta contrived by passive and dilatory means, and by argumentative despatches, to delay compliance with the orders of the Home Government for six years and a-half, from June, 1858, down to December, 1864.\* Dhar was saved, but instead of his territorial reward, Holkar, to the national dishonour, has got nothing for his pains but detraction and obloquy.

By this reversal of the hasty condemnation of Dhar, nobody lost anything except Holkar, and far from giving a blow to our authority, it had a most beneficial effect, spreading abroad a belief in the real supervision of the Crown, and raising the moral influence of our Government. Yet it was one of those acts that are seldom done by a Minister long enough in office to be thoroughly broken in.

The same may be said of a far more important and widely-extending measure—the Queen's Proclamation of 1858, on taking over the direct administration of India from the East India Company. This memorable document, which did much to tranquillize and restore confidence after the convulsion and horrors of 1857, and which is cherished in every Native State as the charter of its existence, could never have been put forth by the Government of Lord Palmerston, for it conveys a covert condemnation of that Government's past proceedings. The decencies and precedents of official diction are observed; the settled custom of keeping up an appearance of consistency and continuity is maintained; but no one acquainted with the reign of terror through which the protected States of India had been living between 1848 and 1856, can misunderstand the

\* "Further Papers, Dhar" (196 of 1865), p. 117.

purport of the two following clauses in the Proclamation of 1858 :—

We hereby announce to the Native Princes of India that all Treaties and Engagements made by them by or under the authority of the Honourable East India Company, are by Us accepted, and will be scrupulously maintained : and we look for the like observance on their part.

We desire no extension of Our present territorial possessions ; and, while we will permit no aggression upon Our dominions or Our rights to be attempted with impunity, We shall sanction no encroachment on those of others. We shall respect the rights, dignity, and honour of Native Princes as Our own.

These assurances were accepted as they were intended—as a solemn pledge that the principles of Lord Dalhousie's policy of annexation were abandoned for ever. In that sense, and in the sense of a retrospective reproach on the Cabinet of which he had been a member, these assurances were evidently understood by the Duke of Argyll. An article from his Grace's pen in the *Edinburgh Review* for April, 1863, subsequently reprinted in a small volume, pronounced it "more than doubtful whether it was expedient to issue any proclamation to the people of India, such as that which the Cabinet of Lord Derby issued in the name of the Crown." "As regards the administration of affairs no change of principle was required." "The Government was not a new one, neither were its principles of administration new." "Already," complained the Duke, "the words of the Proclamation are used as an armoury for debate, and are wildly quoted as consistent or inconsistent with the tenor of particular measures." This was "a dangerous position." "It would have been better to stand on the character which the Government of India had never forfeited, and which it required no new Proclamation to define."\*

The Royal Proclamation of 1858 being, however, an accomplished fact, and one most welcome to those independent members in both Houses who had paid most attention to India, was loyally acknowledged by the Liberal administration on their return to power, as a fixed and fundamental point in Imperial policy. Lord Canning made a still greater advance in repudiating Lord Dalhousie's doctrines as to the impotence and uselessness to the Empire of the Native States, in his despatch of the 30th of April, 1860, recommending that for the future there should be no interference with succession by

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\* "India under Dalhousie and Canning" (Longmans, 1865), pp. 105, 106. 1

adoption in Hindoo Principalities. Not only did he bear testimony to the strength that our Government had derived from the allied and protected States during the rebellion—when, as he said, “these patches of Native Government served as breakwaters to the storm which would otherwise have swept over us in one great wave,” but he implicitly confessed that the destructive process freely employed by Lord Dalhousie, was historically and legally indefensible. Sweeping away the sham precedents and prerogatives by which the faithful and friendly States of Nagpore, Sattara, and Jhansi had been destroyed, “we have not shown,” he says, in paragraph 17 of that despatch, “so far as I can find, a single instance in which adoption by a Sovereign Prince has been invalidated by a refusal of assent from a paramount Power.” In the sentiments as well as the arguments of the Adoption despatches, the Secretary of State, Sir Charles Wood (now Viscount Halifax) entirely concurred.\*

It is a singular fact that at this very time, these two eminent statesmen, Lord Canning and Lord Halifax, with apparently strange inconsistency, were bent on the annexation of Mysore, and the latter eventually, though, it is believed, unwillingly, decided on carrying it out by the discredited plan of ignoring the effect of an adoption. Lord Canning was misled by his official surroundings into the belief that the possession of Mysore would be peculiarly advantageous; and he was also misled by certain alleged expressions of impatience and hopelessness during Lord Dalhousie’s incumbency, into a belief that the old Maharajah did not really wish to adopt a successor, but would make “a bequest of his country, in full sovereignty to the Crown” (see despatch to the Secretary of State, No. 35, dated the 30th of March, 1860).

The Maharajah, however, made no such bequest, but on the 18th of June, 1865, formally and publicly adopted a son, in accordance with necessary native customs. At this crisis, once more, party spirit, in its best form, and under its most benevolent aspect, came to the rescue. The Liberal Cabinet, never thoroughly converted from the showy plausibilities of the policy it had for eight years upheld, hesitated to give up the “exceptional” reversion of Mysore, and but for the salutary action of party government the annexation would probably have taken place. The

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\* There is a fact in connection with these despatches, that it will be our business, by-and-by, to disclose.—Ed. S.

recognition of the adopted son as heir to the throne was deferred until a Conservative Ministry came into office, in 1866, and until the fresher and younger mind, and unbiassed judgment of Lord Cranborne (now Lord Salisbury) was brought to bear on the subject. Sir Stafford Northcote, who succeeded to the India Office when the Reform Bill of 1867 had led to Lord Salisbury's resignation, was enabled to reverse in reality the decision of his predecessors, while preserving, according to official custom, the consecutiveness and harmonious continuity of records, by a fortunate circumstance. The persistent claim of the old Maharajah, repeatedly rejected, had been for the restoration of his personal rule over the Mysore State. But in his Highness's latest letter, dated 4th July, 1866, unanswered when Sir Stafford Northcote came into office, "the question as to the disposal of the territory of Mysore, after the death of the present Maharajah," was, for the first time, "formally raised," and, thereupon, Her Majesty's Government, "having regard to the antiquity of the Maharajah's family, and its long connection with Mysore," determined "to maintain that family on the throne in the person of his Highness's adopted son."\* Consequently, on the demise of the aged Maharajah, in March, 1868, his heir, Chamrajendra Wadiyar, was enthroned as his successor. In December of the same year the Liberals, under Mr. Gladstone, regained power, but every provision that had been made for the education of the young Prince, for the safe custody of the treasures contained in the Palace, and for so modifying the fabric of administration as to render it suitable for transfer to his Highness on his majority, was approved and confirmed by the Duke of Argyll, who succeeded Sir Stafford Northcote. Throughout his tenure of office the Duke of Argyll firmly upheld and promoted a policy which, so long as it was an open question, he is known to have deprecated. Into this case, therefore, no bitterness of party can enter.

In the promised reconstitution of the Mysore State, we have the solitary instance of an Indian Principality held under sequestration for nearly fifty years, and doomed to extinction as a separate State, reprieved from that sentence, and held for the last twelve years in trust for its infant Sovereign. When the cloud of annexation—hanging above Mysore and thereby gathering again over the constituent States of the Empire—was dispersed by the Home Government in 1867, the moral authority of the

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\* "*Mysore Papers*," 1866, pp. 3, 9.



Imperial Crown was greatly strengthened throughout India. The time now approaches for a still more decisive step in the work of restitution. Only a few months remain in which the final arrangements can be made for transferring executive power and direct control over the entire fabric of administration from the British Commissioner to the Indian Prince, and for choosing his Highness's first Minister. The project of transition is now anxiously scanned, and the process will be eagerly watched, not only at Bangalore and Calcutta, but at every centre of political activity and thought throughout India. Recent intelligence from Mysore tells us of deep dissatisfaction being very prevalent, and of alarming doubts as to the success, and even as to the integrity, of local stewardship since the decease of the late Maharajah in 1868. If Lord Hartington and Lord Ripon can rise to the height of the situation, it may be a fortunate circumstance, for India no less than for the Mysore State, that this crisis of the young Maharajah's minority should be so closely coincident with the fall of the Beaconsfield Ministry. And here there is no invidious comparison of principles or capacity. The complications in Mysore are represented as being of such a nature, that nothing but the freshness of judgment and freedom of initiative possessed by a Secretary of State newly appointed under our system of party rule, would be likely to stay the sickness or to create healthy conditions.

In the Administration Report of Mysore for 1872-3, the Chief Commissioner, Sir Richard Meade, expressed this confident hope:—"When the time comes for the young Maharajah's accession to power, he will succeed to a flourishing exchequer, and to an administration organized in all its details. Seldom," he added, "will a monarch have assumed the reins of government under fairer auspices, and never will an Indian ruler have assumed the dominion of a province richer in all the elements of material wealth." It is a serious question for the Imperial Government, while yet a few months remain for curative measures, whether, under existing auspices, the confident hopes of Sir Richard Meade are in a fair way to be realised, whether the Maharajah is likely to find his public exchequer flourishing, or the material wealth of the Palace intact, or to be assisted in his earliest efforts as a ruler by a competent "administration, organized in all its details." The "flourishing exchequer," indeed, is past praying for. The year of famine came to give the finishing touch to ten years of extravagance and waste. In 1861, when the twenty-five years of General Sir Mark Cubbon's administration

came to an end, he left a million sterling in hard cash in the Mysore treasury, the fruit of accumulated surpluses. At the close of the official year 1871-2, £300,000 of this fund still remained. All has now gone, and a million of debt appears on the wrong side of the account.

As to the competent "administration organized in all its details," general instructions of marked liberality and unquestionable equity have been despatched on several occasions by the Home Government without distinction of party—both when the Duke of Argyll was Secretary of State, and since the late Ministry came into power—declaring it to be "essential that the administration should be conducted with a judicious reference to native feelings, and, in a great measure, by native agency." But no Secretary of State hitherto seems to have realised the obstructive resources of a chartered bureaucracy. During the ample interval of twelve years since the installation of the minor Prince, instead of a serious, well-considered scheme of transmutation, various dilatory measures have, been talked about, taken up, dropped, and resumed, always with more serious regard for the outgoing body of English officials, than for the nascent Indian hierarchy, upon whose tried qualifications the Maharajah ought to be able to depend on the very day of his assuming charge. His Highness's own capabilities, views, and wishes are probably somewhat obscure at present. Those who have the warmest and most legitimate interest in his welfare and in the success of his rule, complain that every person having the least claim, from birth and rank, or public services, to be considered as one of the notables of Mysore, has been jealously excluded from personal intercourse with the Maharajah. The young Prince, it is said, has received a fair education, has learned to ride, to shoot, to take a part in polo, cricket, and other manly exercises, to drive four-in-hand, and to enjoy the society of accomplished English ladies—all excellent things in their way—but has not been allowed to see enough of his own territories or of his own subjects. It is said, also, that the too common aversion of English officials in India to Native coadjutors of decided originality and strength of character, has been most injuriously displayed of late years, more particularly in appointments and promotions, having a direct connection with the impending transfer of government.

A strong Dewan or Minister is, above all, essential for the prosperity of an Indian State, especially when the Prince is young. In the first instance, the choice of a Minister must

obviously be exercised by the British Government, although it is most requisite that the person chosen, whether found within Mysore or brought in from another province, should be acceptable to the Rajah, and capable of commanding respect and obedience throughout his dominions. A mere creature of the British Commissioner, with purely official qualifications, would be of no use, either to Mysore or to the Empire, even though his reputation might be without a stain. Any discredit or grave suspicion hanging over the antecedents of such a person would make him worse than useless.

It was made a very unfair topic of reproach against the late Maharajah, during his appeal for restoration in 1866, that he had enjoyed, without profiting by them, singular "advantages in the way of political education," under "the tutelage of a native statesman," the celebrated Poorniah, "of high character and great ability." Poorniah's tutelage, in fact, had consisted in removing from the young Prince's reach, all means of improving his mind and of becoming acquainted with public business, and in encouraging him in every sort of frivolous pursuit. Poorniah's great project was to throw his master completely into the background, and to gain for himself and his family, the position of hereditary premier. But Poorniah was, undoubtedly, a man of high and commanding character, whose rank and services, no less than his administrative ability, ensured public respect, and made him an efficient Minister. Poorniah was, to say the least, a good steward. His personal integrity was unimpeachable. He handed over to his master a full treasury and a great store of jewels. The present Maharajah's ancestral property, in jewellery and plate—property of a nature peculiarly indestructible and identifiable—was valued, in 1869, at about £400,000. No one who cannot give as clear an account in this department as Poorniah did, must be allowed to take Poorniah's place, or to occupy any post that would enable him to cut all connection with the past, and to give and take a reciprocal acquittance. Very ugly rumours have been in circulation for some time, as to a contemplated arrangement under which there would be no transmission of power at all, under which the reconstitution of the Native State would be merely colourable, without any honest consultation as to its new conditions, without any inquiry as to the past, without any accountability in the future. It is to be hoped, notwithstanding much anxiety and alarm, that up to this time the departmental authorities in London and at Calcutta, though to

some extent, perhaps, prepared, are not pledged to an approval of the rumoured arrangement. But wider and weightier issues than those of local interest are bound up in the investigation and correction of neglect or misconduct in Mysore. The nomination of a competent Dewan cannot fail to bring up for decision the main question whether the restoration of the Mysore State is to be genuine and ungrudging, or is to be impaired by arbitrary and unwarranted conditions. There is one point in the case that it might seem ungracious—not to say audacious—to urge openly on the one side, unless under great pressure, but which most assuredly has never been, and never will be, forgotten, and that is that the original sequestration, as recorded by Lord William Bentinck, and confessed so late as 1863, in the Council of India, by Sir John Willoughby,\* was illegal and a violation of the Treaty. This wrongful act, however well intended, can confer no right or title on the protecting Power to make any demand or exaction from the restored Prince, that might not have been made from his predecessor if his rule had been uninterrupted.

The prospective transfer of executive authority over the extensive and fertile territories of Mysore from a British Commission to a Hindu Prince may well be watched by politicians of both our great parties as a trial of the compatibility of Imperial supremacy with provincial self-government; and there can be no doubt that the details of the transaction will be most closely observed, not only by the Mysoreans, but by all Indian Princes and statesmen, and will be regarded as affording a crucial test of the good faith and sincerity of Imperial declarations. Upon the prompt and decisive action of the new Viceroy and the new Secretary of State, it now depends whether this important and conspicuous experiment is to be an honourable success or a foregone and predestined failure. Whether it is to be a failure, or whether it is to be a success, may possibly turn to some extent on timely inquiries being made as to its progress or conclusion; and no person in either House of Parliament should be deterred from making and pressing such inquiries by vague laudation of officialism, or by stale and unfair denunciation of party spirit.

## THE PHILOSOPHY OF LIBERALISM.

It needs no demonstration that a cause or principle will always be most likely to triumph in the world when it is sought to be carried out most completely in accordance with its own genius, when it moves most exactly along its proper lines, and puts forth its undivided strength. More especially must this be the case with all principles which derive their strength from the eternal nature of things, and whose motive power lies in the moral enthusiasm they create in men. Expressing pure abstract truth, they have a thousand allies in the constitution of each human mind; appealing to the great moral sanctions, they arouse by far the deepest and strongest principle in a nature, and turn its force against the evil they seek to overthrow. Principles of this character are always most influential in proportion as they are expressed with their native breadth and grandeur. They may come from the lips of one man, but behind him, giving force to his words, are those massive forces of right, which in the long run bear away all obstacles in their path. And since Liberalism possesses both these characteristics, and from them derives its strength—since its path lies along the line of pure abstract right, which gives it its *raison d'être*, and since it appeals for its success to the moral instincts of men, to the sense of justice and humanity—it follows that it is always strongest when it is most robust, most uncompromising; when it most exactly hits the line of wise practical statesmanship, and calls up the greatest volume of enthusiasm to carry its projects into effect. When these two are combined it is nearly always a conquering power. As Herbert Spencer would put it, choosing the line of right, it chooses the line of least resistance; calling up the moral enthusiasms as the motive force, it lays hold of the most potent engines that reside in the nature of man. Combining these two, it is assured of ultimate triumph, and it is most likely to win the triumph of the day.\*

The path of true Liberalism is along the lines of moral equity

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\* As our readers will perceive, this article was written before the result of the late elections was known.

and intellectual right. If an exact statement could now be made of all legislation as it now is ; if a *conspectus* of our social system and legislative code could be presented before us ; and if a mind able to traverse the whole extent of every conception were then to draw lines from things as they are to things as they ought to be, those lines would mark out the exact march which ought to be taken by the great Liberal host. That would express the grand strategical movements which they could most easily and most effectively carry out. No doubt this sketches a project of Reform which would demand generations to get embodied in laws on the statute-book, but that is the line along which the Liberal advance must be made, and, sooner or later, it must overtake the whole. English statesmanship has always been solid and practical—it has had no projects in the air, no paper constitutions ; each brick of the edifice forming the body politic must be laid close to the last brick, and there must be no unseen gaps, but the outlines made by pure abstract right make the plan and elevation of the social edifice which the Liberal builders have it in charge to construct. Our legislative system follows the order of Nature : it moves only a little at a time, so as to give as trifling inconvenience as possible to those whom it affects ; but its true line of development is along the line pointed out by Nature, and Liberalism is always strongest when along this line it calls up its greatest force to “do the next thing,” accomplish the task of the hour.

If such lines, from things as they are to things as they ought to be, could be drawn, not only would they mark out the proper line of march of the Liberal host, they would also mark out the line along which the nation is sure, sooner or later, to go. There are forces every moment gathering greater strength, which press in this direction, and their quiet constant momentum cannot possibly be withstood. The living tide of the great mass of humanity ; the ever-growing energy of an advancing people ; the native sentiments of justice and honour which dwell in all unsophisticated souls ; the influence of culture and education, of science and art and poetry, and all those thousand things which make for the right, form, in their union, a force against which it is futile to strive. This is always most clearly seen when we look at great historic breadths. We may then see the continuous conquest of right as clearly as from a mountain top we can trace the course of a great river, and mark it growing broader, deeper, more resistless as it nears the sea. Mr. Herbert Spencer’s “Sociological Tables” show us, at one view, our English history from the time of the Druids to the year 1850 ; and anyone who examines them will find one steady pro-

gress, one continuous triumph—the martyrs of one age the heroes and fashioners of the next. Can anyone believe that that march of a great people can be withstood, that the momentum of ages will cease, that the principles which have always triumphed in the past can fail to secure victory in the future? Everyone who fights in the Liberal ranks ought to fight with the assurance of victory; the cause he advocates, if it be just, must triumph. Beaten down to-day, he shall be successful to-morrow. If his blood be shed as a martyr in the cause, it clothes that cause with a moral force which shall secure it a nobler conquest.

It is therefore of the highest importance that Liberals, especially Liberal leaders, should be capable of taking large, broad, statesman-like views. Obviously this is necessary for many reasons. In the first place, only by so doing can they look away, from the point where they now stand, up to the point which the Liberal creed marks out as the line of advance, and by this means lead the host along that line. If they are feeble, little men, shut in within narrow conventionalisms, unable to range over great areas, they have not the mental and moral robustness needed to command the confidence of the people; they are not worthy to lead a strong and high-spirited race like the English race; and they had far better retire into the background, and let more capable men come to the front. Every Liberal leader ought to be like the great Hebrew legislator, when he stood on Pisgah, and viewed the promised land—behind him, not unworthy deeds, and unheroic ancestors, but all these forming themselves into nobler inspirations to lead on to a worthier and richer life, to a solid and enduring greatness far surpassing anything yet attained. None but an able and enlightened statesman can ever appreciate the greatness, the majesty, the simple nobleness of our English constitution; can see the immortal strength it possesses as it rests “broad-based upon the people’s will.” Only such an one can ever be in deep sympathy with it—his mental structure fashioned by its broad principles, his moral nature roused to enthusiasm by its grand traditions. Given only a great man, one touched with reverence for the mighty dead—such an one will drink in from the Liberal principle all high and heroic inspirations; he will dilate to the full measure of the idea; the powerful champions of English liberty will live over again in his nature; he will exult in the glorious strength of Milton, the glorious daring of Sidney. Thus, in the second place, having this large calibre and mould, he will see clearly the surpassing greatness of the cause for which he fights, the breadth and nobleness of the Liberal principle, and the relative littleness and insignifi-

cance of all those crotchets and hobbies, which, even if right and just, are only very small parts of that principle. He will see that to secure conquest, the whole Liberal army must march abreast; that nothing can possibly be gained, in the long run, by taking any one true idea, and giving it a prominence out of proportion to its real importance. The task of practical wisdom for all true Liberals, is to find out what is really the one work of the hour—what is the one cause which most completely approaches the breadth of the Liberal idea; and then, having found this, to put all dividing questions aside, assigning them their relatively smaller importance, to close the ranks, and in one solid phalanx of earnest and resolute men, bear down in full strength upon the foe. If the cause be right and just, the Liberals of England have never failed to carry it; they have assailed stronghold upon stronghold, privilege upon privilege, monopoly after monopoly; the combined strength of the English people, thus exerted, has borne down Crown, Peers, and Church, and asserted the irresistible might of the nation's will. Each Liberal leader should fight with the lofty consciousness of the glorious host behind him; he should remember he bears a banner which has never known defeat; he should be in living sympathy with those reformers and heroes who have won for us our rights; he should feel the greatness and the sacredness of the cause he represents; and then, like a true man made powerful by the aspirations and the prayers of England's noblest sons, he should go forth and fight his battle with that dogged determination and royal courage which in unnumbered fields have made our cause victorious.

Strong and able men, men of powerful mind and solid principle, can always do much to sway a constituency, and rouse it to heroic resolve. If noble and unselfish himself, a man can diffuse an air of nobleness around him; the generous enthusiasm for the right which possesses him will insensibly enter into his hearers, and bear them along, and will often make its way to their hearts, and through these lay hold of their judgments. There is something almost resistless in noble sentiments, if felt to be real, if spoken with the accent of conviction. It is these which have been the mighty force of Liberalism in days gone by, which have won its signal victories. For such sentiments are as the utterance of a god; they appeal to everything that is noble and divine in each man's soul; they make him feel the deity slumbering there; they strike hard upon his indolence, and bid him arise and espouse the cause of right. And there is no man living who can despise that appeal if it be made



with sufficient strength. He may put it aside—but a strong resolute man, one who is proof in a good conscience himself, and mighty in that sevenfold force of right, can compel him, if he trifle with it, to pass judgment upon himself, and to slink and cower before him, as a mere slave who is bound hand and foot, and will not claim his freedom—as a poor coward, who dare not for his life follow his highest convictions as a man. Given only a strong sense of moral righteousness, a strong will driving it home, and earnest plain-spoken Saxon pouring it out in manly, burning words before the people, we do not believe there is any English constituency where, with such an indictment as the Liberals have to present, the moral sense of the people may not be won over, and made to give a verdict for the right.

Such men, moreover—men of robust understanding and sound sense—men who possess our English faculty of going straight to the heart of a question, and cutting clean through it in a few sentences—can raise a people for a time into a higher mental region. Giving out great thoughts, appealing to broad principles, rousing a generous enthusiasm, they sweep away, for a time, the little world of selfish and sordid cares; they show men the heavens of truth and right which stretch above them; they bring into clear view the sanctities which every true man, whatever his creed, reveres; and they make evident how little, and poor, and paltry a great nation like England becomes when it descends to a mean and selfish policy. They can show how much greater it is to cultivate an open and even-handed justice towards all nations, to live in peace and good-will, to be unsuspicious and unfearing, abiding in calm content with the quiet majesty of England, with a known strength whose full resources have never yet been ascertained.

It is this combination of sober sense, robust intellect, and high moral earnestness which are wanted to rouse the sleeping conscience of the nation, and bring it to its right mind. There must have been a serious loss of these qualities, a sad descent from the high lines on which our national policy hitherto moved, or there could never have been the deeds of the Beaconsfield Administration. Before one-half of them had been perpetrated the national conscience would have spoken out, in tones not to be trifled with. If England had been in a healthy moral state, as she used to be, the strongest administration which had ventured on such a course would have been long ago swept away. It is difficult to say what has caused the descent, and probably none are exempt from blame. There has been, it can hardly be questioned, a wide-spread relaxation of moral

and mental fibre. All classes and sections of the community have yielded more or less to a sensuous ease; they have not been faithful and vigilant, keeping up the old English traditions, placing before their eyes our sublime ideal of duty, giving conscience her supreme throne, and caring only to do honest, solid work. All the better portion of the nation has been yielding to an emasculating pursuit of pleasure, more or less pronounced, much as the warriors of Hannibal did at Capua, and the grand moral strength, the clear vision and heroic courage, which used to mark this portion of the community have vanished. Our wisdom is to recognise this fact, and to remedy it. How the election will go will be known before this paper meets our readers' eye, but in any case, victorious or defeated, the Liberal party has a great task before it. For even when it comes into power, it has carefully to purge the nation of that baser element which made the Beaconsfield administration possible; it has to build up the people in solid righteousness, and, as far as possible, make them in future incapable of such descent. The perils through which we have passed must be a lesson to us all, and ever afterwards we must guard against their recurrence.

Now let us lay to heart this evident fact that every true Liberal, if he really cares about his principles, and wishes to see them in the ascendant, must himself maintain a tone of unvarying heroism. Having chosen his side, because it is the side of right, he must have a moral courage which can make him invincibly firm, which can uphold the supremacy of unchanging principle, which can make him strong to assail any of the strongholds of wrong. His political antagonists may sink to anything they choose, either in the moral or the mental plane, but any descent or relaxation is fatal to him, his cause can triumph only in proportion as he and his party continue at *their maximum of strength*, and so force the nation along the upward path. The very moment Liberals begin to be idle, listless, wanting in moral enthusiasm, in that moment they begin to suffer disintegration and defeat. The triumph of Liberalism arises from the triumph of intelligence, principle, unselfishness, over ignorance, prescription, and the baser passions of men, and such a triumph never can be achieved save by the indomitable determination of the strongest and best.

Now moral courage is not a quality which can be gained in an hour; rather is it the slow work of a life-time. It may be said, indeed, to contain every high quality, and to show them all in their grandest and purest state. Probably, it bows us in reverence for this very reason, that we recognize it to be the expression of a

great and full-orbed man—the momentary flashing of a lofty and magnanimous soul. We can see that it could not spring up so nobly, and rise so high, if it were not constantly present, if the whole life were not of an heroic tone. And it is this heroism in the *minutiae* of daily life which is wanted. It is an unfaltering devotion to duty, at all costs; an acceptance of the great law of right as the constant rule of the life. One who accepts the principle of right at all costs in politics, is manifestly in a false position, is hypocritical and unreal, if he does not accept and carry out that principle in social and domestic, commercial and literary life. He is no true Liberal—his Liberal creed is only the mere shell of a Tory nature—who does not constantly have recourse to unchanging, eternal law as the standard by which he tests all things. If he accepts conventional maxims which have no moral significance; if he estimates men according to their riches or position, apart from their character; if he takes false doctrines in any department of thought; if he accepts sophisms for solid logic, and shallow platitudes for manly sense; if he judges of books by the current opinions of the day, and has no definite eternal canon of his own by which to try them; then he may dwell in the Liberal host, and profess the Liberal creed—but he is at heart a Tory, and the great bulk of his life really goes to setting up the Tory rule. He accepts the principle of authority instead of right; of the local coterie of the sect or the hour, instead of the universal canons made for all time; of shallow declamation instead of solid argument; of plausible statements instead of proof, and mere appearance instead of rock-like fact. One who so acts has started away from Liberalism—has surrendered his right and his duty to judge all things; he has given charlatans the place due to the wise; and he has no right to complain if charlatanism comes to the front, and fashions the nation's policy. He has paved the way for it: on the small scale, he has been so acting himself.

This carries us over a very wide field, over the whole extent of society, and social life, over all books and literature, art, science, poetry. It is not possible to generalise accurately in so small a compass, but it may safely be said that the heroic tone—the tone of high moral nobility—is not so manifest in these as it once was. There is very little—some would say there is scarcely anything—which presents the sublime and arduous, which strengthens the moral fibre, calls up the energies of will, bids man live the nobler and the better life. No rugged prophet now sends his rousing blast through the nation, and sternly tells it what are the

high commands of duty; no grand Englishman, catching the inspiration from great ancestors, strikes hard upon the nation's will, and rouses it to deeds of moral heroism worthy of the past; no teacher of righteousness ventures to set forth, with eloquence and power, any of the mighty themes which rouse and fashion men, like those who formed the worthies long ago; prophets and preachers, authors and journalists, poets and artists—all alike are reduced by the golden god, and all they say and do does little more than make more sensuous and worldly a civilization which is already gorgeous enough. They all have been unfaithful to their high calling; they have used their gifts as if they were their own; they have sold them to the god of this world; they take their highest powers, and make them slaves to men's lower selves. Not thus lived the great ones of the past. The long roll of England's worthies is not made up of men who cared mostly for worldly success. Rather is it of men who dared to follow out their own convictions; who were content, if need be, with a crust; who were rich enough in themselves to despise outward riches, but who would not be false to the high endowments they had received. It is the souls of these heroes, and their invincible resolve, which carried England on her upward path. Therefore they produced works and wrote words which the world will not willingly let die. And those who should be their successors—who should still have pointed men to all that is great, and sublime, and noble, have rather pointed them to what is little, and frivolous, and gorgeous. For every painting in the Royal Academy for some years past which contained one idea that could show a man the majesty of moral greatness, and make him strong to resist temptation, there have been at least a score which tended rather to relax his powers, and make him indulge in soft voluptuous ease. To pass through the rooms was to pass through a moral Capua. Nor is literature much better. A few books have been written in this generation which strengthen the moral fibre, and increase the mental force—but very few; and, for the most part, the books of the day have just the reverse effect. They are so weak and diffuse—they are so deficient in mental vigour—striking and noble thoughts hardly ever come—the mental areas they cover are so contracted—they have such an air of dainty fastidiousness—they seldom or never point to any eternal canons—and manifestly they are so distinctly the production of feeble, little men, who are a woeful descent from the high lines English literature once attained, that, on the whole, they debauch the nation's moral sense, and emasculate its mental manhood. To some who sit in

the critical chair, and are regarded as literary dictators, we confess we feel no manner of respect. If that is the judgment accepted by those who guard and reverence the works of England's mighty ones, we venture to wait till the national genius once more shall speak, or till the tribunal of the immortals shall sit. The countrymen of Milton and Shakespeare, Hooker and Barrow, Butler and Paley, cannot much longer accept the dictum of men who are not great enough to understand such worthies, and who revile as defects what are really their crowning excellencies.

We regard the Beaconsfield Administration as the outcome of the nation's moral tone. That Administration could not have continued in power if the nation had not been demoralised. Secret forces have been at work upon us, slowly changing our moral habitudes. As, across the Channel, under the degraded Second Empire, there was a most pronounced descent in moral tone, a most evident love for the gilded, the gaudy, the sensuous, and a distinct mental barrenness, which things were at once the cause and the consequence of a barbaric Imperialism, so the Imperialism with which we have been threatened has had its roots, and its sources of supply, in a like moral degeneracy amongst ourselves. It is the hateful fungus which springs from moral corruption. It means the decay of all the finest qualities of the English race. It means the dying out of that love of liberty which has hitherto been to us more than the love of life itself. It means the departure of that healthy, homely simplicity which has hitherto marked us, of that commanding sense of duty which has given us our high tone. And, just as the French people, having shaken off their incubus, are now diligently weeding out all the causes which fed Imperialism; are cultivating all that is noble, lofty, severe—in art, literature, life; are purifying all the springs of conduct, and seeking to lift up their whole nation to something like an antique severity; and so doing are growing nobler and greater than ever,—so we, if we be wise, shall in like manner set about lifting up all about us, and cultivating simplicity, manliness, and moral greatness.

And if the Liberals of England, forming at least one-half of the nation, will resolutely determine so to live, they must succeed in bringing back the old tone. If each one will be true and noble, living a high and heroic life; scorning all that is false, shallow, little; putting conscience, right, and truth far above mere pleasure, honour, or gain; and generally aiming at all that is lofty, great and good, thoroughly carrying out these principles over the whole range of life and conduct—then there will be created a moral force which will not only bear back all hurtful tendencies, but will

purify and ennoble our England to an extent never known before. Every man and woman of such a stamp would be a centre of holy and noble influences; thousands would catch from them the contagion of moral enthusiasm; plain living and high thinking would become the order of the day; all society would undergo renovation—its weariness, its *ennui*, its unrest would give place to dignified earnestness; and the whole nation would have an elasticity, a bound, a joyousness—like a giant newly charged with power. Let every true-hearted patriot, everyone who honours and loves the land that gave him birth, and the deathless names who have greatedened and enriched his life, set himself to do his part in accomplishing this moral renovation. Let him put aside considerations of greater profit or honour, and let him rather do what will lift the nation's moral tone. Let the artist paint his pictures, not showy and sensuous, because such are more in demand; but let him dare to be heroic, to paint scenes which are sublime, pictures of men who dared all for the right, pictures which rouse the will, and stiffen the nerves, and call up fortitude, courage, and endurance. Let him take, if need be, a much smaller sum—he will not starve—and have the consciousness that he has used his powers to greaten and ennoble men. Let the poet and the novelist turn away from the feeble and the frivolous, and rather speak in earnest, burning words, as genius can, of the sanctities of a stainless name, of the glory of lofty character, of the dignity of honest work. Let the author and the journalist not write poor, diffuse stuff, which only weakens the intellect and the will, simply because they are paid for quantity; but let them remember that they have a higher work before them—to uphold the honour of the English literature, to maintain its great traditions, to keep it on the level it once had won. Let the buyer and the reader turn away from books and magazines that are shallow and feeble; where what ought to have been said in a sentence is spread over a page; where brilliant plausibilities are put for honest logic; and let him rather turn to the literature that is stately, noble, elevated; that lays hold with a grasp of power; that presents things majestic, great, strong; that conducts as to a mountain top, demanding of him not a little exertion ere he ascend it, but from whence, when reached, and as he is going, he can feel the pure air of heaven fanning his cheek, the exertion demanded strengthening his will and rousing his sensibilities, and the mighty expanse all around giving conceptions of vastness, sublimity, grandeur, such as no meaner ascent can ever afford. Let the preacher—who is as

great a sinner as any, often, when he least knows it—not descend to poor, shallow thought, and diffuse platitudes, or even sensuous illustrations, simply because this is popular, and will attract crowds; let him remember he is a prophet of God, holding commission from the King, bidden to deliver His message, and look to Him for guerdon; and let him rather deal in earnest, forceful Saxon, with those mighty themes, rugged as granite rocks, which most of all can charge a people with moral force, and build them up invincible in righteousness. Let us, then, who have the interests of England at heart, understand what is expected of us as her true sons, and set about living the heroic life. It matters not of what creed we are, and if of no creed at all; this is a duty devolving upon us as men, a duty plainly recognised in Pagan times; and unless we arise, and fulfil it, we are unworthy of the name we bear, and traitors and betrayers of the greatness of England.

## PARLIAMENTARY REFORM.

"WHOEVER understands the theory of the British Constitution, and will compare it with the fact, must see at once how widely they differ. We must reconcile them to each other, if we wish to save the liberties of the country; and we must reduce our political practice as near as possible to our principles." These were the words of Lord Chatham, one hundred and ten years ago, and though the accumulated errors and wrongs of ages have since received a partial rectification, he would indeed be a bold man who would assert that the fact has been approximated as nearly as possible to the theory. It would be more true to say that the approximation has been as close as the actual constitution of Parliament would allow. And in that statement would be comprised the whole history of the national struggles, which culminated in the Reform Bills of 1832 and 1867. In that one word "allow" would be comprised the selfishness, the despotic pride, which look with perpetual jealousy upon every division of their ancient power, and would guard it against division by any means still left to them. There are few who will now deny that if the Duke of Wellington could have relied on the military power, the Reform Bill of 1832 would not have been allowed to take its course. And if we mistake not the tenor of a recent treatise on Democracy and Monarchy, such a spirit is even not yet wholly extinguished among us. We have no wish to revive the memory of such a spirit further than is necessary; we hope rather that the next great approximating step to the reconciliation of the fact with the theory of our constitution, may be no more accompanied by Bristol conflagrations or Hyde Park riots than it has as yet been preceded by Peterloo massacres or Beales' processions. It may be that the solemn suggestion of the Laureate points to a great truth:

If New and Old, disastrous feud,  
Must ever shock like armed foes,  
And this be true till time shall close  
That principles are rained in blood.



But we will rest rather in the spirit of his peaceful verse :

Where freedom broadens slowly down  
From precedent to precedent—

since the great struggles of 1832 and 1867 have, perhaps, afforded sufficient of precedent both to warn obstinacy and encourage effort. We will presume, then, that those minds, which consider all Reform only a necessary evil, which regard the distribution of political power among the people with as great and often sincere fear as some of the Stuarts regarded the attack on the divinity of their despotism, have at least become convinced of the impossibility of maintaining their position by any subtle employment of terrorism or procrastination. The wave of progress will pass on irresistibly, and those who resist will only pass under it; and in a very few years their death-cries will become as much the subjects of wonder and ridicule, as the speeches of Sir R. Inglis, Sir C. Wetherell, and many others before the great Reform Bill are to men of the present generation. It is, therefore, now necessary that those who would modify the progress of Reform, should show clearly on what grounds their modifications stand, and no longer rely on the power of the Horse Guards to quell insurrection, and the selfishness and apathy of the Lords to reject Reform Bills. There have been, and there doubtless remain many unselfish and sincere opponents of the system of direct popular representation. It is unnecessary to say here that those opponents are unworthy of notice who consider that the large mass of the people exist only for the benefit of the upper classes and should therefore be for ever kept silent and servile. The solid and unselfish arguments, however, must be touched upon, though every Englishman will probably, in spite of wider theories, revert to the actual theory of the English Constitution, as expressed by Mr. Pitt, in his motion for Reform in 1782, in the words: "It is the essence of the Constitution that the people have a share in the government by the means of representation, and its excellence and permanency is calculated to consist in this representation, having been designed to be equal, easy, practicable, and complete." Nevertheless, though the ears of many readers will be closed to any argument for an aristocratic form of government, it is perhaps worthy of a little consideration. Mr. Carlyle's and Mr. Ruskin's writings present an emotional view of the case; the Positivist School of thinkers perhaps present the most thorough intellectual view of it, though in saying so it is not implied that their view is exclusively intellectual. Probably few people of any earnest feelings have failed to receive

great pleasure from the strong advocacy of the two former for the rule of a truly noble aristocracy ; but the pleasure will have been for the most part the enthusiasm of a day dream, nor can the most ardent enthusiast in cool contemplation hope that either the Society of St. George or of St. Michael will effect a great political revolution. The books of their faith are for the most part books of lamentation and reproach ; very sincere, very impressive, but scarcely apt to provide any definite object or definite means for the present. With the Positivists it is, perhaps, otherwise. Their system is based upon a very close and acute investigation into human motive, assisted by a no less minute and accurate reference to history. They contend that the political system advocated—one might, perhaps, say prophesied—by Auguste Comte, is the certain result of human progress, the sure product of history, though it must be fairly admitted that Comte did not pretend to a knowledge of the complete end of progress. Moreover, they add immense consistency and strength to that system by making it part of a new religion. Politics are not to them as they are to most men—only a matter of business, or practical interest or ambition, unmixed with religion, or but very slightly tempered with it. In their minds politics are—what they are, too, perhaps to a few exceptional statesmen like Mr. Gladstone—a public life, which is the true and complete outcome of deep religious thought, referred not only ultimately and in the abstract, but most immediately and in the concrete to high religious principles. The utterance of the Positivist serial on the Afghan question might be quoted as an instance of this. No one, who has studied the history of Islamism or of Mediæval Catholicism can fail to see how much more effective a political system is likely to be if it is an integral part of a religion. It is for this reason that the Positivist view of popular representation is at least interesting and most probably important. If it be comparatively unknown to the public, it is to be hoped it will be all the more so. “Public life,” says Comte, “consists wholly in the due realization of these two maxims—Devotion of the strong to the weak ; veneration of the weak for the strong.” These are the religious principles of politics. In another place he says : “The method of election was only introduced as a protest, and, for a long time, a *necessary* protest against the caste system, which had finally become oppressive. In itself the choice of the superior by the inferior is, in all cases, thoroughly anarchical. It has never been of use except as a means of breaking up a defective social order.” It is, perhaps, unnecessary to give further quotations, or to add that Comte provides for continuity in the

thesis—"He who worthily discharges any function whatever, is always the best judge of his successor." All who are acquainted with Government working in England admit that much, if not all, of the most valuable work is done by the Permanent Secretaries and those officials who are promoted by the vigilant eyes of superiors. Even the most grave part of the legislative work of Parliament is often in reality originated by active minds in the Government offices, and so handled there as to require little more than formal treatment to complete it. How far the voice of the people through their representatives really modifies such work, is a question to which one hears widely different answers. A little study of Parliamentary proceedings will show that such modification is almost always of a comparatively insignificant nature. In fine, the actual work of the Constitution is done by men receiving their powers on a principle much more akin to that of Comte's stated above than to that of popular election.

It is very worthy of notice that Comte does treat the system of election from below as "a necessary protest against the caste system," and "as a means of breaking up a defective social order." Perhaps few of the advocates of the system have looked upon it as only a transitional stage; the general inclination is rather to consider universal suffrage with an efficient body of electors as the final climax and glorious goal of all Reform. Mr. Mill, in his "Representative Government," would certainly seem to point to this. And yet, in this consideration of the electoral system as a transition stage, lies the best hope of reconciling all parties, of leading all alike to a full and proper recognition of its value. The instinct which makes so many cling to the idea of rule by an aristocracy can perhaps be thereby fairly and fully satisfied, and the errors of an overwhelming democracy possibly averted or moderated.

But before passing to a consideration of the true value of the electoral system, it may be worth while to glance at a few of Mr. Mill's statements with regard to popular representation. A remarkable passage in his "Thoughts on Parliamentary Reform," in the third volume of "Dissertations and Discussions," must lead every reader to a conviction that his treatment of the question was (even to his own mind) a compromise. In discussing the relation of political rights to human worth, he says: "Putting aside, for the present, the consideration of moral worth, of which, though more important than intellectual, it is not so easy to find an available test," etc., etc. This little sentence contains the chief difficulty of the electoral system, and shows the compromise which

any acceptance of it as final renders imperative. Again, in the third chapter of the "Representative Government," he asserts, as a political principle in favour of popular government, "that the rights and interests of every or any person are only secure from being disregarded, when the person interested is himself able and habitually disposed to stand up for them;" while a little further on he candidly assures us: "For my own part, not believing in universal selfishness, I have no difficulty in admitting that Communism would even now be practicable among the *élite* of mankind, and may become so among the rest." This looks very like a wreck of principles on the rock of expediency. In another place in the same book, in arguing against a good despotism as an ideal form of government, he says: "Religion remains; and here at least, it may be thought, is an agency that may be relied on for lifting men's eyes and minds above the dust at their feet. But religion, even suppose it to escape perversion for the purposes of despotism, ceases in these circumstances to be a social concern, and narrows into a personal affair between an individual and his Maker, in which the issue at stake is but his private salvation. Religion in this shape is quite consistent with the most selfish and contracted egoism, and identifies the votary as little in feeling with the rest of his kind as sensuality itself."

It is with no desire to disparage Mr. Mill's splendid work on the subject that the above flaws in it are sought to be exposed. In those passages he asserts (1) that morality is of supreme importance in the elector, and yet must be disregarded; (2) that selfishness and individualism must be made the basis of government, though he does not himself believe in them; (3) that the effect of religion may be merely to promote egoism. In fine, he takes the lower human motives and builds up on them an ideal polity. What wonder if it should occur to some of his readers that such a polity can scarcely ever be a permanent one? It may seem well nigh impossible to our eyes that the altruism required for the realization of the two great maxims of Comte quoted above should be attained; perfect confidence and truthfulness, perfect sense of responsibility, may seem to be idle dreams; to make religion operative in politics may seem wildly Utopian. But once for all it should be clearly understood that no one who pretends to be an architect of new political systems, or a reformer of existing systems, should base his plans upon anything but the highest human principles. A compromise with baseness is as pernicious in theoretical as it is in practical politics.

Let us now proceed to consider what seems to be the true value

of popular representation. Everyone who has followed the course of English Constitutional History, so minutely written by so many able hands in latter years, cannot fail to have been impressed with the fact that almost every single change of any importance has been effected by external pressure upon the dominant powers of the realm. Up to our own time this has remained so. The Bristol riots and general turbulence pushed the Great Reform Bill through, as did the Hyde Park Riot that of 1867. A passage in the third volume of Sir T. Erskine May's History admirably illustrates this position. "The greater number of Conservatives had viewed the progress of legislation, which they could not resist, as a hard necessity; they had accepted it grudgingly in an unfriendly spirit—as defendants submitting to the adverse judgment of a Court, whence there is no appeal." It would perhaps be really fair to add that the Liberal party would not have been much more willing than the Conservative to make changes, if they had not realized more fully than the latter that the popular pressure was irresistible, and that the stability of government depended on gradual change in accordance with such pressure. The gist of all the past of England's history is that the Legislature has rather been driven on to effect changes than moved towards them of its own accord. If the basis of selfishness, assumed by Mr. Mill as the only practical basis of politics, hold good, we may well ask, what interest is the Legislature likely to conceive for itself in change? The large majority thereof, as it is at present constituted, doubtless think there is much to be sacrificed and nothing to be won by change. The welfare of the whole people has little, or they imagine it has little to do with their own welfare. The representation of popular claims and grievances must always add to their labours and anxieties. Why, therefore, if selfishness be even in a moderate degree the basis of their action, should they care to promote the welfare of the people, much less to admit them to the possibility of perpetually troubling them with new claims? The idea that mankind exists for the few is certainly not wholly communicated from the minds of either branch of the Legislature. One might perhaps even venture to say that there is in both Houses a strong caste feeling, which is more or less inclined on all occasions to resist any impression from without. It is for the purpose of destroying the evil effect of all such feeling, for the purpose of neutralising this self-preservative, self-interested action, that the system of popular representation is so immensely valuable. When the governing classes of a country are ignorant and neglectful of the claims of the main body of the people; when a House of Commons is so venal, as in the days of regal gold pills, that it can

be turned to any purpose; when an aristocracy is so secure and comfortable in the possession of land and wealth that it sinks idle and selfish into the lap of luxury, then is a movement of the people the last resource. It may be anarchical; it may organize itself for riot and revolution; it may end in civil war, as it did against the worthless Stuarts. But it is all justified, if those who held rule could not foresee its causes and apply the remedy. And just as the special movements of the people concerted on special emergencies are of great value and irresistible power, so too is what might be called the more extensive and permanent policy of the people. There can be little doubt that the electoral system, as revised by and since the Reform Bill of 1832, has done much to enforce among candidates for the government of the nation a higher sense of responsibility and a more thorough acquaintance with the facts of lives wholly beyond their knowledge and sympathy. Anyone who has had any intimate acquaintance with the manner in which representatives now find it necessary to investigate the interests of their electors, must realise how very much more closely the duties of their seats must be impressed upon them than if they had been less dependent on those electors. So that one of the means of forming an aristocracy or ruling body in the State, sufficiently endowed with a high sense of responsibility and an intimate acquaintance with their duties, is to give every interest which will be under their care the power of influencing them. Viewed in this light, even definite pledges become useful, though from a higher point of view they are merely the results of want of confidence and responsibility.

The arguments which are commonly opposed to this statement of the case in favour of popular election, are that, whether the people have much or little influence in the choice of their representatives, they will always be moved indirectly with great force by the rank and wealth of those, who look upon a position in the Legislature as their destiny, their right, or their reward, and that candidates will always have sufficient ingenuity to mould their opinions into satisfactory election addresses, however inconsistent with their real legislative intentions, if indeed they have any. Both these arguments certainly contain a large amount of truth. Even the Ballot Act has not destroyed a tie, which might almost be called feudal—or, to use a more gentle term, domestic—between many constituencies, chiefly those of the counties, and their elect. Cheshire, for instance, in spite of a most powerful and extensive Liberal conviction, has at this General Election again returned its six old Tory representatives, and everyone who has been connected with the election has

observed—not, too, without admiration—how influential the tender domestic feeling towards the old families of the county has been in producing that result. In so far as acquaintance with, and confidence in, the personal character of the elect wins the votes, no one entertaining a true view of the connection between elect and elector could wish them given otherwise. Indeed, it can scarcely be said to be the object of popular representation to destroy the influence of the upper classes, when it is exerted in a just and noble manner, when the superior character and training which may result from rank and wealth are relied on rather than the rank and wealth themselves. So that even if it were a fact that no reasonable extension of the Suffrage could really diminish the power, direct or indirect, of the upper over the lower classes, that fact would be no argument against such extension. On the contrary, as is ably argued by the late Lord Hobart, in a short essay originally published in *Macmillan*, the possession of a share in politics by the people is to be desired, even if no substantial difference result therefrom either in representation or government. And apart from the benefit of the interest in politics, which Mr. Mill so strongly states to be an education in itself, it affords most unquestionably a salutary check on their rulers, if the people can show a disapproval of their conduct. It is, of course, not a fact that the people make their choice in subservience to the current influences of the upper classes. If it were so, we should not have working-men, or such men as the new atheistic-republican member for Northampton, returned. From another prevalent point of view, such returns are, of course, the greatest evils of the system. If they are evils, they do not vitiate the system; they only enhance its value by drawing the attention of the upper classes to movements and opinions among the lower classes, which, if wrong, they are responsible for the existence of, and if right, they should be forced to recognize in the course of legislation. The other argument mentioned above, as intended to show the comparative fruitlessness of reform, is perhaps as true as it is shameful. There is certainly little doubt that a large number of candidates consider it perfectly fair and right to make their addresses as favourable to their success as possible, without any conscientious regard for the actual state of their opinions where they have any, and without any care or thought in the formation of opinions where they have none. This fact is almost notorious, and requires no corroboration. At the recent General Election it has been a matter of common daily curiosity how far compromise would go, and of daily wonder how crude and how unthoughtful have been the answers to questions put at public meetings. But such treat-

ment of the public cannot last for ever; electors will gradually become more wide awake to the real meaning of public compromises and crude statements. They will see that the former imply the very opposite of what they are intended to persuade—a willingness to represent all their interests; and that the latter prove what is perhaps worse—a total ignorance of those interests. They will, perhaps, resort eventually to the exaction of pledges of a more definite and unmistakable character than any yet exacted; they will, perhaps, even agitate, if that course do not succeed, for some such measure as a Bill for Triennial or Annual Parliaments, whereby they may gain the power of recalling their representatives if they fail in performing their duty. Let no man think that the ingenuity of the upper classes will long suffice, as it has already perhaps too long sufficed, to blind the people, for whom they should care, to their carelessness and irresponsibility. As the Monarchy was summoned and forced to a sense of its duty by the Barons at Runnymede, by the people itself three centuries later; as the Lords were driven from their seats by the wrath of a neglected nation, to let the great Reform Bill pass—so will the representatives of the people, if they do not recognize the full interests and feelings of all classes down to the very lowest—if they trifle with the people and make them but the means for gratifying individual ambition, be in some irresistible manner recalled to a proper sense of their responsibility. It is, therefore, scarcely to be admitted that either the vast material and social influence, or the superior ingenuity of the upper classes will preserve their position as rulers of the nation in spite of the real power placed in the hands of electors by measures of Parliamentary Reform, similar to those of 1832 and 1867, unless they simultaneously realize the full meaning of their stations as the representatives of a whole nation. When Mr. Pitt, in 1792, ten years after his first young motion for Reform, stated his opinion in his remarks on Mr. Grey's notice of a motion on Reform, he was unquestionably influenced by the turbulent tendencies produced in England by the French Revolution, as he was still more in his statement five years later. He said it was "not a time to make hazardous experiments." Yet, in that very speech, there is a most valuable definition given of the proper condition of the House of Commons. "It was essential," he said, "to the happiness of the people, that they should be convinced that they, and the members of that House, felt an identity of interest; that the nation at large, and the representatives of the people, held a conformity of sentiment: this was the



essence of a proper representative assembly ; under this legitimate authority a people could be said to be really free. And this was a state in which the true spirit of proper democracy could be said to subsist." There is the same ring of truth, and deep conviction, and high principle in this sentence, as when, in 1782, he so openly exposed the anomalies of representation, and the subservience of seats to aristocracy and money. But in 1792, the fear of revolution was uppermost ; and there is no reason to doubt but that, in Mr. Pitt, it was a sincere fear ; and so it continued all the rest of his great life, and he never did anything more to produce that Reform, which he only failed to initiate in 1782 by twenty votes—a better minority than any again obtained on the same question for half a century. Nor was this fear at all confined to Mr. Pitt and his times. Many were the voices which rose in 1832, and even in 1867, both within and without the walls of Parliament, to warn the party of progress that it was bringing on not Reform, not a return to the true theory of the Constitution—but a Revolution ; "a revolution," as the erudite Sir R. Inglis said in his opposition to the first reading of the great Reform Bill, "which will overturn all the natural influence of rank and property." Indeed, so real was the fear that many people were convinced that anarchy would ensue, that the masses which formed the Blanketeer movement, the Peterloo meeting, the Birmingham demonstrations, would rule the country in their own crude way, and render it unsafe for the upper classes.

The risk attendant upon that liberation of force which usually accompanies compulsion, when exercised by large bodies of men, is not, however, so great in a stolid race like the English as it is with the more volatile spirits of other countries ; and it is questionable whether a Reform Bill might not have been passed by Mr. Grey with less disturbance and with as good result in the last century, as it was by Earl Grey in 1832. Indeed, could Mr. Pitt have foreseen the immense force which postponement of Reform was continually imprisoning till it reached a strength wholly beyond restraint, would he not have continued the course he so ardently began ?

At the present day there is, perhaps, little fear of a repetition of the political error, which represses progress till it forces its growth up through all bonds. Popular organization is too strong and too loud to allow of it. But there are doubtless many reforms in popular representation which ought to be and will be called for at no remote date. If there be any recurrence of the anarchical experiences of former years, delay will be the cause of them. It

thus becomes incumbent upon all who would avert violent and revolutionary agitation from below to insist upon the necessity of such measures being moved and carried from above as shall convince the people, to use Mr. Pitt's clear language, that they and their representatives feel an identity of interest and a conformity of sentiment. If we were to seek for an instance of conduct wholly alien to such a purpose, we might refer to the recent action of the Beaconsfield Ministry in continuing to hold office when the country was ready to return the Opposition to power by such an enormous majority. No better instance could be found of the mockery of national representation, which the present constitution and regulations of Parliament can afford. There was in the Tory party a unity of servility (to use the term once applied to the political creatures of the Second Empire) so complete, there is so little check applicable to representatives when once elected by their constituents, that the Ministry could openly defy the Opposition to carry a vote of censure. This is but one of the flaws in the present political system, and comes partly within the question of the Duration of Parliaments, partly within that of the Powers of Ministers.

The points in Reform, which require most immediate attention are undoubtedly those in which the underlying principle has been clearly admitted in past measures, but either inadequately carried into practice or vitiated by recent change of population or other circumstances. The foremost of these is clearly the Redistribution of Seats. As to the urgent necessity for this, there can be absolutely no question to any mind which will take the trouble to investigate the figures and interests concerned. It would be indeed a shameful thing if the petty jealousies and rivalries of various constituencies, which operated so severely against the great reorganization effected by the last Reform Bills, were again to prevent or postpone the introduction of a measure which, even if there had been any initiatory distribution of seats in accordance with fixed principles, would on the electoral system in vogue have now become indispensable.

The extension of the Suffrage, and more especially the state of the County Franchise, is another such question, and only requires a fair and patient examination of masses of facts, which individuals can only deal with in such a way as to produce general convictions, and with the details of which a Government office alone can hope fairly to cope. The question which comes next in importance to this, would seem to be the Representation of Minorities, and therefore with the complete representation of every interest of adequate

importance. It must be a matter of wonder to every one who has read Mr. Mill's, Mr. Hare's, and Mr. Fawcett's writings on this branch of Reform,—that so little attention is given to the matter even by electors themselves. It is nothing short of a paradox that, when reformers are springing up every day on all kinds of points, there should all the time be an almost total silence on this. It is strange that it should not occur to more minds that representation in its present condition is not a representation even of the two million or so of electors, who themselves represent but a very small proportion of the whole interests of the nation, but only of a majority, conceivably even of a minority of those electors. This last fact, that the party which represents the larger number of seats, entirely irrespective of the sizes of the constituencies, can govern the country on the opinions held by a minority of a minority of the nation, should surely avail to throw doubt, if not ridicule, upon the electoral system as at present arranged. Next in order of immediate importance, though in view of the recent experience stated above it would scarcely seem to bear any postponement, is the question of Duration of Parliaments. It is almost incredible that the nation should have acquiesced so quietly and permanently in a modification of the original rule of the Constitution on this point, which was avowedly made to meet a temporary emergency—*i.e.*, the possible entry of the Jacobite party into Parliament in sufficient strength to endanger the Hanoverian King's stability. After this question would follow, perhaps, a consideration of the Limits to the Powers of Ministers. Whether such an inquiry, which some bold spirit would do well to start at once, while the nation is still mindful of the unconstitutional proceedings of the late Ministry, should be applied only to the relation of Ministers to Foreign Affairs, or to their general powers, is a nice question, and would bear much research and minute examination. The last but not least grave question for Reformers is the Method of Conducting Elections. It must be patent to all unprejudiced minds that the current method is adapted rather to annul the chances of real free choice than to assist them. Not even the Ballot Act has really effected anything like a complete amendment of this evil, though it must be admitted to have been a grand step. Undue influence is still much practised, and the weaker minds of the electorate are misled in the most immoral manner. Under this head, too, should be included all the important points relating to the expenses of candidates. Everything possible should be done to detect and abolish the lower material influences now not even concealed at elections, while everything should be done to enhance the moral and intellectual

influences, which, in a choice that helps to make or mar a nation, are of supreme gravity.

These appear to be the questions which cry most urgently for a hearing. The main body of the people themselves are perhaps little acquainted with them, for they are little written of or talked of among them. But the industrial classes, which form so weighty a section of the electoral body, are daily becoming more alive to the necessity of asserting a place for their political opinions by the side of those of the bureaucracy, and of the special political caste. It will be well for the country if Parliament exercises more foresight than it has on former occasions done, and takes all these matters into consideration before and not after the nation. It were to be desired even that it should change its ancient character, and, instead of waiting for external pressure, gracefully and wisely give to the people, whose interests it should promote, a full measure of equal and easy representation, based upon the highest and most sound moral principles, guarded by the most stern and inviolable laws.

## IRRIGATION IN UPPER INDIA.

"WHAT," asks a careful inquirer into the agricultural condition of British India, "has irrigation done for the country? It has signally failed to do all that was foretold of it. Famines have been more frequent and more severe since canals were made. Droughts are greater than they previously were. The air of the whole country is more arid and injurious to animal and vegetable life than it formerly was, from the cutting down of forest trees, &c., for burning bricks and lime for the canals and other canal purposes, and to clear the land for irrigation. A great amount of land has become covered with *Reh*, and is by many persons considered to be permanently sterilised. There is very good reason to fear there is not a single acre of land that has been irrigated by canals for ten years whose product has not very considerably diminished. The prices of food grains and all agricultural produce are notoriously higher than they were. . . . Add to these the fevers and consequent prostration of the inhabitants of the districts longest irrigated by canals, whilst we are told the population is decreasing, the men having become emasculated, &c., from the effects of fevers and other diseases caused by irrigation. In the face of these facts, there are people who still talk of the so-called *blessings* of irrigation. Are these blessings, or are they curses? . . . . Irrigation merely acts as a stimulant for a short time, and eventually reduces the productive powers of the land. . . . The increase of indigo cultivation in the Upper Doab, and its successful prosecution there, is advanced as an argument in favour of canal irrigation. Here is an extract of a letter from an indigo planter on the subject—"The produce in canal-irrigated lands, in my opinion, will be worse yearly; what with sowing the same seed, and with the constant cropping and flooding, the lands are being thoroughly exhausted. I remark yearly a great falling off of leaf, and this, by-the-bye, appears to be increasing. Canal plant grows too quickly; it is, in fact, forced, and it consequently cannot draw sufficient support from the soil fast enough to keep pace with its rapid growth. If I am right in my con-

jecture, produce will get worse as the soil becomes more exhausted.' ”

Such is the judgment passed on canal irrigation in India by Lieut.-Colonel Corbett, in his book entitled “Climate and Resources of Upper India.” It is the judgment of a man thoroughly competent to form one. The work from which it is taken is, unfortunately, defective in style and arrangement; and it is, we suppose, on this account that it has attracted so little attention. Colonel Corbett was not a literary man, but an agriculturist, and his book is a record of careful observation and experiment which ought to be studied by all who are interested in the well-being of India. I propose, in the present paper, to point out, mainly under his guidance, the dangers attending irrigation in Upper India, and the appalling mischief it has already wrought.

There are few people who will deny that the climate of India has, within the last quarter of a century, experienced a marked change for the worse. The heat has become more intense; the rain-fall less and less constant, having been scanty and insufficient for many years in succession, and frequently altogether withheld. Hence the country has been scourged with a succession of famines, unparalleled in their number and intensity. In 1860, famine desolated the North-west Provinces; in 1866, occurred the terrible famine in Orissa, which first aroused the attention of the English nation to these appalling visitations; in 1868, upwards of a million of human beings perished of hunger in Rajpootana; in 1870, there was scarcity, verging upon famine, throughout the North-west; in 1873, occurred the well-known famine in Behar; this was followed, in 1877, by the widespread famine which carried off a third of the population in Madras and Mysore, and extended its ravages to a portion of the provinces under the Bombay Government; in 1877-78, throughout the North-west, the *Khureef* harvest, as the crops reaped in November are called, entirely failed, and upwards of a million of men and women perished during the winter months of cold, disease, and hunger.

The two chief agents in the production of this disastrous change, are the destruction of forest lands, and the action of surface drainage.

A century ago, Hindostan was a richly-wooded country; but since that time, a variety of destructive agencies have been at work upon the beautiful groves which gave fertility to the soil, and cool and refreshing shade to the people. First in time and in destructiveness were the Mahrattas and the Sikhs. These savage conquerors over-ran the whole of Central India, of the North West

Provinces, and the Land of the Five Rivers. And wherever they came, they cut down the trees and used them as fire-wood. In this way, some of the most beautifully-wooded districts of India were swept as clean as the palm of a man's hand. Since the country has passed into our possession, though not carried on with the blind folly of savages, the process of denudation has not been stayed. Probably, the work having been done more systematically, and with an object, has also been done more effectually. The enlargement of the area of cultivation has occasioned the clearance of large tracts of woodland. Our railways have been grievously destructive to the trees of India. They have been cut down by the hundred thousand to supply fuel to the engines. An Oudh Missionary, writing a short time ago to one of the Calcutta papers, says: "It was more than five years ago that I was touring along the line of railway newly opened. My attention was then first called to the above subject by seeing the immense quantities of wood cut, and being cut, along the line. When I inquired where all this wood was going to, I was told that some Company had contracted for some hundreds of thousands of trees. And this spoliation has been going on ever since." It has, indeed, gone far to render the once beautifully wooded country of Oudh—the Garden of India, as it was called—a treeless plain, to the great diminution of the fertility of the soil, and the healthiness of the climate. Along the hill frontiers of our Empire, again, the destruction of trees has been greater under our rule than in any previous period. Vast hill-sides are now bare from base to summit, which, half-a-century ago, were completely hidden by thick masses of foliage. Everyone knows what France, Italy, and Spain have suffered from the wanton destruction of forest lands. And a like disregard of the provisions of Nature has produced results hardly less disastrous in India.

Colonel Corbett thus describes the influence of forest lands upon the soil of a country:—

Forests and woods preserve moisture in a country in so far as they prevent or retard surface-drainage by their leaves, which fall and form a soft, porous carpet on the surface; this, yearly increasing in depth, holds water like a sponge, the lower layers gradually rot and become incorporated with the soil; thus, in the course of time, there is in every forest (where not carried away by surface-drainage) above the mineral soil a layer of loose humus, the remains of decayed leaves, on which are other layers of leaves in varying stages of decay, the whole forming a mass which freely admits water, and prevents its escape by surface-drainage.\* The shade of the trees prevents the incidence of the direct rays of the sun; and the trees break the force of the wind, and prevent the surface of the ground being swept and dried by them. Thus forests preserve moisture in the country, firstly, by their soil being in a condition to arrest and retain water; and,

secondly, by the trees preventing the incidence of the sun's rays on the surface, and checking the force of the wind; thus the two chief causes of evaporation are absent. (Pp. 31, 32.)

It follows in a country like Upper India, where the sun shines with an intolerable heat, and fierce, hot winds sweep across the plains, that the soil, in absence of trees, will be entirely desiccated. And this evil will be aggravated by the effects of surface-drainage. The clearing of the hill-sides results, necessarily, in bringing down a heavier rush of water upon the plains. This pours over the hardened and desiccated higher lands as it might do over stone or marble, while it floods all the low lands. Thus, the upper lands are sterilised by the absence of moisture, and the low lands are desolated by excess of it. From these causes, according to Colonel Corbett, "the extent of barren lands—lands formerly cultivated, but now producing no crop, save, perhaps, some poor grass in the rains—is yearly increasing."

The cultivated lands in India are mainly under two descriptions of crops—the rain crops, and the cold weather crops. The rain crops are sown shortly after the commencement of the rains, and reaped in October and November. The land is then allowed to lie fallow until the ensuing rains. The cold weather crops are sown in October and November, and reaped in March and April; and consequently, during the height of the hot season—the months, namely, of April, May, and June—the land occupied by the cold weather crops is a bare plain. The sun beats on these bare, unsheltered plains, and the hot winds sweep across them, drying them up to the hardness of stone. The heat is further intensified by this state of the surface soil, which retains and reflects it as a rock or stone would. The true remedy for this condition of the soil would be a system of deep ploughing. The land thus broken up would absorb and retain a far larger quantity of moisture than is possible for the present glazed surface to do. But deep ploughing, in the present condition of native agriculture, is out of the question. The native cultivators possess neither the draught-cattle, nor the plough requisite for deep ploughing. The ploughing of a field in India is little more than a slight scarifying of the surface. If the rains be withheld, the earth literally becomes iron, and defies the puny efforts of the cultivator to prepare it for the reception of seed. Hence arose the notion that if we could cover India with a network of canals, so that every cultivator should have a stream of water brought to his field, we should be independent of the rain-fall. The aid which the cultivator requires, in order to break up the soil, would never be wanting to him. There was, of course, a certain



measure of truth in this supposition ; but the canal engineers, not being agriculturists, were ignorant of the evil latent in their proposed remedy. By irrigation, Colonel Corbett tells us, "the whole surface soil is brought into the condition of sun-dried bricks ; the more water that has been applied to the land, the harder the soil becomes ; and while its powers of absorption and radiation are reduced, those of reflection and retention of heat are increased ; and we also find that the power of capillary attraction possessed by the land is increased, and that the soil so compacted will sooner become dried up than soil left loose and 'open.'" As an illustration, he describes what takes place in a field of wheat, duly irrigated :—

The land is prepared by being ploughed and re-ploughed, or rather scarified, some two or three inches deep, about ten or twelve times during the rains, and immediately after they have ceased. Perhaps not so often on canal-irrigated lands, as on lands not so irrigated. The object of these frequent ploughings or scarifyings is said to be to bring all grass, and other vegetable matter there may be in the soil, to the surface, where it is collected and often burnt, thus farther diminishing the amount of vegetable matter in the soil. The seed is sown in the latter part of October, and in a few days, when the blades show above ground, the field is irrigated ; the surface soil is converted into loose mud, which, on drying, forms a crust ; this crust cracks in all directions from the heat of the sun ; the water which had thoroughly soaked the loosened surface-soil, and only slightly moistened the upper part of the hard *pan* below it, is dried up in a few days . . . . Water is again turned on ; the loosened soil is converted into a liquid mud, and is carried by gravitation, and deposited in the fissures made by the heat on drying up, after it had on the previous occasion been irrigated. The process is repeated time after time, until every pore of the soil is plugged up, and the land becomes almost hermetically sealed. In this state of the soil healthy action is impossible. The crop is reaped in March or April, when the surface soil presents a smooth glazed appearance, in the very best possible physical condition for retaining and reflecting heat ; and in the very worst possible physical condition for absorbing and radiating heat. In fact, we have brought the soil into a condition as much resembling stone as possible, and in this state it remains during the hottest months of the year, increasing the intensity of the heat, until the rains commence. (Pp. 21-22.)

Thus, the direct and inevitable effects of canal-irrigation are evil in every way. By hardening the soil they diminish its productiveness ; and yet the cultivator is driven, by the fact of this hardening, to depend upon this poisonous agency before he can, in the absence of the rain, prepare the soil for cultivation at all. In other words, by the extension of canal-irrigation we obtain a temporary and precarious advantage, at the cost of the permanent sterilising of the soil.

But worse, far worse, than any of the evils we have yet enumerated as the consequences of irrigation, is the production

of what is called *Reh*, which follows in the wake of our canals like black care behind the horseman. So far back as 1850, the officiating Superintendent of the Western Jumna Canal, in forwarding to Calcutta some samples of *Reh* for analysis, wrote thus :—

The attention of the Civil and Canal Authorities in these parts has, for a considerable period, been directed to a change which is taking place in the soil in various parts of the country irrigated by these canals. A white efflorescence has made and is making its appearance in various places, destroying all vegetation with which it comes in contact. The barren space gradually increases in area, and speedily the ground thus affected is deserted by the cultivators, who forthwith assail the civil officers with petitions for remission of revenue.

In the twenty-eight years which have elapsed since the foregoing was written, there has been a most appalling extension of *Reh* in the canal-irrigated districts of the North-west Provinces. In 1874, a canal officer records his opinion in the following emphatic language :—

Canal water creates *Reh*, especially when it runs above the surface of the ground-level. It is with canal-water that the disease is propagated. The canal, in its passage through *oosar* lands, drains off the saline matter in the *oosar*, and deposits it elsewhere. *Three to seven years is the time required to poison the land, and the Reh to show itself.* . . . No physical law governs the character of the land in which *Reh* appears. It is only necessary to irrigate good land with poisoned water for four or five years to propagate *Reh*.

If these statements be true to the letter, it follows that the completion of our canal-system would result in the conversion of British India into a waste of salt. But even if true at all, they render it incumbent upon the Government to proceed with the utmost caution in the construction of irrigation works. As most of my readers will doubtless never have heard of *Reh* in connection with Indian canals, a brief account of the ravage it has already accomplished will be read with interest.

The Western Jumna Canal was originally constructed in the days of the Delhi Emperors. But it fell into disrepair and disuse (from barbarous indolence, the English said: because its terilised the land, was the native tradition), and was re-opened by us, amid the customary panegyrics on the progressive and enlightened character of British rule.

For a time "all went merry as a marriage bell." Irrigation does not blight the fertility of a land all at once. There is always a period of brief and deceptive prosperity. Dalilah-like, it lulls its victims to a false security before it deals the mortal blow. In the area watered by the Jumna Canal, the extent of land under cultiva-

tion largely increased. The soil yielded cotton, wheat, and sugarcane, the cultivation of which had been deemed impossible previously to the construction of the canal. So matters went on until the year 1850, when signs of an impending calamity were, for the first time, perceived by the civil officers. In that year, the Collector of Paneeput reported that thirteen of the villages\* in his district had been seriously injured by the appearance of *Reh*. In one of these, which he caused to be measured, no less than 21 per cent. of the cultivable area had been rendered sterile. This alarming report caused the Government to address inquiries to the other civil officers whose districts were watered by the Jumna Canal. The answers given were to the effect that in all such districts *Reh* had appeared to a greater or smaller extent. But no measures were taken to ascertain the cause of this new phenomenon, nor to lighten the burden of the State demand on the afflicted villages. For several years the *Reh* continued to increase unchecked; until, in 1856, it was found that in the Delhi territory one-tenth of the entire number of villages watered by the canal had been smitten. Some had been rendered wholly sterile; all, it was feared, would become so if prompt remedial measures were not applied. It became impossible to ignore the evil any longer. Mr. Sherer, an officer of the Civil Service, was deputed to visit the distressed districts, and report upon the condition of the people and the soil. His report is a painful document to read. He found lands which had been singularly rich a few years before, now barren and depopulated, and either covered with *Reh* or hopelessly waterlogged. The condition of the people was pitiable. They were Jhuts—the most industrious agriculturists in India, and willing to endure almost any suffering rather than abandon their hereditary lands. While our canals had been ruining their fields, our tax-collecting machinery had been grinding on as if nothing had happened to alter the condition of the cultivators. To meet our demands, these villagers had had recourse to every device which the ingenuity of misery could suggest. They had borrowed money at extravagant rates of interest. They had become the mere farm-slaves of the money lenders residing in their villages. They had sold the trees on their estates. They had sold their daughters, their silver ornaments, their brass utensils, as many of their cattle as they could spare, and even the rafters of their houses. "The spectacle," writes Mr. Sherer, "of sick women and diseased children crouching among the ruins of their

\* In India a "village" includes not merely the dwelling-houses of the people, but all the land cultivated by the inhabitants of the village.

houses, of haggard cultivators wading in the swamps, or watching their sickly crops, or attempting to pasture their bony cattle on the unwholesome grass, is present to my mind constantly." For this plague of water had brought the plague of sickness in its train. Fever claimed its multitudes of victims every year. The women were stricken with unfruitfulness. And the whole body of survivors had resolved upon emigrating into the territories of the neighbouring Rajah of Jheend. Such was the state to which they had been reduced by the "infallible panacea" against famine and drought.

Mr. Sherer's Report convinced the Government of India that "something" must be done. The immediate "something" was to refer the matter to Colonel Baird Smith, the head of the Irrigation Department. His reply was worthy of the most extravagant department that ever tried the patience of a financial minister. It amounted, in effect, to a proposition that the present canal, being defective in its construction, should be closed, and a new one excavated upon improved principles. And it is not improbable that this lavish suggestion might have been adopted by the Indian Government but for the insurrection of 1857. For three years all questions of internal administration were shelved of necessity, and British rule in India was engaged in a doubtful struggle for existence. The Mutiny was followed by the terrible famine of 1861; that again by the Orissa famine of 1866; and that again by the famine in Rajpootana. These successive calamities made the problem of the prevention of famines an extremely urgent one. A few men here and there doubted of the efficacy of canal irrigation—notably, Lieutenant-Colonel Cobbett. But such were in a very small minority, and their convictions regarded as individual eccentricities to which no heed needed to be paid. The counsels of the Government of India were actuated by a very different spirit. Lord Mayo was at that time Governor-General, and he proposed, with the concurrence of his Council, to borrow ninety millions in order to carry out a gigantic system of irrigation for the whole of British India. In order to secure the Government from loss, every ryot to whose field the water was brought was to be charged seven per cent. on the cost of construction, whether he availed himself of the canal water or not. Had this scheme been carried out, the British Empire in India must have collapsed. The liveliest imagination cannot even dimly realise the extravagant achievements of the Indian Public Works Department, when in possession of a guarantee to the amount of seven per cent. on all they expended. The people would have perished of fever by thousands; Upper

India would have been smitten with barrenness from one end to the other; and the Government reduced to bankruptcy. Happily, with Lord Mayo's death, the scheme also came to an end. A more sober, if less startling, style of administration prevailed during Lord Northbrook's tenure of power. But though all these years, unheeding of either war or peace, the plague of *Reh* extended its ravages. Along the Western Jumna Canal, matters became far worse than when Mr. Sherer, reported on them in 1856. In the Eastern Jumna Canal tract, *Reh* was reported as "increasing year by year." In the year 1868, that tract is officially described as follows:—

In many villages lying along the Eastern Jumna Canal, . . . . . field after field of the best lands near the village site has had to be abandoned; for miles of country on the left bank of the Jumna Canal, the surface of the soil is as white as snow; all the impurities of the soil have been driven to the surface. The country in and around Shamlee is known as "Rehala"; and when this *Reh*, or impure soda, once makes its appearance, not even grass will grow. The climate has changed very much for the worse; the very worst kinds of fevers prevail in the neighbourhood of canals. In many villages . . . . . population is either at a standstill, or is retrograding; trees and groves are becoming leafless, and the wells are choked with filthy stagnant water to the brim.

In the district of Etawah, where *Reh* was formerly unknown, the canal water had not been irrigating it for more than a few years when *Reh* appeared, and, according to an official report, "spread far and wide." But it is in the district of Allyghur, watered by the Ganges Canal, that there has, within the last few years, been the most formidable and fatal extension of *Reh*. Large tracts which, at the date of the late settlement a short time back, were exceptionally rich and productive, are now desolate salt wastes. A private letter, written from the afflicted districts, contains the following:—

I wish you could spare me a week in next October or November to see the real havoc that is going on. What I showed you on my estates is mere child's play to what I can show you within a circle of eight miles radius. Your last visit was literally one of a few hours only; give me even three clear days, and you may judge for yourself how rapidly this curse is marching over the country.

Seriously alarmed by these reports from so many different quarters, the Government of India appointed, at the close of 1878, a Committee to visit the worst *Reh* district, for the purpose of making an investigation of the facts, and suggesting remedial measures. A thoroughly competent scientific man was placed upon this Committee in the person of Mr. Medlicott, the head of the Geological Department, in India. His report

upon the matter has not yet been made public; but *Reh* is a phenomenon which Mr. Medlicott has already investigated, and his conclusions are in print. It is not, therefore, needful to wait for the publication of his last Report in order to ascertain what these are.

To the engineer officers of India—the great advocates and constructors of canals—this persistent appearance and extension of *Reh* has been little less than a personal affront. It has seriously damaged the character of *their* water; and in the controversies on the subject, their principal object has been to vindicate for the canal water the reputation of a “perfectly harmless fluid.” If they could not do this—farewell content, farewell the tranquil mind. The occupation of the canal engineer would be gone. Unhappily for these endeavours, chemical analysis has proved that the canal water contains a small proportion of the constituents of *Reh*. Thus one cause of the formation of *Reh* on the surface of the land is the same as that which produces salt-water lakes—viz., evaporation of river water. An immense body of water is turned upon the field to be irrigated. The cultivator is not content until he has laid his land under as much water as it can hold. From the hardened condition of the soil but a small portion of this water finds its way underground. The larger part is drawn off by evaporation, leaving a salt deposit behind—slight, of course, in the first instance, but steadily increasing year by year. On this branch of the inquiry, Mr. Medlicott has expressed himself as follows:—

From motives of beneficence and of economy, the object of the Department is to make the given supply of water in any canal cover as large a surface as possible. The cultivator (if the quantity supplied affects his water-rent) would have even more active motives to make his share go as far as possible, regulating his draught to just that amount which would keep the soil, to a small depth, in the state of moisture required for vegetation. Little, if any, thorough soaking, with underground escape, or even surface washings, occur on canal lands. The arrangements are made to retain the irrigation water in each field till drunk by it, and this acts for the rains also. A more ingenious system for the production of *Reh* could scarcely be devised. It is true that the primary elements of *Reh* are scanty, and very slowly set free on alluvial soil; but then the canal water would daily bring its dose of ready-made *Reh*. This goes on over a country where the rainfall ranges from less than 10 to less than 30 inches, where the mean humidity is under 60 per cent. of saturation, and the mean temperature 75°, with summer monthly (day and night) means over 90°. It may safely be said that over a large portion of this land not a drop of the fertilising water so distributed escapes. . . . The area irrigated per cubic foot of discharge is about 200 acres; and if this were being watered all day and all night all the year round, it would only get 3·6 feet of water. The irrigating season is about half the year, and not much work is done at night, except in the very high demand season, so that two feet may be taken as the very outside any irrigated field ever gets in the year. It is

calculated that at this rate pure soil might be converted into bad *Reh* soil from the salt in the canal water in about two hundred years.

But it is not the salt in the canal water which has been the efficient agent in thus rapidly converting vast tracts of fertile land into salt desert. All over Upper India sweet water is found at a distance of from 60 to 100 feet below the surface. But between this and the surface, there is interposed an upper water-bed of a strongly saline character. Mr. Medlicott is of opinion that originally the water in this upper bed was as sweet as the well water beneath it; and that its present saline character is due to defective sub-soil water circulation. He writes:

These *Reh* lands are certainly freshwater (river) deposits; their original state was one of objectionable purity, as is that of the lands in some of the Eastern districts, recently reported on by Mr. Scott as unfit for the cultivation of opium because of their lack of salts. All the circumstances of the *Reh*—its composition and mode of occurrence—show it to be the result of the slow accumulation of the soda-salts rejected by vegetation, for the removal of which, by the natural process of thorough drainage, the rain-fall has been insufficient, or its escape obstructed, or evaporation too powerful."

The immediate effect of the canal irrigation is to raise the level of this impure water-bed so as to place it more immediately within the reach of active evaporation, resulting in a profuse efflorescence of *Reh* on the surface.

If this be a true explanation of the origin of *Reh*, the agricultural prospect in India is black indeed. The denudation of forest lands has resulted in an increase of the heat, and a diminution of the rainfall. The increase of the heat has resulted in so hardening the soil, that without the aid of the rains, the cultivator cannot break it up for the purpose of sowing. The increasing uncertainty of the rainfall has led to the construction of canals at a vast expense. Canal irrigation has resulted in still further hardening and impoverishing of the soil, and in setting free an agency which has only to come into contact with vegetation in order to destroy it utterly. But are there no remedies? None, that we can see, which will be of any use. If the canals be closed, and the rain be withheld, the people will perish of hunger. If the canals be kept open, the plague of sterility will be increased, and famine must be the ultimate result. Could deep ploughing be introduced into the country, the cultivator would find immediate relief. But to say this is to advise a man to stay his hunger with buns when he is unable to purchase bread. The Indian cultivator has neither the capital nor the cattle either to provide himself with an English plough, nor to use it if it were

provided for him. A thorough system of sub-soil drainage, in order to purify the upper water-bed is advocated by some. But the cost would be incalculable, and the success of the enterprise more than doubtful. There remains the endeavour to mitigate the fierceness of the sun, and improve the character of the soil by plantations of trees on all waste land capable of growing them. This is feasible, and ought to be set about at once. But no improvement can be wrought by this means, until after the lapse of many years; and the question as to what immediate measures of relief ought to be adopted remains unanswered—and we fear unanswerable. One thing, at least, ought to be decided upon, and that is that till this *Reh* question is thoroughly investigated and understood, not another rupee shall be expended in the construction of irrigation-canals.

The foregoing article has been written in the hope of awakening discussion. The very greatest service which, at the present moment, could be rendered to India, would be a free discussion of her condition by intelligent and unbiassed minds. This inestimable privilege British rule in India has never enjoyed. Our administration of the country has been carried on, from generation to generation, by bureaucrats, who looked neither before nor after, and the difficulties which, in consequence, are accumulating around us, are sufficient to make the most sanguine despair of the future. This will startle people in England. They have been accustomed to regard British rule in India as a series of astonishing administrative successes. This belief must be eradicated from their minds. It would be far nearer the truth to say that the annals of our rule are a record of disastrous failures. Nor ought this to surprise anyone who compares the manner in which changes are effected in England, and the manner in which such matters are managed in India. In England there is a division of labour essential to the success of reforming legislation. The work of thinking is carried on by quite other minds than the work of law-making. If it had depended upon Sir Robert Peel, not merely to repeal the Corn Laws, but also to educate the nation to that state of mind which rendered such legislation possible, we should have remained Protectionists to this day. But any radical change in our national institutions is, in the first instance, prepared by professional thinkers, whose object is truth, and truth only. And not until the national heart is moved by the impulse of an overwhelming conviction, does the legislator step forward to give effect to the popular will. An English statesman, whose mind was greatly in advance of the nation,



would, on that very account, be consigned to obscurity and insignificance. Nor does the process of thorough discussion cease when the measure is laid before Parliament. Every clause is subjected to a microscopical examination. Every objection which the ingenuity of menaced vested interests can devise, has to be listened to and taken into account. And only after passing and re-passing through a refining furnace, heated seven times, is the Bill invested with the authority of Law. Nevertheless, legislative failures are not unknown in England. But in India there is no preliminary discussion by unbiassed thinkers; there is no severe and searching criticism by hostile minds. Men whose intellectual sensitiveness has been dulled by a monotonous routine of official duties, are required to be thinkers as well. Their crude thoughts are then embodied in legislative enactments, without having to pass through the ordeal of discussion at all. The consequences are what might have been expected. But the blunders of Indian Administrators have escaped detection because they have been blunders on such a very large scale. They have been blunders in what Mr. Arnold would call the "grand" style. It is hard to believe that a man, at whose fiat sixty millions of human beings are subjected to some radical change of status, is quite an ordinary person. Yet so it has been; our (so-called) great Indian administrators have, for the most part, been little better than blind leaders of the blind. And under successive Governors-General the domestic policy of the Indian Government has swung backwards and forwards, from one extreme to another. At one time, for example, we were all in favour of landlords, and fixity of tenure, in our dealings with the land. Landlords existed in England; therefore without landlords no agricultural country could prosper. Landlords were accordingly manufactured all over Bengal, Behar, and Orissa, and have grievously afflicted both the people and the Government ever since. Then the landlord experiment having failed, we swung away to the opposite extreme, and went about the country seeking for anything in the shape of a landlord in order to destroy him. "Away with such a fellow from the earth, for it is not fit that he should live." The effect of the first extreme was to place the soil of Bengal in the possession of men who had no proprietary right in it at all. The effect of the second extreme was to dispossess, in the North-West Provinces, a landed gentry of estates which they and their ancestors had owned for generations.

Lord Dalhousie's annexation policy is another example of this thoughtless rushing into extremes. Having, convinced ourselves

that our rule was superior to that of the Native Princes, we rushed to the conclusion, also, that we were bound to dethrone the Native Princes, and appropriate their territories. Lord Dalhousie's "doctrine of lapse" laid down a principle that, when a Native Prince died without a son of his own begetting, his dominions "lapsed" of right to the British Government. Imagine the Emperor of Russia proclaiming such a doctrine as henceforth to be the guiding principle of his Central Asian policy! Would not England ring from end to end with denunciations of his shameless greed? But Englishmen needed the sharp lesson of the Mutiny before they understood that the excellencies of British Administration are not a reason for the appropriation of other people's property.

Did space permit, it would be easy to show that our management of the Native Army, and our modes of combating Famine, have been characterized by the same wild oscillations from one extreme to another. It has been the same with our vast irrigation schemes. Men perceived that on the parched soil of India a carpet of refreshing verdure sprang up, as if by magic, wherever moisture touched the land. The conclusion was obvious. Pour water over the whole of India, and the whole of India will be green! No thought was taken of the effects on the health of the people by thus deluging the land. No attempt was made to ascertain the effects of irrigation in other countries. Agriculture in India was deemed to be a branch of engineering, and nothing more. The canal engineers opened the campaign as the avowed enemies of all methods of irrigating the land, except through the medium of canals. With malice prepense, water-ways were laid down so as to destroy as many wells as possible. And now, all this reckless energy would seem, not improbably, to have for result the conversion of Upper India into a sterile waste of salt.

## HOME AND FOREIGN AFFAIRS.

THE lately-announced Indian deficit of £4,000,000 will surprise no one who has watched the conduct of Indian affairs under the guidance of Lord Lytton. The amount set down as war expenditure in Sir John Strachey's Budget was ridiculously inadequate. The Abyssinian War lasted seven months; the entire force employed did not exceed 10,000 men; and the cost amounted to £14,000,000. The war in Afghanistan has extended over eighteen months; from 50,000 to 60,000 troops have been employed in a country so barren and difficult, that their supplies had to be sent them from India; and yet Sir John Strachey asked the world to believe that all this had been done at a cost of little more than £5,000,000. If Sir John Strachey really believed this, it would prove him to be the most incompetent Minister of Finance that had ever held office in India. The truth probably is, that Sir John Strachey neither believed nor disbelieved it. The order had been given to all the Departments of the Indian Administration to prophesy smooth things. The Military Department came to the conclusion that the most effective manner of obeying these instructions would be to diminish the recorded total of their expenditure by a sum of £4,000,000, and Sir John Strachey was too much pleased with the result, as shown on paper, of this extraordinary achievement to care to inquire how far it tallied with the facts. The transaction is strictly consistent with all that the Indian Government has done in reference to this wicked and unhappy war. They have never ceased from saying "Peace" when there was no peace. This has been the one device which their ingenuity could invent for surmounting the difficulties their folly had created. Even now, it is hardly open to doubt that we have yet to learn the entire cost of the war, or that we shall emerge from it with a total expenditure of less than £20,000,000. Moreover, the pecuniary loss is as nothing when set side by side with the human suffering which it represents. The millions squandered in carrying slaughter and havoc through Afghanistan, represent the last pittance of food wrung from the Indian ryot and his famishing family. The drain caused by this war has forced the Indian Government into a course of pitiless rapacity, hardly to be surpassed even by the Turkish tax-gatherers. In the North-west Provinces, no less than 1,250,000 men, women, and children, have perished of hunger; the Government wringing from them in their season of dire distress, no less a sum than £2,000,000. In the Deccan, the misery and mortality have been hardly less appalling than in the North-west Provinces. The massing of troops along our North-west Frontier, and the enormous quantities of supplies required for the columns operating in Afghanistan, have so raised the price of provisions, that in the Punjab and along the frontier, the great body of the people have, for months past, had to endure all the severities of famine. It is no exaggeration to say, that for

every hundred Afghans whom we have slain in this unrighteous war, we have caused a thousand of our own subjects to perish of want and hunger.

The question, then, which presses for a reply with increasing urgency is, How long are we to go on as we are doing? How long are we to persist in slaughtering a people with whom we do not even pretend to have a cause of quarrel? How long are we to continue heaping up fresh burdens upon our native subjects, already crushed as they are, by the pitilessness of the seasons, and the even greater cruelty of their rulers? Those who imagine that General Stewart's march from Candahar to Cabul has facilitated a settlement are grievously deceived. Not one man of note has made his submission in consequence of that march; while the evacuation of Ghuznee has shown to the Afghans that we do not possess the military strength necessary for an occupation of their country. There is only one policy possible, and that is, to march out of the country with the least possible delay. Every month we delay our departure represents nothing but so much more time, treasure, and human life needlessly expended. There is, however, an objection which will be urged against this, the one rational proceeding which still remains for us to do. It is one we have touched upon in a foregoing paper. We propose to deal with it now at greater length.

The objection is, that having destroyed the government which formerly existed in Afghanistan, we are in honour bound to remain in the country until we have furnished a substitute for that which we have destroyed. To any one who knows aught of Afghanistan, or of what we have been doing there during the past eighteen months, an objection of this kind is simply laughable and absurd. We are encamped in Afghanistan; but we are not governing or even pretending to govern the country. The authority of the Indian Viceroy does not extend beyond the line of sentries which encircles each British encampment. The Afghans are, at this moment, managing their own concerns in as complete independence of us, as if we were not in the country at all. The fact is that the Ameer is only the leading chief among a number of chiefs. (Shere Ali, it is true, was a man of exceptionally great ruling capacity, but we speak of ordinary rulers.) The men on whom devolves the duty of upholding such law and order as prevail amid the tribes of Afghanistan, are the chiefs of those tribes. And whether we remain encamped in the country, or whether we leave it, the authority of these chiefs will be unaffected. They will continue to administer, precisely as they are administering at present, the rough justice to which the tribes are accustomed. The fear, therefore, that our withdrawal from the country will be the signal for letting loose an anarchy which is repressed by our presence, is an idle one. Our presence has, on the contrary, an effect exactly the reverse of this. It stimulates the ambition of aspirants who trust, with our assistance, to reach an eminence which, unassisted, they would not have ventured to aim at. The situation in Cabul at the present moment is this. Our presence in Cabul has aroused against us the hostility of what are called the "great tribes," by which are to be understood the Ghilzais, the Kohistanes, the Wardaks, and the Tarakzais. These tribes, or at least the larger part of them, appear to be united in upholding the claims of Moosa Khan, the son of the expatriated Yakooob. Besides this party, there is that of Abd-al-Rahman Khan, the strength of which is uncertain. Now it is plainly impossible to satisfy both these parties; nay, more, it is absolutely certain that whichever side we take, that side will immediately be discredited by the fact of our patronage. Try as long as we may, there is no escape from this

dilemma. For us to endeavour to set up a ruler in Afghanistan is to make civil war a certainty as soon as we are out of the country. It is, unhappily, more probable than not, that a civil war is inevitable under any circumstances. But the probability is to a certain extent diminished if we leave the chiefs of the "great tribes" in absolute freedom to choose their own ruler—he be Moosa Khan, or Abd-al-Rahman Khan. As to whether such ruler is or is not "friendly to the British," is surely now a matter in which no reasonable person can get up an interest. If he be unfriendly now, there is no reason why he should not be friendly a year hence; whereas, if he be friendly, we may confidently reckon upon his hostility before many years have passed. But these changes of disposition are of no consequence to the British Empire in India. The war has demonstrated that that Empire lies securely fenced behind a frontier absolutely impregnable. Even if India were not the costly, dangerous, and burdensome possession that she is, it is not to be supposed that the lessons to be learned from the campaign in Afghanistan have not been taken to heart by Russian soldiers and statesmen, if any there be crazy enough to covet an Indian Empire. After witnessing our inability to accomplish aught decisive, though we have thrown upwards of fifty thousand men into Afghanistan, is it probable that the Russian Government will wantonly entangle themselves in a like coil of difficulties? But even assuming that, untaught by experience, the Russian Government continued to cherish such a project, the operations against the Tekke-Turcomans have shown that it is as impossible for the Russians to advance up to the frontier of Afghanistan as it is for us to penetrate to Central Asia. The whole of our vast expenditure of blood and treasure has been occasioned by the groundless fears and unteachable ignorance of half-a-dozen political monomaniacs. Events have demonstrated beyond reach of question that their forecasts and calculations were wrong in every particular. The operations of Russia in Central Asia, so far from being (as they declared) a menace to the safety of India, have shown that India has absolutely nothing to fear from Russia in Central Asia. The conquest of Afghanistan, so far from being the brief, easy, and inexpensive operation which they confidently assumed it would be, has been found to be an operation of vast and incalculable difficulty, wholly beyond the military strength and financial resources of India. These facts it is which not merely justify but imperatively require that the Liberal Government should reverse the policy of their predecessors. The only possible alternative is the annexation of Afghanistan. "The British Government," Mr. Lepel Griffin announced to the Sirdars assembled at Cabul, "not only always desired and still desires friendship with Afghanistan, but will not appoint any one as Ameer who does not profess friendship; nor will allow him to continue Ameer unless he plainly shows himself the friend of the friends of the British Government, and the enemy of its enemies." "Nor will allow him to continue Ameer." What does this statement foreshadow? Nothing less than this, that whenever there is, or seems to be, an unfriendly Ameer on the throne of Cabul, we shall invade the country and depose him. In other words, we shall be perpetually marching to Cabul either to restore a friendly puppet whom the scorn and hatred of his own subjects have expelled from power, or to displace a national sovereign whom we choose to consider unfriendly. Fortunately for the British Empire at this crisis, there is hardly a single member of the existing Government who is not pledged, as deeply as words can commit a man, to a policy of complete withdrawal from Afghanistan. We earnestly hope that they will not be lacking in the courage of their convictions. The only way to escape the loss of honour, and the heavy prospective difficulties

which are inseparable from the Afghanistan policy of their predecessors, is to boldly repudiate that policy altogether. No half measure—no compromise—is possible. In attempting to extend our sway over Afghanistan, we have undertaken a task beyond our strength; and the very existence of our Indian Empire depends upon prompt and complete renunciation of it.

Another duty which devolves upon the Liberal Government, and in which Great Britain is hardly less interested than in an early termination of the Afghan war, is the restoration of the European concert in regard to Turkey. And this, we rejoice to see, they have already vigorously taken in hand. In the Eastern policy of the late Government, the only ruling idea that we have been able to discover is that the European concert was to be destroyed, whenever an agreement appeared on the point of accomplishment. The last and most flagrant instance of the operation of this idea was in the filching of Cyprus, and the secret Anglo-Turkish Convention. This Convention placed the dominions of the Sultan (in obvious defiance of both the letter and the spirit of the Treaty of Berlin) under the separate and special Protectorate of Great Britain, as an indemnification to the Sultan for the cession of Cyprus. Thus the European concert, formulated in the Treaty of Berlin, was destroyed at its very birth; and all concerted action in the affairs of Turkey has been paralysed ever since. Having accepted the wages of iniquity from the Turk, the Government found itself in a manner bound to uphold the Turk against the pressure of Europe, and the Sultan's subjects. Its honour, rooted in dishonour, stood; and thus Lord Beaconsfield and his colleagues have been forced to oppose the stipulations of that very Treaty of which they claimed to be the principal framers. If we could forget the terrible suffering that this opposition has caused, there would not be much reason to regret it; for it has shown the hopeless and incorrigible weakness, corruption, and inefficiency of the Sultan's government. It has convinced all Europe that if Turkey is not to pass under the domination of either Russian or Austrian Emperor, the means of averting this destiny must be found in the populations of Turkey, and not in the Sultan and his Pashas. This is an immense gain. The Liberals have never unreservedly condemned the Treaty of Berlin. What they have protested against without ceasing has been the apathy of the late Ministry in allowing those provisions to remain unfulfilled which pledged the Turkish Government to grant to all its provinces the same privileges which have been secured for Eastern Roumelia. This apathetic acquiescence in wrongdoing has now, we believe, given place to an activity in well-doing: Greece will have her amended frontier; Montenegro will be secured in the peaceful possession of the territory ceded to her; Macedonia, Armenia, Asia Minor will, it is to be hoped, one and all be delivered from the cruel oppressors that have laid them waste for so many centuries; and—may we hope?—that the murderers of Mr. Ogle will be discovered and hung. Meanwhile, as an earnest of better things to come, Sir Henry Layard has been removed from Constantinople; and Europe will cease to be amused, and England humiliated by the spectacle of this blatant devotee of Jingo harassed, baited, and insulted by his own particular friends, the Sultan and his Pashas.

From Afghanistan and Turkey one's thoughts spontaneously pass onward to South Africa. There, also, the late Government has left the traces of its existence written in characters of blood; and these, so far as is possible, it will be a primary duty of the new Ministry to efface. Any timorous reluctance to right the wrongs which have been done will leave the honour of the Empire unredeemed. We remember that Mr. Gladstone, in one of his Midlothian speeches,

took credit for the Government of Sir Robert Peel in that, while they profoundly disapproved of Sir Charles Napier's conquest of Sind, they none the less confirmed the deposition of the Ameers, and gave their sanction to the new province being permanently incorporated as part of our Indian Empire. It is to be hoped that Mr. Gladstone and his colleagues are not about to approach the difficulties at present awaiting solution, in a spirit of such equivocal morality. There can be hardly any doubt that had Sir Robert Peel's Government had the courage to do justice in the matter of Sind, they would have averted the catastrophe of 1857. The annexation of that province shattered the faith of the Indian people in British justice and integrity. It has acted as a fatal precedent ever since. No one acquainted with the facts doubts that if right was done, the Berars would at once be restored to the Nizam of Hyderabad. There can be no question that Holkar was grievously calumniated by Sir Henry Durand for his conduct when the native troops mutinied at Mhow. But in neither case has justice been done, nor is it likely to be done. The authorities rely upon the precedent of Sind, which asserts that it is safer to uphold a wrong than to make confession of an error. This maxim it is which has been a veritable dry-rot, destroying the strength and prosperity of both our Indian and Colonial Empire. We trust that the new Government will have the courage to fling it to the winds. No punishment short of execution for high treason would, it is true, be adequate for such criminals as Lord Lytton and Sir Bartle Frere. But there is no reason, because an adequate punishment cannot, be inflicted, that these men should escape with none at all. It is difficult to imagine a greater crime than that of which Sir Bartle Frere stands convicted. He is responsible for having drawn this nation into a cowardly, savage, and unprovoked massacre of a brave and unoffending people, who had for fifty years been our friends, and had no wish but to remain so. Sir Bartle Frere elaborately manufactured a war with the Zulu King, precisely as Lord Lytton manufactured a war with the loyal Shere Ali. He has branded every Englishman with a stigma of infamy, not to be effaced until the wrong-doer has been punished, and reparation made to the victims of his cruelty and untruthfulness. It is worse than idle when acts like these have been done, to talk of letting bygones be bygones. They are not bygones. Not all great Neptune's ocean can wash this blood clean from our hands. But the Government can, if they please, record the national hatred of crime which an unprincipled man has perpetrated in the name of Great Britain. They can render that man disqualified henceforth for the service of the country in any capacity, high or low—and this much we trust that they will have the courage to do. It is, we are aware, at variance with constitutional practice for one Government to attempt to reverse either the acts or the policy of its predecessor. And the rule, no doubt, is essential to the preservation of order and progress in the Government of the Empire. But to pronounce a formal censure upon Sir Bartle Frere—to disqualify him henceforth for the service of the country—would not be to reverse the policy of the late Government. They have repeatedly disavowed all complicity in the policy which resulted in the Zulu War. They have condemned it hardly less emphatically than Mr. Gladstone and his colleagues. A vote of censure, therefore, on Sir Bartle Frere would be in accordance with their convictions, however much they might object to giving expression to those convictions. And should the Government shrink from discharging a duty which the blackened honour of the nation requires at their hands, we hope that some independent member will move the resolution which they decline to do. In addition to this, it is hardly necessary

to say that Langelibalele ought to be set at liberty; and the unhappy Ketchywayo released from the close durance in which he has been kept since he was taken prisoner.

The Finance of India is another matter requiring the prompt attention of Government. The recently discovered deficit has completely overthrown the optimistic predictions of Sir John Strachey; but people in England are still unaware that these predictions were without foundation from the first. Sir John Strachey's Budget statement, even in its original form, was a mere delusion and a snare. When a Finance Minister talks of possessing a surplus over expenditure, people unknowing of the ways of Indian officials, fondly suppose that this surplus represents the excess of the year's income over the year's expenditure. This is not Sir John Strachey's method. He counts, as his income all that comes into the Treasury, no matter from what sources obtained. And in the present year, the Indian surplus over expenditure was obtained by the simple expedient of borrowing money to the extent of £5,131,000. Of this, £2,000,000 were lent by the British Government without interest. Consequently, quite independently of the four millions of deficit just announced, the Indian Budget, but for this device of borrowing, would have shown another deficit of similar amount. In a word, during the past financial year, the acknowledged excess of expenditure over income has been in India considerably above £9,000,000. The actual excess has certainly been much greater. At the same time, the Famine Insurance Fund has been regularly confiscated from the first day of its existence, and expended upon the war in Afghanistan. Nor is this the only instance of misappropriation of which Lord Lytton's Government has been guilty. In order to obtain that shortlived and delusive appearance of prosperity caused by Sir John Strachey's first Budget statement, no less a sum than £670,000 was taken from the Treasuries of the Indian Provincial Governments. The money in these Treasuries is obtained by means of local rates and municipal funds, and the Supreme Government have no more right to apply it to general purposes, than to rob people upon the highway, in order to obtain funds for carrying on the war in Afghanistan. The £670,000 thus obtained represents, therefore, so much additional debt—so much the larger excess of expenditure over income. The truth is that this last Budget, is symbolical of what our Government of India has become. It is a huge system of "eye-wash," concocted and prepared for the deception of the British Public. Mr. Val Prinsep, in his astonishing picture of the Imperial Durbar at Delhi, has given us a work of greater significance than perhaps he intended. The intelligent spectator will not have failed to observe that the prominent feature in the picture is a group of trumpeters. The cerulean blue Viceroy, the native Princes, the General Officers, and all the other imperial paraphernalia, whether human or in the shape of flags, are only accessories, to this favoured band of trumpeters. There is an admirable fitness in this arrangement. A band of trumpeters performing upon wind instruments, represents very exactly the nature of Lord Lytton's Indian Administration.

It is too early as yet to say much of Home Affairs; but the measures mentioned in the Queen's speech are sufficient to show that the Government is determined to make the best use of the short remainder of the Session which still remains to them. It is a truism that the worst kings have been the greatest benefactors of the nations. Their excesses have made men fight for and obtain those political privileges, without which no nation can develop a healthy and vigorous life, but which, without some such urgent stimulus, men might not have



started themselves to win. The same principle holds good with bad Ministries. If the late unlamented Government had done nothing else, a certain measure of gratitude is due to them, in that their apathy and obstructiveness towards all internal improvements has rekindled the desire and the determination to again move forward on the path of progress. They have convinced us that even in this nineteenth century it is possible for a daring Minister, backed by a mechanical majority, to deprive Englishmen of their vaunted political privileges. They have shown that our constitution depends for its preservation upon the good faith of the nation's elected representatives—that if these betray the trust reposed in them, great Britain can may be made, as easily as France or any other nation, the slave of a Brummagem Caesarism. For such lessons as these we are bound to be profoundly grateful; and still more so, for the lesson they have taught us, that a humane and a peaceful policy abroad is the indispensable condition of prosperity and happiness at home. Quite apart from the scope and moral character of their Foreign Policy, it is obvious that under six more years of Tory rule, the very machinery of the Administration would have broken down and become unworkable. To carry on the mere routine business of a great Empire, requires unremitting diligence, the most watchful care and attention. Lord Beaconsfield and his colleagues appeared to think that this routine business was carried on by some self-acting machinery, which left them in freedom to roam about the world in search of adventures, filching a Cyprus here, a Transvaal there; and attempting to filch a "scientific frontier" in a third place, but catching only a very uncompromising Tartar. These experiences have taught us to value at their true worth, the past years when Mr. Gladstone was king; and all things flourished except hoary abuses which had no right to do so. And though we feel—and have not shrunk from giving free expression to that feeling—that in their Foreign Policy the action of the present Government is not likely to conform to that national enthusiasm for humanity and justice which called it into existence—that in such matters it will advance with halting steps, and a mind that trembles at the thought of doing strict justice—we have no such fear in regard to Home concerns. There the axe will be laid to the roots of the trees; and trees which do not bear good fruit will be hewn down with as hearty a good will, as if they cumbered the ground in the park of Hawarden.





